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// Copyright (c) 2009-2010 Satoshi Nakamoto
// Copyright (c) 2009-2014 The Bitcoin Core developers
// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
#include "wallet/wallet.h"
#include "base58.h"
#include "checkpoints.h"
#include "coincontrol.h"
#include "consensus/consensus.h"
#include "consensus/validation.h"
#include "main.h"
#include "net.h"
#include "policy/policy.h"
#include "script/script.h"
#include "script/sign.h"
#include "timedata.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "utilmoneystr.h"
#include <assert.h>
#include <boost/algorithm/string/replace.hpp>
#include <boost/filesystem.hpp>
#include <boost/thread.hpp>
using namespace std;
/**
* Settings
*/
CFeeRate payTxFee(DEFAULT_TRANSACTION_FEE);
CAmount maxTxFee = DEFAULT_TRANSACTION_MAXFEE;
unsigned int nTxConfirmTarget = DEFAULT_TX_CONFIRM_TARGET;
bool bSpendZeroConfChange = true;
bool fSendFreeTransactions = false;
bool fPayAtLeastCustomFee = true;
/**
* Fees smaller than this (in satoshi) are considered zero fee (for transaction creation)
* Override with -mintxfee
*/
CFeeRate CWallet::minTxFee = CFeeRate(1000);
/** @defgroup mapWallet
*
* @{
*/
struct CompareValueOnly
{
bool operator()(const pair<CAmount, pair<const CWalletTx*, unsigned int> >& t1,
const pair<CAmount, pair<const CWalletTx*, unsigned int> >& t2) const
{
return t1.first < t2.first;
}
};
std::string COutput::ToString() const
{
return strprintf("COutput(%s, %d, %d) [%s]", tx->GetHash().ToString(), i, nDepth, FormatMoney(tx->vout[i].nValue));
}
const CWalletTx* CWallet::GetWalletTx(const uint256& hash) const
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
std::map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator it = mapWallet.find(hash);
if (it == mapWallet.end())
return NULL;
return &(it->second);
}
CPubKey CWallet::GenerateNewKey()
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // mapKeyMetadata
bool fCompressed = CanSupportFeature(FEATURE_COMPRPUBKEY); // default to compressed public keys if we want 0.6.0 wallets
CKey secret;
secret.MakeNewKey(fCompressed);
// Compressed public keys were introduced in version 0.6.0
if (fCompressed)
SetMinVersion(FEATURE_COMPRPUBKEY);
CPubKey pubkey = secret.GetPubKey();
assert(secret.VerifyPubKey(pubkey));
// Create new metadata
int64_t nCreationTime = GetTime();
mapKeyMetadata[pubkey.GetID()] = CKeyMetadata(nCreationTime);
if (!nTimeFirstKey || nCreationTime < nTimeFirstKey)
nTimeFirstKey = nCreationTime;
if (!AddKeyPubKey(secret, pubkey))
throw std::runtime_error("CWallet::GenerateNewKey(): AddKey failed");
return pubkey;
}
bool CWallet::AddKeyPubKey(const CKey& secret, const CPubKey &pubkey)
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // mapKeyMetadata
if (!CCryptoKeyStore::AddKeyPubKey(secret, pubkey))
return false;
// check if we need to remove from watch-only
CScript script;
script = GetScriptForDestination(pubkey.GetID());
if (HaveWatchOnly(script))
RemoveWatchOnly(script);
script = GetScriptForRawPubKey(pubkey);
if (HaveWatchOnly(script))
RemoveWatchOnly(script);
if (!fFileBacked)
return true;
if (!IsCrypted()) {
return CWalletDB(strWalletFile).WriteKey(pubkey,
secret.GetPrivKey(),
mapKeyMetadata[pubkey.GetID()]);
}
return true;
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
}
bool CWallet::AddCryptedKey(const CPubKey &vchPubKey,
const vector<unsigned char> &vchCryptedSecret)
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
{
if (!CCryptoKeyStore::AddCryptedKey(vchPubKey, vchCryptedSecret))
return false;
if (!fFileBacked)
return true;
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
if (pwalletdbEncryption)
return pwalletdbEncryption->WriteCryptedKey(vchPubKey,
vchCryptedSecret,
mapKeyMetadata[vchPubKey.GetID()]);
else
return CWalletDB(strWalletFile).WriteCryptedKey(vchPubKey,
vchCryptedSecret,
mapKeyMetadata[vchPubKey.GetID()]);
}
return false;
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
}
bool CWallet::LoadKeyMetadata(const CPubKey &pubkey, const CKeyMetadata &meta)
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // mapKeyMetadata
if (meta.nCreateTime && (!nTimeFirstKey || meta.nCreateTime < nTimeFirstKey))
nTimeFirstKey = meta.nCreateTime;
mapKeyMetadata[pubkey.GetID()] = meta;
return true;
}
bool CWallet::LoadCryptedKey(const CPubKey &vchPubKey, const std::vector<unsigned char> &vchCryptedSecret)
{
return CCryptoKeyStore::AddCryptedKey(vchPubKey, vchCryptedSecret);
}
bool CWallet::AddCScript(const CScript& redeemScript)
{
if (!CCryptoKeyStore::AddCScript(redeemScript))
return false;
if (!fFileBacked)
return true;
return CWalletDB(strWalletFile).WriteCScript(Hash160(redeemScript), redeemScript);
}
bool CWallet::LoadCScript(const CScript& redeemScript)
{
/* A sanity check was added in pull #3843 to avoid adding redeemScripts
* that never can be redeemed. However, old wallets may still contain
* these. Do not add them to the wallet and warn. */
if (redeemScript.size() > MAX_SCRIPT_ELEMENT_SIZE)
{
std::string strAddr = CBitcoinAddress(CScriptID(redeemScript)).ToString();
LogPrintf("%s: Warning: This wallet contains a redeemScript of size %i which exceeds maximum size %i thus can never be redeemed. Do not use address %s.\n",
__func__, redeemScript.size(), MAX_SCRIPT_ELEMENT_SIZE, strAddr);
return true;
}
return CCryptoKeyStore::AddCScript(redeemScript);
}
bool CWallet::AddWatchOnly(const CScript &dest)
{
if (!CCryptoKeyStore::AddWatchOnly(dest))
return false;
nTimeFirstKey = 1; // No birthday information for watch-only keys.
NotifyWatchonlyChanged(true);
if (!fFileBacked)
return true;
return CWalletDB(strWalletFile).WriteWatchOnly(dest);
}
bool CWallet::RemoveWatchOnly(const CScript &dest)
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet);
if (!CCryptoKeyStore::RemoveWatchOnly(dest))
return false;
if (!HaveWatchOnly())
NotifyWatchonlyChanged(false);
if (fFileBacked)
if (!CWalletDB(strWalletFile).EraseWatchOnly(dest))
return false;
return true;
}
bool CWallet::LoadWatchOnly(const CScript &dest)
{
return CCryptoKeyStore::AddWatchOnly(dest);
}
bool CWallet::Unlock(const SecureString& strWalletPassphrase)
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
{
CCrypter crypter;
CKeyingMaterial vMasterKey;
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
BOOST_FOREACH(const MasterKeyMap::value_type& pMasterKey, mapMasterKeys)
{
if(!crypter.SetKeyFromPassphrase(strWalletPassphrase, pMasterKey.second.vchSalt, pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations, pMasterKey.second.nDerivationMethod))
return false;
if (!crypter.Decrypt(pMasterKey.second.vchCryptedKey, vMasterKey))
continue; // try another master key
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
if (CCryptoKeyStore::Unlock(vMasterKey))
return true;
}
}
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
return false;
}
bool CWallet::ChangeWalletPassphrase(const SecureString& strOldWalletPassphrase, const SecureString& strNewWalletPassphrase)
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
{
bool fWasLocked = IsLocked();
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
Lock();
CCrypter crypter;
CKeyingMaterial vMasterKey;
BOOST_FOREACH(MasterKeyMap::value_type& pMasterKey, mapMasterKeys)
{
if(!crypter.SetKeyFromPassphrase(strOldWalletPassphrase, pMasterKey.second.vchSalt, pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations, pMasterKey.second.nDerivationMethod))
return false;
if (!crypter.Decrypt(pMasterKey.second.vchCryptedKey, vMasterKey))
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
return false;
if (CCryptoKeyStore::Unlock(vMasterKey))
{
int64_t nStartTime = GetTimeMillis();
crypter.SetKeyFromPassphrase(strNewWalletPassphrase, pMasterKey.second.vchSalt, pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations, pMasterKey.second.nDerivationMethod);
pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations = pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations * (100 / ((double)(GetTimeMillis() - nStartTime)));
nStartTime = GetTimeMillis();
crypter.SetKeyFromPassphrase(strNewWalletPassphrase, pMasterKey.second.vchSalt, pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations, pMasterKey.second.nDerivationMethod);
pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations = (pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations + pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations * 100 / ((double)(GetTimeMillis() - nStartTime))) / 2;
if (pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations < 25000)
pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations = 25000;
LogPrintf("Wallet passphrase changed to an nDeriveIterations of %i\n", pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
if (!crypter.SetKeyFromPassphrase(strNewWalletPassphrase, pMasterKey.second.vchSalt, pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations, pMasterKey.second.nDerivationMethod))
return false;
if (!crypter.Encrypt(vMasterKey, pMasterKey.second.vchCryptedKey))
return false;
CWalletDB(strWalletFile).WriteMasterKey(pMasterKey.first, pMasterKey.second);
if (fWasLocked)
Lock();
return true;
}
}
}
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
return false;
}
13 years ago
void CWallet::SetBestChain(const CBlockLocator& loc)
{
CWalletDB walletdb(strWalletFile);
walletdb.WriteBestBlock(loc);
}
bool CWallet::SetMinVersion(enum WalletFeature nVersion, CWalletDB* pwalletdbIn, bool fExplicit)
{
LOCK(cs_wallet); // nWalletVersion
if (nWalletVersion >= nVersion)
return true;
// when doing an explicit upgrade, if we pass the max version permitted, upgrade all the way
if (fExplicit && nVersion > nWalletMaxVersion)
nVersion = FEATURE_LATEST;
nWalletVersion = nVersion;
if (nVersion > nWalletMaxVersion)
nWalletMaxVersion = nVersion;
if (fFileBacked)
{
CWalletDB* pwalletdb = pwalletdbIn ? pwalletdbIn : new CWalletDB(strWalletFile);
if (nWalletVersion > 40000)
pwalletdb->WriteMinVersion(nWalletVersion);
if (!pwalletdbIn)
delete pwalletdb;
}
return true;
}
bool CWallet::SetMaxVersion(int nVersion)
{
LOCK(cs_wallet); // nWalletVersion, nWalletMaxVersion
// cannot downgrade below current version
if (nWalletVersion > nVersion)
return false;
nWalletMaxVersion = nVersion;
return true;
}
set<uint256> CWallet::GetConflicts(const uint256& txid) const
{
set<uint256> result;
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet);
std::map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator it = mapWallet.find(txid);
if (it == mapWallet.end())
return result;
const CWalletTx& wtx = it->second;
std::pair<TxSpends::const_iterator, TxSpends::const_iterator> range;
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxIn& txin, wtx.vin)
{
if (mapTxSpends.count(txin.prevout) <= 1)
continue; // No conflict if zero or one spends
range = mapTxSpends.equal_range(txin.prevout);
for (TxSpends::const_iterator it = range.first; it != range.second; ++it)
result.insert(it->second);
}
return result;
}
void CWallet::Flush(bool shutdown)
{
bitdb.Flush(shutdown);
}
bool CWallet::Verify(const string& walletFile, string& warningString, string& errorString)
{
if (!bitdb.Open(GetDataDir()))
{
// try moving the database env out of the way
boost::filesystem::path pathDatabase = GetDataDir() / "database";
boost::filesystem::path pathDatabaseBak = GetDataDir() / strprintf("database.%d.bak", GetTime());
try {
boost::filesystem::rename(pathDatabase, pathDatabaseBak);
LogPrintf("Moved old %s to %s. Retrying.\n", pathDatabase.string(), pathDatabaseBak.string());
} catch (const boost::filesystem::filesystem_error&) {
// failure is ok (well, not really, but it's not worse than what we started with)
}
// try again
if (!bitdb.Open(GetDataDir())) {
// if it still fails, it probably means we can't even create the database env
string msg = strprintf(_("Error initializing wallet database environment %s!"), GetDataDir());
errorString += msg;
return true;
}
}
if (GetBoolArg("-salvagewallet", false))
{
// Recover readable keypairs:
if (!CWalletDB::Recover(bitdb, walletFile, true))
return false;
}
if (boost::filesystem::exists(GetDataDir() / walletFile))
{
CDBEnv::VerifyResult r = bitdb.Verify(walletFile, CWalletDB::Recover);
if (r == CDBEnv::RECOVER_OK)
{
warningString += strprintf(_("Warning: wallet.dat corrupt, data salvaged!"
" Original wallet.dat saved as wallet.{timestamp}.bak in %s; if"
" your balance or transactions are incorrect you should"
" restore from a backup."), GetDataDir());
}
if (r == CDBEnv::RECOVER_FAIL)
errorString += _("wallet.dat corrupt, salvage failed");
}
return true;
}
void CWallet::SyncMetaData(pair<TxSpends::iterator, TxSpends::iterator> range)
{
// We want all the wallet transactions in range to have the same metadata as
// the oldest (smallest nOrderPos).
// So: find smallest nOrderPos:
int nMinOrderPos = std::numeric_limits<int>::max();
const CWalletTx* copyFrom = NULL;
for (TxSpends::iterator it = range.first; it != range.second; ++it)
{
const uint256& hash = it->second;
int n = mapWallet[hash].nOrderPos;
if (n < nMinOrderPos)
{
nMinOrderPos = n;
copyFrom = &mapWallet[hash];
}
}
// Now copy data from copyFrom to rest:
for (TxSpends::iterator it = range.first; it != range.second; ++it)
{
const uint256& hash = it->second;
CWalletTx* copyTo = &mapWallet[hash];
if (copyFrom == copyTo) continue;
if (!copyFrom->IsEquivalentTo(*copyTo)) continue;
copyTo->mapValue = copyFrom->mapValue;
copyTo->vOrderForm = copyFrom->vOrderForm;
// fTimeReceivedIsTxTime not copied on purpose
// nTimeReceived not copied on purpose
copyTo->nTimeSmart = copyFrom->nTimeSmart;
copyTo->fFromMe = copyFrom->fFromMe;
copyTo->strFromAccount = copyFrom->strFromAccount;
// nOrderPos not copied on purpose
// cached members not copied on purpose
}
}
/**
* Outpoint is spent if any non-conflicted transaction
* spends it:
*/
bool CWallet::IsSpent(const uint256& hash, unsigned int n) const
{
const COutPoint outpoint(hash, n);
pair<TxSpends::const_iterator, TxSpends::const_iterator> range;
range = mapTxSpends.equal_range(outpoint);
for (TxSpends::const_iterator it = range.first; it != range.second; ++it)
{
const uint256& wtxid = it->second;
std::map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator mit = mapWallet.find(wtxid);
if (mit != mapWallet.end() && mit->second.GetDepthInMainChain() >= 0)
return true; // Spent
}
return false;
}
void CWallet::AddToSpends(const COutPoint& outpoint, const uint256& wtxid)
{
mapTxSpends.insert(make_pair(outpoint, wtxid));
pair<TxSpends::iterator, TxSpends::iterator> range;
range = mapTxSpends.equal_range(outpoint);
SyncMetaData(range);
}
void CWallet::AddToSpends(const uint256& wtxid)
{
assert(mapWallet.count(wtxid));
CWalletTx& thisTx = mapWallet[wtxid];
if (thisTx.IsCoinBase()) // Coinbases don't spend anything!
return;
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxIn& txin, thisTx.vin)
AddToSpends(txin.prevout, wtxid);
}
bool CWallet::EncryptWallet(const SecureString& strWalletPassphrase)
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
{
if (IsCrypted())
return false;
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
CKeyingMaterial vMasterKey;
RandAddSeedPerfmon();
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
vMasterKey.resize(WALLET_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE);
GetRandBytes(&vMasterKey[0], WALLET_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
CMasterKey kMasterKey;
RandAddSeedPerfmon();
kMasterKey.vchSalt.resize(WALLET_CRYPTO_SALT_SIZE);
GetRandBytes(&kMasterKey.vchSalt[0], WALLET_CRYPTO_SALT_SIZE);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
CCrypter crypter;
int64_t nStartTime = GetTimeMillis();
crypter.SetKeyFromPassphrase(strWalletPassphrase, kMasterKey.vchSalt, 25000, kMasterKey.nDerivationMethod);
kMasterKey.nDeriveIterations = 2500000 / ((double)(GetTimeMillis() - nStartTime));
nStartTime = GetTimeMillis();
crypter.SetKeyFromPassphrase(strWalletPassphrase, kMasterKey.vchSalt, kMasterKey.nDeriveIterations, kMasterKey.nDerivationMethod);
kMasterKey.nDeriveIterations = (kMasterKey.nDeriveIterations + kMasterKey.nDeriveIterations * 100 / ((double)(GetTimeMillis() - nStartTime))) / 2;
if (kMasterKey.nDeriveIterations < 25000)
kMasterKey.nDeriveIterations = 25000;
LogPrintf("Encrypting Wallet with an nDeriveIterations of %i\n", kMasterKey.nDeriveIterations);
if (!crypter.SetKeyFromPassphrase(strWalletPassphrase, kMasterKey.vchSalt, kMasterKey.nDeriveIterations, kMasterKey.nDerivationMethod))
return false;
if (!crypter.Encrypt(vMasterKey, kMasterKey.vchCryptedKey))
return false;
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
mapMasterKeys[++nMasterKeyMaxID] = kMasterKey;
if (fFileBacked)
{
assert(!pwalletdbEncryption);
pwalletdbEncryption = new CWalletDB(strWalletFile);
if (!pwalletdbEncryption->TxnBegin()) {
delete pwalletdbEncryption;
pwalletdbEncryption = NULL;
return false;
}
pwalletdbEncryption->WriteMasterKey(nMasterKeyMaxID, kMasterKey);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
}
if (!EncryptKeys(vMasterKey))
{
if (fFileBacked) {
pwalletdbEncryption->TxnAbort();
delete pwalletdbEncryption;
}
// We now probably have half of our keys encrypted in memory, and half not...
// die and let the user reload the unencrypted wallet.
assert(false);
}
// Encryption was introduced in version 0.4.0
SetMinVersion(FEATURE_WALLETCRYPT, pwalletdbEncryption, true);
if (fFileBacked)
{
if (!pwalletdbEncryption->TxnCommit()) {
delete pwalletdbEncryption;
// We now have keys encrypted in memory, but not on disk...
// die to avoid confusion and let the user reload the unencrypted wallet.
assert(false);
}
delete pwalletdbEncryption;
pwalletdbEncryption = NULL;
}
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
Lock();
Unlock(strWalletPassphrase);
NewKeyPool();
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
Lock();
// Need to completely rewrite the wallet file; if we don't, bdb might keep
// bits of the unencrypted private key in slack space in the database file.
CDB::Rewrite(strWalletFile);
}
NotifyStatusChanged(this);
13 years ago
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
return true;
}
int64_t CWallet::IncOrderPosNext(CWalletDB *pwalletdb)
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // nOrderPosNext
int64_t nRet = nOrderPosNext++;
if (pwalletdb) {
pwalletdb->WriteOrderPosNext(nOrderPosNext);
} else {
CWalletDB(strWalletFile).WriteOrderPosNext(nOrderPosNext);
}
return nRet;
}
CWallet::TxItems CWallet::OrderedTxItems(std::list<CAccountingEntry>& acentries, std::string strAccount)
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // mapWallet
CWalletDB walletdb(strWalletFile);
// First: get all CWalletTx and CAccountingEntry into a sorted-by-order multimap.
TxItems txOrdered;
// Note: maintaining indices in the database of (account,time) --> txid and (account, time) --> acentry
// would make this much faster for applications that do this a lot.
for (map<uint256, CWalletTx>::iterator it = mapWallet.begin(); it != mapWallet.end(); ++it)
{
CWalletTx* wtx = &((*it).second);
txOrdered.insert(make_pair(wtx->nOrderPos, TxPair(wtx, (CAccountingEntry*)0)));
}
acentries.clear();
walletdb.ListAccountCreditDebit(strAccount, acentries);
BOOST_FOREACH(CAccountingEntry& entry, acentries)
{
txOrdered.insert(make_pair(entry.nOrderPos, TxPair((CWalletTx*)0, &entry)));
}
return txOrdered;
}
void CWallet::MarkDirty()
{
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
BOOST_FOREACH(PAIRTYPE(const uint256, CWalletTx)& item, mapWallet)
item.second.MarkDirty();
}
}
bool CWallet::AddToWallet(const CWalletTx& wtxIn, bool fFromLoadWallet, CWalletDB* pwalletdb)
{
uint256 hash = wtxIn.GetHash();
if (fFromLoadWallet)
{
mapWallet[hash] = wtxIn;
mapWallet[hash].BindWallet(this);
AddToSpends(hash);
}
else
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
// Inserts only if not already there, returns tx inserted or tx found
pair<map<uint256, CWalletTx>::iterator, bool> ret = mapWallet.insert(make_pair(hash, wtxIn));
CWalletTx& wtx = (*ret.first).second;
wtx.BindWallet(this);
bool fInsertedNew = ret.second;
if (fInsertedNew)
{
wtx.nTimeReceived = GetAdjustedTime();
wtx.nOrderPos = IncOrderPosNext(pwalletdb);
wtx.nTimeSmart = wtx.nTimeReceived;
if (!wtxIn.hashBlock.IsNull())
{
if (mapBlockIndex.count(wtxIn.hashBlock))
{
int64_t latestNow = wtx.nTimeReceived;
int64_t latestEntry = 0;
{
// Tolerate times up to the last timestamp in the wallet not more than 5 minutes into the future
int64_t latestTolerated = latestNow + 300;
std::list<CAccountingEntry> acentries;
TxItems txOrdered = OrderedTxItems(acentries);
for (TxItems::reverse_iterator it = txOrdered.rbegin(); it != txOrdered.rend(); ++it)
{
CWalletTx *const pwtx = (*it).second.first;
if (pwtx == &wtx)
continue;
CAccountingEntry *const pacentry = (*it).second.second;
int64_t nSmartTime;
if (pwtx)
{
nSmartTime = pwtx->nTimeSmart;
if (!nSmartTime)
nSmartTime = pwtx->nTimeReceived;
}
else
nSmartTime = pacentry->nTime;
if (nSmartTime <= latestTolerated)
{
latestEntry = nSmartTime;
if (nSmartTime > latestNow)
latestNow = nSmartTime;
break;
}
}
}
int64_t blocktime = mapBlockIndex[wtxIn.hashBlock]->GetBlockTime();
wtx.nTimeSmart = std::max(latestEntry, std::min(blocktime, latestNow));
}
else
LogPrintf("AddToWallet(): found %s in block %s not in index\n",
wtxIn.GetHash().ToString(),
wtxIn.hashBlock.ToString());
}
AddToSpends(hash);
}
bool fUpdated = false;
if (!fInsertedNew)
{
// Merge
if (!wtxIn.hashBlock.IsNull() && wtxIn.hashBlock != wtx.hashBlock)
{
wtx.hashBlock = wtxIn.hashBlock;
fUpdated = true;
}
if (wtxIn.nIndex != -1 && (wtxIn.vMerkleBranch != wtx.vMerkleBranch || wtxIn.nIndex != wtx.nIndex))
{
wtx.vMerkleBranch = wtxIn.vMerkleBranch;
wtx.nIndex = wtxIn.nIndex;
fUpdated = true;
}
if (wtxIn.fFromMe && wtxIn.fFromMe != wtx.fFromMe)
{
wtx.fFromMe = wtxIn.fFromMe;
fUpdated = true;
}
}
//// debug print
LogPrintf("AddToWallet %s %s%s\n", wtxIn.GetHash().ToString(), (fInsertedNew ? "new" : ""), (fUpdated ? "update" : ""));
// Write to disk
if (fInsertedNew || fUpdated)
if (!wtx.WriteToDisk(pwalletdb))
return false;
// Break debit/credit balance caches:
wtx.MarkDirty();
// Notify UI of new or updated transaction
NotifyTransactionChanged(this, hash, fInsertedNew ? CT_NEW : CT_UPDATED);
// notify an external script when a wallet transaction comes in or is updated
std::string strCmd = GetArg("-walletnotify", "");
if ( !strCmd.empty())
{
boost::replace_all(strCmd, "%s", wtxIn.GetHash().GetHex());
boost::thread t(runCommand, strCmd); // thread runs free
}
}
return true;
}
/**
* Add a transaction to the wallet, or update it.
* pblock is optional, but should be provided if the transaction is known to be in a block.
* If fUpdate is true, existing transactions will be updated.
*/
bool CWallet::AddToWalletIfInvolvingMe(const CTransaction& tx, const CBlock* pblock, bool fUpdate)
{
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet);
bool fExisted = mapWallet.count(tx.GetHash()) != 0;
if (fExisted && !fUpdate) return false;
if (fExisted || IsMine(tx) || IsFromMe(tx))
{
CWalletTx wtx(this,tx);
// Get merkle branch if transaction was found in a block
if (pblock)
wtx.SetMerkleBranch(*pblock);
// Do not flush the wallet here for performance reasons
// this is safe, as in case of a crash, we rescan the necessary blocks on startup through our SetBestChain-mechanism
CWalletDB walletdb(strWalletFile, "r+", false);
return AddToWallet(wtx, false, &walletdb);
}
}
return false;
}
void CWallet::SyncTransaction(const CTransaction& tx, const CBlock* pblock)
{
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
if (!AddToWalletIfInvolvingMe(tx, pblock, true))
return; // Not one of ours
// If a transaction changes 'conflicted' state, that changes the balance
// available of the outputs it spends. So force those to be
// recomputed, also:
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxIn& txin, tx.vin)
{
if (mapWallet.count(txin.prevout.hash))
mapWallet[txin.prevout.hash].MarkDirty();
}
}
isminetype CWallet::IsMine(const CTxIn &txin) const
{
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator mi = mapWallet.find(txin.prevout.hash);
if (mi != mapWallet.end())
{
const CWalletTx& prev = (*mi).second;
if (txin.prevout.n < prev.vout.size())
return IsMine(prev.vout[txin.prevout.n]);
}
}
return ISMINE_NO;
}
CAmount CWallet::GetDebit(const CTxIn &txin, const isminefilter& filter) const
{
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator mi = mapWallet.find(txin.prevout.hash);
if (mi != mapWallet.end())
{
const CWalletTx& prev = (*mi).second;
if (txin.prevout.n < prev.vout.size())
if (IsMine(prev.vout[txin.prevout.n]) & filter)
return prev.vout[txin.prevout.n].nValue;
}
}
return 0;
}
isminetype CWallet::IsMine(const CTxOut& txout) const
{
return ::IsMine(*this, txout.scriptPubKey);
}
CAmount CWallet::GetCredit(const CTxOut& txout, const isminefilter& filter) const
{
if (!MoneyRange(txout.nValue))
throw std::runtime_error("CWallet::GetCredit(): value out of range");
return ((IsMine(txout) & filter) ? txout.nValue : 0);
}
bool CWallet::IsChange(const CTxOut& txout) const
{
// TODO: fix handling of 'change' outputs. The assumption is that any
// payment to a script that is ours, but is not in the address book
// is change. That assumption is likely to break when we implement multisignature
// wallets that return change back into a multi-signature-protected address;
// a better way of identifying which outputs are 'the send' and which are
// 'the change' will need to be implemented (maybe extend CWalletTx to remember
// which output, if any, was change).
if (::IsMine(*this, txout.scriptPubKey))
{
CTxDestination address;
if (!ExtractDestination(txout.scriptPubKey, address))
return true;
LOCK(cs_wallet);
if (!mapAddressBook.count(address))
return true;
}
return false;
}
CAmount CWallet::GetChange(const CTxOut& txout) const
{
if (!MoneyRange(txout.nValue))
throw std::runtime_error("CWallet::GetChange(): value out of range");
return (IsChange(txout) ? txout.nValue : 0);
}
bool CWallet::IsMine(const CTransaction& tx) const
{
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxOut& txout, tx.vout)
if (IsMine(txout))
return true;
return false;
}
bool CWallet::IsFromMe(const CTransaction& tx) const
{
return (GetDebit(tx, ISMINE_ALL) > 0);
}
CAmount CWallet::GetDebit(const CTransaction& tx, const isminefilter& filter) const
{
CAmount nDebit = 0;
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxIn& txin, tx.vin)
{
nDebit += GetDebit(txin, filter);
if (!MoneyRange(nDebit))
throw std::runtime_error("CWallet::GetDebit(): value out of range");
}
return nDebit;
}
CAmount CWallet::GetCredit(const CTransaction& tx, const isminefilter& filter) const
{
CAmount nCredit = 0;
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxOut& txout, tx.vout)
{
nCredit += GetCredit(txout, filter);
if (!MoneyRange(nCredit))
throw std::runtime_error("CWallet::GetCredit(): value out of range");
}
return nCredit;
}
CAmount CWallet::GetChange(const CTransaction& tx) const
{
CAmount nChange = 0;
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxOut& txout, tx.vout)
{
nChange += GetChange(txout);
if (!MoneyRange(nChange))
throw std::runtime_error("CWallet::GetChange(): value out of range");
}
return nChange;
}
int64_t CWalletTx::GetTxTime() const
{
int64_t n = nTimeSmart;
return n ? n : nTimeReceived;
}
int CWalletTx::GetRequestCount() const
{
// Returns -1 if it wasn't being tracked
int nRequests = -1;
{
LOCK(pwallet->cs_wallet);
if (IsCoinBase())
{
// Generated block
if (!hashBlock.IsNull())
{
map<uint256, int>::const_iterator mi = pwallet->mapRequestCount.find(hashBlock);
if (mi != pwallet->mapRequestCount.end())
nRequests = (*mi).second;
}
}
else
{
// Did anyone request this transaction?
map<uint256, int>::const_iterator mi = pwallet->mapRequestCount.find(GetHash());
if (mi != pwallet->mapRequestCount.end())
{
nRequests = (*mi).second;
// How about the block it's in?
if (nRequests == 0 && !hashBlock.IsNull())
{
map<uint256, int>::const_iterator mi = pwallet->mapRequestCount.find(hashBlock);
if (mi != pwallet->mapRequestCount.end())
nRequests = (*mi).second;
else
nRequests = 1; // If it's in someone else's block it must have got out
}
}
}
}
return nRequests;
}
void CWalletTx::GetAmounts(list<COutputEntry>& listReceived,
list<COutputEntry>& listSent, CAmount& nFee, string& strSentAccount, const isminefilter& filter) const
{
nFee = 0;
listReceived.clear();
listSent.clear();
strSentAccount = strFromAccount;
// Compute fee:
CAmount nDebit = GetDebit(filter);
if (nDebit > 0) // debit>0 means we signed/sent this transaction
{
CAmount nValueOut = GetValueOut();
nFee = nDebit - nValueOut;
}
// Sent/received.
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < vout.size(); ++i)
{
const CTxOut& txout = vout[i];
isminetype fIsMine = pwallet->IsMine(txout);
// Only need to handle txouts if AT LEAST one of these is true:
// 1) they debit from us (sent)
// 2) the output is to us (received)
if (nDebit > 0)
{
// Don't report 'change' txouts
if (pwallet->IsChange(txout))
continue;
}
else if (!(fIsMine & filter))
continue;
// In either case, we need to get the destination address
CTxDestination address;
if (!ExtractDestination(txout.scriptPubKey, address))
{
LogPrintf("CWalletTx::GetAmounts: Unknown transaction type found, txid %s\n",
this->GetHash().ToString());
address = CNoDestination();
}
COutputEntry output = {address, txout.nValue, (int)i};
// If we are debited by the transaction, add the output as a "sent" entry
if (nDebit > 0)
listSent.push_back(output);
// If we are receiving the output, add it as a "received" entry
if (fIsMine & filter)
listReceived.push_back(output);
}
}
void CWalletTx::GetAccountAmounts(const string& strAccount, CAmount& nReceived,
CAmount& nSent, CAmount& nFee, const isminefilter& filter) const
{
nReceived = nSent = nFee = 0;
CAmount allFee;
string strSentAccount;
list<COutputEntry> listReceived;
list<COutputEntry> listSent;
GetAmounts(listReceived, listSent, allFee, strSentAccount, filter);
if (strAccount == strSentAccount)
{
BOOST_FOREACH(const COutputEntry& s, listSent)
nSent += s.amount;
nFee = allFee;
}
{
LOCK(pwallet->cs_wallet);
BOOST_FOREACH(const COutputEntry& r, listReceived)
{
if (pwallet->mapAddressBook.count(r.destination))
{
map<CTxDestination, CAddressBookData>::const_iterator mi = pwallet->mapAddressBook.find(r.destination);
if (mi != pwallet->mapAddressBook.end() && (*mi).second.name == strAccount)
nReceived += r.amount;
}
else if (strAccount.empty())
{
nReceived += r.amount;
}
}
}
}
bool CWalletTx::WriteToDisk(CWalletDB *pwalletdb)
{
return pwalletdb->WriteTx(GetHash(), *this);
}
/**
* Scan the block chain (starting in pindexStart) for transactions
* from or to us. If fUpdate is true, found transactions that already
* exist in the wallet will be updated.
*/
int CWallet::ScanForWalletTransactions(CBlockIndex* pindexStart, bool fUpdate)
{
int ret = 0;
int64_t nNow = GetTime();
const CChainParams& chainParams = Params();
CBlockIndex* pindex = pindexStart;
{
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
// no need to read and scan block, if block was created before
// our wallet birthday (as adjusted for block time variability)
while (pindex && nTimeFirstKey && (pindex->GetBlockTime() < (nTimeFirstKey - 7200)))
pindex = chainActive.Next(pindex);
ShowProgress(_("Rescanning..."), 0); // show rescan progress in GUI as dialog or on splashscreen, if -rescan on startup
double dProgressStart = Checkpoints::GuessVerificationProgress(chainParams.Checkpoints(), pindex, false);
double dProgressTip = Checkpoints::GuessVerificationProgress(chainParams.Checkpoints(), chainActive.Tip(), false);
while (pindex)
{
if (pindex->nHeight % 100 == 0 && dProgressTip - dProgressStart > 0.0)
ShowProgress(_("Rescanning..."), std::max(1, std::min(99, (int)((Checkpoints::GuessVerificationProgress(chainParams.Checkpoints(), pindex, false) - dProgressStart) / (dProgressTip - dProgressStart) * 100))));
CBlock block;
ReadBlockFromDisk(block, pindex);
BOOST_FOREACH(CTransaction& tx, block.vtx)
{
if (AddToWalletIfInvolvingMe(tx, &block, fUpdate))
ret++;
}
pindex = chainActive.Next(pindex);
if (GetTime() >= nNow + 60) {
nNow = GetTime();
LogPrintf("Still rescanning. At block %d. Progress=%f\n", pindex->nHeight, Checkpoints::GuessVerificationProgress(chainParams.Checkpoints(), pindex));
}
}
ShowProgress(_("Rescanning..."), 100); // hide progress dialog in GUI
}
return ret;
}
void CWallet::ReacceptWalletTransactions()
{
// If transactions aren't being broadcasted, don't let them into local mempool either
if (!fBroadcastTransactions)
return;
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
std::map<int64_t, CWalletTx*> mapSorted;
// Sort pending wallet transactions based on their initial wallet insertion order
BOOST_FOREACH(PAIRTYPE(const uint256, CWalletTx)& item, mapWallet)
{
const uint256& wtxid = item.first;
CWalletTx& wtx = item.second;
assert(wtx.GetHash() == wtxid);
int nDepth = wtx.GetDepthInMainChain();
if (!wtx.IsCoinBase() && nDepth < 0) {
mapSorted.insert(std::make_pair(wtx.nOrderPos, &wtx));
}
}
// Try to add wallet transactions to memory pool
BOOST_FOREACH(PAIRTYPE(const int64_t, CWalletTx*)& item, mapSorted)
{
CWalletTx& wtx = *(item.second);
LOCK(mempool.cs);
wtx.AcceptToMemoryPool(false);
}
}
bool CWalletTx::RelayWalletTransaction()
{
assert(pwallet->GetBroadcastTransactions());
if (!IsCoinBase())
{
if (GetDepthInMainChain() == 0) {
LogPrintf("Relaying wtx %s\n", GetHash().ToString());
RelayTransaction((CTransaction)*this);
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
set<uint256> CWalletTx::GetConflicts() const
{
set<uint256> result;
if (pwallet != NULL)
{
uint256 myHash = GetHash();
result = pwallet->GetConflicts(myHash);
result.erase(myHash);
}
return result;
}
CAmount CWalletTx::GetDebit(const isminefilter& filter) const
{
if (vin.empty())
return 0;
CAmount debit = 0;
if(filter & ISMINE_SPENDABLE)
{
if (fDebitCached)
debit += nDebitCached;
else
{
nDebitCached = pwallet->GetDebit(*this, ISMINE_SPENDABLE);
fDebitCached = true;
debit += nDebitCached;
}
}
if(filter & ISMINE_WATCH_ONLY)
{
if(fWatchDebitCached)
debit += nWatchDebitCached;
else
{
nWatchDebitCached = pwallet->GetDebit(*this, ISMINE_WATCH_ONLY);
fWatchDebitCached = true;
debit += nWatchDebitCached;
}
}
return debit;
}
CAmount CWalletTx::GetCredit(const isminefilter& filter) const
{
// Must wait until coinbase is safely deep enough in the chain before valuing it
if (IsCoinBase() && GetBlocksToMaturity() > 0)
return 0;
int64_t credit = 0;
if (filter & ISMINE_SPENDABLE)
{
// GetBalance can assume transactions in mapWallet won't change
if (fCreditCached)
credit += nCreditCached;
else
{
nCreditCached = pwallet->GetCredit(*this, ISMINE_SPENDABLE);
fCreditCached = true;
credit += nCreditCached;
}
}
if (filter & ISMINE_WATCH_ONLY)
{
if (fWatchCreditCached)
credit += nWatchCreditCached;
else
{
nWatchCreditCached = pwallet->GetCredit(*this, ISMINE_WATCH_ONLY);
fWatchCreditCached = true;
credit += nWatchCreditCached;
}
}
return credit;
}
CAmount CWalletTx::GetImmatureCredit(bool fUseCache) const
{
if (IsCoinBase() && GetBlocksToMaturity() > 0 && IsInMainChain())
{
if (fUseCache && fImmatureCreditCached)
return nImmatureCreditCached;
nImmatureCreditCached = pwallet->GetCredit(*this, ISMINE_SPENDABLE);
fImmatureCreditCached = true;
return nImmatureCreditCached;
}
return 0;
}
CAmount CWalletTx::GetAvailableCredit(bool fUseCache) const
{
if (pwallet == 0)
return 0;
// Must wait until coinbase is safely deep enough in the chain before valuing it
if (IsCoinBase() && GetBlocksToMaturity() > 0)
return 0;
if (fUseCache && fAvailableCreditCached)
return nAvailableCreditCached;
CAmount nCredit = 0;
uint256 hashTx = GetHash();
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < vout.size(); i++)
{
if (!pwallet->IsSpent(hashTx, i))
{
const CTxOut &txout = vout[i];
nCredit += pwallet->GetCredit(txout, ISMINE_SPENDABLE);
if (!MoneyRange(nCredit))
throw std::runtime_error("CWalletTx::GetAvailableCredit() : value out of range");
}
}
nAvailableCreditCached = nCredit;
fAvailableCreditCached = true;
return nCredit;
}
CAmount CWalletTx::GetImmatureWatchOnlyCredit(const bool& fUseCache) const
{
if (IsCoinBase() && GetBlocksToMaturity() > 0 && IsInMainChain())
{
if (fUseCache && fImmatureWatchCreditCached)
return nImmatureWatchCreditCached;
nImmatureWatchCreditCached = pwallet->GetCredit(*this, ISMINE_WATCH_ONLY);
fImmatureWatchCreditCached = true;
return nImmatureWatchCreditCached;
}
return 0;
}
CAmount CWalletTx::GetAvailableWatchOnlyCredit(const bool& fUseCache) const
{
if (pwallet == 0)
return 0;
// Must wait until coinbase is safely deep enough in the chain before valuing it
if (IsCoinBase() && GetBlocksToMaturity() > 0)
return 0;
if (fUseCache && fAvailableWatchCreditCached)
return nAvailableWatchCreditCached;
CAmount nCredit = 0;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < vout.size(); i++)
{
if (!pwallet->IsSpent(GetHash(), i))
{
const CTxOut &txout = vout[i];
nCredit += pwallet->GetCredit(txout, ISMINE_WATCH_ONLY);
if (!MoneyRange(nCredit))
throw std::runtime_error("CWalletTx::GetAvailableCredit() : value out of range");
}
}
nAvailableWatchCreditCached = nCredit;
fAvailableWatchCreditCached = true;
return nCredit;
}
CAmount CWalletTx::GetChange() const
{
if (fChangeCached)
return nChangeCached;
nChangeCached = pwallet->GetChange(*this);
fChangeCached = true;
return nChangeCached;
}
bool CWalletTx::IsTrusted() const
{
// Quick answer in most cases
if (!CheckFinalTx(*this))
return false;
int nDepth = GetDepthInMainChain();
if (nDepth >= 1)
return true;
if (nDepth < 0)
return false;
if (!bSpendZeroConfChange || !IsFromMe(ISMINE_ALL)) // using wtx's cached debit
return false;
// Trusted if all inputs are from us and are in the mempool:
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxIn& txin, vin)
{
// Transactions not sent by us: not trusted
const CWalletTx* parent = pwallet->GetWalletTx(txin.prevout.hash);
if (parent == NULL)
return false;
const CTxOut& parentOut = parent->vout[txin.prevout.n];
if (pwallet->IsMine(parentOut) != ISMINE_SPENDABLE)
return false;
}
return true;
}
bool CWalletTx::IsEquivalentTo(const CWalletTx& tx) const
{
CMutableTransaction tx1 = *this;
CMutableTransaction tx2 = tx;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < tx1.vin.size(); i++) tx1.vin[i].scriptSig = CScript();
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < tx2.vin.size(); i++) tx2.vin[i].scriptSig = CScript();
return CTransaction(tx1) == CTransaction(tx2);
}
std::vector<uint256> CWallet::ResendWalletTransactionsBefore(int64_t nTime)
{
std::vector<uint256> result;
LOCK(cs_wallet);
// Sort them in chronological order
multimap<unsigned int, CWalletTx*> mapSorted;
BOOST_FOREACH(PAIRTYPE(const uint256, CWalletTx)& item, mapWallet)
{
CWalletTx& wtx = item.second;
// Don't rebroadcast if newer than nTime:
if (wtx.nTimeReceived > nTime)
continue;
mapSorted.insert(make_pair(wtx.nTimeReceived, &wtx));
}
BOOST_FOREACH(PAIRTYPE(const unsigned int, CWalletTx*)& item, mapSorted)
{
CWalletTx& wtx = *item.second;
if (wtx.RelayWalletTransaction())
result.push_back(wtx.GetHash());
}
return result;
}
void CWallet::ResendWalletTransactions(int64_t nBestBlockTime)
{
// Do this infrequently and randomly to avoid giving away
// that these are our transactions.
if (GetTime() < nNextResend || !fBroadcastTransactions)
return;
bool fFirst = (nNextResend == 0);
nNextResend = GetTime() + GetRand(30 * 60);
if (fFirst)
return;
// Only do it if there's been a new block since last time
if (nBestBlockTime < nLastResend)
return;
nLastResend = GetTime();
// Rebroadcast unconfirmed txes older than 5 minutes before the last
// block was found:
std::vector<uint256> relayed = ResendWalletTransactionsBefore(nBestBlockTime-5*60);
if (!relayed.empty())
LogPrintf("%s: rebroadcast %u unconfirmed transactions\n", __func__, relayed.size());
}
/** @} */ // end of mapWallet
/** @defgroup Actions
*
* @{
*/
CAmount CWallet::GetBalance() const
{
CAmount nTotal = 0;
{
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
for (map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator it = mapWallet.begin(); it != mapWallet.end(); ++it)
{
const CWalletTx* pcoin = &(*it).second;
if (pcoin->IsTrusted())
nTotal += pcoin->GetAvailableCredit();
}
}
return nTotal;
}
CAmount CWallet::GetUnconfirmedBalance() const
{
CAmount nTotal = 0;
{
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
for (map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator it = mapWallet.begin(); it != mapWallet.end(); ++it)
{
const CWalletTx* pcoin = &(*it).second;
if (!CheckFinalTx(*pcoin) || (!pcoin->IsTrusted() && pcoin->GetDepthInMainChain() == 0))
nTotal += pcoin->GetAvailableCredit();
}
}
return nTotal;
}
CAmount CWallet::GetImmatureBalance() const
{
CAmount nTotal = 0;
{
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
for (map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator it = mapWallet.begin(); it != mapWallet.end(); ++it)
{
const CWalletTx* pcoin = &(*it).second;
nTotal += pcoin->GetImmatureCredit();
}
}
return nTotal;
}
CAmount CWallet::GetWatchOnlyBalance() const
{
CAmount nTotal = 0;
{
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
for (map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator it = mapWallet.begin(); it != mapWallet.end(); ++it)
{
const CWalletTx* pcoin = &(*it).second;
if (pcoin->IsTrusted())
nTotal += pcoin->GetAvailableWatchOnlyCredit();
}
}
return nTotal;
}
CAmount CWallet::GetUnconfirmedWatchOnlyBalance() const
{
CAmount nTotal = 0;
{
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
for (map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator it = mapWallet.begin(); it != mapWallet.end(); ++it)
{
const CWalletTx* pcoin = &(*it).second;
if (!CheckFinalTx(*pcoin) || (!pcoin->IsTrusted() && pcoin->GetDepthInMainChain() == 0))
nTotal += pcoin->GetAvailableWatchOnlyCredit();
}
}
return nTotal;
}
CAmount CWallet::GetImmatureWatchOnlyBalance() const
{
CAmount nTotal = 0;
{
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
for (map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator it = mapWallet.begin(); it != mapWallet.end(); ++it)
{
const CWalletTx* pcoin = &(*it).second;
nTotal += pcoin->GetImmatureWatchOnlyCredit();
}
}
return nTotal;
}
/**
* populate vCoins with vector of available COutputs.
*/
void CWallet::AvailableCoins(vector<COutput>& vCoins, bool fOnlyConfirmed, const CCoinControl *coinControl, bool fIncludeZeroValue) const
{
vCoins.clear();
{
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
for (map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator it = mapWallet.begin(); it != mapWallet.end(); ++it)
{
const uint256& wtxid = it->first;
const CWalletTx* pcoin = &(*it).second;
if (!CheckFinalTx(*pcoin))
continue;
if (fOnlyConfirmed && !pcoin->IsTrusted())
continue;
if (pcoin->IsCoinBase() && pcoin->GetBlocksToMaturity() > 0)
continue;
int nDepth = pcoin->GetDepthInMainChain();
if (nDepth < 0)
continue;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < pcoin->vout.size(); i++) {
isminetype mine = IsMine(pcoin->vout[i]);
if (!(IsSpent(wtxid, i)) && mine != ISMINE_NO &&
!IsLockedCoin((*it).first, i) && (pcoin->vout[i].nValue > 0 || fIncludeZeroValue) &&
(!coinControl || !coinControl->HasSelected() || coinControl->fAllowOtherInputs || coinControl->IsSelected((*it).first, i)))
vCoins.push_back(COutput(pcoin, i, nDepth,
((mine & ISMINE_SPENDABLE) != ISMINE_NO) ||
(coinControl && coinControl->fAllowWatchOnly && (mine & ISMINE_WATCH_PUBKEY) != ISMINE_NO)));
}
}
}
}
static void ApproximateBestSubset(vector<pair<CAmount, pair<const CWalletTx*,unsigned int> > >vValue, const CAmount& nTotalLower, const CAmount& nTargetValue,
vector<char>& vfBest, CAmount& nBest, int iterations = 1000)
{
vector<char> vfIncluded;
vfBest.assign(vValue.size(), true);
nBest = nTotalLower;
seed_insecure_rand();
for (int nRep = 0; nRep < iterations && nBest != nTargetValue; nRep++)
{
vfIncluded.assign(vValue.size(), false);
CAmount nTotal = 0;
bool fReachedTarget = false;
for (int nPass = 0; nPass < 2 && !fReachedTarget; nPass++)
{
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < vValue.size(); i++)
{
//The solver here uses a randomized algorithm,
//the randomness serves no real security purpose but is just
//needed to prevent degenerate behavior and it is important
//that the rng is fast. We do not use a constant random sequence,
//because there may be some privacy improvement by making
//the selection random.
if (nPass == 0 ? insecure_rand()&1 : !vfIncluded[i])
{
nTotal += vValue[i].first;
vfIncluded[i] = true;
if (nTotal >= nTargetValue)
{
fReachedTarget = true;
if (nTotal < nBest)
{
nBest = nTotal;
vfBest = vfIncluded;
}
nTotal -= vValue[i].first;
vfIncluded[i] = false;
}
}
}
}
}
}
bool CWallet::SelectCoinsMinConf(const CAmount& nTargetValue, int nConfMine, int nConfTheirs, vector<COutput> vCoins,
set<pair<const CWalletTx*,unsigned int> >& setCoinsRet, CAmount& nValueRet) const
{
setCoinsRet.clear();
nValueRet = 0;
// List of values less than target
pair<CAmount, pair<const CWalletTx*,unsigned int> > coinLowestLarger;
coinLowestLarger.first = std::numeric_limits<CAmount>::max();
coinLowestLarger.second.first = NULL;
vector<pair<CAmount, pair<const CWalletTx*,unsigned int> > > vValue;
CAmount nTotalLower = 0;
random_shuffle(vCoins.begin(), vCoins.end(), GetRandInt);
BOOST_FOREACH(const COutput &output, vCoins)
{
if (!output.fSpendable)
continue;
const CWalletTx *pcoin = output.tx;
if (output.nDepth < (pcoin->IsFromMe(ISMINE_ALL) ? nConfMine : nConfTheirs))
continue;
int i = output.i;
CAmount n = pcoin->vout[i].nValue;
pair<CAmount,pair<const CWalletTx*,unsigned int> > coin = make_pair(n,make_pair(pcoin, i));
if (n == nTargetValue)
{
setCoinsRet.insert(coin.second);
nValueRet += coin.first;
return true;
}
else if (n < nTargetValue + CENT)
{
vValue.push_back(coin);
nTotalLower += n;
}
else if (n < coinLowestLarger.first)
{
coinLowestLarger = coin;
}
}
if (nTotalLower == nTargetValue)
{
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < vValue.size(); ++i)
{
setCoinsRet.insert(vValue[i].second);
nValueRet += vValue[i].first;
}
return true;
}
if (nTotalLower < nTargetValue)
{
if (coinLowestLarger.second.first == NULL)
return false;
setCoinsRet.insert(coinLowestLarger.second);
nValueRet += coinLowestLarger.first;
return true;
}
// Solve subset sum by stochastic approximation
sort(vValue.rbegin(), vValue.rend(), CompareValueOnly());
vector<char> vfBest;
CAmount nBest;
ApproximateBestSubset(vValue, nTotalLower, nTargetValue, vfBest, nBest, 1000);
if (nBest != nTargetValue && nTotalLower >= nTargetValue + CENT)
ApproximateBestSubset(vValue, nTotalLower, nTargetValue + CENT, vfBest, nBest, 1000);
// If we have a bigger coin and (either the stochastic approximation didn't find a good solution,
// or the next bigger coin is closer), return the bigger coin
if (coinLowestLarger.second.first &&
((nBest != nTargetValue && nBest < nTargetValue + CENT) || coinLowestLarger.first <= nBest))
{
setCoinsRet.insert(coinLowestLarger.second);
nValueRet += coinLowestLarger.first;
}
else {
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < vValue.size(); i++)
if (vfBest[i])
{
setCoinsRet.insert(vValue[i].second);
nValueRet += vValue[i].first;
}
LogPrint("selectcoins", "SelectCoins() best subset: ");
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < vValue.size(); i++)
if (vfBest[i])
LogPrint("selectcoins", "%s ", FormatMoney(vValue[i].first));
LogPrint("selectcoins", "total %s\n", FormatMoney(nBest));
}
return true;
}
bool CWallet::SelectCoins(const CAmount& nTargetValue, set<pair<const CWalletTx*,unsigned int> >& setCoinsRet, CAmount& nValueRet, const CCoinControl* coinControl) const
{
vector<COutput> vCoins;
AvailableCoins(vCoins, true, coinControl);
// coin control -> return all selected outputs (we want all selected to go into the transaction for sure)
if (coinControl && coinControl->HasSelected() && !coinControl->fAllowOtherInputs)
{
BOOST_FOREACH(const COutput& out, vCoins)
{
if (!out.fSpendable)
continue;
nValueRet += out.tx->vout[out.i].nValue;
setCoinsRet.insert(make_pair(out.tx, out.i));
}
return (nValueRet >= nTargetValue);
}
// calculate value from preset inputs and store them
set<pair<const CWalletTx*, uint32_t> > setPresetCoins;
CAmount nValueFromPresetInputs = 0;
std::vector<COutPoint> vPresetInputs;
if (coinControl)
coinControl->ListSelected(vPresetInputs);
BOOST_FOREACH(const COutPoint& outpoint, vPresetInputs)
{
map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator it = mapWallet.find(outpoint.hash);
if (it != mapWallet.end())
{
const CWalletTx* pcoin = &it->second;
// Clearly invalid input, fail
if (pcoin->vout.size() <= outpoint.n)
return false;
nValueFromPresetInputs += pcoin->vout[outpoint.n].nValue;
setPresetCoins.insert(make_pair(pcoin, outpoint.n));
} else
return false; // TODO: Allow non-wallet inputs
}
// remove preset inputs from vCoins
for (vector<COutput>::iterator it = vCoins.begin(); it != vCoins.end() && coinControl && coinControl->HasSelected();)
{
if (setPresetCoins.count(make_pair(it->tx, it->i)))
it = vCoins.erase(it);
else
++it;
}
bool res = nTargetValue <= nValueFromPresetInputs ||
SelectCoinsMinConf(nTargetValue - nValueFromPresetInputs, 1, 6, vCoins, setCoinsRet, nValueRet) ||
SelectCoinsMinConf(nTargetValue - nValueFromPresetInputs, 1, 1, vCoins, setCoinsRet, nValueRet) ||
(bSpendZeroConfChange && SelectCoinsMinConf(nTargetValue - nValueFromPresetInputs, 0, 1, vCoins, setCoinsRet, nValueRet));
// because SelectCoinsMinConf clears the setCoinsRet, we now add the possible inputs to the coinset
setCoinsRet.insert(setPresetCoins.begin(), setPresetCoins.end());
// add preset inputs to the total value selected
nValueRet += nValueFromPresetInputs;
return res;
}
bool CWallet::FundTransaction(CMutableTransaction& tx, CAmount &nFeeRet, int& nChangePosRet, std::string& strFailReason, bool includeWatching)
{
vector<CRecipient> vecSend;
// Turn the txout set into a CRecipient vector
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxOut& txOut, tx.vout)
{
CRecipient recipient = {txOut.scriptPubKey, txOut.nValue, false};
vecSend.push_back(recipient);
}
CCoinControl coinControl;
coinControl.fAllowOtherInputs = true;
coinControl.fAllowWatchOnly = includeWatching;
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxIn& txin, tx.vin)
coinControl.Select(txin.prevout);
CReserveKey reservekey(this);
CWalletTx wtx;
if (!CreateTransaction(vecSend, wtx, reservekey, nFeeRet, nChangePosRet, strFailReason, &coinControl, false))
return false;
if (nChangePosRet != -1)
tx.vout.insert(tx.vout.begin() + nChangePosRet, wtx.vout[nChangePosRet]);
// Add new txins (keeping original txin scriptSig/order)
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxIn& txin, wtx.vin)
{
bool found = false;
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxIn& origTxIn, tx.vin)
{
if (txin.prevout.hash == origTxIn.prevout.hash && txin.prevout.n == origTxIn.prevout.n)
{
found = true;
break;
}
}
if (!found)
tx.vin.push_back(txin);
}
return true;
}
bool CWallet::CreateTransaction(const vector<CRecipient>& vecSend, CWalletTx& wtxNew, CReserveKey& reservekey, CAmount& nFeeRet,
int& nChangePosRet, std::string& strFailReason, const CCoinControl* coinControl, bool sign)
{
CAmount nValue = 0;
unsigned int nSubtractFeeFromAmount = 0;
BOOST_FOREACH (const CRecipient& recipient, vecSend)
{
if (nValue < 0 || recipient.nAmount < 0)
{
strFailReason = _("Transaction amounts must be positive");
return false;
}
nValue += recipient.nAmount;
if (recipient.fSubtractFeeFromAmount)
nSubtractFeeFromAmount++;
}
if (vecSend.empty() || nValue < 0)
{
strFailReason = _("Transaction amounts must be positive");
return false;
}
wtxNew.fTimeReceivedIsTxTime = true;
wtxNew.BindWallet(this);
CMutableTransaction txNew;
// Discourage fee sniping.
//
// However because of a off-by-one-error in previous versions we need to
// neuter it by setting nLockTime to at least one less than nBestHeight.
// Secondly currently propagation of transactions created for block heights
// corresponding to blocks that were just mined may be iffy - transactions
// aren't re-accepted into the mempool - we additionally neuter the code by
// going ten blocks back. Doesn't yet do anything for sniping, but does act
// to shake out wallet bugs like not showing nLockTime'd transactions at
// all.
txNew.nLockTime = std::max(0, chainActive.Height() - 10);
// Secondly occasionally randomly pick a nLockTime even further back, so
// that transactions that are delayed after signing for whatever reason,
// e.g. high-latency mix networks and some CoinJoin implementations, have
// better privacy.
if (GetRandInt(10) == 0)
txNew.nLockTime = std::max(0, (int)txNew.nLockTime - GetRandInt(100));
assert(txNew.nLockTime <= (unsigned int)chainActive.Height());
assert(txNew.nLockTime < LOCKTIME_THRESHOLD);
{
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
{
nFeeRet = 0;
while (true)
{
txNew.vin.clear();
txNew.vout.clear();
wtxNew.fFromMe = true;
nChangePosRet = -1;
bool fFirst = true;
CAmount nTotalValue = nValue;
if (nSubtractFeeFromAmount == 0)
nTotalValue += nFeeRet;
double dPriority = 0;
// vouts to the payees
BOOST_FOREACH (const CRecipient& recipient, vecSend)
{
CTxOut txout(recipient.nAmount, recipient.scriptPubKey);
if (recipient.fSubtractFeeFromAmount)
{
txout.nValue -= nFeeRet / nSubtractFeeFromAmount; // Subtract fee equally from each selected recipient
if (fFirst) // first receiver pays the remainder not divisible by output count
{
fFirst = false;
txout.nValue -= nFeeRet % nSubtractFeeFromAmount;
}
}
if (txout.IsDust(::minRelayTxFee))
{
if (recipient.fSubtractFeeFromAmount && nFeeRet > 0)
{
if (txout.nValue < 0)
strFailReason = _("The transaction amount is too small to pay the fee");
else
strFailReason = _("The transaction amount is too small to send after the fee has been deducted");
}
else
strFailReason = _("Transaction amount too small");
return false;
}
txNew.vout.push_back(txout);
}
// Choose coins to use
set<pair<const CWalletTx*,unsigned int> > setCoins;
CAmount nValueIn = 0;
if (!SelectCoins(nTotalValue, setCoins, nValueIn, coinControl))
{
strFailReason = _("Insufficient funds");
return false;
}
BOOST_FOREACH(PAIRTYPE(const CWalletTx*, unsigned int) pcoin, setCoins)
{
CAmount nCredit = pcoin.first->vout[pcoin.second].nValue;
//The coin age after the next block (depth+1) is used instead of the current,
//reflecting an assumption the user would accept a bit more delay for
//a chance at a free transaction.
//But mempool inputs might still be in the mempool, so their age stays 0
int age = pcoin.first->GetDepthInMainChain();
if (age != 0)
age += 1;
dPriority += (double)nCredit * age;
}
CAmount nChange = nValueIn - nValue;
if (nSubtractFeeFromAmount == 0)
nChange -= nFeeRet;
if (nChange > 0)
{
// Fill a vout to ourself
// TODO: pass in scriptChange instead of reservekey so
// change transaction isn't always pay-to-bitcoin-address
CScript scriptChange;
// coin control: send change to custom address
if (coinControl && !boost::get<CNoDestination>(&coinControl->destChange))
scriptChange = GetScriptForDestination(coinControl->destChange);
// no coin control: send change to newly generated address
else
{
// Note: We use a new key here to keep it from being obvious which side is the change.
// The drawback is that by not reusing a previous key, the change may be lost if a
// backup is restored, if the backup doesn't have the new private key for the change.
// If we reused the old key, it would be possible to add code to look for and
// rediscover unknown transactions that were written with keys of ours to recover
// post-backup change.
// Reserve a new key pair from key pool
CPubKey vchPubKey;
bool ret;
ret = reservekey.GetReservedKey(vchPubKey);
assert(ret); // should never fail, as we just unlocked
scriptChange = GetScriptForDestination(vchPubKey.GetID());
}
CTxOut newTxOut(nChange, scriptChange);
// We do not move dust-change to fees, because the sender would end up paying more than requested.
// This would be against the purpose of the all-inclusive feature.
// So instead we raise the change and deduct from the recipient.
if (nSubtractFeeFromAmount > 0 && newTxOut.IsDust(::minRelayTxFee))
{
CAmount nDust = newTxOut.GetDustThreshold(::minRelayTxFee) - newTxOut.nValue;
newTxOut.nValue += nDust; // raise change until no more dust
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < vecSend.size(); i++) // subtract from first recipient
{
if (vecSend[i].fSubtractFeeFromAmount)
{
txNew.vout[i].nValue -= nDust;
if (txNew.vout[i].IsDust(::minRelayTxFee))
{
strFailReason = _("The transaction amount is too small to send after the fee has been deducted");
return false;
}
break;
}
}
}
// Never create dust outputs; if we would, just
// add the dust to the fee.
if (newTxOut.IsDust(::minRelayTxFee))
{
nFeeRet += nChange;
reservekey.ReturnKey();
}
else
{
// Insert change txn at random position:
nChangePosRet = GetRandInt(txNew.vout.size()+1);
vector<CTxOut>::iterator position = txNew.vout.begin()+nChangePosRet;
txNew.vout.insert(position, newTxOut);
}
}
else
reservekey.ReturnKey();
// Fill vin
//
// Note how the sequence number is set to max()-1 so that the
// nLockTime set above actually works.
BOOST_FOREACH(const PAIRTYPE(const CWalletTx*,unsigned int)& coin, setCoins)
txNew.vin.push_back(CTxIn(coin.first->GetHash(),coin.second,CScript(),
std::numeric_limits<unsigned int>::max()-1));
// Sign
int nIn = 0;
CTransaction txNewConst(txNew);
BOOST_FOREACH(const PAIRTYPE(const CWalletTx*,unsigned int)& coin, setCoins)
{
bool signSuccess;
const CScript& scriptPubKey = coin.first->vout[coin.second].scriptPubKey;
CScript& scriptSigRes = txNew.vin[nIn].scriptSig;
if (sign)
signSuccess = ProduceSignature(TransactionSignatureCreator(this, &txNewConst, nIn, SIGHASH_ALL), scriptPubKey, scriptSigRes);
else
signSuccess = ProduceSignature(DummySignatureCreator(this), scriptPubKey, scriptSigRes);
if (!signSuccess)
{
strFailReason = _("Signing transaction failed");
return false;
}
nIn++;
}
unsigned int nBytes = ::GetSerializeSize(txNew, SER_NETWORK, PROTOCOL_VERSION);
// Remove scriptSigs if we used dummy signatures for fee calculation
if (!sign) {
BOOST_FOREACH (CTxIn& vin, txNew.vin)
vin.scriptSig = CScript();
}
// Embed the constructed transaction data in wtxNew.
*static_cast<CTransaction*>(&wtxNew) = CTransaction(txNew);
// Limit size
if (nBytes >= MAX_STANDARD_TX_SIZE)
{
strFailReason = _("Transaction too large");
return false;
}
dPriority = wtxNew.ComputePriority(dPriority, nBytes);
// Can we complete this as a free transaction?
if (fSendFreeTransactions && nBytes <= MAX_FREE_TRANSACTION_CREATE_SIZE)
{
// Not enough fee: enough priority?
double dPriorityNeeded = mempool.estimatePriority(nTxConfirmTarget);
// Not enough mempool history to estimate: use hard-coded AllowFree.
if (dPriorityNeeded <= 0 && AllowFree(dPriority))
break;
// Small enough, and priority high enough, to send for free
if (dPriorityNeeded > 0 && dPriority >= dPriorityNeeded)
break;
}
CAmount nFeeNeeded = GetMinimumFee(nBytes, nTxConfirmTarget, mempool);
// If we made it here and we aren't even able to meet the relay fee on the next pass, give up
// because we must be at the maximum allowed fee.
if (nFeeNeeded < ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(nBytes))
{
strFailReason = _("Transaction too large for fee policy");
return false;
}
if (nFeeRet >= nFeeNeeded)
break; // Done, enough fee included.
// Include more fee and try again.
nFeeRet = nFeeNeeded;
continue;
}
}
}
return true;
}
/**
* Call after CreateTransaction unless you want to abort
*/
bool CWallet::CommitTransaction(CWalletTx& wtxNew, CReserveKey& reservekey)
{
{
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
LogPrintf("CommitTransaction:\n%s", wtxNew.ToString());
{
// This is only to keep the database open to defeat the auto-flush for the
// duration of this scope. This is the only place where this optimization
// maybe makes sense; please don't do it anywhere else.
CWalletDB* pwalletdb = fFileBacked ? new CWalletDB(strWalletFile,"r+") : NULL;
// Take key pair from key pool so it won't be used again
reservekey.KeepKey();
// Add tx to wallet, because if it has change it's also ours,
// otherwise just for transaction history.
AddToWallet(wtxNew, false, pwalletdb);
// Notify that old coins are spent
set<CWalletTx*> setCoins;
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxIn& txin, wtxNew.vin)
{
CWalletTx &coin = mapWallet[txin.prevout.hash];
coin.BindWallet(this);
NotifyTransactionChanged(this, coin.GetHash(), CT_UPDATED);
}
if (fFileBacked)
delete pwalletdb;
}
// Track how many getdata requests our transaction gets
mapRequestCount[wtxNew.GetHash()] = 0;
if (fBroadcastTransactions)
{
// Broadcast
if (!wtxNew.AcceptToMemoryPool(false))
{
// This must not fail. The transaction has already been signed and recorded.
LogPrintf("CommitTransaction(): Error: Transaction not valid");
return false;
}
wtxNew.RelayWalletTransaction();
}
}
return true;
}
CAmount CWallet::GetMinimumFee(unsigned int nTxBytes, unsigned int nConfirmTarget, const CTxMemPool& pool)
{
// payTxFee is user-set "I want to pay this much"
CAmount nFeeNeeded = payTxFee.GetFee(nTxBytes);
// user selected total at least (default=true)
if (fPayAtLeastCustomFee && nFeeNeeded > 0 && nFeeNeeded < payTxFee.GetFeePerK())
nFeeNeeded = payTxFee.GetFeePerK();
// User didn't set: use -txconfirmtarget to estimate...
if (nFeeNeeded == 0)
nFeeNeeded = pool.estimateFee(nConfirmTarget).GetFee(nTxBytes);
// ... unless we don't have enough mempool data, in which case fall
// back to a hard-coded fee
if (nFeeNeeded == 0)
nFeeNeeded = minTxFee.GetFee(nTxBytes);
// prevent user from paying a non-sense fee (like 1 satoshi): 0 < fee < minRelayFee
if (nFeeNeeded < ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(nTxBytes))
nFeeNeeded = ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(nTxBytes);
// But always obey the maximum
if (nFeeNeeded > maxTxFee)
nFeeNeeded = maxTxFee;
return nFeeNeeded;
}
DBErrors CWallet::LoadWallet(bool& fFirstRunRet)
{
if (!fFileBacked)
return DB_LOAD_OK;
fFirstRunRet = false;
DBErrors nLoadWalletRet = CWalletDB(strWalletFile,"cr+").LoadWallet(this);
if (nLoadWalletRet == DB_NEED_REWRITE)
13 years ago
{
if (CDB::Rewrite(strWalletFile, "\x04pool"))
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
setKeyPool.clear();
// Note: can't top-up keypool here, because wallet is locked.
// User will be prompted to unlock wallet the next operation
// that requires a new key.
}
13 years ago
}
if (nLoadWalletRet != DB_LOAD_OK)
return nLoadWalletRet;
fFirstRunRet = !vchDefaultKey.IsValid();
uiInterface.LoadWallet(this);
return DB_LOAD_OK;
}
DBErrors CWallet::ZapWalletTx(std::vector<CWalletTx>& vWtx)
{
if (!fFileBacked)
return DB_LOAD_OK;
DBErrors nZapWalletTxRet = CWalletDB(strWalletFile,"cr+").ZapWalletTx(this, vWtx);
if (nZapWalletTxRet == DB_NEED_REWRITE)
{
if (CDB::Rewrite(strWalletFile, "\x04pool"))
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
setKeyPool.clear();
// Note: can't top-up keypool here, because wallet is locked.
// User will be prompted to unlock wallet the next operation
// that requires a new key.
}
}
if (nZapWalletTxRet != DB_LOAD_OK)
return nZapWalletTxRet;
return DB_LOAD_OK;
}
bool CWallet::SetAddressBook(const CTxDestination& address, const string& strName, const string& strPurpose)
{
bool fUpdated = false;
{
LOCK(cs_wallet); // mapAddressBook
std::map<CTxDestination, CAddressBookData>::iterator mi = mapAddressBook.find(address);
fUpdated = mi != mapAddressBook.end();
mapAddressBook[address].name = strName;
if (!strPurpose.empty()) /* update purpose only if requested */
mapAddressBook[address].purpose = strPurpose;
}
NotifyAddressBookChanged(this, address, strName, ::IsMine(*this, address) != ISMINE_NO,
strPurpose, (fUpdated ? CT_UPDATED : CT_NEW) );
if (!fFileBacked)
return false;
if (!strPurpose.empty() && !CWalletDB(strWalletFile).WritePurpose(CBitcoinAddress(address).ToString(), strPurpose))
return false;
return CWalletDB(strWalletFile).WriteName(CBitcoinAddress(address).ToString(), strName);
}
bool CWallet::DelAddressBook(const CTxDestination& address)
{
{
LOCK(cs_wallet); // mapAddressBook
if(fFileBacked)
{
// Delete destdata tuples associated with address
std::string strAddress = CBitcoinAddress(address).ToString();
BOOST_FOREACH(const PAIRTYPE(string, string) &item, mapAddressBook[address].destdata)
{
CWalletDB(strWalletFile).EraseDestData(strAddress, item.first);
}
}
mapAddressBook.erase(address);
}
NotifyAddressBookChanged(this, address, "", ::IsMine(*this, address) != ISMINE_NO, "", CT_DELETED);
if (!fFileBacked)
return false;
CWalletDB(strWalletFile).ErasePurpose(CBitcoinAddress(address).ToString());
return CWalletDB(strWalletFile).EraseName(CBitcoinAddress(address).ToString());
}
bool CWallet::SetDefaultKey(const CPubKey &vchPubKey)
{
if (fFileBacked)
{
if (!CWalletDB(strWalletFile).WriteDefaultKey(vchPubKey))
return false;
}
vchDefaultKey = vchPubKey;
return true;
}
/**
* Mark old keypool keys as used,
* and generate all new keys
*/
bool CWallet::NewKeyPool()
{
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
CWalletDB walletdb(strWalletFile);
BOOST_FOREACH(int64_t nIndex, setKeyPool)
walletdb.ErasePool(nIndex);
setKeyPool.clear();
if (IsLocked())
return false;
int64_t nKeys = max(GetArg("-keypool", 100), (int64_t)0);
for (int i = 0; i < nKeys; i++)
{
int64_t nIndex = i+1;
walletdb.WritePool(nIndex, CKeyPool(GenerateNewKey()));
setKeyPool.insert(nIndex);
}
LogPrintf("CWallet::NewKeyPool wrote %d new keys\n", nKeys);
}
return true;
}
bool CWallet::TopUpKeyPool(unsigned int kpSize)
{
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
if (IsLocked())
return false;
CWalletDB walletdb(strWalletFile);
// Top up key pool
unsigned int nTargetSize;
if (kpSize > 0)
nTargetSize = kpSize;
else
nTargetSize = max(GetArg("-keypool", 100), (int64_t) 0);
while (setKeyPool.size() < (nTargetSize + 1))
{
int64_t nEnd = 1;
if (!setKeyPool.empty())
nEnd = *(--setKeyPool.end()) + 1;
if (!walletdb.WritePool(nEnd, CKeyPool(GenerateNewKey())))
throw runtime_error("TopUpKeyPool(): writing generated key failed");
setKeyPool.insert(nEnd);
LogPrintf("keypool added key %d, size=%u\n", nEnd, setKeyPool.size());
}
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
}
return true;
}
void CWallet::ReserveKeyFromKeyPool(int64_t& nIndex, CKeyPool& keypool)
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
{
nIndex = -1;
keypool.vchPubKey = CPubKey();
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
if (!IsLocked())
TopUpKeyPool();
// Get the oldest key
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
if(setKeyPool.empty())
return;
CWalletDB walletdb(strWalletFile);
nIndex = *(setKeyPool.begin());
setKeyPool.erase(setKeyPool.begin());
if (!walletdb.ReadPool(nIndex, keypool))
throw runtime_error("ReserveKeyFromKeyPool(): read failed");
if (!HaveKey(keypool.vchPubKey.GetID()))
throw runtime_error("ReserveKeyFromKeyPool(): unknown key in key pool");
assert(keypool.vchPubKey.IsValid());
LogPrintf("keypool reserve %d\n", nIndex);
}
}
void CWallet::KeepKey(int64_t nIndex)
{
// Remove from key pool
if (fFileBacked)
{
CWalletDB walletdb(strWalletFile);
walletdb.ErasePool(nIndex);
}
LogPrintf("keypool keep %d\n", nIndex);
}
void CWallet::ReturnKey(int64_t nIndex)
{
// Return to key pool
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
setKeyPool.insert(nIndex);
}
LogPrintf("keypool return %d\n", nIndex);
}
bool CWallet::GetKeyFromPool(CPubKey& result)
{
int64_t nIndex = 0;
CKeyPool keypool;
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
ReserveKeyFromKeyPool(nIndex, keypool);
if (nIndex == -1)
{
if (IsLocked()) return false;
result = GenerateNewKey();
return true;
}
KeepKey(nIndex);
result = keypool.vchPubKey;
}
return true;
}
int64_t CWallet::GetOldestKeyPoolTime()
{
int64_t nIndex = 0;
CKeyPool keypool;
ReserveKeyFromKeyPool(nIndex, keypool);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
if (nIndex == -1)
return GetTime();
ReturnKey(nIndex);
return keypool.nTime;
}
std::map<CTxDestination, CAmount> CWallet::GetAddressBalances()
{
map<CTxDestination, CAmount> balances;
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
BOOST_FOREACH(PAIRTYPE(uint256, CWalletTx) walletEntry, mapWallet)
{
CWalletTx *pcoin = &walletEntry.second;
if (!CheckFinalTx(*pcoin) || !pcoin->IsTrusted())
continue;
if (pcoin->IsCoinBase() && pcoin->GetBlocksToMaturity() > 0)
continue;
int nDepth = pcoin->GetDepthInMainChain();
if (nDepth < (pcoin->IsFromMe(ISMINE_ALL) ? 0 : 1))
continue;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < pcoin->vout.size(); i++)
{
CTxDestination addr;
if (!IsMine(pcoin->vout[i]))
continue;
if(!ExtractDestination(pcoin->vout[i].scriptPubKey, addr))
continue;
CAmount n = IsSpent(walletEntry.first, i) ? 0 : pcoin->vout[i].nValue;
if (!balances.count(addr))
balances[addr] = 0;
balances[addr] += n;
}
}
}
return balances;
}
set< set<CTxDestination> > CWallet::GetAddressGroupings()
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // mapWallet
set< set<CTxDestination> > groupings;
set<CTxDestination> grouping;
BOOST_FOREACH(PAIRTYPE(uint256, CWalletTx) walletEntry, mapWallet)
{
CWalletTx *pcoin = &walletEntry.second;
if (pcoin->vin.size() > 0)
{
bool any_mine = false;
// group all input addresses with each other
BOOST_FOREACH(CTxIn txin, pcoin->vin)
{
CTxDestination address;
if(!IsMine(txin)) /* If this input isn't mine, ignore it */
continue;
if(!ExtractDestination(mapWallet[txin.prevout.hash].vout[txin.prevout.n].scriptPubKey, address))
continue;
grouping.insert(address);
any_mine = true;
}
// group change with input addresses
if (any_mine)
{
BOOST_FOREACH(CTxOut txout, pcoin->vout)
if (IsChange(txout))
{
CTxDestination txoutAddr;
if(!ExtractDestination(txout.scriptPubKey, txoutAddr))
continue;
grouping.insert(txoutAddr);
}
}
if (grouping.size() > 0)
{
groupings.insert(grouping);
grouping.clear();
}
}
// group lone addrs by themselves
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < pcoin->vout.size(); i++)
if (IsMine(pcoin->vout[i]))
{
CTxDestination address;
if(!ExtractDestination(pcoin->vout[i].scriptPubKey, address))
continue;
grouping.insert(address);
groupings.insert(grouping);
grouping.clear();
}
}
set< set<CTxDestination>* > uniqueGroupings; // a set of pointers to groups of addresses
map< CTxDestination, set<CTxDestination>* > setmap; // map addresses to the unique group containing it
BOOST_FOREACH(set<CTxDestination> grouping, groupings)
{
// make a set of all the groups hit by this new group
set< set<CTxDestination>* > hits;
map< CTxDestination, set<CTxDestination>* >::iterator it;
BOOST_FOREACH(CTxDestination address, grouping)
if ((it = setmap.find(address)) != setmap.end())
hits.insert((*it).second);
// merge all hit groups into a new single group and delete old groups
set<CTxDestination>* merged = new set<CTxDestination>(grouping);
BOOST_FOREACH(set<CTxDestination>* hit, hits)
{
merged->insert(hit->begin(), hit->end());
uniqueGroupings.erase(hit);
delete hit;
}
uniqueGroupings.insert(merged);
// update setmap
BOOST_FOREACH(CTxDestination element, *merged)
setmap[element] = merged;
}
set< set<CTxDestination> > ret;
BOOST_FOREACH(set<CTxDestination>* uniqueGrouping, uniqueGroupings)
{
ret.insert(*uniqueGrouping);
delete uniqueGrouping;
}
return ret;
}
std::set<CTxDestination> CWallet::GetAccountAddresses(const std::string& strAccount) const
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
set<CTxDestination> result;
BOOST_FOREACH(const PAIRTYPE(CTxDestination, CAddressBookData)& item, mapAddressBook)
{
const CTxDestination& address = item.first;
const string& strName = item.second.name;
if (strName == strAccount)
result.insert(address);
}
return result;
}
bool CReserveKey::GetReservedKey(CPubKey& pubkey)
{
if (nIndex == -1)
{
CKeyPool keypool;
pwallet->ReserveKeyFromKeyPool(nIndex, keypool);
if (nIndex != -1)
vchPubKey = keypool.vchPubKey;
else {
return false;
}
}
assert(vchPubKey.IsValid());
pubkey = vchPubKey;
return true;
}
void CReserveKey::KeepKey()
{
if (nIndex != -1)
pwallet->KeepKey(nIndex);
nIndex = -1;
vchPubKey = CPubKey();
}
void CReserveKey::ReturnKey()
{
if (nIndex != -1)
pwallet->ReturnKey(nIndex);
nIndex = -1;
vchPubKey = CPubKey();
}
void CWallet::GetAllReserveKeys(set<CKeyID>& setAddress) const
{
setAddress.clear();
CWalletDB walletdb(strWalletFile);
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
BOOST_FOREACH(const int64_t& id, setKeyPool)
{
CKeyPool keypool;
if (!walletdb.ReadPool(id, keypool))
throw runtime_error("GetAllReserveKeyHashes(): read failed");
assert(keypool.vchPubKey.IsValid());
CKeyID keyID = keypool.vchPubKey.GetID();
if (!HaveKey(keyID))
throw runtime_error("GetAllReserveKeyHashes(): unknown key in key pool");
setAddress.insert(keyID);
}
}
void CWallet::UpdatedTransaction(const uint256 &hashTx)
{
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
// Only notify UI if this transaction is in this wallet
map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator mi = mapWallet.find(hashTx);
if (mi != mapWallet.end())
NotifyTransactionChanged(this, hashTx, CT_UPDATED);
}
}
void CWallet::GetScriptForMining(boost::shared_ptr<CReserveScript> &script)
{
boost::shared_ptr<CReserveKey> rKey(new CReserveKey(this));
CPubKey pubkey;
if (!rKey->GetReservedKey(pubkey))
return;
script = rKey;
script->reserveScript = CScript() << ToByteVector(pubkey) << OP_CHECKSIG;
}
void CWallet::LockCoin(COutPoint& output)
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // setLockedCoins
setLockedCoins.insert(output);
}
void CWallet::UnlockCoin(COutPoint& output)
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // setLockedCoins
setLockedCoins.erase(output);
}
void CWallet::UnlockAllCoins()
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // setLockedCoins
setLockedCoins.clear();
}
bool CWallet::IsLockedCoin(uint256 hash, unsigned int n) const
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // setLockedCoins
COutPoint outpt(hash, n);
return (setLockedCoins.count(outpt) > 0);
}
void CWallet::ListLockedCoins(std::vector<COutPoint>& vOutpts)
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // setLockedCoins
for (std::set<COutPoint>::iterator it = setLockedCoins.begin();
it != setLockedCoins.end(); it++) {
COutPoint outpt = (*it);
vOutpts.push_back(outpt);
}
}
/** @} */ // end of Actions
class CAffectedKeysVisitor : public boost::static_visitor<void> {
private:
const CKeyStore &keystore;
std::vector<CKeyID> &vKeys;
public:
CAffectedKeysVisitor(const CKeyStore &keystoreIn, std::vector<CKeyID> &vKeysIn) : keystore(keystoreIn), vKeys(vKeysIn) {}
void Process(const CScript &script) {
txnouttype type;
std::vector<CTxDestination> vDest;
int nRequired;
if (ExtractDestinations(script, type, vDest, nRequired)) {
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxDestination &dest, vDest)
boost::apply_visitor(*this, dest);
}
}
void operator()(const CKeyID &keyId) {
if (keystore.HaveKey(keyId))
vKeys.push_back(keyId);
}
void operator()(const CScriptID &scriptId) {
CScript script;
if (keystore.GetCScript(scriptId, script))
Process(script);
}
void operator()(const CNoDestination &none) {}
};
void CWallet::GetKeyBirthTimes(std::map<CKeyID, int64_t> &mapKeyBirth) const {
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // mapKeyMetadata
mapKeyBirth.clear();
// get birth times for keys with metadata
for (std::map<CKeyID, CKeyMetadata>::const_iterator it = mapKeyMetadata.begin(); it != mapKeyMetadata.end(); it++)
if (it->second.nCreateTime)
mapKeyBirth[it->first] = it->second.nCreateTime;
// map in which we'll infer heights of other keys
CBlockIndex *pindexMax = chainActive[std::max(0, chainActive.Height() - 144)]; // the tip can be reorganised; use a 144-block safety margin
std::map<CKeyID, CBlockIndex*> mapKeyFirstBlock;
std::set<CKeyID> setKeys;
GetKeys(setKeys);
BOOST_FOREACH(const CKeyID &keyid, setKeys) {
if (mapKeyBirth.count(keyid) == 0)
mapKeyFirstBlock[keyid] = pindexMax;
}
setKeys.clear();
// if there are no such keys, we're done
if (mapKeyFirstBlock.empty())
return;
// find first block that affects those keys, if there are any left
std::vector<CKeyID> vAffected;
for (std::map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator it = mapWallet.begin(); it != mapWallet.end(); it++) {
// iterate over all wallet transactions...
const CWalletTx &wtx = (*it).second;
BlockMap::const_iterator blit = mapBlockIndex.find(wtx.hashBlock);
if (blit != mapBlockIndex.end() && chainActive.Contains(blit->second)) {
// ... which are already in a block
int nHeight = blit->second->nHeight;
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxOut &txout, wtx.vout) {
// iterate over all their outputs
CAffectedKeysVisitor(*this, vAffected).Process(txout.scriptPubKey);
BOOST_FOREACH(const CKeyID &keyid, vAffected) {
// ... and all their affected keys
std::map<CKeyID, CBlockIndex*>::iterator rit = mapKeyFirstBlock.find(keyid);
if (rit != mapKeyFirstBlock.end() && nHeight < rit->second->nHeight)
rit->second = blit->second;
}
vAffected.clear();
}
}
}
// Extract block timestamps for those keys
for (std::map<CKeyID, CBlockIndex*>::const_iterator it = mapKeyFirstBlock.begin(); it != mapKeyFirstBlock.end(); it++)
mapKeyBirth[it->first] = it->second->GetBlockTime() - 7200; // block times can be 2h off
}
bool CWallet::AddDestData(const CTxDestination &dest, const std::string &key, const std::string &value)
{
if (boost::get<CNoDestination>(&dest))
return false;
mapAddressBook[dest].destdata.insert(std::make_pair(key, value));
if (!fFileBacked)
return true;
return CWalletDB(strWalletFile).WriteDestData(CBitcoinAddress(dest).ToString(), key, value);
}
bool CWallet::EraseDestData(const CTxDestination &dest, const std::string &key)
{
if (!mapAddressBook[dest].destdata.erase(key))
return false;
if (!fFileBacked)
return true;
return CWalletDB(strWalletFile).EraseDestData(CBitcoinAddress(dest).ToString(), key);
}
bool CWallet::LoadDestData(const CTxDestination &dest, const std::string &key, const std::string &value)
{
mapAddressBook[dest].destdata.insert(std::make_pair(key, value));
return true;
}
bool CWallet::GetDestData(const CTxDestination &dest, const std::string &key, std::string *value) const
{
std::map<CTxDestination, CAddressBookData>::const_iterator i = mapAddressBook.find(dest);
if(i != mapAddressBook.end())
{
CAddressBookData::StringMap::const_iterator j = i->second.destdata.find(key);
if(j != i->second.destdata.end())
{
if(value)
*value = j->second;
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
CKeyPool::CKeyPool()
{
nTime = GetTime();
}
CKeyPool::CKeyPool(const CPubKey& vchPubKeyIn)
{
nTime = GetTime();
vchPubKey = vchPubKeyIn;
}
CWalletKey::CWalletKey(int64_t nExpires)
{
nTimeCreated = (nExpires ? GetTime() : 0);
nTimeExpires = nExpires;
}
int CMerkleTx::SetMerkleBranch(const CBlock& block)
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
CBlock blockTmp;
// Update the tx's hashBlock
hashBlock = block.GetHash();
// Locate the transaction
for (nIndex = 0; nIndex < (int)block.vtx.size(); nIndex++)
if (block.vtx[nIndex] == *(CTransaction*)this)
break;
if (nIndex == (int)block.vtx.size())
{
vMerkleBranch.clear();
nIndex = -1;
LogPrintf("ERROR: SetMerkleBranch(): couldn't find tx in block\n");
return 0;
}
// Fill in merkle branch
vMerkleBranch = block.GetMerkleBranch(nIndex);
// Is the tx in a block that's in the main chain
BlockMap::iterator mi = mapBlockIndex.find(hashBlock);
if (mi == mapBlockIndex.end())
return 0;
const CBlockIndex* pindex = (*mi).second;
if (!pindex || !chainActive.Contains(pindex))
return 0;
return chainActive.Height() - pindex->nHeight + 1;
}
int CMerkleTx::GetDepthInMainChainINTERNAL(const CBlockIndex* &pindexRet) const
{
if (hashBlock.IsNull() || nIndex == -1)
return 0;
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
// Find the block it claims to be in
BlockMap::iterator mi = mapBlockIndex.find(hashBlock);
if (mi == mapBlockIndex.end())
return 0;
CBlockIndex* pindex = (*mi).second;
if (!pindex || !chainActive.Contains(pindex))
return 0;
// Make sure the merkle branch connects to this block
if (!fMerkleVerified)
{
if (CBlock::CheckMerkleBranch(GetHash(), vMerkleBranch, nIndex) != pindex->hashMerkleRoot)
return 0;
fMerkleVerified = true;
}
pindexRet = pindex;
return chainActive.Height() - pindex->nHeight + 1;
}
int CMerkleTx::GetDepthInMainChain(const CBlockIndex* &pindexRet) const
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
int nResult = GetDepthInMainChainINTERNAL(pindexRet);
if (nResult == 0 && !mempool.exists(GetHash()))
return -1; // Not in chain, not in mempool
return nResult;
}
int CMerkleTx::GetBlocksToMaturity() const
{
if (!IsCoinBase())
return 0;
return max(0, (COINBASE_MATURITY+1) - GetDepthInMainChain());
}
bool CMerkleTx::AcceptToMemoryPool(bool fLimitFree, bool fRejectAbsurdFee)
{
CValidationState state;
return ::AcceptToMemoryPool(mempool, state, *this, fLimitFree, NULL, fRejectAbsurdFee);
}