Note that this is not a major issue as, in order for the missing
lock to cause issues, you have to receive a GETBLOCKTXN message
while reindexing, adding a block header via RPC, etc, which results
in either a table rehash or an insert into the bucket which you are
currently looking at.
There are only a few uses of `insecure_random` outside the tests.
This PR replaces uses of insecure_random (and its accompanying global
state) in the core code with an FastRandomContext that is automatically
seeded on creation.
This is meant to be used for inner loops. The FastRandomContext
can be in the outer scope, or the class itself, then rand32() is used
inside the loop. Useful e.g. for pushing addresses in CNode or the fee
rounding, or randomization for coin selection.
As a context is created per purpose, thus it gets rid of
cross-thread unprotected shared usage of a single set of globals, this
should also get rid of the potential race conditions.
- I'd say TxMempool::check is not called enough to warrant using a special
fast random context, this is switched to GetRand() (open for
discussion...)
- The use of `insecure_rand` in ConnectThroughProxy has been replaced by
an atomic integer counter. The only goal here is to have a different
credentials pair for each connection to go on a different Tor circuit,
it does not need to be random nor unpredictable.
- To avoid having a FastRandomContext on every CNode, the context is
passed into PushAddress as appropriate.
There remains an insecure_random for test usage in `test_random.h`.
This adds a new CValidationInterface subclass, defined in main.h,
to receive notifications of UpdatedBlockTip and use that to push
blocks to peers, instead of doing it directly from
ActivateBestChain.
In anticipation of making all the callbacks out of block processing
flow through it. Note that vHashes will always have something in it
since pindexFork != pindexNewTip.
This fixes a bug where we might (in exceedingly rare circumstances)
accidentally ban a node for sending us the first (potentially few)
segwit blocks in non-segwit mode.
75ead758 turned these into crashes in the event of a handshake failure, most
notably when a peer does not offer the expected services.
There are likely other cases that these assertions will find as well.
In principle, the checksums of P2P packets are simply 4-byte blobs which
are the first four bytes of SHA256(SHA256(payload)).
Currently they are handled as little-endian 32-bit integers half of the
time, as blobs the other half, sometimes copying the one to the other,
resulting in somewhat confused code.
This PR changes the handling to be consistent both at packet creation
and receiving, making it (I think) easier to understand.
An example of where this might be useful is allowing a node to connect blocksonly during IBD but then becoming a full-node once caught up with the latest block. This might also even want to be the default behaviour since during IBD most TXs appear to be orphans, and are routinely dropped (for example when a node disconnects). Therefore, this can waste a lot of bandwidth.
Additionally, another pull could be written to stop relaying of TXs to nodes that are clearly far behind the latest block and are running a node that doesn't store many orphan TXs, such as recent versions of Bitcoin Core.
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
Geoffrey Tsui