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// Copyright (c) 2009-2013 The Bitcoin developers
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// Distributed under the MIT/X11 software license, see the accompanying
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// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
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#include "key.h"
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#include "crypto/sha2.h"
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
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#include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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// anonymous namespace with local implementation code (OpenSSL interaction)
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namespace {
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// Generate a private key from just the secret parameter
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int EC_KEY_regenerate_key(EC_KEY *eckey, BIGNUM *priv_key)
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{
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int ok = 0;
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BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
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EC_POINT *pub_key = NULL;
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if (!eckey) return 0;
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const EC_GROUP *group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey);
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if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
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goto err;
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pub_key = EC_POINT_new(group);
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if (pub_key == NULL)
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goto err;
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if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, pub_key, priv_key, NULL, NULL, ctx))
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goto err;
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EC_KEY_set_private_key(eckey,priv_key);
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EC_KEY_set_public_key(eckey,pub_key);
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ok = 1;
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err:
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if (pub_key)
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EC_POINT_free(pub_key);
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if (ctx != NULL)
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BN_CTX_free(ctx);
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return(ok);
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}
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// Perform ECDSA key recovery (see SEC1 4.1.6) for curves over (mod p)-fields
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// recid selects which key is recovered
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// if check is non-zero, additional checks are performed
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int ECDSA_SIG_recover_key_GFp(EC_KEY *eckey, ECDSA_SIG *ecsig, const unsigned char *msg, int msglen, int recid, int check)
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{
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if (!eckey) return 0;
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int ret = 0;
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BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
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BIGNUM *x = NULL;
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BIGNUM *e = NULL;
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BIGNUM *order = NULL;
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BIGNUM *sor = NULL;
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BIGNUM *eor = NULL;
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BIGNUM *field = NULL;
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EC_POINT *R = NULL;
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EC_POINT *O = NULL;
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EC_POINT *Q = NULL;
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BIGNUM *rr = NULL;
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BIGNUM *zero = NULL;
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int n = 0;
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int i = recid / 2;
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const EC_GROUP *group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey);
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if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { ret = -1; goto err; }
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BN_CTX_start(ctx);
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order = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx)) { ret = -2; goto err; }
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x = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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if (!BN_copy(x, order)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
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if (!BN_mul_word(x, i)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
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if (!BN_add(x, x, ecsig->r)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
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field = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(group, field, NULL, NULL, ctx)) { ret=-2; goto err; }
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if (BN_cmp(x, field) >= 0) { ret=0; goto err; }
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if ((R = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { ret = -2; goto err; }
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if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, R, x, recid % 2, ctx)) { ret=0; goto err; }
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if (check)
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{
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if ((O = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { ret = -2; goto err; }
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if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, O, NULL, R, order, ctx)) { ret=-2; goto err; }
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if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, O)) { ret = 0; goto err; }
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}
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if ((Q = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { ret = -2; goto err; }
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n = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
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e = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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if (!BN_bin2bn(msg, msglen, e)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
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if (8*msglen > n) BN_rshift(e, e, 8-(n & 7));
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zero = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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if (!BN_zero(zero)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
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if (!BN_mod_sub(e, zero, e, order, ctx)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
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rr = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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if (!BN_mod_inverse(rr, ecsig->r, order, ctx)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
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sor = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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if (!BN_mod_mul(sor, ecsig->s, rr, order, ctx)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
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eor = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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if (!BN_mod_mul(eor, e, rr, order, ctx)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
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if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, Q, eor, R, sor, ctx)) { ret=-2; goto err; }
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if (!EC_KEY_set_public_key(eckey, Q)) { ret=-2; goto err; }
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ret = 1;
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err:
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if (ctx) {
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BN_CTX_end(ctx);
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BN_CTX_free(ctx);
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}
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if (R != NULL) EC_POINT_free(R);
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if (O != NULL) EC_POINT_free(O);
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if (Q != NULL) EC_POINT_free(Q);
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return ret;
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}
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// RAII Wrapper around OpenSSL's EC_KEY
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class CECKey {
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private:
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EC_KEY *pkey;
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public:
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CECKey() {
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pkey = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp256k1);
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assert(pkey != NULL);
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}
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~CECKey() {
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EC_KEY_free(pkey);
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}
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void GetSecretBytes(unsigned char vch[32]) const {
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const BIGNUM *bn = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(pkey);
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assert(bn);
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int nBytes = BN_num_bytes(bn);
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int n=BN_bn2bin(bn,&vch[32 - nBytes]);
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assert(n == nBytes);
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memset(vch, 0, 32 - nBytes);
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}
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void SetSecretBytes(const unsigned char vch[32]) {
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bool ret;
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BIGNUM bn;
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BN_init(&bn);
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ret = BN_bin2bn(vch, 32, &bn);
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assert(ret);
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ret = EC_KEY_regenerate_key(pkey, &bn);
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assert(ret);
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BN_clear_free(&bn);
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}
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void GetPrivKey(CPrivKey &privkey, bool fCompressed) {
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EC_KEY_set_conv_form(pkey, fCompressed ? POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED : POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED);
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int nSize = i2d_ECPrivateKey(pkey, NULL);
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assert(nSize);
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privkey.resize(nSize);
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unsigned char* pbegin = &privkey[0];
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int nSize2 = i2d_ECPrivateKey(pkey, &pbegin);
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assert(nSize == nSize2);
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}
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bool SetPrivKey(const CPrivKey &privkey, bool fSkipCheck=false) {
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const unsigned char* pbegin = &privkey[0];
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if (d2i_ECPrivateKey(&pkey, &pbegin, privkey.size())) {
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if(fSkipCheck)
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return true;
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// d2i_ECPrivateKey returns true if parsing succeeds.
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// This doesn't necessarily mean the key is valid.
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if (EC_KEY_check_key(pkey))
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return true;
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}
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return false;
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}
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void GetPubKey(CPubKey &pubkey, bool fCompressed) {
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EC_KEY_set_conv_form(pkey, fCompressed ? POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED : POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED);
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int nSize = i2o_ECPublicKey(pkey, NULL);
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assert(nSize);
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assert(nSize <= 65);
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unsigned char c[65];
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unsigned char *pbegin = c;
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int nSize2 = i2o_ECPublicKey(pkey, &pbegin);
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assert(nSize == nSize2);
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pubkey.Set(&c[0], &c[nSize]);
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}
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bool SetPubKey(const CPubKey &pubkey) {
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const unsigned char* pbegin = pubkey.begin();
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return o2i_ECPublicKey(&pkey, &pbegin, pubkey.size());
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}
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bool Sign(const uint256 &hash, std::vector<unsigned char>& vchSig) {
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Only create signatures with even S, and verification mode to check.
To fix a minor malleability found by Sergio Lerner (reported here:
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=8392.msg1245898#msg1245898)
The problem is that if (R,S) is a valid ECDSA signature for a given
message and public key, (R,-S) is also valid. Modulo N (the order
of the secp256k1 curve), this means that both (R,S) and (R,N-S) are
valid. Given that N is odd, S and N-S have a different lowest bit.
We solve the problem by forcing signatures to have an even S value,
excluding one of the alternatives.
This commit just changes the signing code to always produce even S
values, and adds a verification mode to check it. This code is not
enabled anywhere yet. Existing tests in key_tests.cpp verify that
the produced signatures are still valid.
12 years ago
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vchSig.clear();
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ECDSA_SIG *sig = ECDSA_do_sign((unsigned char*)&hash, sizeof(hash), pkey);
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if (sig == NULL)
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return false;
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BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
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BN_CTX_start(ctx);
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const EC_GROUP *group = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey);
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BIGNUM *order = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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BIGNUM *halforder = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx);
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BN_rshift1(halforder, order);
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if (BN_cmp(sig->s, halforder) > 0) {
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// enforce low S values, by negating the value (modulo the order) if above order/2.
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Only create signatures with even S, and verification mode to check.
To fix a minor malleability found by Sergio Lerner (reported here:
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=8392.msg1245898#msg1245898)
The problem is that if (R,S) is a valid ECDSA signature for a given
message and public key, (R,-S) is also valid. Modulo N (the order
of the secp256k1 curve), this means that both (R,S) and (R,N-S) are
valid. Given that N is odd, S and N-S have a different lowest bit.
We solve the problem by forcing signatures to have an even S value,
excluding one of the alternatives.
This commit just changes the signing code to always produce even S
values, and adds a verification mode to check it. This code is not
enabled anywhere yet. Existing tests in key_tests.cpp verify that
the produced signatures are still valid.
12 years ago
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BN_sub(sig->s, order, sig->s);
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}
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BN_CTX_end(ctx);
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BN_CTX_free(ctx);
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unsigned int nSize = ECDSA_size(pkey);
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vchSig.resize(nSize); // Make sure it is big enough
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Only create signatures with even S, and verification mode to check.
To fix a minor malleability found by Sergio Lerner (reported here:
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=8392.msg1245898#msg1245898)
The problem is that if (R,S) is a valid ECDSA signature for a given
message and public key, (R,-S) is also valid. Modulo N (the order
of the secp256k1 curve), this means that both (R,S) and (R,N-S) are
valid. Given that N is odd, S and N-S have a different lowest bit.
We solve the problem by forcing signatures to have an even S value,
excluding one of the alternatives.
This commit just changes the signing code to always produce even S
values, and adds a verification mode to check it. This code is not
enabled anywhere yet. Existing tests in key_tests.cpp verify that
the produced signatures are still valid.
12 years ago
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unsigned char *pos = &vchSig[0];
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nSize = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig, &pos);
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ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
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vchSig.resize(nSize); // Shrink to fit actual size
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return true;
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}
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bool Verify(const uint256 &hash, const std::vector<unsigned char>& vchSig) {
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// -1 = error, 0 = bad sig, 1 = good
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if (ECDSA_verify(0, (unsigned char*)&hash, sizeof(hash), &vchSig[0], vchSig.size(), pkey) != 1)
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return false;
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return true;
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}
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bool SignCompact(const uint256 &hash, unsigned char *p64, int &rec) {
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bool fOk = false;
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ECDSA_SIG *sig = ECDSA_do_sign((unsigned char*)&hash, sizeof(hash), pkey);
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if (sig==NULL)
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return false;
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memset(p64, 0, 64);
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int nBitsR = BN_num_bits(sig->r);
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int nBitsS = BN_num_bits(sig->s);
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if (nBitsR <= 256 && nBitsS <= 256) {
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CPubKey pubkey;
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GetPubKey(pubkey, true);
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for (int i=0; i<4; i++) {
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CECKey keyRec;
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if (ECDSA_SIG_recover_key_GFp(keyRec.pkey, sig, (unsigned char*)&hash, sizeof(hash), i, 1) == 1) {
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CPubKey pubkeyRec;
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keyRec.GetPubKey(pubkeyRec, true);
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if (pubkeyRec == pubkey) {
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rec = i;
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fOk = true;
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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assert(fOk);
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BN_bn2bin(sig->r,&p64[32-(nBitsR+7)/8]);
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BN_bn2bin(sig->s,&p64[64-(nBitsS+7)/8]);
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}
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ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
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return fOk;
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}
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// reconstruct public key from a compact signature
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// This is only slightly more CPU intensive than just verifying it.
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// If this function succeeds, the recovered public key is guaranteed to be valid
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// (the signature is a valid signature of the given data for that key)
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bool Recover(const uint256 &hash, const unsigned char *p64, int rec)
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{
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if (rec<0 || rec>=3)
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return false;
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ECDSA_SIG *sig = ECDSA_SIG_new();
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BN_bin2bn(&p64[0], 32, sig->r);
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BN_bin2bn(&p64[32], 32, sig->s);
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bool ret = ECDSA_SIG_recover_key_GFp(pkey, sig, (unsigned char*)&hash, sizeof(hash), rec, 0) == 1;
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ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
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return ret;
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}
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static bool TweakSecret(unsigned char vchSecretOut[32], const unsigned char vchSecretIn[32], const unsigned char vchTweak[32])
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{
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bool ret = true;
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BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
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BN_CTX_start(ctx);
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BIGNUM *bnSecret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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BIGNUM *bnTweak = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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BIGNUM *bnOrder = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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EC_GROUP *group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp256k1);
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EC_GROUP_get_order(group, bnOrder, ctx); // what a grossly inefficient way to get the (constant) group order...
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BN_bin2bn(vchTweak, 32, bnTweak);
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if (BN_cmp(bnTweak, bnOrder) >= 0)
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ret = false; // extremely unlikely
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BN_bin2bn(vchSecretIn, 32, bnSecret);
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BN_add(bnSecret, bnSecret, bnTweak);
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BN_nnmod(bnSecret, bnSecret, bnOrder, ctx);
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if (BN_is_zero(bnSecret))
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ret = false; // ridiculously unlikely
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int nBits = BN_num_bits(bnSecret);
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memset(vchSecretOut, 0, 32);
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BN_bn2bin(bnSecret, &vchSecretOut[32-(nBits+7)/8]);
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|
|
EC_GROUP_free(group);
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bool TweakPublic(const unsigned char vchTweak[32]) {
|
|
|
|
bool ret = true;
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
|
|
|
|
BIGNUM *bnTweak = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
|
|
|
|
BIGNUM *bnOrder = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
|
|
|
|
BIGNUM *bnOne = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
|
|
|
|
const EC_GROUP *group = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey);
|
|
|
|
EC_GROUP_get_order(group, bnOrder, ctx); // what a grossly inefficient way to get the (constant) group order...
|
|
|
|
BN_bin2bn(vchTweak, 32, bnTweak);
|
|
|
|
if (BN_cmp(bnTweak, bnOrder) >= 0)
|
|
|
|
ret = false; // extremely unlikely
|
|
|
|
EC_POINT *point = EC_POINT_dup(EC_KEY_get0_public_key(pkey), group);
|
|
|
|
BN_one(bnOne);
|
|
|
|
EC_POINT_mul(group, point, bnTweak, point, bnOne, ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point))
|
|
|
|
ret = false; // ridiculously unlikely
|
|
|
|
EC_KEY_set_public_key(pkey, point);
|
|
|
|
EC_POINT_free(point);
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int CompareBigEndian(const unsigned char *c1, size_t c1len, const unsigned char *c2, size_t c2len) {
|
|
|
|
while (c1len > c2len) {
|
|
|
|
if (*c1)
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
c1++;
|
|
|
|
c1len--;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while (c2len > c1len) {
|
|
|
|
if (*c2)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
c2++;
|
|
|
|
c2len--;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while (c1len > 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (*c1 > *c2)
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
if (*c2 > *c1)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
c1++;
|
|
|
|
c2++;
|
|
|
|
c1len--;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Order of secp256k1's generator minus 1.
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char vchMaxModOrder[32] = {
|
|
|
|
0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,
|
|
|
|
0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFE,
|
|
|
|
0xBA,0xAE,0xDC,0xE6,0xAF,0x48,0xA0,0x3B,
|
|
|
|
0xBF,0xD2,0x5E,0x8C,0xD0,0x36,0x41,0x40
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Half of the order of secp256k1's generator minus 1.
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char vchMaxModHalfOrder[32] = {
|
|
|
|
0x7F,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,
|
|
|
|
0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,
|
|
|
|
0x5D,0x57,0x6E,0x73,0x57,0xA4,0x50,0x1D,
|
|
|
|
0xDF,0xE9,0x2F,0x46,0x68,0x1B,0x20,0xA0
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char vchZero[0] = {};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
}; // end of anonymous namespace
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bool CKey::Check(const unsigned char *vch) {
|
|
|
|
return CompareBigEndian(vch, 32, vchZero, 0) > 0 &&
|
|
|
|
CompareBigEndian(vch, 32, vchMaxModOrder, 32) <= 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bool CKey::CheckSignatureElement(const unsigned char *vch, int len, bool half) {
|
|
|
|
return CompareBigEndian(vch, len, vchZero, 0) > 0 &&
|
|
|
|
CompareBigEndian(vch, len, half ? vchMaxModHalfOrder : vchMaxModOrder, 32) <= 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void CKey::MakeNewKey(bool fCompressedIn) {
|
|
|
|
do {
|
|
|
|
RAND_bytes(vch, sizeof(vch));
|
|
|
|
} while (!Check(vch));
|
|
|
|
fValid = true;
|
|
|
|
fCompressed = fCompressedIn;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bool CKey::SetPrivKey(const CPrivKey &privkey, bool fCompressedIn) {
|
|
|
|
CECKey key;
|
|
|
|
if (!key.SetPrivKey(privkey))
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
key.GetSecretBytes(vch);
|
|
|
|
fCompressed = fCompressedIn;
|
|
|
|
fValid = true;
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CPrivKey CKey::GetPrivKey() const {
|
|
|
|
assert(fValid);
|
|
|
|
CECKey key;
|
|
|
|
key.SetSecretBytes(vch);
|
|
|
|
CPrivKey privkey;
|
|
|
|
key.GetPrivKey(privkey, fCompressed);
|
|
|
|
return privkey;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CPubKey CKey::GetPubKey() const {
|
|
|
|
assert(fValid);
|
|
|
|
CECKey key;
|
|
|
|
key.SetSecretBytes(vch);
|
|
|
|
CPubKey pubkey;
|
|
|
|
key.GetPubKey(pubkey, fCompressed);
|
|
|
|
return pubkey;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bool CKey::Sign(const uint256 &hash, std::vector<unsigned char>& vchSig) const {
|
|
|
|
if (!fValid)
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
CECKey key;
|
|
|
|
key.SetSecretBytes(vch);
|
|
|
|
return key.Sign(hash, vchSig);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bool CKey::SignCompact(const uint256 &hash, std::vector<unsigned char>& vchSig) const {
|
|
|
|
if (!fValid)
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
CECKey key;
|
|
|
|
key.SetSecretBytes(vch);
|
|
|
|
vchSig.resize(65);
|
|
|
|
int rec = -1;
|
|
|
|
if (!key.SignCompact(hash, &vchSig[1], rec))
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
assert(rec != -1);
|
|
|
|
vchSig[0] = 27 + rec + (fCompressed ? 4 : 0);
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bool CKey::Load(CPrivKey &privkey, CPubKey &vchPubKey, bool fSkipCheck=false) {
|
|
|
|
CECKey key;
|
|
|
|
if (!key.SetPrivKey(privkey, fSkipCheck))
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
key.GetSecretBytes(vch);
|
|
|
|
fCompressed = vchPubKey.IsCompressed();
|
|
|
|
fValid = true;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (fSkipCheck)
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (GetPubKey() != vchPubKey)
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bool CPubKey::Verify(const uint256 &hash, const std::vector<unsigned char>& vchSig) const {
|
|
|
|
if (!IsValid())
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
CECKey key;
|
|
|
|
if (!key.SetPubKey(*this))
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
if (!key.Verify(hash, vchSig))
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bool CPubKey::RecoverCompact(const uint256 &hash, const std::vector<unsigned char>& vchSig) {
|
|
|
|
if (vchSig.size() != 65)
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
CECKey key;
|
|
|
|
if (!key.Recover(hash, &vchSig[1], (vchSig[0] - 27) & ~4))
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
key.GetPubKey(*this, (vchSig[0] - 27) & 4);
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bool CPubKey::IsFullyValid() const {
|
|
|
|
if (!IsValid())
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
CECKey key;
|
|
|
|
if (!key.SetPubKey(*this))
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bool CPubKey::Decompress() {
|
|
|
|
if (!IsValid())
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
CECKey key;
|
|
|
|
if (!key.SetPubKey(*this))
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
key.GetPubKey(*this, false);
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void static BIP32Hash(const unsigned char chainCode[32], unsigned int nChild, unsigned char header, const unsigned char data[32], unsigned char output[64]) {
|
|
|
|
unsigned char num[4];
|
|
|
|
num[0] = (nChild >> 24) & 0xFF;
|
|
|
|
num[1] = (nChild >> 16) & 0xFF;
|
|
|
|
num[2] = (nChild >> 8) & 0xFF;
|
|
|
|
num[3] = (nChild >> 0) & 0xFF;
|
|
|
|
CHMAC_SHA512(chainCode, 32).Write(&header, 1)
|
|
|
|
.Write(data, 32)
|
|
|
|
.Write(num, 4)
|
|
|
|
.Finalize(output);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bool CKey::Derive(CKey& keyChild, unsigned char ccChild[32], unsigned int nChild, const unsigned char cc[32]) const {
|
|
|
|
assert(IsValid());
|
|
|
|
assert(IsCompressed());
|
|
|
|
unsigned char out[64];
|
|
|
|
LockObject(out);
|
|
|
|
if ((nChild >> 31) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
CPubKey pubkey = GetPubKey();
|
|
|
|
assert(pubkey.begin() + 33 == pubkey.end());
|
|
|
|
BIP32Hash(cc, nChild, *pubkey.begin(), pubkey.begin()+1, out);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
assert(begin() + 32 == end());
|
|
|
|
BIP32Hash(cc, nChild, 0, begin(), out);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(ccChild, out+32, 32);
|
|
|
|
bool ret = CECKey::TweakSecret((unsigned char*)keyChild.begin(), begin(), out);
|
|
|
|
UnlockObject(out);
|
|
|
|
keyChild.fCompressed = true;
|
|
|
|
keyChild.fValid = ret;
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bool CPubKey::Derive(CPubKey& pubkeyChild, unsigned char ccChild[32], unsigned int nChild, const unsigned char cc[32]) const {
|
|
|
|
assert(IsValid());
|
|
|
|
assert((nChild >> 31) == 0);
|
|
|
|
assert(begin() + 33 == end());
|
|
|
|
unsigned char out[64];
|
|
|
|
BIP32Hash(cc, nChild, *begin(), begin()+1, out);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(ccChild, out+32, 32);
|
|
|
|
CECKey key;
|
|
|
|
bool ret = key.SetPubKey(*this);
|
|
|
|
ret &= key.TweakPublic(out);
|
|
|
|
key.GetPubKey(pubkeyChild, true);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bool CExtKey::Derive(CExtKey &out, unsigned int nChild) const {
|
|
|
|
out.nDepth = nDepth + 1;
|
|
|
|
CKeyID id = key.GetPubKey().GetID();
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&out.vchFingerprint[0], &id, 4);
|
|
|
|
out.nChild = nChild;
|
|
|
|
return key.Derive(out.key, out.vchChainCode, nChild, vchChainCode);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void CExtKey::SetMaster(const unsigned char *seed, unsigned int nSeedLen) {
|
|
|
|
static const unsigned char hashkey[] = {'B','i','t','c','o','i','n',' ','s','e','e','d'};
|
|
|
|
unsigned char out[64];
|
|
|
|
LockObject(out);
|
|
|
|
CHMAC_SHA512(hashkey, sizeof(hashkey)).Write(seed, nSeedLen).Finalize(out);
|
|
|
|
key.Set(&out[0], &out[32], true);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(vchChainCode, &out[32], 32);
|
|
|
|
UnlockObject(out);
|
|
|
|
nDepth = 0;
|
|
|
|
nChild = 0;
|
|
|
|
memset(vchFingerprint, 0, sizeof(vchFingerprint));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CExtPubKey CExtKey::Neuter() const {
|
|
|
|
CExtPubKey ret;
|
|
|
|
ret.nDepth = nDepth;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&ret.vchFingerprint[0], &vchFingerprint[0], 4);
|
|
|
|
ret.nChild = nChild;
|
|
|
|
ret.pubkey = key.GetPubKey();
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&ret.vchChainCode[0], &vchChainCode[0], 32);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void CExtKey::Encode(unsigned char code[74]) const {
|
|
|
|
code[0] = nDepth;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(code+1, vchFingerprint, 4);
|
|
|
|
code[5] = (nChild >> 24) & 0xFF; code[6] = (nChild >> 16) & 0xFF;
|
|
|
|
code[7] = (nChild >> 8) & 0xFF; code[8] = (nChild >> 0) & 0xFF;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(code+9, vchChainCode, 32);
|
|
|
|
code[41] = 0;
|
|
|
|
assert(key.size() == 32);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(code+42, key.begin(), 32);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void CExtKey::Decode(const unsigned char code[74]) {
|
|
|
|
nDepth = code[0];
|
|
|
|
memcpy(vchFingerprint, code+1, 4);
|
|
|
|
nChild = (code[5] << 24) | (code[6] << 16) | (code[7] << 8) | code[8];
|
|
|
|
memcpy(vchChainCode, code+9, 32);
|
|
|
|
key.Set(code+42, code+74, true);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void CExtPubKey::Encode(unsigned char code[74]) const {
|
|
|
|
code[0] = nDepth;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(code+1, vchFingerprint, 4);
|
|
|
|
code[5] = (nChild >> 24) & 0xFF; code[6] = (nChild >> 16) & 0xFF;
|
|
|
|
code[7] = (nChild >> 8) & 0xFF; code[8] = (nChild >> 0) & 0xFF;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(code+9, vchChainCode, 32);
|
|
|
|
assert(pubkey.size() == 33);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(code+41, pubkey.begin(), 33);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void CExtPubKey::Decode(const unsigned char code[74]) {
|
|
|
|
nDepth = code[0];
|
|
|
|
memcpy(vchFingerprint, code+1, 4);
|
|
|
|
nChild = (code[5] << 24) | (code[6] << 16) | (code[7] << 8) | code[8];
|
|
|
|
memcpy(vchChainCode, code+9, 32);
|
|
|
|
pubkey.Set(code+41, code+74);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bool CExtPubKey::Derive(CExtPubKey &out, unsigned int nChild) const {
|
|
|
|
out.nDepth = nDepth + 1;
|
|
|
|
CKeyID id = pubkey.GetID();
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&out.vchFingerprint[0], &id, 4);
|
|
|
|
out.nChild = nChild;
|
|
|
|
return pubkey.Derive(out.pubkey, out.vchChainCode, nChild, vchChainCode);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bool ECC_InitSanityCheck() {
|
|
|
|
EC_KEY *pkey = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp256k1);
|
|
|
|
if(pkey == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
EC_KEY_free(pkey);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// TODO Is there more EC functionality that could be missing?
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|