Previously the minRelayTxFee was only enforced on user specified values.
It was possible for smartfee to produce a fee below minRelayTxFee which
would just result in the transaction getting stuck because it can't be
relayed.
This also introduces a maxtxfee option which sets an absolute maximum
for any fee created by the wallet, with an intention of increasing
user confidence that the automatic fees won't burn them. This was
frequently a concern even before smartfees.
If the configured fee policy won't even allow the wallet to meet the relay
fee the transaction creation may be aborted.
'Sane' was already defined by this code as:
fee.GetFeePerK() > minRelayFee.GetFeePerK() * 10000
But sanity was only enforced for data loaded from disk.
Note that this is a pretty expansive definition of 'sane': A 10 BTC
fee is still passes the test if its on a 100kb transaction.
This prevents a single insane fee on the network from making us reject
our stored fee data at start. We still may reject valid saved fee
state if minRelayFee is changed between executions.
This also reduces the risk and limits the damage from a cascading
failure where one party pays a bunch of insane fees which cases
others to pay insane fees.
This is a check that is mentioned in BIP 37, but never implemented in the
reference code. As Bitcoin Core so far never decodes partial merkle trees,
this is not a problem. But perhaps others use the code as a reference.
bccaf86 Merge pull request #150
2a53a47 Merge pull request #151
5f5a31f Merge pull request #149
3907277 Merge pull request #142
a3e0611 Enable tests in x86 travis builds
45da235 x86 builder
8bb0e93 Merge pull request #155
971fe81 build: fix openssl detection for cross builds
f22d73e Explicitly access %0..%2 as 64-bit so we use the right registers for x32 ABI
e66d4d6 Avoid the stack in assembly and use explicit registers
cf7b2b4 Fix ECDSA message hashes to 32 bytes
056ad31 Really compile with -O3 by default
74ad63a Merge pull request #146
9000458 Merge pull request #145
1f46b00 build: fix __builtin_expect detection for clang
aaba2e0 Merge pull request #136
8a0775c Merge pull request #144
ee1eaa7 Merge pull request #141
c88e2b8 Compile with -O3 by default
6558a26 Make the benchmarks print out stats
000bdf6 Rename bench_verify to bench_recovery
7c6fed2 Add a few more additional tests.
992e03b travis: add clang to the test matrix
b43b79a Merge pull request #143
e06a924 Include time.h header for time().
8d11164 Add some additional tests.
3545627 Merge pull request #118
6a9901e Merge pull request #137
376b28b Merge pull request #128
1728806 Merge pull request #138
a5759c5 Check return value of malloc
39bd94d Variable time normalize
ad86bdf Merge pull request #140
54b768c Another redundant secp256k1_fe_normalize
69dcaab Merge pull request #139
1c29f2e Remove redundant secp256k1_fe_normalize from secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var.
2b9388b Remove unused secp256k1_fe_inv_all
f461b76 Allocate precomputation arrays on the heap
b2c9681 Make {mul,sqr}_inner use the same argument order as {mul,sqr}
6793505 Convert YASM code into inline assembly
f048615 Rewrite field assembly to match the C version
3ce74b1 Tweak precomputed table size for G
git-subtree-dir: src/secp256k1
git-subtree-split: bccaf86caa9c44166e5a66600b742c516e03c3f0
- rest block request returns full unfolded tx details
- /rest/block/notxdetails/<HASH> returns block where transactions are only represented by its hash
This still leaves transactions in mempool that are potentially
invalid if the maturity period has been reorged out of, but at
least they're not missing inputs entirely.
- current code only does this for payment request files, which are
used on Mac
- also rename readPaymentRequest to readPaymentRequestFromFile, so it's
obvious that function only handles payment request files and not URIs
- small logging changes in readPaymentRequestFromFile
TLS is subject to downgrade attacks when SSLv3 is available, and
SSLv3 has vulnerabilities.
The popular solution is to disable SSLv3. On the web this breaks
some tiny number of very old clients. While Bitcoin RPC shouldn't
be exposed to the open Internet, it also shouldn't be exposed to
really old SSL implementations, so it shouldn't be a major issue
for us to disable SSLv3.
There is more information on the downgrade attacks and disabling
SSLv3 at https://disablessl3.com/ .
Matt Corallo