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// Copyright (c) 2009-2014 The Bitcoin Core developers
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// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
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// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
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#include "key.h"
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#include "arith_uint256.h"
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#include "crypto/common.h"
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#include "crypto/hmac_sha512.h"
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#include "eccryptoverify.h"
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#include "pubkey.h"
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#include "random.h"
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#include <secp256k1.h>
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#include "ecwrapper.h"
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Update key.cpp to use new libsecp256k1
libsecp256k1's API changed, so update key.cpp to use it.
Libsecp256k1 now has explicit context objects, which makes it completely thread-safe.
In turn, keep an explicit context object in key.cpp, which is explicitly initialized
destroyed. This is not really pretty now, but it's more efficient than the static
initialized object in key.cpp (which made for example bitcoin-tx slow, as for most of
its calls, libsecp256k1 wasn't actually needed).
This also brings in the new blinding support in libsecp256k1. By passing in a random
seed, temporary variables during the elliptic curve computations are altered, in such
a way that if an attacker does not know the blind, observing the internal operations
leaks less information about the keys used. This was implemented by Greg Maxwell.
10 years ago
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static secp256k1_context_t* secp256k1_context = NULL;
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bool CKey::Check(const unsigned char *vch) {
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return eccrypto::Check(vch);
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}
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void CKey::MakeNewKey(bool fCompressedIn) {
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RandAddSeedPerfmon();
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do {
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GetRandBytes(vch, sizeof(vch));
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} while (!Check(vch));
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fValid = true;
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fCompressed = fCompressedIn;
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}
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bool CKey::SetPrivKey(const CPrivKey &privkey, bool fCompressedIn) {
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Update key.cpp to use new libsecp256k1
libsecp256k1's API changed, so update key.cpp to use it.
Libsecp256k1 now has explicit context objects, which makes it completely thread-safe.
In turn, keep an explicit context object in key.cpp, which is explicitly initialized
destroyed. This is not really pretty now, but it's more efficient than the static
initialized object in key.cpp (which made for example bitcoin-tx slow, as for most of
its calls, libsecp256k1 wasn't actually needed).
This also brings in the new blinding support in libsecp256k1. By passing in a random
seed, temporary variables during the elliptic curve computations are altered, in such
a way that if an attacker does not know the blind, observing the internal operations
leaks less information about the keys used. This was implemented by Greg Maxwell.
10 years ago
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if (!secp256k1_ec_privkey_import(secp256k1_context, (unsigned char*)begin(), &privkey[0], privkey.size()))
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return false;
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fCompressed = fCompressedIn;
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fValid = true;
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return true;
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}
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CPrivKey CKey::GetPrivKey() const {
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assert(fValid);
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CPrivKey privkey;
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int privkeylen, ret;
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privkey.resize(279);
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privkeylen = 279;
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Update key.cpp to use new libsecp256k1
libsecp256k1's API changed, so update key.cpp to use it.
Libsecp256k1 now has explicit context objects, which makes it completely thread-safe.
In turn, keep an explicit context object in key.cpp, which is explicitly initialized
destroyed. This is not really pretty now, but it's more efficient than the static
initialized object in key.cpp (which made for example bitcoin-tx slow, as for most of
its calls, libsecp256k1 wasn't actually needed).
This also brings in the new blinding support in libsecp256k1. By passing in a random
seed, temporary variables during the elliptic curve computations are altered, in such
a way that if an attacker does not know the blind, observing the internal operations
leaks less information about the keys used. This was implemented by Greg Maxwell.
10 years ago
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ret = secp256k1_ec_privkey_export(secp256k1_context, begin(), (unsigned char*)&privkey[0], &privkeylen, fCompressed);
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assert(ret);
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privkey.resize(privkeylen);
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return privkey;
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}
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CPubKey CKey::GetPubKey() const {
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assert(fValid);
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CPubKey result;
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int clen = 65;
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Update key.cpp to use new libsecp256k1
libsecp256k1's API changed, so update key.cpp to use it.
Libsecp256k1 now has explicit context objects, which makes it completely thread-safe.
In turn, keep an explicit context object in key.cpp, which is explicitly initialized
destroyed. This is not really pretty now, but it's more efficient than the static
initialized object in key.cpp (which made for example bitcoin-tx slow, as for most of
its calls, libsecp256k1 wasn't actually needed).
This also brings in the new blinding support in libsecp256k1. By passing in a random
seed, temporary variables during the elliptic curve computations are altered, in such
a way that if an attacker does not know the blind, observing the internal operations
leaks less information about the keys used. This was implemented by Greg Maxwell.
10 years ago
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int ret = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(secp256k1_context, (unsigned char*)result.begin(), &clen, begin(), fCompressed);
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assert((int)result.size() == clen);
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assert(ret);
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assert(result.IsValid());
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return result;
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}
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bool CKey::Sign(const uint256 &hash, std::vector<unsigned char>& vchSig, uint32_t test_case) const {
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if (!fValid)
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return false;
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vchSig.resize(72);
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int nSigLen = 72;
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unsigned char extra_entropy[32] = {0};
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WriteLE32(extra_entropy, test_case);
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Update key.cpp to use new libsecp256k1
libsecp256k1's API changed, so update key.cpp to use it.
Libsecp256k1 now has explicit context objects, which makes it completely thread-safe.
In turn, keep an explicit context object in key.cpp, which is explicitly initialized
destroyed. This is not really pretty now, but it's more efficient than the static
initialized object in key.cpp (which made for example bitcoin-tx slow, as for most of
its calls, libsecp256k1 wasn't actually needed).
This also brings in the new blinding support in libsecp256k1. By passing in a random
seed, temporary variables during the elliptic curve computations are altered, in such
a way that if an attacker does not know the blind, observing the internal operations
leaks less information about the keys used. This was implemented by Greg Maxwell.
10 years ago
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int ret = secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(secp256k1_context, hash.begin(), (unsigned char*)&vchSig[0], &nSigLen, begin(), secp256k1_nonce_function_rfc6979, test_case ? extra_entropy : NULL);
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assert(ret);
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vchSig.resize(nSigLen);
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return true;
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}
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bool CKey::VerifyPubKey(const CPubKey& pubkey) const {
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if (pubkey.IsCompressed() != fCompressed) {
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return false;
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}
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unsigned char rnd[8];
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std::string str = "Bitcoin key verification\n";
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GetRandBytes(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
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uint256 hash;
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CHash256().Write((unsigned char*)str.data(), str.size()).Write(rnd, sizeof(rnd)).Finalize(hash.begin());
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std::vector<unsigned char> vchSig;
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Sign(hash, vchSig);
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return pubkey.Verify(hash, vchSig);
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}
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bool CKey::SignCompact(const uint256 &hash, std::vector<unsigned char>& vchSig) const {
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if (!fValid)
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return false;
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vchSig.resize(65);
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int rec = -1;
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Update key.cpp to use new libsecp256k1
libsecp256k1's API changed, so update key.cpp to use it.
Libsecp256k1 now has explicit context objects, which makes it completely thread-safe.
In turn, keep an explicit context object in key.cpp, which is explicitly initialized
destroyed. This is not really pretty now, but it's more efficient than the static
initialized object in key.cpp (which made for example bitcoin-tx slow, as for most of
its calls, libsecp256k1 wasn't actually needed).
This also brings in the new blinding support in libsecp256k1. By passing in a random
seed, temporary variables during the elliptic curve computations are altered, in such
a way that if an attacker does not know the blind, observing the internal operations
leaks less information about the keys used. This was implemented by Greg Maxwell.
10 years ago
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int ret = secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_compact(secp256k1_context, hash.begin(), &vchSig[1], begin(), secp256k1_nonce_function_rfc6979, NULL, &rec);
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assert(ret);
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assert(rec != -1);
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vchSig[0] = 27 + rec + (fCompressed ? 4 : 0);
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return true;
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}
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bool CKey::Load(CPrivKey &privkey, CPubKey &vchPubKey, bool fSkipCheck=false) {
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Update key.cpp to use new libsecp256k1
libsecp256k1's API changed, so update key.cpp to use it.
Libsecp256k1 now has explicit context objects, which makes it completely thread-safe.
In turn, keep an explicit context object in key.cpp, which is explicitly initialized
destroyed. This is not really pretty now, but it's more efficient than the static
initialized object in key.cpp (which made for example bitcoin-tx slow, as for most of
its calls, libsecp256k1 wasn't actually needed).
This also brings in the new blinding support in libsecp256k1. By passing in a random
seed, temporary variables during the elliptic curve computations are altered, in such
a way that if an attacker does not know the blind, observing the internal operations
leaks less information about the keys used. This was implemented by Greg Maxwell.
10 years ago
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if (!secp256k1_ec_privkey_import(secp256k1_context, (unsigned char*)begin(), &privkey[0], privkey.size()))
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return false;
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fCompressed = vchPubKey.IsCompressed();
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fValid = true;
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if (fSkipCheck)
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return true;
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return VerifyPubKey(vchPubKey);
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}
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bool CKey::Derive(CKey& keyChild, ChainCode &ccChild, unsigned int nChild, const ChainCode& cc) const {
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assert(IsValid());
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assert(IsCompressed());
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unsigned char out[64];
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LockObject(out);
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if ((nChild >> 31) == 0) {
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CPubKey pubkey = GetPubKey();
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assert(pubkey.begin() + 33 == pubkey.end());
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BIP32Hash(cc, nChild, *pubkey.begin(), pubkey.begin()+1, out);
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} else {
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assert(begin() + 32 == end());
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BIP32Hash(cc, nChild, 0, begin(), out);
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}
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memcpy(ccChild.begin(), out+32, 32);
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memcpy((unsigned char*)keyChild.begin(), begin(), 32);
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Update key.cpp to use new libsecp256k1
libsecp256k1's API changed, so update key.cpp to use it.
Libsecp256k1 now has explicit context objects, which makes it completely thread-safe.
In turn, keep an explicit context object in key.cpp, which is explicitly initialized
destroyed. This is not really pretty now, but it's more efficient than the static
initialized object in key.cpp (which made for example bitcoin-tx slow, as for most of
its calls, libsecp256k1 wasn't actually needed).
This also brings in the new blinding support in libsecp256k1. By passing in a random
seed, temporary variables during the elliptic curve computations are altered, in such
a way that if an attacker does not know the blind, observing the internal operations
leaks less information about the keys used. This was implemented by Greg Maxwell.
10 years ago
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bool ret = secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(secp256k1_context, (unsigned char*)keyChild.begin(), out);
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UnlockObject(out);
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keyChild.fCompressed = true;
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keyChild.fValid = ret;
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return ret;
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}
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bool CExtKey::Derive(CExtKey &out, unsigned int nChild) const {
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out.nDepth = nDepth + 1;
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CKeyID id = key.GetPubKey().GetID();
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memcpy(&out.vchFingerprint[0], &id, 4);
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out.nChild = nChild;
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return key.Derive(out.key, out.chaincode, nChild, chaincode);
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}
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void CExtKey::SetMaster(const unsigned char *seed, unsigned int nSeedLen) {
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static const unsigned char hashkey[] = {'B','i','t','c','o','i','n',' ','s','e','e','d'};
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unsigned char out[64];
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LockObject(out);
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CHMAC_SHA512(hashkey, sizeof(hashkey)).Write(seed, nSeedLen).Finalize(out);
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key.Set(&out[0], &out[32], true);
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memcpy(chaincode.begin(), &out[32], 32);
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UnlockObject(out);
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nDepth = 0;
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nChild = 0;
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memset(vchFingerprint, 0, sizeof(vchFingerprint));
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}
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CExtPubKey CExtKey::Neuter() const {
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CExtPubKey ret;
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ret.nDepth = nDepth;
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memcpy(&ret.vchFingerprint[0], &vchFingerprint[0], 4);
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ret.nChild = nChild;
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ret.pubkey = key.GetPubKey();
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ret.chaincode = chaincode;
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return ret;
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}
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void CExtKey::Encode(unsigned char code[74]) const {
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code[0] = nDepth;
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memcpy(code+1, vchFingerprint, 4);
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code[5] = (nChild >> 24) & 0xFF; code[6] = (nChild >> 16) & 0xFF;
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code[7] = (nChild >> 8) & 0xFF; code[8] = (nChild >> 0) & 0xFF;
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memcpy(code+9, chaincode.begin(), 32);
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code[41] = 0;
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assert(key.size() == 32);
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memcpy(code+42, key.begin(), 32);
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}
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void CExtKey::Decode(const unsigned char code[74]) {
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nDepth = code[0];
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memcpy(vchFingerprint, code+1, 4);
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nChild = (code[5] << 24) | (code[6] << 16) | (code[7] << 8) | code[8];
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memcpy(chaincode.begin(), code+9, 32);
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key.Set(code+42, code+74, true);
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}
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bool ECC_InitSanityCheck() {
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if (!CECKey::SanityCheck()) {
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return false;
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}
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CKey key;
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key.MakeNewKey(true);
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CPubKey pubkey = key.GetPubKey();
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return key.VerifyPubKey(pubkey);
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}
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Update key.cpp to use new libsecp256k1
libsecp256k1's API changed, so update key.cpp to use it.
Libsecp256k1 now has explicit context objects, which makes it completely thread-safe.
In turn, keep an explicit context object in key.cpp, which is explicitly initialized
destroyed. This is not really pretty now, but it's more efficient than the static
initialized object in key.cpp (which made for example bitcoin-tx slow, as for most of
its calls, libsecp256k1 wasn't actually needed).
This also brings in the new blinding support in libsecp256k1. By passing in a random
seed, temporary variables during the elliptic curve computations are altered, in such
a way that if an attacker does not know the blind, observing the internal operations
leaks less information about the keys used. This was implemented by Greg Maxwell.
10 years ago
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void ECC_Start() {
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assert(secp256k1_context == NULL);
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secp256k1_context_t *ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN);
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assert(ctx != NULL);
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{
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// Pass in a random blinding seed to the secp256k1 context.
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unsigned char seed[32];
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LockObject(seed);
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GetRandBytes(seed, 32);
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bool ret = secp256k1_context_randomize(ctx, seed);
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assert(ret);
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UnlockObject(seed);
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}
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secp256k1_context = ctx;
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}
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void ECC_Stop() {
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secp256k1_context_t *ctx = secp256k1_context;
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secp256k1_context = NULL;
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if (ctx) {
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secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx);
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}
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}
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