This reduces the rate of not founds by better matching the far
end expectations, it also improves privacy by removing the
ability to use getdata to probe for a node having a txn before
it has been relayed.
The ability to GETDATA a transaction which has not (yet) been relayed
is a privacy loss vector.
The use of the mempool for this was added as part of the mempool p2p
message and is only needed to fetch transactions returned by it.
* CAddrDB modified so that when de-serialization code throws an exception Addrman is reset to a clean state
* CAddrDB modified to make unit tests possible
* Regression test created to ensure bug is fixed
* StartNode modifed to clear adrman if CAddrDB::Read returns an error code.
This will avoid sending more pointless INVs around updates, and
prevents using filter updates to timetag transactions.
Also adds locking for fRelayTxes.
By eliminating queued entries from the mempool response and responding only at
trickle time, this makes the mempool no longer leak transaction arrival order
information (as the mempool itself is also sorted)-- at least no more than
relay itself leaks it.
Previously we used the CInv that would be sent to the peer announcing the
transaction as the key, but using the txid instead allows us to decouple the
p2p layer from the application logic (which relies on this map to avoid
duplicate tx requests).
The "feefilter" p2p message is used to inform other nodes of your mempool min fee which is the feerate that any new transaction must meet to be accepted to your mempool. This will allow them to filter invs to you according to this feerate.
We used to have a trickle node, a node which was chosen in each iteration of
the send loop that was privileged and allowed to send out queued up non-time
critical messages. Since the removal of the fixed sleeps in the network code,
this resulted in fast and attackable treatment of such broadcasts.
This pull request changes the 3 remaining trickle use cases by random delays:
* Local address broadcast (while also removing the the wiping of the seen filter)
* Address relay
* Inv relay (for transactions; blocks are always relayed immediately)
The code is based on older commits by Patrick Strateman.
Mruset setInventoryKnown was reduced to a remarkably small 1000
entries as a side effect of sendbuffer size reductions in 2012.
This removes setInventoryKnown filtering from merkleBlock responses
because false positives there are especially unattractive and
also because I'm not sure if there aren't race conditions around
the relay pool that would cause some transactions there to
be suppressed. (Also, ProcessGetData was accessing
setInventoryKnown without taking the required lock.)
This replaces using inv messages to announce new blocks, when a peer requests
(via the new "sendheaders" message) that blocks be announced with headers
instead of inv's.
Since headers-first was introduced, peers send getheaders messages in response
to an inv, which requires generating a block locator that is large compared to
the size of the header being requested, and requires an extra round-trip before
a reorg can be relayed. Save time by tracking headers that a peer is likely to
know about, and send a headers chain that would connect to a peer's known
headers, unless the chain would be too big, in which case we revert to sending
an inv instead.
Based off of @sipa's commit to announce all blocks in a reorg via inv,
which has been squashed into this commit.
Rebased-by: Pieter Wuille
The setAskFor duplicate elimination was too eager and removed entries
when we still had no getdata response, allowing the peer to keep
INVing and not responding.
mapAlreadyAskedFor does not keep track of which peer has a request queued for a
particular tx. As a result, a peer can blind a node to a tx indefinitely by
sending many invs for the same tx, and then never replying to getdatas for it.
Each inv received will be placed 2 minutes farther back in mapAlreadyAskedFor,
so a short message containing 10 invs would render that tx unavailable for 20
minutes.
This is fixed by disallowing a peer from having more than one entry for a
particular inv in mapAlreadyAskedFor at a time.
- Force AUTHCOOKIE size to be 32 bytes: This provides protection against
an attack where a process pretends to be Tor and uses the cookie
authentication method to nab arbitrary files such as the
wallet
- torcontrol logging
- fix cookie auth
- add HASHEDPASSWORD auth, fix fd leak when fwrite() fails
- better error reporting when cookie file is not ok
- better init/shutdown flow
- stop advertizing service when disconnected from tor control port
- COOKIE->SAFECOOKIE auth
* -maxuploadtarget can be set in MiB
* if <limit> - ( time-left-in-24h-cycle / 600 * MAX_BLOCK_SIZE ) has reach, stop serve blocks older than one week and filtered blocks
* no action if limit has reached, no guarantee that the target will not be surpassed
* add outbound limit informations to rpc getnettotals
This sets aside a number of connection slots for whitelisted peers,
useful for ensuring your local users and miners can always get in,
even if your limit on inbound connections has already been reached.
Patrick Strateman