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Merge #11380: Remove outdated share/certs/ directory

6951a1c Remove extremely outdated share/certs dir (MeshCollider)

Pull request description:

  The directory hasn't been touched for 5 years (other than a couple of typo fixes/renaming). The certificates are expired, the build process notes are out of date, especially with the gitian building and everything, Gavin no longer has anything to do with it, etc.

  The signing process is all documented (and scripted) elsewhere (e.g. doc/release-process.md and gitian-building.md, contrib/macdeploy and windeploy), this can just be removed

  @theuni can confirm if this is okay, we discussed it on IRC for a bit :)

Tree-SHA512: e229785f7514a0f9988105f2ce68531a0a876032983ee5c77f41f1a976b9e732eb63cf2eb1f82841df8f7194940635c5ea5d4f8b30f95e69c763f74d4a3a28b1
0.16
Wladimir J. van der Laan 7 years ago
parent
commit
390771be62
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 1E4AED62986CD25D
  1. 37
      share/certs/BitcoinFoundation_Apple_Cert.pem
  2. 37
      share/certs/BitcoinFoundation_Comodo_Cert.pem
  3. 46
      share/certs/PrivateKeyNotes.md

37
share/certs/BitcoinFoundation_Apple_Cert.pem

@ -1,37 +0,0 @@ @@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
Bag Attributes
friendlyName: Developer ID Application: BITCOIN FOUNDATION, INC., THE
localKeyID: 6B 9C 6C A8 A5 73 70 70 E2 57 A3 49 D8 62 FB 97 C7 A5 5D 5E
subject=/UID=PBV4GLS9J4/CN=Developer ID Application: BITCOIN FOUNDATION, INC., THE/OU=PBV4GLS9J4/O=BITCOIN FOUNDATION, INC., THE/C=US
issuer=/CN=Developer ID Certification Authority/OU=Apple Certification Authority/O=Apple Inc./C=US
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIFhzCCBG+gAwIBAgIIJ0r1rumyfZAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAweTEtMCsGA1UE
AwwkRGV2ZWxvcGVyIElEIENlcnRpZmljYXRpb24gQXV0aG9yaXR5MSYwJAYDVQQL
DB1BcHBsZSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uIEF1dGhvcml0eTETMBEGA1UECgwKQXBwbGUg
SW5jLjELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMwHhcNMTMwMTEwMjIzOTAxWhcNMTgwMTExMjIzOTAx
WjCBqDEaMBgGCgmSJomT8ixkAQEMClBCVjRHTFM5SjQxQDA+BgNVBAMMN0RldmVs
b3BlciBJRCBBcHBsaWNhdGlvbjogQklUQ09JTiBGT1VOREFUSU9OLCBJTkMuLCBU
SEUxEzARBgNVBAsMClBCVjRHTFM5SjQxJjAkBgNVBAoMHUJJVENPSU4gRk9VTkRB
VElPTiwgSU5DLiwgVEhFMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAD
ggEPADCCAQoCggEBALTd5zURuZVoJviusr119aktXksenb9IN9vq6kBbq38vxEk7
9wkKMES2XfBRh0HxcEizGzhMNy5OCXuTLMaNMihYdfwYSoBoR2foEU+6kjPUnyJ4
dQBFLJZJr5/QeQmALmYHEgZ6lwXFD2lU8t92340zeJ4y5LZw5pcEHtH9IummYDut
OGCkCGXDcjL+5nHhNScJiXHhswM+62o6XXsQiP6EWbM1CsgrGTNLtaa0U/UvVDwE
79YKklSC5Bog2LD0jBcTuveI66mFzqu++L9X9u+ZArtebwCl7BPNQ+uboYy5uV2d
zf8lpNNZLfXCFjoLe9bLICKfZ7ub9V5aC8+GhckCAwEAAaOCAeEwggHdMD4GCCsG
AQUFBwEBBDIwMDAuBggrBgEFBQcwAYYiaHR0cDovL29jc3AuYXBwbGUuY29tL29j
c3AtZGV2aWQwMTAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUa5xsqKVzcHDiV6NJ2GL7l8elXV4wDAYDVR0T
AQH/BAIwADAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBRXF+2iz9x8mKEQ4Py+hy0s8uMXVDCCAQ4GA1Ud
IASCAQUwggEBMIH+BgkqhkiG92NkBQEwgfAwKAYIKwYBBQUHAgEWHGh0dHA6Ly93
d3cuYXBwbGUuY29tL2FwcGxlY2EwgcMGCCsGAQUFBwICMIG2DIGzUmVsaWFuY2Ug
b24gdGhpcyBjZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBieSBhbnkgcGFydHkgYXNzdW1lcyBhY2NlcHRh
bmNlIG9mIHRoZSB0aGVuIGFwcGxpY2FibGUgc3RhbmRhcmQgdGVybXMgYW5kIGNv
bmRpdGlvbnMgb2YgdXNlLCBjZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBwb2xpY3kgYW5kIGNlcnRpZmlj
YXRpb24gcHJhY3RpY2Ugc3RhdGVtZW50cy4wDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgeAMBYGA1Ud
JQEB/wQMMAoGCCsGAQUFBwMDMBMGCiqGSIb3Y2QGAQ0BAf8EAgUAMA0GCSqGSIb3
DQEBCwUAA4IBAQAfJ0BjID/1dS2aEeVyhAzPzCBjG8vm0gDf+/qfwRn3+yWeL9vS
nMdbilwM48IyQWTagjGGcojbsAd/vE4N7NhQyHInoCllNoeor1I5xx+blTaGRBK+
dDhJbbdlGCjsLnH/BczGZi5fyEJds9lUIrp1hJidRcUKO76qb/9gc6qNZpl1vH5k
lDUuJYt7YhAs+L6rTXDyqcK9maeQr0gaOPsRRAQLLwiQCorPeMTUNsbVMdMwZYJs
R+PxiAnk+nyi7rfiFvPoASAYUuI6OzYL/Fa6QU4/gYyPgic944QYVkaQBnc0vEP1
nXq6LGKwgVGcqJnkr/E2kui5gJoV5C3qll3e
-----END CERTIFICATE-----

37
share/certs/BitcoinFoundation_Comodo_Cert.pem

@ -1,37 +0,0 @@ @@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
Bag Attributes
friendlyName: The Bitcoin Foundation, Inc.'s COMODO CA Limited ID
localKeyID: 8C 94 64 E3 B5 B0 41 89 5B 89 B0 57 CC 74 B9 44 E5 B2 92 66
subject=/C=US/postalCode=98104-1444/ST=WA/L=Seattle/street=Suite 300/street=71 Columbia St/O=The Bitcoin Foundation, Inc./CN=The Bitcoin Foundation, Inc.
issuer=/C=GB/ST=Greater Manchester/L=Salford/O=COMODO CA Limited/CN=COMODO Code Signing CA 2
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----

46
share/certs/PrivateKeyNotes.md

@ -1,46 +0,0 @@ @@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
Code-signing private key notes
==
The private keys for these certificates were generated on Gavin's main work machine,
following the certificate authority's recommendations for generating certificate
signing requests.
For OSX, the private key was generated by Keychain.app on Gavin's main work machine.
The key and certificate is in a separate, passphrase-protected keychain file that is
unlocked to sign the Bitcoin-Qt.app bundle.
For Windows, the private key was generated by Firefox running on Gavin's main work machine.
The key and certificate were exported into a separate, passphrase-protected PKCS#12 file, and
then deleted from Firefox's keystore. The exported file is used to sign the Windows setup.exe.
Threat analysis
--
Gavin is a single point of failure. He could be coerced to divulge the secret signing keys,
allowing somebody to distribute a Bitcoin-Qt.app or bitcoin-qt-setup.exe with a valid
signature but containing a malicious binary.
Or the machine Gavin uses to sign the binaries could be compromised, either remotely or
by breaking in to his office, allowing the attacker to get the private key files and then
install a keylogger to get the passphrase that protects them.
Threat Mitigation
--
"Air gapping" the machine used to do the signing will not work, because the signing
process needs to access a timestamp server over the network. And it would not
prevent the "rubber hose cryptography" threat (coercing Gavin to sign a bad binary
or divulge the private keys).
Windows binaries are reproducibly 'gitian-built', and the setup.exe file created
by the NSIS installer system is a 7zip archive, so you could check to make sure
that the bitcoin-qt.exe file inside the installer had not been tampered with.
However, an attacker could modify the installer's code, so when the setup.exe
was run it compromised users' systems. A volunteer to write an auditing tool
that checks the setup.exe for tampering, and checks the files in it against
the list of gitian signatures, is needed.
The long-term solution is something like the 'gitian downloader' system, which
uses signatures from multiple developers to determine whether or not a binary
should be trusted. However, that just pushes the problem to "how will
non-technical users securely get the gitian downloader code to start?"
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