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809 lines
29 KiB
809 lines
29 KiB
// Copyright (c) 2009-2012 The Bitcoin developers |
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// Distributed under the MIT/X11 software license, see the accompanying |
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// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php. |
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#include <openssl/ecdsa.h> |
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#include <openssl/rand.h> |
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#include <openssl/obj_mac.h> |
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#include <openssl/ecdh.h> |
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#include <openssl/evp.h> |
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#include <openssl/hmac.h> |
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#include "key.h" |
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#ifdef DEBUG_ECIES |
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#include "util.h" |
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#endif |
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// anonymous namespace with local implementation code (OpenSSL interaction) |
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namespace { |
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// Generate a private key from just the secret parameter |
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int EC_KEY_regenerate_key(EC_KEY *eckey, BIGNUM *priv_key) |
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{ |
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int ok = 0; |
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BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
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EC_POINT *pub_key = NULL; |
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if (!eckey) return 0; |
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const EC_GROUP *group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey); |
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if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) |
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goto err; |
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pub_key = EC_POINT_new(group); |
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if (pub_key == NULL) |
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goto err; |
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if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, pub_key, priv_key, NULL, NULL, ctx)) |
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goto err; |
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EC_KEY_set_private_key(eckey,priv_key); |
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EC_KEY_set_public_key(eckey,pub_key); |
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ok = 1; |
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err: |
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if (pub_key) |
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EC_POINT_free(pub_key); |
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if (ctx != NULL) |
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BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
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return(ok); |
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} |
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// Perform ECDSA key recovery (see SEC1 4.1.6) for curves over (mod p)-fields |
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// recid selects which key is recovered |
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// if check is non-zero, additional checks are performed |
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int ECDSA_SIG_recover_key_GFp(EC_KEY *eckey, ECDSA_SIG *ecsig, const unsigned char *msg, int msglen, int recid, int check) |
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{ |
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if (!eckey) return 0; |
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int ret = 0; |
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BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
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BIGNUM *x = NULL; |
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BIGNUM *e = NULL; |
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BIGNUM *order = NULL; |
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BIGNUM *sor = NULL; |
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BIGNUM *eor = NULL; |
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BIGNUM *field = NULL; |
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EC_POINT *R = NULL; |
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EC_POINT *O = NULL; |
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EC_POINT *Q = NULL; |
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BIGNUM *rr = NULL; |
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BIGNUM *zero = NULL; |
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int n = 0; |
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int i = recid / 2; |
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const EC_GROUP *group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey); |
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if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { ret = -1; goto err; } |
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BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
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order = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
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if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx)) { ret = -2; goto err; } |
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x = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
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if (!BN_copy(x, order)) { ret=-1; goto err; } |
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if (!BN_mul_word(x, i)) { ret=-1; goto err; } |
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if (!BN_add(x, x, ecsig->r)) { ret=-1; goto err; } |
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field = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
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if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(group, field, NULL, NULL, ctx)) { ret=-2; goto err; } |
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if (BN_cmp(x, field) >= 0) { ret=0; goto err; } |
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if ((R = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { ret = -2; goto err; } |
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if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, R, x, recid % 2, ctx)) { ret=0; goto err; } |
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if (check) |
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{ |
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if ((O = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { ret = -2; goto err; } |
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if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, O, NULL, R, order, ctx)) { ret=-2; goto err; } |
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if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, O)) { ret = 0; goto err; } |
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} |
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if ((Q = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { ret = -2; goto err; } |
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n = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group); |
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e = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
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if (!BN_bin2bn(msg, msglen, e)) { ret=-1; goto err; } |
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if (8*msglen > n) BN_rshift(e, e, 8-(n & 7)); |
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zero = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
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if (!BN_zero(zero)) { ret=-1; goto err; } |
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if (!BN_mod_sub(e, zero, e, order, ctx)) { ret=-1; goto err; } |
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rr = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
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if (!BN_mod_inverse(rr, ecsig->r, order, ctx)) { ret=-1; goto err; } |
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sor = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
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if (!BN_mod_mul(sor, ecsig->s, rr, order, ctx)) { ret=-1; goto err; } |
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eor = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
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if (!BN_mod_mul(eor, e, rr, order, ctx)) { ret=-1; goto err; } |
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if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, Q, eor, R, sor, ctx)) { ret=-2; goto err; } |
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if (!EC_KEY_set_public_key(eckey, Q)) { ret=-2; goto err; } |
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ret = 1; |
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err: |
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if (ctx) { |
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BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
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BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
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} |
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if (R != NULL) EC_POINT_free(R); |
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if (O != NULL) EC_POINT_free(O); |
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if (Q != NULL) EC_POINT_free(Q); |
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return ret; |
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} |
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void * ecies_key_derivation(const void *input, size_t ilen, void *output, size_t *olen) { |
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if (*olen < SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH) { |
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return NULL; |
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} |
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*olen = SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH; |
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return SHA512(static_cast<const unsigned char*>(input), ilen, static_cast<unsigned char*>(output)); |
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} |
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// RAII Wrapper around OpenSSL's EC_KEY |
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class CECKey { |
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private: |
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EC_KEY *pkey; |
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public: |
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CECKey() { |
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pkey = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp256k1); |
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assert(pkey != NULL); |
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} |
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~CECKey() { |
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EC_KEY_free(pkey); |
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} |
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void GetSecretBytes(unsigned char vch[32]) const { |
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const BIGNUM *bn = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(pkey); |
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assert(bn); |
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int nBytes = BN_num_bytes(bn); |
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int n=BN_bn2bin(bn,&vch[32 - nBytes]); |
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assert(n == nBytes); |
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memset(vch, 0, 32 - nBytes); |
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} |
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void SetSecretBytes(const unsigned char vch[32]) { |
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BIGNUM bn; |
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BN_init(&bn); |
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bool check = BN_bin2bn(vch, 32, &bn); |
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assert(check); |
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check = EC_KEY_regenerate_key(pkey, &bn); |
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assert(check); |
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BN_clear_free(&bn); |
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} |
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void GetPrivKey(CPrivKey &privkey, bool fCompressed) { |
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EC_KEY_set_conv_form(pkey, fCompressed ? POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED : POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED); |
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int nSize = i2d_ECPrivateKey(pkey, NULL); |
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assert(nSize); |
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privkey.resize(nSize); |
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unsigned char* pbegin = &privkey[0]; |
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int nSize2 = i2d_ECPrivateKey(pkey, &pbegin); |
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assert(nSize == nSize2); |
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} |
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bool SetPrivKey(const CPrivKey &privkey) { |
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const unsigned char* pbegin = &privkey[0]; |
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if (d2i_ECPrivateKey(&pkey, &pbegin, privkey.size())) { |
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// d2i_ECPrivateKey returns true if parsing succeeds. |
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// This doesn't necessarily mean the key is valid. |
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if (EC_KEY_check_key(pkey)) |
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return true; |
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} |
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return false; |
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} |
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void GetPubKey(CPubKey &pubkey, bool fCompressed) { |
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EC_KEY_set_conv_form(pkey, fCompressed ? POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED : POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED); |
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int nSize = i2o_ECPublicKey(pkey, NULL); |
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assert(nSize); |
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assert(nSize <= 65); |
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unsigned char c[65]; |
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unsigned char *pbegin = c; |
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int nSize2 = i2o_ECPublicKey(pkey, &pbegin); |
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assert(nSize == nSize2); |
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pubkey.Set(&c[0], &c[nSize]); |
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} |
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bool SetPubKey(const CPubKey &pubkey) { |
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const unsigned char* pbegin = pubkey.begin(); |
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return o2i_ECPublicKey(&pkey, &pbegin, pubkey.size()); |
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} |
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bool Sign(const uint256 &hash, std::vector<unsigned char>& vchSig) { |
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unsigned int nSize = ECDSA_size(pkey); |
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vchSig.resize(nSize); // Make sure it is big enough |
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bool check = ECDSA_sign(0, (unsigned char*)&hash, sizeof(hash), &vchSig[0], &nSize, pkey); |
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assert(check); |
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vchSig.resize(nSize); // Shrink to fit actual size |
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return true; |
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} |
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bool Verify(const uint256 &hash, const std::vector<unsigned char>& vchSig) { |
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// -1 = error, 0 = bad sig, 1 = good |
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if (ECDSA_verify(0, (unsigned char*)&hash, sizeof(hash), &vchSig[0], vchSig.size(), pkey) != 1) |
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return false; |
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return true; |
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} |
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bool SignCompact(const uint256 &hash, unsigned char *p64, int &rec) { |
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bool fOk = false; |
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ECDSA_SIG *sig = ECDSA_do_sign((unsigned char*)&hash, sizeof(hash), pkey); |
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if (sig==NULL) |
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return false; |
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memset(p64, 0, 64); |
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int nBitsR = BN_num_bits(sig->r); |
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int nBitsS = BN_num_bits(sig->s); |
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if (nBitsR <= 256 && nBitsS <= 256) { |
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CPubKey pubkey; |
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GetPubKey(pubkey, true); |
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for (int i=0; i<4; i++) { |
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CECKey keyRec; |
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if (ECDSA_SIG_recover_key_GFp(keyRec.pkey, sig, (unsigned char*)&hash, sizeof(hash), i, 1) == 1) { |
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CPubKey pubkeyRec; |
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keyRec.GetPubKey(pubkeyRec, true); |
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if (pubkeyRec == pubkey) { |
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rec = i; |
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fOk = true; |
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break; |
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} |
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} |
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} |
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assert(fOk); |
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BN_bn2bin(sig->r,&p64[32-(nBitsR+7)/8]); |
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BN_bn2bin(sig->s,&p64[64-(nBitsS+7)/8]); |
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} |
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ECDSA_SIG_free(sig); |
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return fOk; |
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} |
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// reconstruct public key from a compact signature |
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// This is only slightly more CPU intensive than just verifying it. |
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// If this function succeeds, the recovered public key is guaranteed to be valid |
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// (the signature is a valid signature of the given data for that key) |
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bool Recover(const uint256 &hash, const unsigned char *p64, int rec) |
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{ |
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if (rec<0 || rec>=3) |
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return false; |
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ECDSA_SIG *sig = ECDSA_SIG_new(); |
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BN_bin2bn(&p64[0], 32, sig->r); |
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BN_bin2bn(&p64[32], 32, sig->s); |
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bool ret = ECDSA_SIG_recover_key_GFp(pkey, sig, (unsigned char*)&hash, sizeof(hash), rec, 0) == 1; |
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ECDSA_SIG_free(sig); |
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return ret; |
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} |
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/** |
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* @file /cryptron/ecies.c |
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* |
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* @brief ECIES encryption/decryption functions. |
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* |
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* $Author: Ladar Levison $ |
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* $Website: http://lavabit.com $ |
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* $Date: 2010/08/06 06:02:03 $ |
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* $Revision: a51931d0f81f6abe29ca91470931d41a374508a7 $ |
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* |
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*/ |
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bool Encrypt(std::string const &vchText, ecies_secure_t &cryptex) |
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{ |
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size_t length = vchText.size(); |
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size_t envelope_length, block_length, key_length; |
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if ((key_length = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(ECIES_CIPHER)) * 2 > SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH) { |
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#ifdef DEBUG_ECIES |
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printf("The key derivation method will not produce enough envelope key material for the chosen ciphers. {envelope = %i / required = %zu}\n", |
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SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH / 8, (key_length * 2) / 8); |
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#endif |
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return false; |
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} |
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// Create the ephemeral key used specifically for this block of data. |
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EC_KEY *ephemeral; |
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if (!(ephemeral = EC_KEY_new())) { |
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#ifdef DEBUG_ECIES |
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printf("An error occurred while trying to generate the ephemeral key.\n"); |
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#endif |
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return false; |
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} else { |
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const EC_GROUP *group = NULL; |
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if( !(group = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey))) { |
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#ifdef DEBUG_ECIES |
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printf("An error occurred in EC_KEY_get0_group.\n"); |
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#endif |
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EC_KEY_free(ephemeral); |
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return false; |
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} |
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if (EC_KEY_set_group(ephemeral, group) != 1) { |
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#ifdef DEBUG_ECIES |
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printf("EC_KEY_set_group failed.\n"); |
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#endif |
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EC_KEY_free(ephemeral); |
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return false; |
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} |
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} |
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if (EC_KEY_generate_key(ephemeral) != 1) { |
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#ifdef DEBUG_ECIES |
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printf("EC_KEY_generate_key failed.\n"); |
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#endif |
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return false; |
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} |
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// Use the intersection of the provided keys to generate the envelope data used by the ciphers below. The ecies_key_derivation() function uses |
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// SHA 512 to ensure we have a sufficient amount of envelope key material and that the material created is sufficiently secure. |
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unsigned char envelope_key[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
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if (ECDH_compute_key(envelope_key, SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH, |
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EC_KEY_get0_public_key(pkey), |
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ephemeral, |
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ecies_key_derivation) != SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH) { |
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#ifdef DEBUG_ECIES |
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printf("An error occurred while trying to compute the envelope key.\n"); |
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#endif |
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EC_KEY_free(ephemeral); |
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return false; |
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} |
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// Determine the envelope and block lengths so we can allocate a buffer for the result. |
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if ((block_length = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ECIES_CIPHER)) == 0 || |
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block_length > EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH || |
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(envelope_length = EC_POINT_point2oct(EC_KEY_get0_group(ephemeral), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ephemeral), |
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POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL)) == 0) { |
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#ifdef DEBUG_ECIES |
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printf("Invalid block or envelope length. {block = %zu / envelope = %zu}\n", block_length, envelope_length); |
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#endif |
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EC_KEY_free(ephemeral); |
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return false; |
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} |
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// We use a conditional to pad the length if the input buffer is not evenly divisible by the block size. |
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cryptex.key.resize(envelope_length); |
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cryptex.mac.resize(EVP_MD_size(ECIES_HASHER)); |
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cryptex.orig = length; |
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cryptex.body.resize(length + (length % block_length ? (block_length - (length % block_length)) : 0)); |
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// Store the public key portion of the ephemeral key. |
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if (EC_POINT_point2oct(EC_KEY_get0_group(ephemeral), |
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EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ephemeral), |
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POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED, |
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reinterpret_cast<unsigned char*>(&cryptex.key[0]), envelope_length, |
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NULL) != envelope_length) { |
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#ifdef DEBUG_ECIES |
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printf("An error occurred while trying to record the public portion of the envelope key.\n"); |
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#endif |
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EC_KEY_free(ephemeral); |
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return false; |
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} |
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// The envelope key has been stored so we no longer need to keep the keys around. |
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EC_KEY_free(ephemeral); |
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unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], block[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; |
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// For now we use an empty initialization vector. |
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memset(iv, 0, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH); |
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// Setup the cipher context, the body length, and store a pointer to the body buffer location. |
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX cipher; |
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&cipher); |
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unsigned char *body = reinterpret_cast<unsigned char *>(&cryptex.body[0]); |
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int body_length = cryptex.body.size(); |
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// Initialize the cipher with the envelope key. |
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if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&cipher, ECIES_CIPHER, NULL, envelope_key, iv) != 1 || |
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&cipher, 0) != 1 || |
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EVP_EncryptUpdate(&cipher, body, &body_length, reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char *>(&vchText[0]), length - (length % block_length)) != 1) { |
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#ifdef DEBUG_ECIES |
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printf("An error occurred while trying to secure the data using the chosen symmetric cipher.\n"); |
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#endif |
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cipher); |
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return false; |
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} |
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// Check whether all of the data was encrypted. If they don't match up, we either have a partial block remaining, or an error occurred. |
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if (body_length != (int)length) { |
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// Make sure all that remains is a partial block, and their wasn't an error. |
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if (length - body_length >= block_length) { |
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#ifdef DEBUG_ECIES |
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printf("Unable to secure the data using the chosen symmetric cipher.\n"); |
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#endif |
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cipher); |
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return false; |
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} |
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// Copy the remaining data into our partial block buffer. The memset() call ensures any extra bytes will be zero'ed out. |
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memset(block, 0, EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH); |
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memcpy(block, vchText.data() + body_length, length - body_length); |
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|
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// Advance the body pointer to the location of the remaining space, and calculate just how much room is still available. |
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body += body_length; |
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if ((body_length = cryptex.body.size() - body_length) < 0) { |
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#ifdef DEBUG_ECIES |
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printf("The symmetric cipher overflowed!\n"); |
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#endif |
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cipher); |
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return false; |
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} |
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// Pass the final partially filled data block into the cipher as a complete block. The padding will be removed during the decryption process. |
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else if (EVP_EncryptUpdate(&cipher, body, &body_length, block, block_length) != 1) { |
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#ifdef DEBUG_ECIES |
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printf("Unable to secure the data using the chosen symmetric cipher\n"); |
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#endif |
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cipher); |
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return false; |
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} |
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} |
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// Advance the pointer, then use pointer arithmetic to calculate how much of the body buffer has been used. The complex logic is needed so that we get |
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// the correct status regardless of whether there was a partial data block. |
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body += body_length; |
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if ((body_length = cryptex.body.size() - (body - reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char *>(cryptex.body.data()))) < 0) { |
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#ifdef DEBUG_ECIES |
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printf("The symmetric cipher overflowed!\n"); |
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#endif |
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cipher); |
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return false; |
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} |
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else if (EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&cipher, body, &body_length) != 1) { |
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#ifdef DEBUG_ECIES |
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printf("Unable to secure the data using the chosen symmetric cipher.\n"); |
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#endif |
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cipher); |
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return false; |
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} |
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cipher); |
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// Generate an authenticated hash which can be used to validate the data during decryption. |
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HMAC_CTX hmac; |
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HMAC_CTX_init(&hmac); |
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unsigned int mac_length = cryptex.mac.size(); |
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|
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// At the moment we are generating the hash using encrypted data. At some point we may want to validate the original text instead. |
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#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x000909000) |
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HMAC_Init_ex(&hmac, envelope_key + key_length, key_length, ECIES_HASHER, NULL); |
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HMAC_Update(&hmac, reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char *>(cryptex.body.data()), cryptex.body.size()); |
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HMAC_Final(&hmac, reinterpret_cast<unsigned char *>(&cryptex.mac[0]), &mac_length); |
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#else |
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if (HMAC_Init_ex(&hmac, envelope_key + key_length, key_length, ECIES_HASHER, NULL) != 1 || |
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HMAC_Update(&hmac, reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char *>(cryptex.body.data()), cryptex.body.size()) != 1 || |
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HMAC_Final(&hmac, reinterpret_cast<unsigned char *>(&cryptex.mac[0]), &mac_length) != 1) { |
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#ifdef DEBUG_ECIES |
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printf("Unable to generate a data authentication code.\n"); |
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#endif |
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HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hmac); |
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return false; |
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} |
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#endif |
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HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hmac); |
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return true; |
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|
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} |
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|
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bool Decrypt(ecies_secure_t const &cryptex, std::string &vchText ) |
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{ |
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size_t key_length; |
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if ((key_length = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(ECIES_CIPHER)) * 2 > SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH) { |
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#ifdef DEBUG_ECIES |
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printf("The key derivation method will not produce enough envelope key material for the chosen ciphers. {envelope = %i / required = %zu}\n", |
|
SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH / 8, (key_length * 2) / 8); |
|
#endif |
|
return false; |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Create the ephemeral key used specifically for this block of data. |
|
EC_KEY *ephemeral; |
|
if (!(ephemeral = EC_KEY_new())) { |
|
#ifdef DEBUG_ECIES |
|
printf("An error occurred while trying to generate the ephemeral key.\n"); |
|
#endif |
|
return false; |
|
} else { |
|
const EC_GROUP *group = NULL; |
|
if( !(group = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey))) { |
|
#ifdef DEBUG_ECIES |
|
printf("An error occurred in EC_KEY_get0_group.\n"); |
|
#endif |
|
EC_KEY_free(ephemeral); |
|
return false; |
|
} |
|
if (EC_KEY_set_group(ephemeral, group) != 1) { |
|
#ifdef DEBUG_ECIES |
|
printf("EC_KEY_set_group failed.\n"); |
|
#endif |
|
EC_KEY_free(ephemeral); |
|
return false; |
|
} |
|
|
|
EC_POINT *point = NULL; |
|
if (!(point = EC_POINT_new(group))) { |
|
#ifdef DEBUG_ECIES |
|
printf("EC_POINT_new failed.\n"); |
|
#endif |
|
EC_KEY_free(ephemeral); |
|
return false; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, point, reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char *>(cryptex.key.data()), cryptex.key.size(), NULL) != 1) { |
|
#ifdef DEBUG_ECIES |
|
printf("EC_POINT_oct2point failed.\n"); |
|
#endif |
|
EC_KEY_free(ephemeral); |
|
return false; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(ephemeral, point) != 1) { |
|
#ifdef DEBUG_ECIES |
|
printf("EC_KEY_set_public_key failed.\n"); |
|
#endif |
|
EC_POINT_free(point); |
|
EC_KEY_free(ephemeral); |
|
return false; |
|
} |
|
EC_POINT_free(point); |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (EC_KEY_check_key(ephemeral) != 1) { |
|
#ifdef DEBUG_ECIES |
|
printf("EC_KEY_check_key ephemeral failed.\n"); |
|
#endif |
|
EC_KEY_free(ephemeral); |
|
return false; |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Use the intersection of the provided keys to generate the envelope data used by the ciphers below. The ecies_key_derivation() function uses |
|
// SHA 512 to ensure we have a sufficient amount of envelope key material and that the material created is sufficiently secure. |
|
unsigned char envelope_key[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
|
if (ECDH_compute_key(envelope_key, SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH, |
|
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ephemeral), |
|
pkey, |
|
ecies_key_derivation) != SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH) { |
|
#ifdef DEBUG_ECIES |
|
printf("An error occurred while trying to compute the envelope key.\n"); |
|
#endif |
|
EC_KEY_free(ephemeral); |
|
return false; |
|
} |
|
|
|
// The envelope key material has been extracted, so we no longer need the user and ephemeral keys. |
|
EC_KEY_free(ephemeral); |
|
|
|
// Use the authenticated hash of the ciphered data to ensure it was not modified after being encrypted. |
|
HMAC_CTX hmac; |
|
HMAC_CTX_init(&hmac); |
|
unsigned int mac_length = EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE; |
|
unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
|
|
|
// At the moment we are generating the hash using encrypted data. At some point we may want to validate the original text instead. |
|
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x000909000) |
|
HMAC_Init_ex(&hmac, envelope_key + key_length, key_length, ECIES_HASHER, NULL); |
|
HMAC_Update(&hmac, reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char *>(cryptex.body.data()), cryptex.body.size()); |
|
HMAC_Final(&hmac, md, &mac_length); |
|
#else |
|
if (HMAC_Init_ex(&hmac, envelope_key + key_length, key_length, ECIES_HASHER, NULL) != 1 || |
|
HMAC_Update(&hmac, reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char *>(cryptex.body.data()), cryptex.body.size()) != 1 || |
|
HMAC_Final(&hmac, md, &mac_length) != 1) { |
|
#ifdef DEBUG_ECIES |
|
printf("Unable to generate a data authentication code.\n"); |
|
#endif |
|
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hmac); |
|
return false; |
|
} |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hmac); |
|
|
|
// We can use the generated hash to ensure the encrypted data was not altered after being encrypted. |
|
if (mac_length != cryptex.mac.size() || memcmp(md, cryptex.mac.data(), mac_length)) { |
|
#ifdef DEBUG_ECIES |
|
printf("The authentication code was invalid! The ciphered data has been corrupted!\n"); |
|
#endif |
|
return NULL; |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Create a buffer to hold the result. |
|
int output_length = cryptex.body.size(); |
|
vchText.resize(output_length+1); |
|
unsigned char *block, *output; |
|
block = output = reinterpret_cast<unsigned char *>(&vchText[0]); |
|
|
|
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; |
|
// For now we use an empty initialization vector. We also clear out the result buffer just to be on the safe side. |
|
memset(iv, 0, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH); |
|
memset(output, 0, output_length + 1); |
|
|
|
// Setup the cipher context, the body length, and store a pointer to the body buffer location. |
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX cipher; |
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&cipher); |
|
|
|
// Decrypt the data using the chosen symmetric cipher. |
|
if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&cipher, ECIES_CIPHER, NULL, envelope_key, iv) != 1 || |
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&cipher, 0) != 1 || |
|
EVP_DecryptUpdate(&cipher, block, &output_length, reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char *>(cryptex.body.data()), cryptex.body.size()) != 1) { |
|
#ifdef DEBUG_ECIES |
|
printf("Unable to decrypt the data using the chosen symmetric cipher.\n"); |
|
#endif |
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cipher); |
|
return false; |
|
} |
|
|
|
block += output_length; |
|
if ((output_length = cryptex.body.size() - output_length) != 0) { |
|
#ifdef DEBUG_ECIES |
|
printf("The symmetric cipher failed to properly decrypt the correct amount of data!\n"); |
|
#endif |
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cipher); |
|
return false; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&cipher, block, &output_length) != 1) { |
|
#ifdef DEBUG_ECIES |
|
printf("Unable to decrypt the data using the chosen symmetric cipher.\n"); |
|
#endif |
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cipher); |
|
return false; |
|
} |
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cipher); |
|
|
|
vchText.resize(cryptex.orig); |
|
return true; |
|
} |
|
}; |
|
|
|
}; // end of anonymous namespace |
|
|
|
bool CKey::Check(const unsigned char *vch) { |
|
// Do not convert to OpenSSL's data structures for range-checking keys, |
|
// it's easy enough to do directly. |
|
static const unsigned char vchMax[32] = { |
|
0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, |
|
0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFE, |
|
0xBA,0xAE,0xDC,0xE6,0xAF,0x48,0xA0,0x3B, |
|
0xBF,0xD2,0x5E,0x8C,0xD0,0x36,0x41,0x40 |
|
}; |
|
bool fIsZero = true; |
|
for (int i=0; i<32 && fIsZero; i++) |
|
if (vch[i] != 0) |
|
fIsZero = false; |
|
if (fIsZero) |
|
return false; |
|
for (int i=0; i<32; i++) { |
|
if (vch[i] < vchMax[i]) |
|
return true; |
|
if (vch[i] > vchMax[i]) |
|
return false; |
|
} |
|
return true; |
|
} |
|
|
|
void CKey::MakeNewKey(bool fCompressedIn) { |
|
do { |
|
RAND_bytes(vch, sizeof(vch)); |
|
} while (!Check(vch)); |
|
fValid = true; |
|
fCompressed = fCompressedIn; |
|
} |
|
|
|
bool CKey::SetPrivKey(const CPrivKey &privkey, bool fCompressedIn) { |
|
CECKey key; |
|
if (!key.SetPrivKey(privkey)) |
|
return false; |
|
key.GetSecretBytes(vch); |
|
fCompressed = fCompressedIn; |
|
fValid = true; |
|
return true; |
|
} |
|
|
|
CPrivKey CKey::GetPrivKey() const { |
|
assert(fValid); |
|
CECKey key; |
|
key.SetSecretBytes(vch); |
|
CPrivKey privkey; |
|
key.GetPrivKey(privkey, fCompressed); |
|
return privkey; |
|
} |
|
|
|
CPubKey CKey::GetPubKey() const { |
|
assert(fValid); |
|
CECKey key; |
|
key.SetSecretBytes(vch); |
|
CPubKey pubkey; |
|
key.GetPubKey(pubkey, fCompressed); |
|
return pubkey; |
|
} |
|
|
|
bool CKey::Sign(const uint256 &hash, std::vector<unsigned char>& vchSig) const { |
|
if (!fValid) |
|
return false; |
|
CECKey key; |
|
key.SetSecretBytes(vch); |
|
return key.Sign(hash, vchSig); |
|
} |
|
|
|
bool CKey::SignCompact(const uint256 &hash, std::vector<unsigned char>& vchSig) const { |
|
if (!fValid) |
|
return false; |
|
CECKey key; |
|
key.SetSecretBytes(vch); |
|
vchSig.resize(65); |
|
int rec = -1; |
|
if (!key.SignCompact(hash, &vchSig[1], rec)) |
|
return false; |
|
assert(rec != -1); |
|
vchSig[0] = 27 + rec + (fCompressed ? 4 : 0); |
|
return true; |
|
} |
|
|
|
bool CKey::Decrypt(ecies_secure_t const &cryptex, std::string &vchText ) |
|
{ |
|
if (!fValid) |
|
return false; |
|
CECKey key; |
|
key.SetSecretBytes(vch); |
|
return key.Decrypt(cryptex, vchText); |
|
} |
|
|
|
bool CPubKey::Verify(const uint256 &hash, const std::vector<unsigned char>& vchSig) const { |
|
if (!IsValid()) |
|
return false; |
|
CECKey key; |
|
if (!key.SetPubKey(*this)) |
|
return false; |
|
if (!key.Verify(hash, vchSig)) |
|
return false; |
|
return true; |
|
} |
|
|
|
bool CPubKey::RecoverCompact(const uint256 &hash, const std::vector<unsigned char>& vchSig) { |
|
if (vchSig.size() != 65) |
|
return false; |
|
CECKey key; |
|
if (!key.Recover(hash, &vchSig[1], (vchSig[0] - 27) & ~4)) |
|
return false; |
|
key.GetPubKey(*this, (vchSig[0] - 27) & 4); |
|
return true; |
|
} |
|
|
|
bool CPubKey::VerifyCompact(const uint256 &hash, const std::vector<unsigned char>& vchSig) const { |
|
if (!IsValid()) |
|
return false; |
|
if (vchSig.size() != 65) |
|
return false; |
|
CECKey key; |
|
if (!key.Recover(hash, &vchSig[1], (vchSig[0] - 27) & ~4)) |
|
return false; |
|
CPubKey pubkeyRec; |
|
key.GetPubKey(pubkeyRec, IsCompressed()); |
|
if (*this != pubkeyRec) |
|
return false; |
|
return true; |
|
} |
|
|
|
bool CPubKey::IsFullyValid() const { |
|
if (!IsValid()) |
|
return false; |
|
CECKey key; |
|
if (!key.SetPubKey(*this)) |
|
return false; |
|
return true; |
|
} |
|
|
|
bool CPubKey::Decompress() { |
|
if (!IsValid()) |
|
return false; |
|
CECKey key; |
|
if (!key.SetPubKey(*this)) |
|
return false; |
|
key.GetPubKey(*this, false); |
|
return true; |
|
} |
|
|
|
bool CPubKey::Encrypt(std::string const &vchText, ecies_secure_t &cryptex) |
|
{ |
|
if (!IsValid()) |
|
return false; |
|
CECKey key; |
|
if (!key.SetPubKey(*this)) |
|
return false; |
|
return key.Encrypt(vchText, cryptex); |
|
} |
|
|
|
|