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// Copyright (c) 2009-2010 Satoshi Nakamoto
// Copyright (c) 2009-2012 The Bitcoin developers
// Distributed under the MIT/X11 software license, see the accompanying
// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
#include "wallet.h"
#include "walletdb.h"
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
#include "crypter.h"
#include "ui_interface.h"
#include "base58.h"
#include <boost/algorithm/string/replace.hpp>
using namespace std;
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// mapWallet
//
struct CompareValueOnly
{
bool operator()(const pair<int64, pair<const CWalletTx*, unsigned int> >& t1,
const pair<int64, pair<const CWalletTx*, unsigned int> >& t2) const
{
return t1.first < t2.first;
}
};
CPubKey CWallet::GenerateNewKey()
{
bool fCompressed = CanSupportFeature(FEATURE_COMPRPUBKEY); // default to compressed public keys if we want 0.6.0 wallets
RandAddSeedPerfmon();
CKey secret;
secret.MakeNewKey(fCompressed);
// Compressed public keys were introduced in version 0.6.0
if (fCompressed)
SetMinVersion(FEATURE_COMPRPUBKEY);
CPubKey pubkey = secret.GetPubKey();
// Create new metadata
int64 nCreationTime = GetTime();
mapKeyMetadata[pubkey.GetID()] = CKeyMetadata(nCreationTime);
if (!nTimeFirstKey || nCreationTime < nTimeFirstKey)
nTimeFirstKey = nCreationTime;
if (!AddKeyPubKey(secret, pubkey))
throw std::runtime_error("CWallet::GenerateNewKey() : AddKey failed");
return pubkey;
}
bool CWallet::AddKeyPubKey(const CKey& secret, const CPubKey &pubkey)
{
if (!CCryptoKeyStore::AddKeyPubKey(secret, pubkey))
return false;
if (!fFileBacked)
return true;
if (!IsCrypted()) {
return CWalletDB(strWalletFile).WriteKey(pubkey,
secret.GetPrivKey(),
mapKeyMetadata[pubkey.GetID()]);
}
return true;
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
}
bool CWallet::AddCryptedKey(const CPubKey &vchPubKey,
const vector<unsigned char> &vchCryptedSecret)
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
{
if (!CCryptoKeyStore::AddCryptedKey(vchPubKey, vchCryptedSecret))
return false;
if (!fFileBacked)
return true;
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
if (pwalletdbEncryption)
return pwalletdbEncryption->WriteCryptedKey(vchPubKey,
vchCryptedSecret,
mapKeyMetadata[vchPubKey.GetID()]);
else
return CWalletDB(strWalletFile).WriteCryptedKey(vchPubKey,
vchCryptedSecret,
mapKeyMetadata[vchPubKey.GetID()]);
}
return false;
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
}
bool CWallet::LoadKeyMetadata(const CPubKey &pubkey, const CKeyMetadata &meta)
{
if (meta.nCreateTime && (!nTimeFirstKey || meta.nCreateTime < nTimeFirstKey))
nTimeFirstKey = meta.nCreateTime;
mapKeyMetadata[pubkey.GetID()] = meta;
return true;
}
bool CWallet::LoadCryptedKey(const CPubKey &vchPubKey, const std::vector<unsigned char> &vchCryptedSecret)
{
return CCryptoKeyStore::AddCryptedKey(vchPubKey, vchCryptedSecret);
}
bool CWallet::AddCScript(const CScript& redeemScript)
{
if (!CCryptoKeyStore::AddCScript(redeemScript))
return false;
if (!fFileBacked)
return true;
return CWalletDB(strWalletFile).WriteCScript(Hash160(redeemScript), redeemScript);
}
bool CWallet::Unlock(const SecureString& strWalletPassphrase)
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
{
CCrypter crypter;
CKeyingMaterial vMasterKey;
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
BOOST_FOREACH(const MasterKeyMap::value_type& pMasterKey, mapMasterKeys)
{
if(!crypter.SetKeyFromPassphrase(strWalletPassphrase, pMasterKey.second.vchSalt, pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations, pMasterKey.second.nDerivationMethod))
return false;
if (!crypter.Decrypt(pMasterKey.second.vchCryptedKey, vMasterKey))
continue; // try another master key
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
if (CCryptoKeyStore::Unlock(vMasterKey))
return true;
}
}
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
return false;
}
bool CWallet::ChangeWalletPassphrase(const SecureString& strOldWalletPassphrase, const SecureString& strNewWalletPassphrase)
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
{
bool fWasLocked = IsLocked();
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
Lock();
CCrypter crypter;
CKeyingMaterial vMasterKey;
BOOST_FOREACH(MasterKeyMap::value_type& pMasterKey, mapMasterKeys)
{
if(!crypter.SetKeyFromPassphrase(strOldWalletPassphrase, pMasterKey.second.vchSalt, pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations, pMasterKey.second.nDerivationMethod))
return false;
if (!crypter.Decrypt(pMasterKey.second.vchCryptedKey, vMasterKey))
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
return false;
if (CCryptoKeyStore::Unlock(vMasterKey))
{
int64 nStartTime = GetTimeMillis();
crypter.SetKeyFromPassphrase(strNewWalletPassphrase, pMasterKey.second.vchSalt, pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations, pMasterKey.second.nDerivationMethod);
pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations = pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations * (100 / ((double)(GetTimeMillis() - nStartTime)));
nStartTime = GetTimeMillis();
crypter.SetKeyFromPassphrase(strNewWalletPassphrase, pMasterKey.second.vchSalt, pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations, pMasterKey.second.nDerivationMethod);
pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations = (pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations + pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations * 100 / ((double)(GetTimeMillis() - nStartTime))) / 2;
if (pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations < 25000)
pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations = 25000;
printf("Wallet passphrase changed to an nDeriveIterations of %i\n", pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
if (!crypter.SetKeyFromPassphrase(strNewWalletPassphrase, pMasterKey.second.vchSalt, pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations, pMasterKey.second.nDerivationMethod))
return false;
if (!crypter.Encrypt(vMasterKey, pMasterKey.second.vchCryptedKey))
return false;
CWalletDB(strWalletFile).WriteMasterKey(pMasterKey.first, pMasterKey.second);
if (fWasLocked)
Lock();
return true;
}
}
}
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
return false;
}
13 years ago
void CWallet::SetBestChain(const CBlockLocator& loc)
{
CWalletDB walletdb(strWalletFile);
walletdb.WriteBestBlock(loc);
}
// This class implements an addrIncoming entry that causes pre-0.4
// clients to crash on startup if reading a private-key-encrypted wallet.
class CCorruptAddress
{
public:
IMPLEMENT_SERIALIZE
(
if (nType & SER_DISK)
READWRITE(nVersion);
)
};
bool CWallet::SetMinVersion(enum WalletFeature nVersion, CWalletDB* pwalletdbIn, bool fExplicit)
{
if (nWalletVersion >= nVersion)
return true;
// when doing an explicit upgrade, if we pass the max version permitted, upgrade all the way
if (fExplicit && nVersion > nWalletMaxVersion)
nVersion = FEATURE_LATEST;
nWalletVersion = nVersion;
if (nVersion > nWalletMaxVersion)
nWalletMaxVersion = nVersion;
if (fFileBacked)
{
CWalletDB* pwalletdb = pwalletdbIn ? pwalletdbIn : new CWalletDB(strWalletFile);
if (nWalletVersion >= 40000)
{
// Versions prior to 0.4.0 did not support the "minversion" record.
// Use a CCorruptAddress to make them crash instead.
CCorruptAddress corruptAddress;
pwalletdb->WriteSetting("addrIncoming", corruptAddress);
}
if (nWalletVersion > 40000)
pwalletdb->WriteMinVersion(nWalletVersion);
if (!pwalletdbIn)
delete pwalletdb;
}
return true;
}
bool CWallet::SetMaxVersion(int nVersion)
{
// cannot downgrade below current version
if (nWalletVersion > nVersion)
return false;
nWalletMaxVersion = nVersion;
return true;
}
bool CWallet::EncryptWallet(const SecureString& strWalletPassphrase)
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
{
if (IsCrypted())
return false;
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
CKeyingMaterial vMasterKey;
RandAddSeedPerfmon();
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
vMasterKey.resize(WALLET_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE);
RAND_bytes(&vMasterKey[0], WALLET_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
CMasterKey kMasterKey;
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
RandAddSeedPerfmon();
kMasterKey.vchSalt.resize(WALLET_CRYPTO_SALT_SIZE);
RAND_bytes(&kMasterKey.vchSalt[0], WALLET_CRYPTO_SALT_SIZE);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
CCrypter crypter;
int64 nStartTime = GetTimeMillis();
crypter.SetKeyFromPassphrase(strWalletPassphrase, kMasterKey.vchSalt, 25000, kMasterKey.nDerivationMethod);
kMasterKey.nDeriveIterations = 2500000 / ((double)(GetTimeMillis() - nStartTime));
nStartTime = GetTimeMillis();
crypter.SetKeyFromPassphrase(strWalletPassphrase, kMasterKey.vchSalt, kMasterKey.nDeriveIterations, kMasterKey.nDerivationMethod);
kMasterKey.nDeriveIterations = (kMasterKey.nDeriveIterations + kMasterKey.nDeriveIterations * 100 / ((double)(GetTimeMillis() - nStartTime))) / 2;
if (kMasterKey.nDeriveIterations < 25000)
kMasterKey.nDeriveIterations = 25000;
printf("Encrypting Wallet with an nDeriveIterations of %i\n", kMasterKey.nDeriveIterations);
if (!crypter.SetKeyFromPassphrase(strWalletPassphrase, kMasterKey.vchSalt, kMasterKey.nDeriveIterations, kMasterKey.nDerivationMethod))
return false;
if (!crypter.Encrypt(vMasterKey, kMasterKey.vchCryptedKey))
return false;
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
mapMasterKeys[++nMasterKeyMaxID] = kMasterKey;
if (fFileBacked)
{
pwalletdbEncryption = new CWalletDB(strWalletFile);
if (!pwalletdbEncryption->TxnBegin())
return false;
pwalletdbEncryption->WriteMasterKey(nMasterKeyMaxID, kMasterKey);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
}
if (!EncryptKeys(vMasterKey))
{
if (fFileBacked)
pwalletdbEncryption->TxnAbort();
exit(1); //We now probably have half of our keys encrypted in memory, and half not...die and let the user reload their unencrypted wallet.
}
// Encryption was introduced in version 0.4.0
SetMinVersion(FEATURE_WALLETCRYPT, pwalletdbEncryption, true);
if (fFileBacked)
{
if (!pwalletdbEncryption->TxnCommit())
exit(1); //We now have keys encrypted in memory, but no on disk...die to avoid confusion and let the user reload their unencrypted wallet.
delete pwalletdbEncryption;
pwalletdbEncryption = NULL;
}
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
Lock();
Unlock(strWalletPassphrase);
NewKeyPool();
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
Lock();
// Need to completely rewrite the wallet file; if we don't, bdb might keep
// bits of the unencrypted private key in slack space in the database file.
CDB::Rewrite(strWalletFile);
}
NotifyStatusChanged(this);
13 years ago
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
return true;
}
int64 CWallet::IncOrderPosNext(CWalletDB *pwalletdb)
{
int64 nRet = nOrderPosNext++;
if (pwalletdb) {
pwalletdb->WriteOrderPosNext(nOrderPosNext);
} else {
CWalletDB(strWalletFile).WriteOrderPosNext(nOrderPosNext);
}
return nRet;
}
CWallet::TxItems CWallet::OrderedTxItems(std::list<CAccountingEntry>& acentries, std::string strAccount)
{
CWalletDB walletdb(strWalletFile);
// First: get all CWalletTx and CAccountingEntry into a sorted-by-order multimap.
TxItems txOrdered;
// Note: maintaining indices in the database of (account,time) --> txid and (account, time) --> acentry
// would make this much faster for applications that do this a lot.
for (map<uint256, CWalletTx>::iterator it = mapWallet.begin(); it != mapWallet.end(); ++it)
{
CWalletTx* wtx = &((*it).second);
txOrdered.insert(make_pair(wtx->nOrderPos, TxPair(wtx, (CAccountingEntry*)0)));
}
acentries.clear();
walletdb.ListAccountCreditDebit(strAccount, acentries);
BOOST_FOREACH(CAccountingEntry& entry, acentries)
{
txOrdered.insert(make_pair(entry.nOrderPos, TxPair((CWalletTx*)0, &entry)));
}
return txOrdered;
}
void CWallet::WalletUpdateSpent(const CTransaction &tx)
{
// Anytime a signature is successfully verified, it's proof the outpoint is spent.
// Update the wallet spent flag if it doesn't know due to wallet.dat being
// restored from backup or the user making copies of wallet.dat.
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxIn& txin, tx.vin)
{
map<uint256, CWalletTx>::iterator mi = mapWallet.find(txin.prevout.hash);
if (mi != mapWallet.end())
{
CWalletTx& wtx = (*mi).second;
if (txin.prevout.n >= wtx.vout.size())
printf("WalletUpdateSpent: bad wtx %s\n", wtx.GetHash().ToString().c_str());
else if (!wtx.IsSpent(txin.prevout.n) && IsMine(wtx.vout[txin.prevout.n]))
{
printf("WalletUpdateSpent found spent coin %sbc %s\n", FormatMoney(wtx.GetCredit()).c_str(), wtx.GetHash().ToString().c_str());
wtx.MarkSpent(txin.prevout.n);
wtx.WriteToDisk();
NotifyTransactionChanged(this, txin.prevout.hash, CT_UPDATED);
}
}
}
}
}
void CWallet::MarkDirty()
{
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
BOOST_FOREACH(PAIRTYPE(const uint256, CWalletTx)& item, mapWallet)
item.second.MarkDirty();
}
}
bool CWallet::AddToWallet(const CWalletTx& wtxIn)
{
uint256 hash = wtxIn.GetHash();
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
// Inserts only if not already there, returns tx inserted or tx found
pair<map<uint256, CWalletTx>::iterator, bool> ret = mapWallet.insert(make_pair(hash, wtxIn));
CWalletTx& wtx = (*ret.first).second;
wtx.BindWallet(this);
bool fInsertedNew = ret.second;
if (fInsertedNew)
{
wtx.nTimeReceived = GetAdjustedTime();
wtx.nOrderPos = IncOrderPosNext();
wtx.nTimeSmart = wtx.nTimeReceived;
if (wtxIn.hashBlock != 0)
{
if (mapBlockIndex.count(wtxIn.hashBlock))
{
unsigned int latestNow = wtx.nTimeReceived;
unsigned int latestEntry = 0;
{
// Tolerate times up to the last timestamp in the wallet not more than 5 minutes into the future
int64 latestTolerated = latestNow + 300;
std::list<CAccountingEntry> acentries;
TxItems txOrdered = OrderedTxItems(acentries);
for (TxItems::reverse_iterator it = txOrdered.rbegin(); it != txOrdered.rend(); ++it)
{
CWalletTx *const pwtx = (*it).second.first;
if (pwtx == &wtx)
continue;
CAccountingEntry *const pacentry = (*it).second.second;
int64 nSmartTime;
if (pwtx)
{
nSmartTime = pwtx->nTimeSmart;
if (!nSmartTime)
nSmartTime = pwtx->nTimeReceived;
}
else
nSmartTime = pacentry->nTime;
if (nSmartTime <= latestTolerated)
{
latestEntry = nSmartTime;
if (nSmartTime > latestNow)
latestNow = nSmartTime;
break;
}
}
}
unsigned int& blocktime = mapBlockIndex[wtxIn.hashBlock]->nTime;
wtx.nTimeSmart = std::max(latestEntry, std::min(blocktime, latestNow));
}
else
printf("AddToWallet() : found %s in block %s not in index\n",
wtxIn.GetHash().ToString().c_str(),
wtxIn.hashBlock.ToString().c_str());
}
}
bool fUpdated = false;
if (!fInsertedNew)
{
// Merge
if (wtxIn.hashBlock != 0 && wtxIn.hashBlock != wtx.hashBlock)
{
wtx.hashBlock = wtxIn.hashBlock;
fUpdated = true;
}
if (wtxIn.nIndex != -1 && (wtxIn.vMerkleBranch != wtx.vMerkleBranch || wtxIn.nIndex != wtx.nIndex))
{
wtx.vMerkleBranch = wtxIn.vMerkleBranch;
wtx.nIndex = wtxIn.nIndex;
fUpdated = true;
}
if (wtxIn.fFromMe && wtxIn.fFromMe != wtx.fFromMe)
{
wtx.fFromMe = wtxIn.fFromMe;
fUpdated = true;
}
fUpdated |= wtx.UpdateSpent(wtxIn.vfSpent);
}
//// debug print
printf("AddToWallet %s %s%s\n", wtxIn.GetHash().ToString().c_str(), (fInsertedNew ? "new" : ""), (fUpdated ? "update" : ""));
// Write to disk
if (fInsertedNew || fUpdated)
if (!wtx.WriteToDisk())
return false;
if (!fHaveGUI) {
// If default receiving address gets used, replace it with a new one
if (vchDefaultKey.IsValid()) {
CScript scriptDefaultKey;
scriptDefaultKey.SetDestination(vchDefaultKey.GetID());
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxOut& txout, wtx.vout)
{
if (txout.scriptPubKey == scriptDefaultKey)
{
CPubKey newDefaultKey;
if (GetKeyFromPool(newDefaultKey, false))
{
SetDefaultKey(newDefaultKey);
SetAddressBookName(vchDefaultKey.GetID(), "");
}
}
}
}
}
// since AddToWallet is called directly for self-originating transactions, check for consumption of own coins
WalletUpdateSpent(wtx);
// Notify UI of new or updated transaction
NotifyTransactionChanged(this, hash, fInsertedNew ? CT_NEW : CT_UPDATED);
// notify an external script when a wallet transaction comes in or is updated
std::string strCmd = GetArg("-walletnotify", "");
if ( !strCmd.empty())
{
boost::replace_all(strCmd, "%s", wtxIn.GetHash().GetHex());
boost::thread t(runCommand, strCmd); // thread runs free
}
}
return true;
}
// Add a transaction to the wallet, or update it.
// pblock is optional, but should be provided if the transaction is known to be in a block.
// If fUpdate is true, existing transactions will be updated.
bool CWallet::AddToWalletIfInvolvingMe(const uint256 &hash, const CTransaction& tx, const CBlock* pblock, bool fUpdate, bool fFindBlock)
{
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
bool fExisted = mapWallet.count(hash);
if (fExisted && !fUpdate) return false;
if (fExisted || IsMine(tx) || IsFromMe(tx))
{
CWalletTx wtx(this,tx);
// Get merkle branch if transaction was found in a block
if (pblock)
wtx.SetMerkleBranch(pblock);
return AddToWallet(wtx);
}
else
WalletUpdateSpent(tx);
}
return false;
}
bool CWallet::EraseFromWallet(uint256 hash)
{
if (!fFileBacked)
return false;
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
if (mapWallet.erase(hash))
CWalletDB(strWalletFile).EraseTx(hash);
}
return true;
}
bool CWallet::IsMine(const CTxIn &txin) const
{
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator mi = mapWallet.find(txin.prevout.hash);
if (mi != mapWallet.end())
{
const CWalletTx& prev = (*mi).second;
if (txin.prevout.n < prev.vout.size())
if (IsMine(prev.vout[txin.prevout.n]))
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
int64 CWallet::GetDebit(const CTxIn &txin) const
{
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator mi = mapWallet.find(txin.prevout.hash);
if (mi != mapWallet.end())
{
const CWalletTx& prev = (*mi).second;
if (txin.prevout.n < prev.vout.size())
if (IsMine(prev.vout[txin.prevout.n]))
return prev.vout[txin.prevout.n].nValue;
}
}
return 0;
}
bool CWallet::IsChange(const CTxOut& txout) const
{
CTxDestination address;
// TODO: fix handling of 'change' outputs. The assumption is that any
// payment to a TX_PUBKEYHASH that is mine but isn't in the address book
// is change. That assumption is likely to break when we implement multisignature
// wallets that return change back into a multi-signature-protected address;
// a better way of identifying which outputs are 'the send' and which are
// 'the change' will need to be implemented (maybe extend CWalletTx to remember
// which output, if any, was change).
if (ExtractDestination(txout.scriptPubKey, address) && ::IsMine(*this, address))
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
if (!mapAddressBook.count(address))
return true;
}
return false;
}
int64 CWalletTx::GetTxTime() const
{
int64 n = nTimeSmart;
return n ? n : nTimeReceived;
}
int CWalletTx::GetRequestCount() const
{
// Returns -1 if it wasn't being tracked
int nRequests = -1;
{
LOCK(pwallet->cs_wallet);
if (IsCoinBase())
{
// Generated block
if (hashBlock != 0)
{
map<uint256, int>::const_iterator mi = pwallet->mapRequestCount.find(hashBlock);
if (mi != pwallet->mapRequestCount.end())
nRequests = (*mi).second;
}
}
else
{
// Did anyone request this transaction?
map<uint256, int>::const_iterator mi = pwallet->mapRequestCount.find(GetHash());
if (mi != pwallet->mapRequestCount.end())
{
nRequests = (*mi).second;
// How about the block it's in?
if (nRequests == 0 && hashBlock != 0)
{
map<uint256, int>::const_iterator mi = pwallet->mapRequestCount.find(hashBlock);
if (mi != pwallet->mapRequestCount.end())
nRequests = (*mi).second;
else
nRequests = 1; // If it's in someone else's block it must have got out
}
}
}
}
return nRequests;
}
void CWalletTx::GetAmounts(list<pair<CTxDestination, int64> >& listReceived,
list<pair<CTxDestination, int64> >& listSent, int64& nFee, string& strSentAccount) const
{
nFee = 0;
listReceived.clear();
listSent.clear();
strSentAccount = strFromAccount;
// Compute fee:
int64 nDebit = GetDebit();
if (nDebit > 0) // debit>0 means we signed/sent this transaction
{
int64 nValueOut = GetValueOut(*this);
nFee = nDebit - nValueOut;
}
// Sent/received.
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxOut& txout, vout)
{
CTxDestination address;
vector<unsigned char> vchPubKey;
if (!ExtractDestination(txout.scriptPubKey, address))
{
printf("CWalletTx::GetAmounts: Unknown transaction type found, txid %s\n",
this->GetHash().ToString().c_str());
}
// Don't report 'change' txouts
if (nDebit > 0 && pwallet->IsChange(txout))
continue;
if (nDebit > 0)
listSent.push_back(make_pair(address, txout.nValue));
if (pwallet->IsMine(txout))
listReceived.push_back(make_pair(address, txout.nValue));
}
}
void CWalletTx::GetAccountAmounts(const string& strAccount, int64& nReceived,
int64& nSent, int64& nFee) const
{
nReceived = nSent = nFee = 0;
int64 allFee;
string strSentAccount;
list<pair<CTxDestination, int64> > listReceived;
list<pair<CTxDestination, int64> > listSent;
GetAmounts(listReceived, listSent, allFee, strSentAccount);
if (strAccount == strSentAccount)
{
BOOST_FOREACH(const PAIRTYPE(CTxDestination,int64)& s, listSent)
nSent += s.second;
nFee = allFee;
}
{
LOCK(pwallet->cs_wallet);
BOOST_FOREACH(const PAIRTYPE(CTxDestination,int64)& r, listReceived)
{
if (pwallet->mapAddressBook.count(r.first))
{
map<CTxDestination, string>::const_iterator mi = pwallet->mapAddressBook.find(r.first);
if (mi != pwallet->mapAddressBook.end() && (*mi).second == strAccount)
nReceived += r.second;
}
else if (strAccount.empty())
{
nReceived += r.second;
}
}
}
}
Ultraprune This switches bitcoin's transaction/block verification logic to use a "coin database", which contains all unredeemed transaction output scripts, amounts and heights. The name ultraprune comes from the fact that instead of a full transaction index, we only (need to) keep an index with unspent outputs. For now, the blocks themselves are kept as usual, although they are only necessary for serving, rescanning and reorganizing. The basic datastructures are CCoins (representing the coins of a single transaction), and CCoinsView (representing a state of the coins database). There are several implementations for CCoinsView. A dummy, one backed by the coins database (coins.dat), one backed by the memory pool, and one that adds a cache on top of it. FetchInputs, ConnectInputs, ConnectBlock, DisconnectBlock, ... now operate on a generic CCoinsView. The block switching logic now builds a single cached CCoinsView with changes to be committed to the database before any changes are made. This means no uncommitted changes are ever read from the database, and should ease the transition to another database layer which does not support transactions (but does support atomic writes), like LevelDB. For the getrawtransaction() RPC call, access to a txid-to-disk index would be preferable. As this index is not necessary or even useful for any other part of the implementation, it is not provided. Instead, getrawtransaction() uses the coin database to find the block height, and then scans that block to find the requested transaction. This is slow, but should suffice for debug purposes.
13 years ago
void CWalletTx::AddSupportingTransactions()
{
vtxPrev.clear();
const int COPY_DEPTH = 3;
if (SetMerkleBranch() < COPY_DEPTH)
{
vector<uint256> vWorkQueue;
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxIn& txin, vin)
vWorkQueue.push_back(txin.prevout.hash);
{
LOCK(pwallet->cs_wallet);
map<uint256, const CMerkleTx*> mapWalletPrev;
set<uint256> setAlreadyDone;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < vWorkQueue.size(); i++)
{
uint256 hash = vWorkQueue[i];
if (setAlreadyDone.count(hash))
continue;
setAlreadyDone.insert(hash);
CMerkleTx tx;
map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator mi = pwallet->mapWallet.find(hash);
if (mi != pwallet->mapWallet.end())
{
tx = (*mi).second;
BOOST_FOREACH(const CMerkleTx& txWalletPrev, (*mi).second.vtxPrev)
mapWalletPrev[txWalletPrev.GetHash()] = &txWalletPrev;
}
else if (mapWalletPrev.count(hash))
{
tx = *mapWalletPrev[hash];
}
int nDepth = tx.SetMerkleBranch();
vtxPrev.push_back(tx);
if (nDepth < COPY_DEPTH)
{
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxIn& txin, tx.vin)
vWorkQueue.push_back(txin.prevout.hash);
}
}
}
}
reverse(vtxPrev.begin(), vtxPrev.end());
}
bool CWalletTx::WriteToDisk()
{
return CWalletDB(pwallet->strWalletFile).WriteTx(GetHash(), *this);
}
// Scan the block chain (starting in pindexStart) for transactions
// from or to us. If fUpdate is true, found transactions that already
// exist in the wallet will be updated.
int CWallet::ScanForWalletTransactions(CBlockIndex* pindexStart, bool fUpdate)
{
int ret = 0;
CBlockIndex* pindex = pindexStart;
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
while (pindex)
{
// no need to read and scan block, if block was created before
// our wallet birthday (as adjusted for block time variability)
if (nTimeFirstKey && (pindex->nTime < (nTimeFirstKey - 7200))) {
pindex = pindex->GetNextInMainChain();
continue;
}
CBlock block;
ReadBlockFromDisk(block, pindex);
BOOST_FOREACH(CTransaction& tx, block.vtx)
{
if (AddToWalletIfInvolvingMe(tx.GetHash(), tx, &block, fUpdate))
ret++;
}
pindex = pindex->GetNextInMainChain();
}
}
return ret;
}
void CWallet::ReacceptWalletTransactions()
{
bool fRepeat = true;
while (fRepeat)
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
fRepeat = false;
Ultraprune This switches bitcoin's transaction/block verification logic to use a "coin database", which contains all unredeemed transaction output scripts, amounts and heights. The name ultraprune comes from the fact that instead of a full transaction index, we only (need to) keep an index with unspent outputs. For now, the blocks themselves are kept as usual, although they are only necessary for serving, rescanning and reorganizing. The basic datastructures are CCoins (representing the coins of a single transaction), and CCoinsView (representing a state of the coins database). There are several implementations for CCoinsView. A dummy, one backed by the coins database (coins.dat), one backed by the memory pool, and one that adds a cache on top of it. FetchInputs, ConnectInputs, ConnectBlock, DisconnectBlock, ... now operate on a generic CCoinsView. The block switching logic now builds a single cached CCoinsView with changes to be committed to the database before any changes are made. This means no uncommitted changes are ever read from the database, and should ease the transition to another database layer which does not support transactions (but does support atomic writes), like LevelDB. For the getrawtransaction() RPC call, access to a txid-to-disk index would be preferable. As this index is not necessary or even useful for any other part of the implementation, it is not provided. Instead, getrawtransaction() uses the coin database to find the block height, and then scans that block to find the requested transaction. This is slow, but should suffice for debug purposes.
13 years ago
bool fMissing = false;
BOOST_FOREACH(PAIRTYPE(const uint256, CWalletTx)& item, mapWallet)
{
CWalletTx& wtx = item.second;
if (wtx.IsCoinBase() && wtx.IsSpent(0))
continue;
Ultraprune This switches bitcoin's transaction/block verification logic to use a "coin database", which contains all unredeemed transaction output scripts, amounts and heights. The name ultraprune comes from the fact that instead of a full transaction index, we only (need to) keep an index with unspent outputs. For now, the blocks themselves are kept as usual, although they are only necessary for serving, rescanning and reorganizing. The basic datastructures are CCoins (representing the coins of a single transaction), and CCoinsView (representing a state of the coins database). There are several implementations for CCoinsView. A dummy, one backed by the coins database (coins.dat), one backed by the memory pool, and one that adds a cache on top of it. FetchInputs, ConnectInputs, ConnectBlock, DisconnectBlock, ... now operate on a generic CCoinsView. The block switching logic now builds a single cached CCoinsView with changes to be committed to the database before any changes are made. This means no uncommitted changes are ever read from the database, and should ease the transition to another database layer which does not support transactions (but does support atomic writes), like LevelDB. For the getrawtransaction() RPC call, access to a txid-to-disk index would be preferable. As this index is not necessary or even useful for any other part of the implementation, it is not provided. Instead, getrawtransaction() uses the coin database to find the block height, and then scans that block to find the requested transaction. This is slow, but should suffice for debug purposes.
13 years ago
CCoins coins;
bool fUpdated = false;
bool fFound = pcoinsTip->GetCoins(wtx.GetHash(), coins);
if (fFound || wtx.GetDepthInMainChain() > 0)
{
// Update fSpent if a tx got spent somewhere else by a copy of wallet.dat
Ultraprune This switches bitcoin's transaction/block verification logic to use a "coin database", which contains all unredeemed transaction output scripts, amounts and heights. The name ultraprune comes from the fact that instead of a full transaction index, we only (need to) keep an index with unspent outputs. For now, the blocks themselves are kept as usual, although they are only necessary for serving, rescanning and reorganizing. The basic datastructures are CCoins (representing the coins of a single transaction), and CCoinsView (representing a state of the coins database). There are several implementations for CCoinsView. A dummy, one backed by the coins database (coins.dat), one backed by the memory pool, and one that adds a cache on top of it. FetchInputs, ConnectInputs, ConnectBlock, DisconnectBlock, ... now operate on a generic CCoinsView. The block switching logic now builds a single cached CCoinsView with changes to be committed to the database before any changes are made. This means no uncommitted changes are ever read from the database, and should ease the transition to another database layer which does not support transactions (but does support atomic writes), like LevelDB. For the getrawtransaction() RPC call, access to a txid-to-disk index would be preferable. As this index is not necessary or even useful for any other part of the implementation, it is not provided. Instead, getrawtransaction() uses the coin database to find the block height, and then scans that block to find the requested transaction. This is slow, but should suffice for debug purposes.
13 years ago
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < wtx.vout.size(); i++)
{
if (wtx.IsSpent(i))
continue;
Ultraprune This switches bitcoin's transaction/block verification logic to use a "coin database", which contains all unredeemed transaction output scripts, amounts and heights. The name ultraprune comes from the fact that instead of a full transaction index, we only (need to) keep an index with unspent outputs. For now, the blocks themselves are kept as usual, although they are only necessary for serving, rescanning and reorganizing. The basic datastructures are CCoins (representing the coins of a single transaction), and CCoinsView (representing a state of the coins database). There are several implementations for CCoinsView. A dummy, one backed by the coins database (coins.dat), one backed by the memory pool, and one that adds a cache on top of it. FetchInputs, ConnectInputs, ConnectBlock, DisconnectBlock, ... now operate on a generic CCoinsView. The block switching logic now builds a single cached CCoinsView with changes to be committed to the database before any changes are made. This means no uncommitted changes are ever read from the database, and should ease the transition to another database layer which does not support transactions (but does support atomic writes), like LevelDB. For the getrawtransaction() RPC call, access to a txid-to-disk index would be preferable. As this index is not necessary or even useful for any other part of the implementation, it is not provided. Instead, getrawtransaction() uses the coin database to find the block height, and then scans that block to find the requested transaction. This is slow, but should suffice for debug purposes.
13 years ago
if ((i >= coins.vout.size() || coins.vout[i].IsNull()) && IsMine(wtx.vout[i]))
{
wtx.MarkSpent(i);
fUpdated = true;
Ultraprune This switches bitcoin's transaction/block verification logic to use a "coin database", which contains all unredeemed transaction output scripts, amounts and heights. The name ultraprune comes from the fact that instead of a full transaction index, we only (need to) keep an index with unspent outputs. For now, the blocks themselves are kept as usual, although they are only necessary for serving, rescanning and reorganizing. The basic datastructures are CCoins (representing the coins of a single transaction), and CCoinsView (representing a state of the coins database). There are several implementations for CCoinsView. A dummy, one backed by the coins database (coins.dat), one backed by the memory pool, and one that adds a cache on top of it. FetchInputs, ConnectInputs, ConnectBlock, DisconnectBlock, ... now operate on a generic CCoinsView. The block switching logic now builds a single cached CCoinsView with changes to be committed to the database before any changes are made. This means no uncommitted changes are ever read from the database, and should ease the transition to another database layer which does not support transactions (but does support atomic writes), like LevelDB. For the getrawtransaction() RPC call, access to a txid-to-disk index would be preferable. As this index is not necessary or even useful for any other part of the implementation, it is not provided. Instead, getrawtransaction() uses the coin database to find the block height, and then scans that block to find the requested transaction. This is slow, but should suffice for debug purposes.
13 years ago
fMissing = true;
}
}
if (fUpdated)
{
printf("ReacceptWalletTransactions found spent coin %sbc %s\n", FormatMoney(wtx.GetCredit()).c_str(), wtx.GetHash().ToString().c_str());
wtx.MarkDirty();
wtx.WriteToDisk();
}
}
else
{
// Re-accept any txes of ours that aren't already in a block
if (!wtx.IsCoinBase())
wtx.AcceptWalletTransaction();
}
}
Ultraprune This switches bitcoin's transaction/block verification logic to use a "coin database", which contains all unredeemed transaction output scripts, amounts and heights. The name ultraprune comes from the fact that instead of a full transaction index, we only (need to) keep an index with unspent outputs. For now, the blocks themselves are kept as usual, although they are only necessary for serving, rescanning and reorganizing. The basic datastructures are CCoins (representing the coins of a single transaction), and CCoinsView (representing a state of the coins database). There are several implementations for CCoinsView. A dummy, one backed by the coins database (coins.dat), one backed by the memory pool, and one that adds a cache on top of it. FetchInputs, ConnectInputs, ConnectBlock, DisconnectBlock, ... now operate on a generic CCoinsView. The block switching logic now builds a single cached CCoinsView with changes to be committed to the database before any changes are made. This means no uncommitted changes are ever read from the database, and should ease the transition to another database layer which does not support transactions (but does support atomic writes), like LevelDB. For the getrawtransaction() RPC call, access to a txid-to-disk index would be preferable. As this index is not necessary or even useful for any other part of the implementation, it is not provided. Instead, getrawtransaction() uses the coin database to find the block height, and then scans that block to find the requested transaction. This is slow, but should suffice for debug purposes.
13 years ago
if (fMissing)
{
// TODO: optimize this to scan just part of the block chain?
if (ScanForWalletTransactions(pindexGenesisBlock))
fRepeat = true; // Found missing transactions: re-do re-accept.
}
}
}
void CWalletTx::RelayWalletTransaction()
{
BOOST_FOREACH(const CMerkleTx& tx, vtxPrev)
{
if (!tx.IsCoinBase())
if (tx.GetDepthInMainChain() == 0)
RelayTransaction((CTransaction)tx, tx.GetHash());
}
if (!IsCoinBase())
{
if (GetDepthInMainChain() == 0) {
uint256 hash = GetHash();
printf("Relaying wtx %s\n", hash.ToString().c_str());
RelayTransaction((CTransaction)*this, hash);
}
}
}
void CWallet::ResendWalletTransactions()
{
// Do this infrequently and randomly to avoid giving away
// that these are our transactions.
static int64 nNextTime;
if (GetTime() < nNextTime)
return;
bool fFirst = (nNextTime == 0);
nNextTime = GetTime() + GetRand(30 * 60);
if (fFirst)
return;
// Only do it if there's been a new block since last time
static int64 nLastTime;
if (nTimeBestReceived < nLastTime)
return;
nLastTime = GetTime();
// Rebroadcast any of our txes that aren't in a block yet
printf("ResendWalletTransactions()\n");
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
// Sort them in chronological order
multimap<unsigned int, CWalletTx*> mapSorted;
BOOST_FOREACH(PAIRTYPE(const uint256, CWalletTx)& item, mapWallet)
{
CWalletTx& wtx = item.second;
// Don't rebroadcast until it's had plenty of time that
// it should have gotten in already by now.
if (nTimeBestReceived - (int64)wtx.nTimeReceived > 5 * 60)
mapSorted.insert(make_pair(wtx.nTimeReceived, &wtx));
}
BOOST_FOREACH(PAIRTYPE(const unsigned int, CWalletTx*)& item, mapSorted)
{
CWalletTx& wtx = *item.second;
wtx.RelayWalletTransaction();
}
}
}
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// Actions
//
int64 CWallet::GetBalance() const
{
int64 nTotal = 0;
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
for (map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator it = mapWallet.begin(); it != mapWallet.end(); ++it)
{
const CWalletTx* pcoin = &(*it).second;
if (pcoin->IsConfirmed())
nTotal += pcoin->GetAvailableCredit();
}
}
return nTotal;
}
int64 CWallet::GetUnconfirmedBalance() const
{
int64 nTotal = 0;
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
for (map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator it = mapWallet.begin(); it != mapWallet.end(); ++it)
{
const CWalletTx* pcoin = &(*it).second;
if (!IsFinalTx(*pcoin) || !pcoin->IsConfirmed())
nTotal += pcoin->GetAvailableCredit();
}
}
return nTotal;
}
int64 CWallet::GetImmatureBalance() const
{
int64 nTotal = 0;
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
for (map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator it = mapWallet.begin(); it != mapWallet.end(); ++it)
{
const CWalletTx* pcoin = &(*it).second;
nTotal += pcoin->GetImmatureCredit();
}
}
return nTotal;
}
// populate vCoins with vector of spendable COutputs
void CWallet::AvailableCoins(vector<COutput>& vCoins, bool fOnlyConfirmed) const
{
vCoins.clear();
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
for (map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator it = mapWallet.begin(); it != mapWallet.end(); ++it)
{
const CWalletTx* pcoin = &(*it).second;
if (!IsFinalTx(*pcoin))
continue;
if (fOnlyConfirmed && !pcoin->IsConfirmed())
continue;
if (pcoin->IsCoinBase() && pcoin->GetBlocksToMaturity() > 0)
continue;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < pcoin->vout.size(); i++) {
if (!(pcoin->IsSpent(i)) && IsMine(pcoin->vout[i]) &&
!IsLockedCoin((*it).first, i) && pcoin->vout[i].nValue > 0)
vCoins.push_back(COutput(pcoin, i, pcoin->GetDepthInMainChain()));
}
}
}
}
static void ApproximateBestSubset(vector<pair<int64, pair<const CWalletTx*,unsigned int> > >vValue, int64 nTotalLower, int64 nTargetValue,
vector<char>& vfBest, int64& nBest, int iterations = 1000)
{
vector<char> vfIncluded;
vfBest.assign(vValue.size(), true);
nBest = nTotalLower;
seed_insecure_rand();
for (int nRep = 0; nRep < iterations && nBest != nTargetValue; nRep++)
{
vfIncluded.assign(vValue.size(), false);
int64 nTotal = 0;
bool fReachedTarget = false;
for (int nPass = 0; nPass < 2 && !fReachedTarget; nPass++)
{
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < vValue.size(); i++)
{
//The solver here uses a randomized algorithm,
//the randomness serves no real security purpose but is just
//needed to prevent degenerate behavior and it is important
//that the rng fast. We do not use a constant random sequence,
//because there may be some privacy improvement by making
//the selection random.
if (nPass == 0 ? insecure_rand()&1 : !vfIncluded[i])
{
nTotal += vValue[i].first;
vfIncluded[i] = true;
if (nTotal >= nTargetValue)
{
fReachedTarget = true;
if (nTotal < nBest)
{
nBest = nTotal;
vfBest = vfIncluded;
}
nTotal -= vValue[i].first;
vfIncluded[i] = false;
}
}
}
}
}
}
bool CWallet::SelectCoinsMinConf(int64 nTargetValue, int nConfMine, int nConfTheirs, vector<COutput> vCoins,
set<pair<const CWalletTx*,unsigned int> >& setCoinsRet, int64& nValueRet) const
{
setCoinsRet.clear();
nValueRet = 0;
// List of values less than target
pair<int64, pair<const CWalletTx*,unsigned int> > coinLowestLarger;
coinLowestLarger.first = std::numeric_limits<int64>::max();
coinLowestLarger.second.first = NULL;
vector<pair<int64, pair<const CWalletTx*,unsigned int> > > vValue;
int64 nTotalLower = 0;
random_shuffle(vCoins.begin(), vCoins.end(), GetRandInt);
BOOST_FOREACH(COutput output, vCoins)
{
const CWalletTx *pcoin = output.tx;
if (output.nDepth < (pcoin->IsFromMe() ? nConfMine : nConfTheirs))
continue;
int i = output.i;
int64 n = pcoin->vout[i].nValue;
pair<int64,pair<const CWalletTx*,unsigned int> > coin = make_pair(n,make_pair(pcoin, i));
if (n == nTargetValue)
{
setCoinsRet.insert(coin.second);
nValueRet += coin.first;
return true;
}
else if (n < nTargetValue + CENT)
{
vValue.push_back(coin);
nTotalLower += n;
}
else if (n < coinLowestLarger.first)
{
coinLowestLarger = coin;
}
}
if (nTotalLower == nTargetValue)
{
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < vValue.size(); ++i)
{
setCoinsRet.insert(vValue[i].second);
nValueRet += vValue[i].first;
}
return true;
}
if (nTotalLower < nTargetValue)
{
if (coinLowestLarger.second.first == NULL)
return false;
setCoinsRet.insert(coinLowestLarger.second);
nValueRet += coinLowestLarger.first;
return true;
}
// Solve subset sum by stochastic approximation
sort(vValue.rbegin(), vValue.rend(), CompareValueOnly());
vector<char> vfBest;
int64 nBest;
ApproximateBestSubset(vValue, nTotalLower, nTargetValue, vfBest, nBest, 1000);
if (nBest != nTargetValue && nTotalLower >= nTargetValue + CENT)
ApproximateBestSubset(vValue, nTotalLower, nTargetValue + CENT, vfBest, nBest, 1000);
// If we have a bigger coin and (either the stochastic approximation didn't find a good solution,
// or the next bigger coin is closer), return the bigger coin
if (coinLowestLarger.second.first &&
((nBest != nTargetValue && nBest < nTargetValue + CENT) || coinLowestLarger.first <= nBest))
{
setCoinsRet.insert(coinLowestLarger.second);
nValueRet += coinLowestLarger.first;
}
else {
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < vValue.size(); i++)
if (vfBest[i])
{
setCoinsRet.insert(vValue[i].second);
nValueRet += vValue[i].first;
}
//// debug print
printf("SelectCoins() best subset: ");
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < vValue.size(); i++)
if (vfBest[i])
printf("%s ", FormatMoney(vValue[i].first).c_str());
printf("total %s\n", FormatMoney(nBest).c_str());
}
return true;
}
bool CWallet::SelectCoins(int64 nTargetValue, set<pair<const CWalletTx*,unsigned int> >& setCoinsRet, int64& nValueRet) const
{
vector<COutput> vCoins;
AvailableCoins(vCoins);
return (SelectCoinsMinConf(nTargetValue, 1, 6, vCoins, setCoinsRet, nValueRet) ||
SelectCoinsMinConf(nTargetValue, 1, 1, vCoins, setCoinsRet, nValueRet) ||
SelectCoinsMinConf(nTargetValue, 0, 1, vCoins, setCoinsRet, nValueRet));
}
bool CWallet::CreateTransaction(const vector<pair<CScript, int64> >& vecSend,
CWalletTx& wtxNew, CReserveKey& reservekey, int64& nFeeRet, std::string& strFailReason)
{
int64 nValue = 0;
BOOST_FOREACH (const PAIRTYPE(CScript, int64)& s, vecSend)
{
if (nValue < 0)
{
strFailReason = _("Transaction amounts must be positive");
return false;
}
nValue += s.second;
}
if (vecSend.empty() || nValue < 0)
{
strFailReason = _("Transaction amounts must be positive");
return false;
}
wtxNew.BindWallet(this);
{
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
{
nFeeRet = nTransactionFee;
loop
{
wtxNew.vin.clear();
wtxNew.vout.clear();
wtxNew.fFromMe = true;
int64 nTotalValue = nValue + nFeeRet;
double dPriority = 0;
// vouts to the payees
BOOST_FOREACH (const PAIRTYPE(CScript, int64)& s, vecSend)
{
CTxOut txout(s.second, s.first);
if (txout.IsDust(CTransaction::nMinRelayTxFee))
{
strFailReason = _("Transaction amount too small");
return false;
}
wtxNew.vout.push_back(txout);
}
// Choose coins to use
set<pair<const CWalletTx*,unsigned int> > setCoins;
int64 nValueIn = 0;
if (!SelectCoins(nTotalValue, setCoins, nValueIn))
{
strFailReason = _("Insufficient funds");
return false;
}
BOOST_FOREACH(PAIRTYPE(const CWalletTx*, unsigned int) pcoin, setCoins)
{
int64 nCredit = pcoin.first->vout[pcoin.second].nValue;
//The priority after the next block (depth+1) is used instead of the current,
//reflecting an assumption the user would accept a bit more delay for
//a chance at a free transaction.
dPriority += (double)nCredit * (pcoin.first->GetDepthInMainChain()+1);
}
int64 nChange = nValueIn - nValue - nFeeRet;
// if sub-cent change is required, the fee must be raised to at least nMinTxFee
// or until nChange becomes zero
// NOTE: this depends on the exact behaviour of GetMinFee
if (nFeeRet < CTransaction::nMinTxFee && nChange > 0 && nChange < CENT)
{
int64 nMoveToFee = min(nChange, CTransaction::nMinTxFee - nFeeRet);
nChange -= nMoveToFee;
nFeeRet += nMoveToFee;
}
if (nChange > 0)
{
// Note: We use a new key here to keep it from being obvious which side is the change.
// The drawback is that by not reusing a previous key, the change may be lost if a
// backup is restored, if the backup doesn't have the new private key for the change.
// If we reused the old key, it would be possible to add code to look for and
// rediscover unknown transactions that were written with keys of ours to recover
// post-backup change.
// Reserve a new key pair from key pool
CPubKey vchPubKey;
assert(reservekey.GetReservedKey(vchPubKey)); // should never fail, as we just unlocked
// Fill a vout to ourself
// TODO: pass in scriptChange instead of reservekey so
// change transaction isn't always pay-to-bitcoin-address
CScript scriptChange;
scriptChange.SetDestination(vchPubKey.GetID());
CTxOut newTxOut(nChange, scriptChange);
// Never create dust outputs; if we would, just
// add the dust to the fee.
if (newTxOut.IsDust(CTransaction::nMinRelayTxFee))
{
nFeeRet += nChange;
reservekey.ReturnKey();
}
else
{
// Insert change txn at random position:
vector<CTxOut>::iterator position = wtxNew.vout.begin()+GetRandInt(wtxNew.vout.size()+1);
wtxNew.vout.insert(position, newTxOut);
}
}
else
reservekey.ReturnKey();
// Fill vin
BOOST_FOREACH(const PAIRTYPE(const CWalletTx*,unsigned int)& coin, setCoins)
wtxNew.vin.push_back(CTxIn(coin.first->GetHash(),coin.second));
// Sign
int nIn = 0;
BOOST_FOREACH(const PAIRTYPE(const CWalletTx*,unsigned int)& coin, setCoins)
if (!SignSignature(*this, *coin.first, wtxNew, nIn++))
{
strFailReason = _("Signing transaction failed");
return false;
}
// Limit size
unsigned int nBytes = ::GetSerializeSize(*(CTransaction*)&wtxNew, SER_NETWORK, PROTOCOL_VERSION);
if (nBytes >= MAX_STANDARD_TX_SIZE)
{
strFailReason = _("Transaction too large");
return false;
}
dPriority /= nBytes;
// Check that enough fee is included
int64 nPayFee = nTransactionFee * (1 + (int64)nBytes / 1000);
bool fAllowFree = AllowFree(dPriority);
int64 nMinFee = GetMinFee(wtxNew, fAllowFree, GMF_SEND);
if (nFeeRet < max(nPayFee, nMinFee))
{
nFeeRet = max(nPayFee, nMinFee);
continue;
}
// Fill vtxPrev by copying from previous transactions vtxPrev
Ultraprune This switches bitcoin's transaction/block verification logic to use a "coin database", which contains all unredeemed transaction output scripts, amounts and heights. The name ultraprune comes from the fact that instead of a full transaction index, we only (need to) keep an index with unspent outputs. For now, the blocks themselves are kept as usual, although they are only necessary for serving, rescanning and reorganizing. The basic datastructures are CCoins (representing the coins of a single transaction), and CCoinsView (representing a state of the coins database). There are several implementations for CCoinsView. A dummy, one backed by the coins database (coins.dat), one backed by the memory pool, and one that adds a cache on top of it. FetchInputs, ConnectInputs, ConnectBlock, DisconnectBlock, ... now operate on a generic CCoinsView. The block switching logic now builds a single cached CCoinsView with changes to be committed to the database before any changes are made. This means no uncommitted changes are ever read from the database, and should ease the transition to another database layer which does not support transactions (but does support atomic writes), like LevelDB. For the getrawtransaction() RPC call, access to a txid-to-disk index would be preferable. As this index is not necessary or even useful for any other part of the implementation, it is not provided. Instead, getrawtransaction() uses the coin database to find the block height, and then scans that block to find the requested transaction. This is slow, but should suffice for debug purposes.
13 years ago
wtxNew.AddSupportingTransactions();
wtxNew.fTimeReceivedIsTxTime = true;
break;
}
}
}
return true;
}
bool CWallet::CreateTransaction(CScript scriptPubKey, int64 nValue,
CWalletTx& wtxNew, CReserveKey& reservekey, int64& nFeeRet, std::string& strFailReason)
{
vector< pair<CScript, int64> > vecSend;
vecSend.push_back(make_pair(scriptPubKey, nValue));
return CreateTransaction(vecSend, wtxNew, reservekey, nFeeRet, strFailReason);
}
// Call after CreateTransaction unless you want to abort
bool CWallet::CommitTransaction(CWalletTx& wtxNew, CReserveKey& reservekey)
{
{
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
printf("CommitTransaction:\n%s", wtxNew.ToString().c_str());
{
// This is only to keep the database open to defeat the auto-flush for the
// duration of this scope. This is the only place where this optimization
// maybe makes sense; please don't do it anywhere else.
CWalletDB* pwalletdb = fFileBacked ? new CWalletDB(strWalletFile,"r") : NULL;
// Take key pair from key pool so it won't be used again
reservekey.KeepKey();
// Add tx to wallet, because if it has change it's also ours,
// otherwise just for transaction history.
AddToWallet(wtxNew);
// Mark old coins as spent
set<CWalletTx*> setCoins;
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxIn& txin, wtxNew.vin)
{
CWalletTx &coin = mapWallet[txin.prevout.hash];
coin.BindWallet(this);
coin.MarkSpent(txin.prevout.n);
coin.WriteToDisk();
NotifyTransactionChanged(this, coin.GetHash(), CT_UPDATED);
}
if (fFileBacked)
delete pwalletdb;
}
// Track how many getdata requests our transaction gets
mapRequestCount[wtxNew.GetHash()] = 0;
// Broadcast
if (!wtxNew.AcceptToMemoryPool(false))
{
// This must not fail. The transaction has already been signed and recorded.
printf("CommitTransaction() : Error: Transaction not valid");
return false;
}
wtxNew.RelayWalletTransaction();
}
return true;
}
string CWallet::SendMoney(CScript scriptPubKey, int64 nValue, CWalletTx& wtxNew, bool fAskFee)
{
CReserveKey reservekey(this);
int64 nFeeRequired;
if (IsLocked())
{
string strError = _("Error: Wallet locked, unable to create transaction!");
printf("SendMoney() : %s", strError.c_str());
return strError;
}
string strError;
if (!CreateTransaction(scriptPubKey, nValue, wtxNew, reservekey, nFeeRequired, strError))
{
if (nValue + nFeeRequired > GetBalance())
strError = strprintf(_("Error: This transaction requires a transaction fee of at least %s because of its amount, complexity, or use of recently received funds!"), FormatMoney(nFeeRequired).c_str());
printf("SendMoney() : %s\n", strError.c_str());
return strError;
}
if (fAskFee && !uiInterface.ThreadSafeAskFee(nFeeRequired))
return "ABORTED";
if (!CommitTransaction(wtxNew, reservekey))
return _("Error: The transaction was rejected! This might happen if some of the coins in your wallet were already spent, such as if you used a copy of wallet.dat and coins were spent in the copy but not marked as spent here.");
return "";
}
string CWallet::SendMoneyToDestination(const CTxDestination& address, int64 nValue, CWalletTx& wtxNew, bool fAskFee)
{
// Check amount
if (nValue <= 0)
return _("Invalid amount");
if (nValue + nTransactionFee > GetBalance())
return _("Insufficient funds");
// Parse Bitcoin address
CScript scriptPubKey;
scriptPubKey.SetDestination(address);
return SendMoney(scriptPubKey, nValue, wtxNew, fAskFee);
}
DBErrors CWallet::LoadWallet(bool& fFirstRunRet)
{
if (!fFileBacked)
return DB_LOAD_OK;
fFirstRunRet = false;
DBErrors nLoadWalletRet = CWalletDB(strWalletFile,"cr+").LoadWallet(this);
if (nLoadWalletRet == DB_NEED_REWRITE)
13 years ago
{
if (CDB::Rewrite(strWalletFile, "\x04pool"))
{
setKeyPool.clear();
// Note: can't top-up keypool here, because wallet is locked.
// User will be prompted to unlock wallet the next operation
// the requires a new key.
}
13 years ago
}
if (nLoadWalletRet != DB_LOAD_OK)
return nLoadWalletRet;
fFirstRunRet = !vchDefaultKey.IsValid();
return DB_LOAD_OK;
}
bool CWallet::SetAddressBookName(const CTxDestination& address, const string& strName)
{
std::map<CTxDestination, std::string>::iterator mi = mapAddressBook.find(address);
mapAddressBook[address] = strName;
NotifyAddressBookChanged(this, address, strName, ::IsMine(*this, address), (mi == mapAddressBook.end()) ? CT_NEW : CT_UPDATED);
if (!fFileBacked)
return false;
return CWalletDB(strWalletFile).WriteName(CBitcoinAddress(address).ToString(), strName);
}
bool CWallet::DelAddressBookName(const CTxDestination& address)
{
mapAddressBook.erase(address);
NotifyAddressBookChanged(this, address, "", ::IsMine(*this, address), CT_DELETED);
if (!fFileBacked)
return false;
return CWalletDB(strWalletFile).EraseName(CBitcoinAddress(address).ToString());
}
void CWallet::PrintWallet(const CBlock& block)
{
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
if (mapWallet.count(block.vtx[0].GetHash()))
{
CWalletTx& wtx = mapWallet[block.vtx[0].GetHash()];
printf(" mine: %d %d %"PRI64d"", wtx.GetDepthInMainChain(), wtx.GetBlocksToMaturity(), wtx.GetCredit());
}
}
printf("\n");
}
bool CWallet::GetTransaction(const uint256 &hashTx, CWalletTx& wtx)
{
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
map<uint256, CWalletTx>::iterator mi = mapWallet.find(hashTx);
if (mi != mapWallet.end())
{
wtx = (*mi).second;
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
bool CWallet::SetDefaultKey(const CPubKey &vchPubKey)
{
if (fFileBacked)
{
if (!CWalletDB(strWalletFile).WriteDefaultKey(vchPubKey))
return false;
}
vchDefaultKey = vchPubKey;
return true;
}
bool GetWalletFile(CWallet* pwallet, string &strWalletFileOut)
{
if (!pwallet->fFileBacked)
return false;
strWalletFileOut = pwallet->strWalletFile;
return true;
}
//
// Mark old keypool keys as used,
// and generate all new keys
//
bool CWallet::NewKeyPool()
{
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
CWalletDB walletdb(strWalletFile);
BOOST_FOREACH(int64 nIndex, setKeyPool)
walletdb.ErasePool(nIndex);
setKeyPool.clear();
if (IsLocked())
return false;
int64 nKeys = max(GetArg("-keypool", 100), (int64)0);
for (int i = 0; i < nKeys; i++)
{
int64 nIndex = i+1;
walletdb.WritePool(nIndex, CKeyPool(GenerateNewKey()));
setKeyPool.insert(nIndex);
}
printf("CWallet::NewKeyPool wrote %"PRI64d" new keys\n", nKeys);
}
return true;
}
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
bool CWallet::TopUpKeyPool()
{
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
if (IsLocked())
return false;
CWalletDB walletdb(strWalletFile);
// Top up key pool
unsigned int nTargetSize = max(GetArg("-keypool", 100), 0LL);
while (setKeyPool.size() < (nTargetSize + 1))
{
int64 nEnd = 1;
if (!setKeyPool.empty())
nEnd = *(--setKeyPool.end()) + 1;
if (!walletdb.WritePool(nEnd, CKeyPool(GenerateNewKey())))
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
throw runtime_error("TopUpKeyPool() : writing generated key failed");
setKeyPool.insert(nEnd);
printf("keypool added key %"PRI64d", size=%"PRIszu"\n", nEnd, setKeyPool.size());
}
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
}
return true;
}
void CWallet::ReserveKeyFromKeyPool(int64& nIndex, CKeyPool& keypool)
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
{
nIndex = -1;
keypool.vchPubKey = CPubKey();
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
if (!IsLocked())
TopUpKeyPool();
// Get the oldest key
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
if(setKeyPool.empty())
return;
CWalletDB walletdb(strWalletFile);
nIndex = *(setKeyPool.begin());
setKeyPool.erase(setKeyPool.begin());
if (!walletdb.ReadPool(nIndex, keypool))
throw runtime_error("ReserveKeyFromKeyPool() : read failed");
if (!HaveKey(keypool.vchPubKey.GetID()))
throw runtime_error("ReserveKeyFromKeyPool() : unknown key in key pool");
assert(keypool.vchPubKey.IsValid());
printf("keypool reserve %"PRI64d"\n", nIndex);
}
}
int64 CWallet::AddReserveKey(const CKeyPool& keypool)
{
{
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
CWalletDB walletdb(strWalletFile);
int64 nIndex = 1 + *(--setKeyPool.end());
if (!walletdb.WritePool(nIndex, keypool))
throw runtime_error("AddReserveKey() : writing added key failed");
setKeyPool.insert(nIndex);
return nIndex;
}
return -1;
}
void CWallet::KeepKey(int64 nIndex)
{
// Remove from key pool
if (fFileBacked)
{
CWalletDB walletdb(strWalletFile);
walletdb.ErasePool(nIndex);
}
printf("keypool keep %"PRI64d"\n", nIndex);
}
void CWallet::ReturnKey(int64 nIndex)
{
// Return to key pool
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
setKeyPool.insert(nIndex);
}
printf("keypool return %"PRI64d"\n", nIndex);
}
bool CWallet::GetKeyFromPool(CPubKey& result, bool fAllowReuse)
{
int64 nIndex = 0;
CKeyPool keypool;
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
ReserveKeyFromKeyPool(nIndex, keypool);
if (nIndex == -1)
{
if (fAllowReuse && vchDefaultKey.IsValid())
{
result = vchDefaultKey;
return true;
}
if (IsLocked()) return false;
result = GenerateNewKey();
return true;
}
KeepKey(nIndex);
result = keypool.vchPubKey;
}
return true;
}
int64 CWallet::GetOldestKeyPoolTime()
{
int64 nIndex = 0;
CKeyPool keypool;
ReserveKeyFromKeyPool(nIndex, keypool);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
if (nIndex == -1)
return GetTime();
ReturnKey(nIndex);
return keypool.nTime;
}
std::map<CTxDestination, int64> CWallet::GetAddressBalances()
{
map<CTxDestination, int64> balances;
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
BOOST_FOREACH(PAIRTYPE(uint256, CWalletTx) walletEntry, mapWallet)
{
CWalletTx *pcoin = &walletEntry.second;
if (!IsFinalTx(*pcoin) || !pcoin->IsConfirmed())
continue;
if (pcoin->IsCoinBase() && pcoin->GetBlocksToMaturity() > 0)
continue;
int nDepth = pcoin->GetDepthInMainChain();
if (nDepth < (pcoin->IsFromMe() ? 0 : 1))
continue;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < pcoin->vout.size(); i++)
{
CTxDestination addr;
if (!IsMine(pcoin->vout[i]))
continue;
if(!ExtractDestination(pcoin->vout[i].scriptPubKey, addr))
continue;
int64 n = pcoin->IsSpent(i) ? 0 : pcoin->vout[i].nValue;
if (!balances.count(addr))
balances[addr] = 0;
balances[addr] += n;
}
}
}
return balances;
}
set< set<CTxDestination> > CWallet::GetAddressGroupings()
{
set< set<CTxDestination> > groupings;
set<CTxDestination> grouping;
BOOST_FOREACH(PAIRTYPE(uint256, CWalletTx) walletEntry, mapWallet)
{
CWalletTx *pcoin = &walletEntry.second;
if (pcoin->vin.size() > 0)
{
bool any_mine = false;
// group all input addresses with each other
BOOST_FOREACH(CTxIn txin, pcoin->vin)
{
CTxDestination address;
if(!IsMine(txin)) /* If this input isn't mine, ignore it */
continue;
if(!ExtractDestination(mapWallet[txin.prevout.hash].vout[txin.prevout.n].scriptPubKey, address))
continue;
grouping.insert(address);
any_mine = true;
}
// group change with input addresses
if (any_mine)
{
BOOST_FOREACH(CTxOut txout, pcoin->vout)
if (IsChange(txout))
{
CTxDestination txoutAddr;
if(!ExtractDestination(txout.scriptPubKey, txoutAddr))
continue;
grouping.insert(txoutAddr);
}
}
if (grouping.size() > 0)
{
groupings.insert(grouping);
grouping.clear();
}
}
// group lone addrs by themselves
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < pcoin->vout.size(); i++)
if (IsMine(pcoin->vout[i]))
{
CTxDestination address;
if(!ExtractDestination(pcoin->vout[i].scriptPubKey, address))
continue;
grouping.insert(address);
groupings.insert(grouping);
grouping.clear();
}
}
set< set<CTxDestination>* > uniqueGroupings; // a set of pointers to groups of addresses
map< CTxDestination, set<CTxDestination>* > setmap; // map addresses to the unique group containing it
BOOST_FOREACH(set<CTxDestination> grouping, groupings)
{
// make a set of all the groups hit by this new group
set< set<CTxDestination>* > hits;
map< CTxDestination, set<CTxDestination>* >::iterator it;
BOOST_FOREACH(CTxDestination address, grouping)
if ((it = setmap.find(address)) != setmap.end())
hits.insert((*it).second);
// merge all hit groups into a new single group and delete old groups
set<CTxDestination>* merged = new set<CTxDestination>(grouping);
BOOST_FOREACH(set<CTxDestination>* hit, hits)
{
merged->insert(hit->begin(), hit->end());
uniqueGroupings.erase(hit);
delete hit;
}
uniqueGroupings.insert(merged);
// update setmap
BOOST_FOREACH(CTxDestination element, *merged)
setmap[element] = merged;
}
set< set<CTxDestination> > ret;
BOOST_FOREACH(set<CTxDestination>* uniqueGrouping, uniqueGroupings)
{
ret.insert(*uniqueGrouping);
delete uniqueGrouping;
}
return ret;
}
bool CReserveKey::GetReservedKey(CPubKey& pubkey)
{
if (nIndex == -1)
{
CKeyPool keypool;
pwallet->ReserveKeyFromKeyPool(nIndex, keypool);
if (nIndex != -1)
vchPubKey = keypool.vchPubKey;
else {
if (pwallet->vchDefaultKey.IsValid()) {
printf("CReserveKey::GetReservedKey(): Warning: Using default key instead of a new key, top up your keypool!");
vchPubKey = pwallet->vchDefaultKey;
} else
return false;
}
}
assert(vchPubKey.IsValid());
pubkey = vchPubKey;
return true;
}
void CReserveKey::KeepKey()
{
if (nIndex != -1)
pwallet->KeepKey(nIndex);
nIndex = -1;
vchPubKey = CPubKey();
}
void CReserveKey::ReturnKey()
{
if (nIndex != -1)
pwallet->ReturnKey(nIndex);
nIndex = -1;
vchPubKey = CPubKey();
}
void CWallet::GetAllReserveKeys(set<CKeyID>& setAddress) const
{
setAddress.clear();
CWalletDB walletdb(strWalletFile);
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
BOOST_FOREACH(const int64& id, setKeyPool)
{
CKeyPool keypool;
if (!walletdb.ReadPool(id, keypool))
throw runtime_error("GetAllReserveKeyHashes() : read failed");
assert(keypool.vchPubKey.IsValid());
CKeyID keyID = keypool.vchPubKey.GetID();
if (!HaveKey(keyID))
throw runtime_error("GetAllReserveKeyHashes() : unknown key in key pool");
setAddress.insert(keyID);
}
}
void CWallet::UpdatedTransaction(const uint256 &hashTx)
{
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
// Only notify UI if this transaction is in this wallet
map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator mi = mapWallet.find(hashTx);
if (mi != mapWallet.end())
NotifyTransactionChanged(this, hashTx, CT_UPDATED);
}
}
void CWallet::LockCoin(COutPoint& output)
{
setLockedCoins.insert(output);
}
void CWallet::UnlockCoin(COutPoint& output)
{
setLockedCoins.erase(output);
}
void CWallet::UnlockAllCoins()
{
setLockedCoins.clear();
}
bool CWallet::IsLockedCoin(uint256 hash, unsigned int n) const
{
COutPoint outpt(hash, n);
return (setLockedCoins.count(outpt) > 0);
}
void CWallet::ListLockedCoins(std::vector<COutPoint>& vOutpts)
{
for (std::set<COutPoint>::iterator it = setLockedCoins.begin();
it != setLockedCoins.end(); it++) {
COutPoint outpt = (*it);
vOutpts.push_back(outpt);
}
}
void CWallet::GetKeyBirthTimes(std::map<CKeyID, int64> &mapKeyBirth) const {
mapKeyBirth.clear();
// get birth times for keys with metadata
for (std::map<CKeyID, CKeyMetadata>::const_iterator it = mapKeyMetadata.begin(); it != mapKeyMetadata.end(); it++)
if (it->second.nCreateTime)
mapKeyBirth[it->first] = it->second.nCreateTime;
// map in which we'll infer heights of other keys
CBlockIndex *pindexMax = FindBlockByHeight(std::max(0, nBestHeight - 144)); // the tip can be reorganised; use a 144-block safety margin
std::map<CKeyID, CBlockIndex*> mapKeyFirstBlock;
std::set<CKeyID> setKeys;
GetKeys(setKeys);
BOOST_FOREACH(const CKeyID &keyid, setKeys) {
if (mapKeyBirth.count(keyid) == 0)
mapKeyFirstBlock[keyid] = pindexMax;
}
setKeys.clear();
// if there are no such keys, we're done
if (mapKeyFirstBlock.empty())
return;
// find first block that affects those keys, if there are any left
std::vector<CKeyID> vAffected;
for (std::map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator it = mapWallet.begin(); it != mapWallet.end(); it++) {
// iterate over all wallet transactions...
const CWalletTx &wtx = (*it).second;
std::map<uint256, CBlockIndex*>::const_iterator blit = mapBlockIndex.find(wtx.hashBlock);
if (blit != mapBlockIndex.end() && blit->second->IsInMainChain()) {
// ... which are already in a block
int nHeight = blit->second->nHeight;
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxOut &txout, wtx.vout) {
// iterate over all their outputs
::ExtractAffectedKeys(*this, txout.scriptPubKey, vAffected);
BOOST_FOREACH(const CKeyID &keyid, vAffected) {
// ... and all their affected keys
std::map<CKeyID, CBlockIndex*>::iterator rit = mapKeyFirstBlock.find(keyid);
if (rit != mapKeyFirstBlock.end() && nHeight < rit->second->nHeight)
rit->second = blit->second;
}
vAffected.clear();
}
}
}
// Extract block timestamps for those keys
for (std::map<CKeyID, CBlockIndex*>::const_iterator it = mapKeyFirstBlock.begin(); it != mapKeyFirstBlock.end(); it++)
mapKeyBirth[it->first] = it->second->nTime - 7200; // block times can be 2h off
}