Community driven twister-core
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// Copyright (c) 2010 Satoshi Nakamoto
// Copyright (c) 2009-2012 The Bitcoin developers
// Distributed under the MIT/X11 software license, see the accompanying
// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
13 years ago
#include "main.h"
#include "wallet.h"
#include "db.h"
#include "walletdb.h"
#include "net.h"
#include "init.h"
13 years ago
#include "ui_interface.h"
#include "base58.h"
#include "bitcoinrpc.h"
13 years ago
#undef printf
#include <boost/asio.hpp>
#include <boost/asio/ip/v6_only.hpp>
#include <boost/bind.hpp>
#include <boost/filesystem.hpp>
#include <boost/foreach.hpp>
#include <boost/iostreams/concepts.hpp>
#include <boost/iostreams/stream.hpp>
#include <boost/algorithm/string.hpp>
#include <boost/lexical_cast.hpp>
#include <boost/asio/ssl.hpp>
#include <boost/filesystem/fstream.hpp>
#include <boost/shared_ptr.hpp>
#include <list>
#define printf OutputDebugStringF
using namespace std;
using namespace boost;
using namespace boost::asio;
using namespace json_spirit;
void ThreadRPCServer2(void* parg);
static std::string strRPCUserColonPass;
static int64 nWalletUnlockTime;
static CCriticalSection cs_nWalletUnlockTime;
extern Value getconnectioncount(const Array& params, bool fHelp); // in rpcnet.cpp
extern Value getpeerinfo(const Array& params, bool fHelp);
extern Value dumpprivkey(const Array& params, bool fHelp); // in rpcdump.cpp
extern Value importprivkey(const Array& params, bool fHelp);
extern Value getrawtransaction(const Array& params, bool fHelp); // in rcprawtransaction.cpp
extern Value listunspent(const Array& params, bool fHelp);
extern Value createrawtransaction(const Array& params, bool fHelp);
extern Value decoderawtransaction(const Array& params, bool fHelp);
extern Value signrawtransaction(const Array& params, bool fHelp);
extern Value sendrawtransaction(const Array& params, bool fHelp);
const Object emptyobj;
void ThreadRPCServer3(void* parg);
Object JSONRPCError(int code, const string& message)
{
Object error;
error.push_back(Pair("code", code));
error.push_back(Pair("message", message));
return error;
}
void RPCTypeCheck(const Array& params,
const list<Value_type>& typesExpected)
{
unsigned int i = 0;
BOOST_FOREACH(Value_type t, typesExpected)
{
if (params.size() <= i)
break;
const Value& v = params[i];
if (v.type() != t)
{
string err = strprintf("Expected type %s, got %s",
Value_type_name[t], Value_type_name[v.type()]);
throw JSONRPCError(-3, err);
}
i++;
}
}
void RPCTypeCheck(const Object& o,
const map<string, Value_type>& typesExpected)
{
BOOST_FOREACH(const PAIRTYPE(string, Value_type)& t, typesExpected)
{
const Value& v = find_value(o, t.first);
if (v.type() == null_type)
throw JSONRPCError(-3, strprintf("Missing %s", t.first.c_str()));
if (v.type() != t.second)
{
string err = strprintf("Expected type %s for %s, got %s",
Value_type_name[t.second], t.first.c_str(), Value_type_name[v.type()]);
throw JSONRPCError(-3, err);
}
}
}
double GetDifficulty(const CBlockIndex* blockindex = NULL)
{
// Floating point number that is a multiple of the minimum difficulty,
// minimum difficulty = 1.0.
if (blockindex == NULL)
{
if (pindexBest == NULL)
return 1.0;
else
blockindex = pindexBest;
}
int nShift = (blockindex->nBits >> 24) & 0xff;
double dDiff =
(double)0x0000ffff / (double)(blockindex->nBits & 0x00ffffff);
while (nShift < 29)
{
dDiff *= 256.0;
nShift++;
}
while (nShift > 29)
{
dDiff /= 256.0;
nShift--;
}
return dDiff;
}
int64 AmountFromValue(const Value& value)
{
double dAmount = value.get_real();
if (dAmount <= 0.0 || dAmount > 21000000.0)
throw JSONRPCError(-3, "Invalid amount");
int64 nAmount = roundint64(dAmount * COIN);
if (!MoneyRange(nAmount))
throw JSONRPCError(-3, "Invalid amount");
return nAmount;
}
Value ValueFromAmount(int64 amount)
{
return (double)amount / (double)COIN;
}
std::string
HexBits(unsigned int nBits)
{
union {
int32_t nBits;
char cBits[4];
} uBits;
uBits.nBits = htonl((int32_t)nBits);
return HexStr(BEGIN(uBits.cBits), END(uBits.cBits));
}
std::string
HelpRequiringPassphrase()
{
return pwalletMain->IsCrypted()
? "\nrequires wallet passphrase to be set with walletpassphrase first"
: "";
}
void
EnsureWalletIsUnlocked()
{
if (pwalletMain->IsLocked())
throw JSONRPCError(-13, "Error: Please enter the wallet passphrase with walletpassphrase first.");
}
void WalletTxToJSON(const CWalletTx& wtx, Object& entry)
{
int confirms = wtx.GetDepthInMainChain();
entry.push_back(Pair("confirmations", confirms));
if (confirms)
{
entry.push_back(Pair("blockhash", wtx.hashBlock.GetHex()));
entry.push_back(Pair("blockindex", wtx.nIndex));
}
entry.push_back(Pair("txid", wtx.GetHash().GetHex()));
entry.push_back(Pair("time", (boost::int64_t)wtx.GetTxTime()));
BOOST_FOREACH(const PAIRTYPE(string,string)& item, wtx.mapValue)
entry.push_back(Pair(item.first, item.second));
}
string AccountFromValue(const Value& value)
{
string strAccount = value.get_str();
if (strAccount == "*")
throw JSONRPCError(-11, "Invalid account name");
return strAccount;
}
Object blockToJSON(const CBlock& block, const CBlockIndex* blockindex)
{
Object result;
result.push_back(Pair("hash", block.GetHash().GetHex()));
CMerkleTx txGen(block.vtx[0]);
txGen.SetMerkleBranch(&block);
result.push_back(Pair("confirmations", (int)txGen.GetDepthInMainChain()));
result.push_back(Pair("size", (int)::GetSerializeSize(block, SER_NETWORK, PROTOCOL_VERSION)));
result.push_back(Pair("height", blockindex->nHeight));
result.push_back(Pair("version", block.nVersion));
result.push_back(Pair("merkleroot", block.hashMerkleRoot.GetHex()));
Array txs;
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTransaction&tx, block.vtx)
txs.push_back(tx.GetHash().GetHex());
result.push_back(Pair("tx", txs));
result.push_back(Pair("time", (boost::int64_t)block.GetBlockTime()));
result.push_back(Pair("nonce", (boost::uint64_t)block.nNonce));
result.push_back(Pair("bits", HexBits(block.nBits)));
result.push_back(Pair("difficulty", GetDifficulty(blockindex)));
if (blockindex->pprev)
result.push_back(Pair("previousblockhash", blockindex->pprev->GetBlockHash().GetHex()));
if (blockindex->pnext)
result.push_back(Pair("nextblockhash", blockindex->pnext->GetBlockHash().GetHex()));
return result;
}
///
/// Note: This interface may still be subject to change.
///
string CRPCTable::help(string strCommand) const
{
string strRet;
set<rpcfn_type> setDone;
for (map<string, const CRPCCommand*>::const_iterator mi = mapCommands.begin(); mi != mapCommands.end(); ++mi)
{
const CRPCCommand *pcmd = mi->second;
string strMethod = mi->first;
// We already filter duplicates, but these deprecated screw up the sort order
if (strMethod.find("label") != string::npos)
continue;
if (strCommand != "" && strMethod != strCommand)
continue;
try
{
Array params;
rpcfn_type pfn = pcmd->actor;
if (setDone.insert(pfn).second)
(*pfn)(params, true);
}
catch (std::exception& e)
{
// Help text is returned in an exception
string strHelp = string(e.what());
if (strCommand == "")
if (strHelp.find('\n') != string::npos)
strHelp = strHelp.substr(0, strHelp.find('\n'));
strRet += strHelp + "\n";
}
}
if (strRet == "")
strRet = strprintf("help: unknown command: %s\n", strCommand.c_str());
strRet = strRet.substr(0,strRet.size()-1);
return strRet;
}
Value help(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (fHelp || params.size() > 1)
throw runtime_error(
"help [command]\n"
"List commands, or get help for a command.");
string strCommand;
if (params.size() > 0)
strCommand = params[0].get_str();
return tableRPC.help(strCommand);
}
Value stop(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (fHelp || params.size() != 0)
throw runtime_error(
"stop\n"
"Stop Bitcoin server.");
// Shutdown will take long enough that the response should get back
StartShutdown();
return "Bitcoin server stopping";
}
Value getblockcount(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (fHelp || params.size() != 0)
throw runtime_error(
"getblockcount\n"
"Returns the number of blocks in the longest block chain.");
return nBestHeight;
}
Value getdifficulty(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (fHelp || params.size() != 0)
throw runtime_error(
"getdifficulty\n"
"Returns the proof-of-work difficulty as a multiple of the minimum difficulty.");
return GetDifficulty();
}
Value getgenerate(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (fHelp || params.size() != 0)
throw runtime_error(
"getgenerate\n"
"Returns true or false.");
return GetBoolArg("-gen");
}
Value setgenerate(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (fHelp || params.size() < 1 || params.size() > 2)
throw runtime_error(
"setgenerate <generate> [genproclimit]\n"
"<generate> is true or false to turn generation on or off.\n"
"Generation is limited to [genproclimit] processors, -1 is unlimited.");
bool fGenerate = true;
if (params.size() > 0)
fGenerate = params[0].get_bool();
if (params.size() > 1)
{
int nGenProcLimit = params[1].get_int();
mapArgs["-genproclimit"] = itostr(nGenProcLimit);
if (nGenProcLimit == 0)
fGenerate = false;
}
mapArgs["-gen"] = (fGenerate ? "1" : "0");
GenerateBitcoins(fGenerate, pwalletMain);
return Value::null;
}
Value gethashespersec(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (fHelp || params.size() != 0)
throw runtime_error(
"gethashespersec\n"
"Returns a recent hashes per second performance measurement while generating.");
if (GetTimeMillis() - nHPSTimerStart > 8000)
return (boost::int64_t)0;
return (boost::int64_t)dHashesPerSec;
}
Value getinfo(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (fHelp || params.size() != 0)
throw runtime_error(
"getinfo\n"
"Returns an object containing various state info.");
CService addrProxy;
GetProxy(NET_IPV4, addrProxy);
Object obj;
obj.push_back(Pair("version", (int)CLIENT_VERSION));
obj.push_back(Pair("protocolversion",(int)PROTOCOL_VERSION));
obj.push_back(Pair("walletversion", pwalletMain->GetVersion()));
obj.push_back(Pair("balance", ValueFromAmount(pwalletMain->GetBalance())));
obj.push_back(Pair("blocks", (int)nBestHeight));
obj.push_back(Pair("connections", (int)vNodes.size()));
obj.push_back(Pair("proxy", (addrProxy.IsValid() ? addrProxy.ToStringIPPort() : string())));
obj.push_back(Pair("difficulty", (double)GetDifficulty()));
obj.push_back(Pair("testnet", fTestNet));
obj.push_back(Pair("keypoololdest", (boost::int64_t)pwalletMain->GetOldestKeyPoolTime()));
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
obj.push_back(Pair("keypoolsize", pwalletMain->GetKeyPoolSize()));
obj.push_back(Pair("paytxfee", ValueFromAmount(nTransactionFee)));
if (pwalletMain->IsCrypted())
obj.push_back(Pair("unlocked_until", (boost::int64_t)nWalletUnlockTime / 1000));
obj.push_back(Pair("errors", GetWarnings("statusbar")));
return obj;
}
Value getmininginfo(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (fHelp || params.size() != 0)
throw runtime_error(
"getmininginfo\n"
"Returns an object containing mining-related information.");
Object obj;
obj.push_back(Pair("blocks", (int)nBestHeight));
obj.push_back(Pair("currentblocksize",(uint64_t)nLastBlockSize));
obj.push_back(Pair("currentblocktx",(uint64_t)nLastBlockTx));
obj.push_back(Pair("difficulty", (double)GetDifficulty()));
obj.push_back(Pair("errors", GetWarnings("statusbar")));
obj.push_back(Pair("generate", GetBoolArg("-gen")));
obj.push_back(Pair("genproclimit", (int)GetArg("-genproclimit", -1)));
obj.push_back(Pair("hashespersec", gethashespersec(params, false)));
obj.push_back(Pair("pooledtx", (uint64_t)mempool.size()));
obj.push_back(Pair("testnet", fTestNet));
return obj;
}
Value getnewaddress(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (fHelp || params.size() > 1)
throw runtime_error(
"getnewaddress [account]\n"
"Returns a new Bitcoin address for receiving payments. "
"If [account] is specified (recommended), it is added to the address book "
"so payments received with the address will be credited to [account].");
// Parse the account first so we don't generate a key if there's an error
string strAccount;
if (params.size() > 0)
strAccount = AccountFromValue(params[0]);
if (!pwalletMain->IsLocked())
pwalletMain->TopUpKeyPool();
// Generate a new key that is added to wallet
CPubKey newKey;
if (!pwalletMain->GetKeyFromPool(newKey, false))
throw JSONRPCError(-12, "Error: Keypool ran out, please call keypoolrefill first");
CKeyID keyID = newKey.GetID();
pwalletMain->SetAddressBookName(keyID, strAccount);
return CBitcoinAddress(keyID).ToString();
}
CBitcoinAddress GetAccountAddress(string strAccount, bool bForceNew=false)
{
CWalletDB walletdb(pwalletMain->strWalletFile);
CAccount account;
walletdb.ReadAccount(strAccount, account);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
bool bKeyUsed = false;
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
// Check if the current key has been used
if (account.vchPubKey.IsValid())
{
CScript scriptPubKey;
scriptPubKey.SetDestination(account.vchPubKey.GetID());
for (map<uint256, CWalletTx>::iterator it = pwalletMain->mapWallet.begin();
it != pwalletMain->mapWallet.end() && account.vchPubKey.IsValid();
++it)
{
const CWalletTx& wtx = (*it).second;
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxOut& txout, wtx.vout)
if (txout.scriptPubKey == scriptPubKey)
bKeyUsed = true;
}
}
// Generate a new key
if (!account.vchPubKey.IsValid() || bForceNew || bKeyUsed)
{
if (!pwalletMain->GetKeyFromPool(account.vchPubKey, false))
throw JSONRPCError(-12, "Error: Keypool ran out, please call keypoolrefill first");
pwalletMain->SetAddressBookName(account.vchPubKey.GetID(), strAccount);
walletdb.WriteAccount(strAccount, account);
}
return CBitcoinAddress(account.vchPubKey.GetID());
}
Value getaccountaddress(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (fHelp || params.size() != 1)
throw runtime_error(
"getaccountaddress <account>\n"
"Returns the current Bitcoin address for receiving payments to this account.");
// Parse the account first so we don't generate a key if there's an error
string strAccount = AccountFromValue(params[0]);
Value ret;
ret = GetAccountAddress(strAccount).ToString();
return ret;
}
Value setaccount(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (fHelp || params.size() < 1 || params.size() > 2)
throw runtime_error(
"setaccount <bitcoinaddress> <account>\n"
"Sets the account associated with the given address.");
CBitcoinAddress address(params[0].get_str());
if (!address.IsValid())
throw JSONRPCError(-5, "Invalid Bitcoin address");
string strAccount;
if (params.size() > 1)
strAccount = AccountFromValue(params[1]);
// Detect when changing the account of an address that is the 'unused current key' of another account:
if (pwalletMain->mapAddressBook.count(address.Get()))
{
string strOldAccount = pwalletMain->mapAddressBook[address.Get()];
if (address == GetAccountAddress(strOldAccount))
GetAccountAddress(strOldAccount, true);
}
pwalletMain->SetAddressBookName(address.Get(), strAccount);
return Value::null;
}
Value getaccount(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (fHelp || params.size() != 1)
throw runtime_error(
"getaccount <bitcoinaddress>\n"
"Returns the account associated with the given address.");
CBitcoinAddress address(params[0].get_str());
if (!address.IsValid())
throw JSONRPCError(-5, "Invalid Bitcoin address");
string strAccount;
map<CTxDestination, string>::iterator mi = pwalletMain->mapAddressBook.find(address.Get());
if (mi != pwalletMain->mapAddressBook.end() && !(*mi).second.empty())
strAccount = (*mi).second;
return strAccount;
}
Value getaddressesbyaccount(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (fHelp || params.size() != 1)
throw runtime_error(
"getaddressesbyaccount <account>\n"
"Returns the list of addresses for the given account.");
string strAccount = AccountFromValue(params[0]);
// Find all addresses that have the given account
Array ret;
BOOST_FOREACH(const PAIRTYPE(CBitcoinAddress, string)& item, pwalletMain->mapAddressBook)
{
const CBitcoinAddress& address = item.first;
const string& strName = item.second;
if (strName == strAccount)
ret.push_back(address.ToString());
}
return ret;
}
Value settxfee(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (fHelp || params.size() < 1 || params.size() > 1)
throw runtime_error(
"settxfee <amount>\n"
"<amount> is a real and is rounded to the nearest 0.00000001");
// Amount
int64 nAmount = 0;
if (params[0].get_real() != 0.0)
nAmount = AmountFromValue(params[0]); // rejects 0.0 amounts
nTransactionFee = nAmount;
return true;
}
Value sendtoaddress(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (fHelp || params.size() < 2 || params.size() > 4)
throw runtime_error(
"sendtoaddress <bitcoinaddress> <amount> [comment] [comment-to]\n"
"<amount> is a real and is rounded to the nearest 0.00000001"
+ HelpRequiringPassphrase());
CBitcoinAddress address(params[0].get_str());
if (!address.IsValid())
throw JSONRPCError(-5, "Invalid Bitcoin address");
// Amount
int64 nAmount = AmountFromValue(params[1]);
// Wallet comments
CWalletTx wtx;
if (params.size() > 2 && params[2].type() != null_type && !params[2].get_str().empty())
wtx.mapValue["comment"] = params[2].get_str();
if (params.size() > 3 && params[3].type() != null_type && !params[3].get_str().empty())
wtx.mapValue["to"] = params[3].get_str();
if (pwalletMain->IsLocked())
throw JSONRPCError(-13, "Error: Please enter the wallet passphrase with walletpassphrase first.");
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
string strError = pwalletMain->SendMoneyToDestination(address.Get(), nAmount, wtx);
if (strError != "")
throw JSONRPCError(-4, strError);
return wtx.GetHash().GetHex();
}
Value signmessage(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (fHelp || params.size() != 2)
throw runtime_error(
"signmessage <bitcoinaddress> <message>\n"
"Sign a message with the private key of an address");
EnsureWalletIsUnlocked();
string strAddress = params[0].get_str();
string strMessage = params[1].get_str();
CBitcoinAddress addr(strAddress);
if (!addr.IsValid())
throw JSONRPCError(-3, "Invalid address");
CKeyID keyID;
if (!addr.GetKeyID(keyID))
throw JSONRPCError(-3, "Address does not refer to key");
CKey key;
if (!pwalletMain->GetKey(keyID, key))
throw JSONRPCError(-4, "Private key not available");
CDataStream ss(SER_GETHASH, 0);
ss << strMessageMagic;
ss << strMessage;
vector<unsigned char> vchSig;
if (!key.SignCompact(Hash(ss.begin(), ss.end()), vchSig))
throw JSONRPCError(-5, "Sign failed");
return EncodeBase64(&vchSig[0], vchSig.size());
}
Value verifymessage(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (fHelp || params.size() != 3)
throw runtime_error(
"verifymessage <bitcoinaddress> <signature> <message>\n"
"Verify a signed message");
string strAddress = params[0].get_str();
string strSign = params[1].get_str();
string strMessage = params[2].get_str();
CBitcoinAddress addr(strAddress);
if (!addr.IsValid())
throw JSONRPCError(-3, "Invalid address");
CKeyID keyID;
if (!addr.GetKeyID(keyID))
throw JSONRPCError(-3, "Address does not refer to key");
bool fInvalid = false;
vector<unsigned char> vchSig = DecodeBase64(strSign.c_str(), &fInvalid);
if (fInvalid)
throw JSONRPCError(-5, "Malformed base64 encoding");
CDataStream ss(SER_GETHASH, 0);
ss << strMessageMagic;
ss << strMessage;
CKey key;
if (!key.SetCompactSignature(Hash(ss.begin(), ss.end()), vchSig))
return false;
return (key.GetPubKey().GetID() == keyID);
}
Value getreceivedbyaddress(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (fHelp || params.size() < 1 || params.size() > 2)
throw runtime_error(
"getreceivedbyaddress <bitcoinaddress> [minconf=1]\n"
"Returns the total amount received by <bitcoinaddress> in transactions with at least [minconf] confirmations.");
// Bitcoin address
CBitcoinAddress address = CBitcoinAddress(params[0].get_str());
CScript scriptPubKey;
if (!address.IsValid())
throw JSONRPCError(-5, "Invalid Bitcoin address");
scriptPubKey.SetDestination(address.Get());
if (!IsMine(*pwalletMain,scriptPubKey))
return (double)0.0;
// Minimum confirmations
int nMinDepth = 1;
if (params.size() > 1)
nMinDepth = params[1].get_int();
// Tally
int64 nAmount = 0;
for (map<uint256, CWalletTx>::iterator it = pwalletMain->mapWallet.begin(); it != pwalletMain->mapWallet.end(); ++it)
{
const CWalletTx& wtx = (*it).second;
if (wtx.IsCoinBase() || !wtx.IsFinal())
continue;
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxOut& txout, wtx.vout)
if (txout.scriptPubKey == scriptPubKey)
if (wtx.GetDepthInMainChain() >= nMinDepth)
nAmount += txout.nValue;
}
return ValueFromAmount(nAmount);
}
void GetAccountAddresses(string strAccount, set<CTxDestination>& setAddress)
{
BOOST_FOREACH(const PAIRTYPE(CTxDestination, string)& item, pwalletMain->mapAddressBook)
{
const CTxDestination& address = item.first;
const string& strName = item.second;
if (strName == strAccount)
setAddress.insert(address);
}
}
Value getreceivedbyaccount(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (fHelp || params.size() < 1 || params.size() > 2)
throw runtime_error(
"getreceivedbyaccount <account> [minconf=1]\n"
"Returns the total amount received by addresses with <account> in transactions with at least [minconf] confirmations.");
// Minimum confirmations
int nMinDepth = 1;
if (params.size() > 1)
nMinDepth = params[1].get_int();
// Get the set of pub keys assigned to account
string strAccount = AccountFromValue(params[0]);
set<CTxDestination> setAddress;
GetAccountAddresses(strAccount, setAddress);
// Tally
int64 nAmount = 0;
for (map<uint256, CWalletTx>::iterator it = pwalletMain->mapWallet.begin(); it != pwalletMain->mapWallet.end(); ++it)
{
const CWalletTx& wtx = (*it).second;
if (wtx.IsCoinBase() || !wtx.IsFinal())
continue;
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxOut& txout, wtx.vout)
{
CTxDestination address;
if (ExtractDestination(txout.scriptPubKey, address) && IsMine(*pwalletMain, address) && setAddress.count(address))
if (wtx.GetDepthInMainChain() >= nMinDepth)
nAmount += txout.nValue;
}
}
return (double)nAmount / (double)COIN;
}
int64 GetAccountBalance(CWalletDB& walletdb, const string& strAccount, int nMinDepth)
{
int64 nBalance = 0;
// Tally wallet transactions
for (map<uint256, CWalletTx>::iterator it = pwalletMain->mapWallet.begin(); it != pwalletMain->mapWallet.end(); ++it)
{
const CWalletTx& wtx = (*it).second;
if (!wtx.IsFinal())
continue;
int64 nGenerated, nReceived, nSent, nFee;
wtx.GetAccountAmounts(strAccount, nGenerated, nReceived, nSent, nFee);
if (nReceived != 0 && wtx.GetDepthInMainChain() >= nMinDepth)
nBalance += nReceived;
nBalance += nGenerated - nSent - nFee;
}
// Tally internal accounting entries
nBalance += walletdb.GetAccountCreditDebit(strAccount);
return nBalance;
}
int64 GetAccountBalance(const string& strAccount, int nMinDepth)
{
CWalletDB walletdb(pwalletMain->strWalletFile);
return GetAccountBalance(walletdb, strAccount, nMinDepth);
}
Value getbalance(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (fHelp || params.size() > 2)
throw runtime_error(
"getbalance [account] [minconf=1]\n"
"If [account] is not specified, returns the server's total available balance.\n"
"If [account] is specified, returns the balance in the account.");
if (params.size() == 0)
return ValueFromAmount(pwalletMain->GetBalance());
int nMinDepth = 1;
if (params.size() > 1)
nMinDepth = params[1].get_int();
if (params[0].get_str() == "*") {
// Calculate total balance a different way from GetBalance()
// (GetBalance() sums up all unspent TxOuts)
// getbalance and getbalance '*' should always return the same number.
int64 nBalance = 0;
for (map<uint256, CWalletTx>::iterator it = pwalletMain->mapWallet.begin(); it != pwalletMain->mapWallet.end(); ++it)
{
const CWalletTx& wtx = (*it).second;
if (!wtx.IsFinal())
continue;
int64 allGeneratedImmature, allGeneratedMature, allFee;
allGeneratedImmature = allGeneratedMature = allFee = 0;
string strSentAccount;
list<pair<CTxDestination, int64> > listReceived;
list<pair<CTxDestination, int64> > listSent;
wtx.GetAmounts(allGeneratedImmature, allGeneratedMature, listReceived, listSent, allFee, strSentAccount);
if (wtx.GetDepthInMainChain() >= nMinDepth)
{
BOOST_FOREACH(const PAIRTYPE(CTxDestination,int64)& r, listReceived)
nBalance += r.second;
}
BOOST_FOREACH(const PAIRTYPE(CTxDestination,int64)& r, listSent)
nBalance -= r.second;
nBalance -= allFee;
nBalance += allGeneratedMature;
}
return ValueFromAmount(nBalance);
}
string strAccount = AccountFromValue(params[0]);
int64 nBalance = GetAccountBalance(strAccount, nMinDepth);
return ValueFromAmount(nBalance);
}
Value movecmd(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (fHelp || params.size() < 3 || params.size() > 5)
throw runtime_error(
"move <fromaccount> <toaccount> <amount> [minconf=1] [comment]\n"
"Move from one account in your wallet to another.");
string strFrom = AccountFromValue(params[0]);
string strTo = AccountFromValue(params[1]);
int64 nAmount = AmountFromValue(params[2]);
if (params.size() > 3)
// unused parameter, used to be nMinDepth, keep type-checking it though
(void)params[3].get_int();
string strComment;
if (params.size() > 4)
strComment = params[4].get_str();
CWalletDB walletdb(pwalletMain->strWalletFile);
if (!walletdb.TxnBegin())
throw JSONRPCError(-20, "database error");
int64 nNow = GetAdjustedTime();
// Debit
CAccountingEntry debit;
debit.strAccount = strFrom;
debit.nCreditDebit = -nAmount;
debit.nTime = nNow;
debit.strOtherAccount = strTo;
debit.strComment = strComment;
walletdb.WriteAccountingEntry(debit);
// Credit
CAccountingEntry credit;
credit.strAccount = strTo;
credit.nCreditDebit = nAmount;
credit.nTime = nNow;
credit.strOtherAccount = strFrom;
credit.strComment = strComment;
walletdb.WriteAccountingEntry(credit);
if (!walletdb.TxnCommit())
throw JSONRPCError(-20, "database error");
return true;
}
Value sendfrom(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (fHelp || params.size() < 3 || params.size() > 6)
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
throw runtime_error(
"sendfrom <fromaccount> <tobitcoinaddress> <amount> [minconf=1] [comment] [comment-to]\n"
"<amount> is a real and is rounded to the nearest 0.00000001"
+ HelpRequiringPassphrase());
string strAccount = AccountFromValue(params[0]);
CBitcoinAddress address(params[1].get_str());
if (!address.IsValid())
throw JSONRPCError(-5, "Invalid Bitcoin address");
int64 nAmount = AmountFromValue(params[2]);
int nMinDepth = 1;
if (params.size() > 3)
nMinDepth = params[3].get_int();
CWalletTx wtx;
wtx.strFromAccount = strAccount;
if (params.size() > 4 && params[4].type() != null_type && !params[4].get_str().empty())
wtx.mapValue["comment"] = params[4].get_str();
if (params.size() > 5 && params[5].type() != null_type && !params[5].get_str().empty())
wtx.mapValue["to"] = params[5].get_str();
EnsureWalletIsUnlocked();
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
// Check funds
int64 nBalance = GetAccountBalance(strAccount, nMinDepth);
if (nAmount > nBalance)
throw JSONRPCError(-6, "Account has insufficient funds");
// Send
string strError = pwalletMain->SendMoneyToDestination(address.Get(), nAmount, wtx);
if (strError != "")
throw JSONRPCError(-4, strError);
return wtx.GetHash().GetHex();
}
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
Value sendmany(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (fHelp || params.size() < 2 || params.size() > 4)
throw runtime_error(
"sendmany <fromaccount> {address:amount,...} [minconf=1] [comment]\n"
"amounts are double-precision floating point numbers"
+ HelpRequiringPassphrase());
string strAccount = AccountFromValue(params[0]);
Object sendTo = params[1].get_obj();
int nMinDepth = 1;
if (params.size() > 2)
nMinDepth = params[2].get_int();
CWalletTx wtx;
wtx.strFromAccount = strAccount;
if (params.size() > 3 && params[3].type() != null_type && !params[3].get_str().empty())
wtx.mapValue["comment"] = params[3].get_str();
set<CBitcoinAddress> setAddress;
vector<pair<CScript, int64> > vecSend;
int64 totalAmount = 0;
BOOST_FOREACH(const Pair& s, sendTo)
{
CBitcoinAddress address(s.name_);
if (!address.IsValid())
throw JSONRPCError(-5, string("Invalid Bitcoin address:")+s.name_);
if (setAddress.count(address))
throw JSONRPCError(-8, string("Invalid parameter, duplicated address: ")+s.name_);
setAddress.insert(address);
CScript scriptPubKey;
scriptPubKey.SetDestination(address.Get());
int64 nAmount = AmountFromValue(s.value_);
totalAmount += nAmount;
vecSend.push_back(make_pair(scriptPubKey, nAmount));
}
EnsureWalletIsUnlocked();
// Check funds
int64 nBalance = GetAccountBalance(strAccount, nMinDepth);
if (totalAmount > nBalance)
throw JSONRPCError(-6, "Account has insufficient funds");
// Send
CReserveKey keyChange(pwalletMain);
int64 nFeeRequired = 0;
bool fCreated = pwalletMain->CreateTransaction(vecSend, wtx, keyChange, nFeeRequired);
if (!fCreated)
{
if (totalAmount + nFeeRequired > pwalletMain->GetBalance())
throw JSONRPCError(-6, "Insufficient funds");
throw JSONRPCError(-4, "Transaction creation failed");
}
if (!pwalletMain->CommitTransaction(wtx, keyChange))
throw JSONRPCError(-4, "Transaction commit failed");
return wtx.GetHash().GetHex();
}
Value addmultisigaddress(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (fHelp || params.size() < 2 || params.size() > 3)
{
string msg = "addmultisigaddress <nrequired> <'[\"key\",\"key\"]'> [account]\n"
"Add a nrequired-to-sign multisignature address to the wallet\"\n"
"each key is a Bitcoin address or hex-encoded public key\n"
"If [account] is specified, assign address to [account].";
throw runtime_error(msg);
}
int nRequired = params[0].get_int();
const Array& keys = params[1].get_array();
string strAccount;
if (params.size() > 2)
strAccount = AccountFromValue(params[2]);
// Gather public keys
if (nRequired < 1)
throw runtime_error("a multisignature address must require at least one key to redeem");
if ((int)keys.size() < nRequired)
throw runtime_error(
strprintf("not enough keys supplied "
"(got %d keys, but need at least %d to redeem)", keys.size(), nRequired));
std::vector<CKey> pubkeys;
pubkeys.resize(keys.size());
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < keys.size(); i++)
{
const std::string& ks = keys[i].get_str();
// Case 1: Bitcoin address and we have full public key:
CBitcoinAddress address(ks);
if (address.IsValid())
{
CKeyID keyID;
if (!address.GetKeyID(keyID))
throw runtime_error(
strprintf("%s does not refer to a key",ks.c_str()));
CPubKey vchPubKey;
if (!pwalletMain->GetPubKey(keyID, vchPubKey))
throw runtime_error(
strprintf("no full public key for address %s",ks.c_str()));
if (!vchPubKey.IsValid() || !pubkeys[i].SetPubKey(vchPubKey))
throw runtime_error(" Invalid public key: "+ks);
}
// Case 2: hex public key
else if (IsHex(ks))
{
CPubKey vchPubKey(ParseHex(ks));
if (!vchPubKey.IsValid() || !pubkeys[i].SetPubKey(vchPubKey))
throw runtime_error(" Invalid public key: "+ks);
}
else
{
throw runtime_error(" Invalid public key: "+ks);
}
}
// Construct using pay-to-script-hash:
CScript inner;
inner.SetMultisig(nRequired, pubkeys);
CScriptID innerID = inner.GetID();
pwalletMain->AddCScript(inner);
pwalletMain->SetAddressBookName(innerID, strAccount);
return CBitcoinAddress(innerID).ToString();
}
struct tallyitem
{
int64 nAmount;
int nConf;
tallyitem()
{
nAmount = 0;
nConf = std::numeric_limits<int>::max();
}
};
Value ListReceived(const Array& params, bool fByAccounts)
{
// Minimum confirmations
int nMinDepth = 1;
if (params.size() > 0)
nMinDepth = params[0].get_int();
// Whether to include empty accounts
bool fIncludeEmpty = false;
if (params.size() > 1)
fIncludeEmpty = params[1].get_bool();
// Tally
map<CBitcoinAddress, tallyitem> mapTally;
for (map<uint256, CWalletTx>::iterator it = pwalletMain->mapWallet.begin(); it != pwalletMain->mapWallet.end(); ++it)
{
const CWalletTx& wtx = (*it).second;
if (wtx.IsCoinBase() || !wtx.IsFinal())
continue;
int nDepth = wtx.GetDepthInMainChain();
if (nDepth < nMinDepth)
continue;
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxOut& txout, wtx.vout)
{
CTxDestination address;
if (!ExtractDestination(txout.scriptPubKey, address) || !IsMine(*pwalletMain, address))
continue;
tallyitem& item = mapTally[address];
item.nAmount += txout.nValue;
item.nConf = min(item.nConf, nDepth);
}
}
// Reply
Array ret;
map<string, tallyitem> mapAccountTally;
BOOST_FOREACH(const PAIRTYPE(CBitcoinAddress, string)& item, pwalletMain->mapAddressBook)
{
const CBitcoinAddress& address = item.first;
const string& strAccount = item.second;
map<CBitcoinAddress, tallyitem>::iterator it = mapTally.find(address);
if (it == mapTally.end() && !fIncludeEmpty)
continue;
int64 nAmount = 0;
int nConf = std::numeric_limits<int>::max();
if (it != mapTally.end())
{
nAmount = (*it).second.nAmount;
nConf = (*it).second.nConf;
}
if (fByAccounts)
{
tallyitem& item = mapAccountTally[strAccount];
item.nAmount += nAmount;
item.nConf = min(item.nConf, nConf);
}
else
{
Object obj;
obj.push_back(Pair("address", address.ToString()));
obj.push_back(Pair("account", strAccount));
obj.push_back(Pair("amount", ValueFromAmount(nAmount)));
obj.push_back(Pair("confirmations", (nConf == std::numeric_limits<int>::max() ? 0 : nConf)));
ret.push_back(obj);
}
}
if (fByAccounts)
{
for (map<string, tallyitem>::iterator it = mapAccountTally.begin(); it != mapAccountTally.end(); ++it)
{
int64 nAmount = (*it).second.nAmount;
int nConf = (*it).second.nConf;
Object obj;
obj.push_back(Pair("account", (*it).first));
obj.push_back(Pair("amount", ValueFromAmount(nAmount)));
obj.push_back(Pair("confirmations", (nConf == std::numeric_limits<int>::max() ? 0 : nConf)));
ret.push_back(obj);
}
}
return ret;
}
Value listreceivedbyaddress(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (fHelp || params.size() > 2)
throw runtime_error(
"listreceivedbyaddress [minconf=1] [includeempty=false]\n"
"[minconf] is the minimum number of confirmations before payments are included.\n"
"[includeempty] whether to include addresses that haven't received any payments.\n"
"Returns an array of objects containing:\n"
" \"address\" : receiving address\n"
" \"account\" : the account of the receiving address\n"
" \"amount\" : total amount received by the address\n"
" \"confirmations\" : number of confirmations of the most recent transaction included");
return ListReceived(params, false);
}
Value listreceivedbyaccount(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (fHelp || params.size() > 2)
throw runtime_error(
"listreceivedbyaccount [minconf=1] [includeempty=false]\n"
"[minconf] is the minimum number of confirmations before payments are included.\n"
"[includeempty] whether to include accounts that haven't received any payments.\n"
"Returns an array of objects containing:\n"
" \"account\" : the account of the receiving addresses\n"
" \"amount\" : total amount received by addresses with this account\n"
" \"confirmations\" : number of confirmations of the most recent transaction included");
return ListReceived(params, true);
}
void ListTransactions(const CWalletTx& wtx, const string& strAccount, int nMinDepth, bool fLong, Array& ret)
{
int64 nGeneratedImmature, nGeneratedMature, nFee;
string strSentAccount;
list<pair<CTxDestination, int64> > listReceived;
list<pair<CTxDestination, int64> > listSent;
wtx.GetAmounts(nGeneratedImmature, nGeneratedMature, listReceived, listSent, nFee, strSentAccount);
bool fAllAccounts = (strAccount == string("*"));
// Generated blocks assigned to account ""
if ((nGeneratedMature+nGeneratedImmature) != 0 && (fAllAccounts || strAccount == ""))
{
Object entry;
entry.push_back(Pair("account", string("")));
if (nGeneratedImmature)
{
entry.push_back(Pair("category", wtx.GetDepthInMainChain() ? "immature" : "orphan"));
entry.push_back(Pair("amount", ValueFromAmount(nGeneratedImmature)));
}
else
{
entry.push_back(Pair("category", "generate"));
entry.push_back(Pair("amount", ValueFromAmount(nGeneratedMature)));
}
if (fLong)
WalletTxToJSON(wtx, entry);
ret.push_back(entry);
}
// Sent
if ((!listSent.empty() || nFee != 0) && (fAllAccounts || strAccount == strSentAccount))
{
BOOST_FOREACH(const PAIRTYPE(CTxDestination, int64)& s, listSent)
{
Object entry;
entry.push_back(Pair("account", strSentAccount));
entry.push_back(Pair("address", CBitcoinAddress(s.first).ToString()));
entry.push_back(Pair("category", "send"));
entry.push_back(Pair("amount", ValueFromAmount(-s.second)));
entry.push_back(Pair("fee", ValueFromAmount(-nFee)));
if (fLong)
WalletTxToJSON(wtx, entry);
ret.push_back(entry);
}
}
// Received
if (listReceived.size() > 0 && wtx.GetDepthInMainChain() >= nMinDepth)
{
BOOST_FOREACH(const PAIRTYPE(CTxDestination, int64)& r, listReceived)
{
string account;
if (pwalletMain->mapAddressBook.count(r.first))
account = pwalletMain->mapAddressBook[r.first];
if (fAllAccounts || (account == strAccount))
{
Object entry;
entry.push_back(Pair("account", account));
entry.push_back(Pair("address", CBitcoinAddress(r.first).ToString()));
entry.push_back(Pair("category", "receive"));
entry.push_back(Pair("amount", ValueFromAmount(r.second)));
if (fLong)
WalletTxToJSON(wtx, entry);
ret.push_back(entry);
}
}
}
}
void AcentryToJSON(const CAccountingEntry& acentry, const string& strAccount, Array& ret)
{
bool fAllAccounts = (strAccount == string("*"));
if (fAllAccounts || acentry.strAccount == strAccount)
{
Object entry;
entry.push_back(Pair("account", acentry.strAccount));
entry.push_back(Pair("category", "move"));
entry.push_back(Pair("time", (boost::int64_t)acentry.nTime));
entry.push_back(Pair("amount", ValueFromAmount(acentry.nCreditDebit)));
entry.push_back(Pair("otheraccount", acentry.strOtherAccount));
entry.push_back(Pair("comment", acentry.strComment));
ret.push_back(entry);
}
}
Value listtransactions(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (fHelp || params.size() > 3)
throw runtime_error(
"listtransactions [account] [count=10] [from=0]\n"
"Returns up to [count] most recent transactions skipping the first [from] transactions for account [account].");
string strAccount = "*";
if (params.size() > 0)
strAccount = params[0].get_str();
int nCount = 10;
if (params.size() > 1)
nCount = params[1].get_int();
int nFrom = 0;
if (params.size() > 2)
nFrom = params[2].get_int();
if (nCount < 0)
throw JSONRPCError(-8, "Negative count");
if (nFrom < 0)
throw JSONRPCError(-8, "Negative from");
Array ret;
CWalletDB walletdb(pwalletMain->strWalletFile);
// First: get all CWalletTx and CAccountingEntry into a sorted-by-time multimap.
typedef pair<CWalletTx*, CAccountingEntry*> TxPair;
typedef multimap<int64, TxPair > TxItems;
TxItems txByTime;
// Note: maintaining indices in the database of (account,time) --> txid and (account, time) --> acentry
// would make this much faster for applications that do this a lot.
for (map<uint256, CWalletTx>::iterator it = pwalletMain->mapWallet.begin(); it != pwalletMain->mapWallet.end(); ++it)
{
CWalletTx* wtx = &((*it).second);
txByTime.insert(make_pair(wtx->GetTxTime(), TxPair(wtx, (CAccountingEntry*)0)));
}
list<CAccountingEntry> acentries;
walletdb.ListAccountCreditDebit(strAccount, acentries);
BOOST_FOREACH(CAccountingEntry& entry, acentries)
{
txByTime.insert(make_pair(entry.nTime, TxPair((CWalletTx*)0, &entry)));
}
// iterate backwards until we have nCount items to return:
for (TxItems::reverse_iterator it = txByTime.rbegin(); it != txByTime.rend(); ++it)
{
CWalletTx *const pwtx = (*it).second.first;
if (pwtx != 0)
ListTransactions(*pwtx, strAccount, 0, true, ret);
CAccountingEntry *const pacentry = (*it).second.second;
if (pacentry != 0)
AcentryToJSON(*pacentry, strAccount, ret);
if ((int)ret.size() >= (nCount+nFrom)) break;
}
// ret is newest to oldest
if (nFrom > (int)ret.size())
nFrom = ret.size();
if ((nFrom + nCount) > (int)ret.size())
nCount = ret.size() - nFrom;
Array::iterator first = ret.begin();
std::advance(first, nFrom);
Array::iterator last = ret.begin();
std::advance(last, nFrom+nCount);
if (last != ret.end()) ret.erase(last, ret.end());
if (first != ret.begin()) ret.erase(ret.begin(), first);
std::reverse(ret.begin(), ret.end()); // Return oldest to newest
return ret;
}
Value listaccounts(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (fHelp || params.size() > 1)
throw runtime_error(
"listaccounts [minconf=1]\n"
"Returns Object that has account names as keys, account balances as values.");
int nMinDepth = 1;
if (params.size() > 0)
nMinDepth = params[0].get_int();
map<string, int64> mapAccountBalances;
BOOST_FOREACH(const PAIRTYPE(CTxDestination, string)& entry, pwalletMain->mapAddressBook) {
if (IsMine(*pwalletMain, entry.first)) // This address belongs to me
mapAccountBalances[entry.second] = 0;
}
for (map<uint256, CWalletTx>::iterator it = pwalletMain->mapWallet.begin(); it != pwalletMain->mapWallet.end(); ++it)
{
const CWalletTx& wtx = (*it).second;
int64 nGeneratedImmature, nGeneratedMature, nFee;
string strSentAccount;
list<pair<CTxDestination, int64> > listReceived;
list<pair<CTxDestination, int64> > listSent;
wtx.GetAmounts(nGeneratedImmature, nGeneratedMature, listReceived, listSent, nFee, strSentAccount);
mapAccountBalances[strSentAccount] -= nFee;
BOOST_FOREACH(const PAIRTYPE(CTxDestination, int64)& s, listSent)
mapAccountBalances[strSentAccount] -= s.second;
if (wtx.GetDepthInMainChain() >= nMinDepth)
{
mapAccountBalances[""] += nGeneratedMature;
BOOST_FOREACH(const PAIRTYPE(CTxDestination, int64)& r, listReceived)
if (pwalletMain->mapAddressBook.count(r.first))
mapAccountBalances[pwalletMain->mapAddressBook[r.first]] += r.second;
else
mapAccountBalances[""] += r.second;
}
}
list<CAccountingEntry> acentries;
CWalletDB(pwalletMain->strWalletFile).ListAccountCreditDebit("*", acentries);
BOOST_FOREACH(const CAccountingEntry& entry, acentries)
mapAccountBalances[entry.strAccount] += entry.nCreditDebit;
Object ret;
BOOST_FOREACH(const PAIRTYPE(string, int64)& accountBalance, mapAccountBalances) {
ret.push_back(Pair(accountBalance.first, ValueFromAmount(accountBalance.second)));
}
return ret;
}
Value listsinceblock(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (fHelp)
throw runtime_error(
"listsinceblock [blockhash] [target-confirmations]\n"
"Get all transactions in blocks since block [blockhash], or all transactions if omitted");
CBlockIndex *pindex = NULL;
int target_confirms = 1;
if (params.size() > 0)
{
uint256 blockId = 0;
blockId.SetHex(params[0].get_str());
pindex = CBlockLocator(blockId).GetBlockIndex();
}
if (params.size() > 1)
{
target_confirms = params[1].get_int();
if (target_confirms < 1)
throw JSONRPCError(-8, "Invalid parameter");
}
int depth = pindex ? (1 + nBestHeight - pindex->nHeight) : -1;
Array transactions;
for (map<uint256, CWalletTx>::iterator it = pwalletMain->mapWallet.begin(); it != pwalletMain->mapWallet.end(); it++)
{
CWalletTx tx = (*it).second;
if (depth == -1 || tx.GetDepthInMainChain() < depth)
ListTransactions(tx, "*", 0, true, transactions);
}
uint256 lastblock;
if (target_confirms == 1)
{
lastblock = hashBestChain;
}
else
{
int target_height = pindexBest->nHeight + 1 - target_confirms;
CBlockIndex *block;
for (block = pindexBest;
block && block->nHeight > target_height;
block = block->pprev) { }
lastblock = block ? block->GetBlockHash() : 0;
}
Object ret;
ret.push_back(Pair("transactions", transactions));
ret.push_back(Pair("lastblock", lastblock.GetHex()));
return ret;
}
Value gettransaction(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (fHelp || params.size() != 1)
throw runtime_error(
"gettransaction <txid>\n"
"Get detailed information about in-wallet transaction <txid>");
uint256 hash;
hash.SetHex(params[0].get_str());
Object entry;
if (!pwalletMain->mapWallet.count(hash))
throw JSONRPCError(-5, "Invalid or non-wallet transaction id");
const CWalletTx& wtx = pwalletMain->mapWallet[hash];
int64 nCredit = wtx.GetCredit();
int64 nDebit = wtx.GetDebit();
int64 nNet = nCredit - nDebit;
int64 nFee = (wtx.IsFromMe() ? wtx.GetValueOut() - nDebit : 0);
entry.push_back(Pair("amount", ValueFromAmount(nNet - nFee)));
if (wtx.IsFromMe())
entry.push_back(Pair("fee", ValueFromAmount(nFee)));
WalletTxToJSON(wtx, entry);
Array details;
ListTransactions(wtx, "*", 0, false, details);
entry.push_back(Pair("details", details));
return entry;
}
Value backupwallet(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (fHelp || params.size() != 1)
throw runtime_error(
"backupwallet <destination>\n"
"Safely copies wallet.dat to destination, which can be a directory or a path with filename.");
string strDest = params[0].get_str();
BackupWallet(*pwalletMain, strDest);
return Value::null;
}
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
Value keypoolrefill(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (fHelp || params.size() > 0)
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
throw runtime_error(
"keypoolrefill\n"
"Fills the keypool."
+ HelpRequiringPassphrase());
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
EnsureWalletIsUnlocked();
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
pwalletMain->TopUpKeyPool();
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
if (pwalletMain->GetKeyPoolSize() < GetArg("-keypool", 100))
throw JSONRPCError(-4, "Error refreshing keypool.");
return Value::null;
}
void ThreadTopUpKeyPool(void* parg)
{
// Make this thread recognisable as the key-topping-up thread
RenameThread("bitcoin-key-top");
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
pwalletMain->TopUpKeyPool();
}
void ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase(void* parg)
{
// Make this thread recognisable as the wallet relocking thread
RenameThread("bitcoin-lock-wa");
int64 nMyWakeTime = GetTimeMillis() + *((int64*)parg) * 1000;
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
ENTER_CRITICAL_SECTION(cs_nWalletUnlockTime);
if (nWalletUnlockTime == 0)
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
{
nWalletUnlockTime = nMyWakeTime;
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
do
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
{
if (nWalletUnlockTime==0)
break;
int64 nToSleep = nWalletUnlockTime - GetTimeMillis();
if (nToSleep <= 0)
break;
LEAVE_CRITICAL_SECTION(cs_nWalletUnlockTime);
Sleep(nToSleep);
ENTER_CRITICAL_SECTION(cs_nWalletUnlockTime);
} while(1);
if (nWalletUnlockTime)
{
nWalletUnlockTime = 0;
pwalletMain->Lock();
}
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
}
else
{
if (nWalletUnlockTime < nMyWakeTime)
nWalletUnlockTime = nMyWakeTime;
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
}
LEAVE_CRITICAL_SECTION(cs_nWalletUnlockTime);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
delete (int64*)parg;
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
}
Value walletpassphrase(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (pwalletMain->IsCrypted() && (fHelp || params.size() != 2))
throw runtime_error(
"walletpassphrase <passphrase> <timeout>\n"
"Stores the wallet decryption key in memory for <timeout> seconds.");
if (fHelp)
return true;
if (!pwalletMain->IsCrypted())
throw JSONRPCError(-15, "Error: running with an unencrypted wallet, but walletpassphrase was called.");
if (!pwalletMain->IsLocked())
throw JSONRPCError(-17, "Error: Wallet is already unlocked.");
// Note that the walletpassphrase is stored in params[0] which is not mlock()ed
SecureString strWalletPass;
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
strWalletPass.reserve(100);
// TODO: get rid of this .c_str() by implementing SecureString::operator=(std::string)
// Alternately, find a way to make params[0] mlock()'d to begin with.
strWalletPass = params[0].get_str().c_str();
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
if (strWalletPass.length() > 0)
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
{
if (!pwalletMain->Unlock(strWalletPass))
throw JSONRPCError(-14, "Error: The wallet passphrase entered was incorrect.");
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
}
else
throw runtime_error(
"walletpassphrase <passphrase> <timeout>\n"
"Stores the wallet decryption key in memory for <timeout> seconds.");
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
CreateThread(ThreadTopUpKeyPool, NULL);
int64* pnSleepTime = new int64(params[1].get_int64());
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
CreateThread(ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase, pnSleepTime);
return Value::null;
}
Value walletpassphrasechange(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (pwalletMain->IsCrypted() && (fHelp || params.size() != 2))
throw runtime_error(
"walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase>\n"
"Changes the wallet passphrase from <oldpassphrase> to <newpassphrase>.");
if (fHelp)
return true;
if (!pwalletMain->IsCrypted())
throw JSONRPCError(-15, "Error: running with an unencrypted wallet, but walletpassphrasechange was called.");
// TODO: get rid of these .c_str() calls by implementing SecureString::operator=(std::string)
// Alternately, find a way to make params[0] mlock()'d to begin with.
SecureString strOldWalletPass;
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
strOldWalletPass.reserve(100);
strOldWalletPass = params[0].get_str().c_str();
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
SecureString strNewWalletPass;
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
strNewWalletPass.reserve(100);
strNewWalletPass = params[1].get_str().c_str();
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
if (strOldWalletPass.length() < 1 || strNewWalletPass.length() < 1)
throw runtime_error(
"walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase>\n"
"Changes the wallet passphrase from <oldpassphrase> to <newpassphrase>.");
if (!pwalletMain->ChangeWalletPassphrase(strOldWalletPass, strNewWalletPass))
throw JSONRPCError(-14, "Error: The wallet passphrase entered was incorrect.");
return Value::null;
}
Value walletlock(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (pwalletMain->IsCrypted() && (fHelp || params.size() != 0))
throw runtime_error(
"walletlock\n"
"Removes the wallet encryption key from memory, locking the wallet.\n"
"After calling this method, you will need to call walletpassphrase again\n"
"before being able to call any methods which require the wallet to be unlocked.");
if (fHelp)
return true;
if (!pwalletMain->IsCrypted())
throw JSONRPCError(-15, "Error: running with an unencrypted wallet, but walletlock was called.");
{
LOCK(cs_nWalletUnlockTime);
pwalletMain->Lock();
nWalletUnlockTime = 0;
}
return Value::null;
}
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
Value encryptwallet(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (!pwalletMain->IsCrypted() && (fHelp || params.size() != 1))
throw runtime_error(
"encryptwallet <passphrase>\n"
"Encrypts the wallet with <passphrase>.");
if (fHelp)
return true;
if (pwalletMain->IsCrypted())
throw JSONRPCError(-15, "Error: running with an encrypted wallet, but encryptwallet was called.");
// TODO: get rid of this .c_str() by implementing SecureString::operator=(std::string)
// Alternately, find a way to make params[0] mlock()'d to begin with.
SecureString strWalletPass;
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
strWalletPass.reserve(100);
strWalletPass = params[0].get_str().c_str();
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
if (strWalletPass.length() < 1)
throw runtime_error(
"encryptwallet <passphrase>\n"
"Encrypts the wallet with <passphrase>.");
if (!pwalletMain->EncryptWallet(strWalletPass))
throw JSONRPCError(-16, "Error: Failed to encrypt the wallet.");
// BDB seems to have a bad habit of writing old data into
// slack space in .dat files; that is bad if the old data is
// unencrypted private keys. So:
StartShutdown();
return "wallet encrypted; Bitcoin server stopping, restart to run with encrypted wallet";
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
}
class DescribeAddressVisitor : public boost::static_visitor<Object>
{
public:
Object operator()(const CNoDestination &dest) const { return Object(); }
Object operator()(const CKeyID &keyID) const {
Object obj;
CPubKey vchPubKey;
pwalletMain->GetPubKey(keyID, vchPubKey);
obj.push_back(Pair("isscript", false));
obj.push_back(Pair("pubkey", HexStr(vchPubKey.Raw())));
obj.push_back(Pair("iscompressed", vchPubKey.IsCompressed()));
return obj;
}
Object operator()(const CScriptID &scriptID) const {
Object obj;
obj.push_back(Pair("isscript", true));
CScript subscript;
pwalletMain->GetCScript(scriptID, subscript);
std::vector<CTxDestination> addresses;
txnouttype whichType;
int nRequired;
ExtractDestinations(subscript, whichType, addresses, nRequired);
obj.push_back(Pair("script", GetTxnOutputType(whichType)));
Array a;
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxDestination& addr, addresses)
a.push_back(CBitcoinAddress(addr).ToString());
obj.push_back(Pair("addresses", a));
if (whichType == TX_MULTISIG)
obj.push_back(Pair("sigsrequired", nRequired));
return obj;
}
};
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
Value validateaddress(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (fHelp || params.size() != 1)
throw runtime_error(
"validateaddress <bitcoinaddress>\n"
"Return information about <bitcoinaddress>.");
CBitcoinAddress address(params[0].get_str());
bool isValid = address.IsValid();
Object ret;
ret.push_back(Pair("isvalid", isValid));
if (isValid)
{
CTxDestination dest = address.Get();
string currentAddress = address.ToString();
ret.push_back(Pair("address", currentAddress));
bool fMine = IsMine(*pwalletMain, dest);
ret.push_back(Pair("ismine", fMine));
if (fMine) {
Object detail = boost::apply_visitor(DescribeAddressVisitor(), dest);
ret.insert(ret.end(), detail.begin(), detail.end());
}
if (pwalletMain->mapAddressBook.count(dest))
ret.push_back(Pair("account", pwalletMain->mapAddressBook[dest]));
}
return ret;
}
Value getwork(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (fHelp || params.size() > 1)
throw runtime_error(
"getwork [data]\n"
"If [data] is not specified, returns formatted hash data to work on:\n"
" \"midstate\" : precomputed hash state after hashing the first half of the data (DEPRECATED)\n" // deprecated
" \"data\" : block data\n"
" \"hash1\" : formatted hash buffer for second hash (DEPRECATED)\n" // deprecated
" \"target\" : little endian hash target\n"
"If [data] is specified, tries to solve the block and returns true if it was successful.");
if (vNodes.empty())
throw JSONRPCError(-9, "Bitcoin is not connected!");
if (IsInitialBlockDownload())
throw JSONRPCError(-10, "Bitcoin is downloading blocks...");
typedef map<uint256, pair<CBlock*, CScript> > mapNewBlock_t;
static mapNewBlock_t mapNewBlock; // FIXME: thread safety
static vector<CBlock*> vNewBlock;
static CReserveKey reservekey(pwalletMain);
if (params.size() == 0)
{
// Update block
static unsigned int nTransactionsUpdatedLast;
static CBlockIndex* pindexPrev;
static int64 nStart;
static CBlock* pblock;
if (pindexPrev != pindexBest ||
(nTransactionsUpdated != nTransactionsUpdatedLast && GetTime() - nStart > 60))
{
if (pindexPrev != pindexBest)
{
// Deallocate old blocks since they're obsolete now
mapNewBlock.clear();
BOOST_FOREACH(CBlock* pblock, vNewBlock)
delete pblock;
vNewBlock.clear();
}
// Clear pindexPrev so future getworks make a new block, despite any failures from here on
pindexPrev = NULL;
// Store the pindexBest used before CreateNewBlock, to avoid races
nTransactionsUpdatedLast = nTransactionsUpdated;
CBlockIndex* pindexPrevNew = pindexBest;
nStart = GetTime();
// Create new block
pblock = CreateNewBlock(reservekey);
if (!pblock)
throw JSONRPCError(-7, "Out of memory");
vNewBlock.push_back(pblock);
// Need to update only after we know CreateNewBlock succeeded
pindexPrev = pindexPrevNew;
}
// Update nTime
pblock->UpdateTime(pindexPrev);
pblock->nNonce = 0;
// Update nExtraNonce
static unsigned int nExtraNonce = 0;
IncrementExtraNonce(pblock, pindexPrev, nExtraNonce);
// Save
mapNewBlock[pblock->hashMerkleRoot] = make_pair(pblock, pblock->vtx[0].vin[0].scriptSig);
// Pre-build hash buffers
char pmidstate[32];
char pdata[128];
char phash1[64];
FormatHashBuffers(pblock, pmidstate, pdata, phash1);
uint256 hashTarget = CBigNum().SetCompact(pblock->nBits).getuint256();
Object result;
result.push_back(Pair("midstate", HexStr(BEGIN(pmidstate), END(pmidstate)))); // deprecated
result.push_back(Pair("data", HexStr(BEGIN(pdata), END(pdata))));
result.push_back(Pair("hash1", HexStr(BEGIN(phash1), END(phash1)))); // deprecated
result.push_back(Pair("target", HexStr(BEGIN(hashTarget), END(hashTarget))));
return result;
}
else
{
// Parse parameters
vector<unsigned char> vchData = ParseHex(params[0].get_str());
if (vchData.size() != 128)
throw JSONRPCError(-8, "Invalid parameter");
CBlock* pdata = (CBlock*)&vchData[0];
// Byte reverse
for (int i = 0; i < 128/4; i++)
((unsigned int*)pdata)[i] = ByteReverse(((unsigned int*)pdata)[i]);
// Get saved block
if (!mapNewBlock.count(pdata->hashMerkleRoot))
return false;
CBlock* pblock = mapNewBlock[pdata->hashMerkleRoot].first;
pblock->nTime = pdata->nTime;
pblock->nNonce = pdata->nNonce;
pblock->vtx[0].vin[0].scriptSig = mapNewBlock[pdata->hashMerkleRoot].second;
pblock->hashMerkleRoot = pblock->BuildMerkleTree();
return CheckWork(pblock, *pwalletMain, reservekey);
}
}
Value getmemorypool(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (fHelp || params.size() > 1)
throw runtime_error(
"getmemorypool [data]\n"
"If [data] is not specified, returns data needed to construct a block to work on:\n"
" \"version\" : block version\n"
" \"previousblockhash\" : hash of current highest block\n"
" \"transactions\" : contents of non-coinbase transactions that should be included in the next block\n"
" \"coinbasevalue\" : maximum allowable input to coinbase transaction, including the generation award and transaction fees\n"
" \"coinbaseflags\" : data that should be included in coinbase so support for new features can be judged\n"
" \"time\" : timestamp appropriate for next block\n"
" \"mintime\" : minimum timestamp appropriate for next block\n"
" \"curtime\" : current timestamp\n"
" \"bits\" : compressed target of next block\n"
"If [data] is specified, tries to solve the block and returns true if it was successful.");
if (params.size() == 0)
{
if (vNodes.empty())
throw JSONRPCError(-9, "Bitcoin is not connected!");
if (IsInitialBlockDownload())
throw JSONRPCError(-10, "Bitcoin is downloading blocks...");
static CReserveKey reservekey(pwalletMain);
// Update block
static unsigned int nTransactionsUpdatedLast;
static CBlockIndex* pindexPrev;
static int64 nStart;
static CBlock* pblock;
if (pindexPrev != pindexBest ||
(nTransactionsUpdated != nTransactionsUpdatedLast && GetTime() - nStart > 5))
{
// Clear pindexPrev so future calls make a new block, despite any failures from here on
pindexPrev = NULL;
// Store the pindexBest used before CreateNewBlock, to avoid races
nTransactionsUpdatedLast = nTransactionsUpdated;
CBlockIndex* pindexPrevNew = pindexBest;
nStart = GetTime();
// Create new block
if(pblock)
{
delete pblock;
pblock = NULL;
}
pblock = CreateNewBlock(reservekey);
if (!pblock)
throw JSONRPCError(-7, "Out of memory");
// Need to update only after we know CreateNewBlock succeeded
pindexPrev = pindexPrevNew;
}
// Update nTime
pblock->UpdateTime(pindexPrev);
pblock->nNonce = 0;
Array transactions;
BOOST_FOREACH(CTransaction tx, pblock->vtx) {
if(tx.IsCoinBase())
continue;
CDataStream ssTx(SER_NETWORK, PROTOCOL_VERSION);
ssTx << tx;
transactions.push_back(HexStr(ssTx.begin(), ssTx.end()));
}
Object result;
result.push_back(Pair("version", pblock->nVersion));
result.push_back(Pair("previousblockhash", pblock->hashPrevBlock.GetHex()));
result.push_back(Pair("transactions", transactions));
result.push_back(Pair("coinbasevalue", (int64_t)pblock->vtx[0].vout[0].nValue));
result.push_back(Pair("coinbaseflags", HexStr(COINBASE_FLAGS.begin(), COINBASE_FLAGS.end())));
result.push_back(Pair("time", (int64_t)pblock->nTime));
result.push_back(Pair("mintime", (int64_t)pindexPrev->GetMedianTimePast()+1));
result.push_back(Pair("curtime", (int64_t)GetAdjustedTime()));
result.push_back(Pair("bits", HexBits(pblock->nBits)));
return result;
}
else
{
// Parse parameters
CDataStream ssBlock(ParseHex(params[0].get_str()), SER_NETWORK, PROTOCOL_VERSION);
CBlock pblock;
ssBlock >> pblock;
return ProcessBlock(NULL, &pblock);
}
}
Value getrawmempool(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (fHelp || params.size() != 0)
throw runtime_error(
"getrawmempool\n"
"Returns all transaction ids in memory pool.");
vector<uint256> vtxid;
mempool.queryHashes(vtxid);
Array a;
BOOST_FOREACH(const uint256& hash, vtxid)
a.push_back(hash.ToString());
return a;
}
Value getblockhash(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (fHelp || params.size() != 1)
throw runtime_error(
"getblockhash <index>\n"
"Returns hash of block in best-block-chain at <index>.");
int nHeight = params[0].get_int();
if (nHeight < 0 || nHeight > nBestHeight)
throw runtime_error("Block number out of range.");
CBlockIndex* pblockindex = FindBlockByHeight(nHeight);
return pblockindex->phashBlock->GetHex();
}
Value getblock(const Array& params, bool fHelp)
{
if (fHelp || params.size() != 1)
throw runtime_error(
"getblock <hash>\n"
"Returns details of a block with given block-hash.");
std::string strHash = params[0].get_str();
uint256 hash(strHash);
if (mapBlockIndex.count(hash) == 0)
throw JSONRPCError(-5, "Block not found");
CBlock block;
CBlockIndex* pblockindex = mapBlockIndex[hash];
block.ReadFromDisk(pblockindex, true);
return blockToJSON(block, pblockindex);
}
//
// Call Table
//
static const CRPCCommand vRPCCommands[] =
{ // name function safe mode?
// ------------------------ ----------------------- ----------
{ "help", &help, true },
{ "stop", &stop, true },
{ "getblockcount", &getblockcount, true },
{ "getconnectioncount", &getconnectioncount, true },
{ "getpeerinfo", &getpeerinfo, true },
{ "getdifficulty", &getdifficulty, true },
{ "getgenerate", &getgenerate, true },
{ "setgenerate", &setgenerate, true },
{ "gethashespersec", &gethashespersec, true },
{ "getinfo", &getinfo, true },
{ "getmininginfo", &getmininginfo, true },
{ "getnewaddress", &getnewaddress, true },
{ "getaccountaddress", &getaccountaddress, true },
{ "setaccount", &setaccount, true },
{ "getaccount", &getaccount, false },
{ "getaddressesbyaccount", &getaddressesbyaccount, true },
{ "sendtoaddress", &sendtoaddress, false },
{ "getreceivedbyaddress", &getreceivedbyaddress, false },
{ "getreceivedbyaccount", &getreceivedbyaccount, false },
{ "listreceivedbyaddress", &listreceivedbyaddress, false },
{ "listreceivedbyaccount", &listreceivedbyaccount, false },
{ "backupwallet", &backupwallet, true },
{ "keypoolrefill", &keypoolrefill, true },
{ "walletpassphrase", &walletpassphrase, true },
{ "walletpassphrasechange", &walletpassphrasechange, false },
{ "walletlock", &walletlock, true },
{ "encryptwallet", &encryptwallet, false },
{ "validateaddress", &validateaddress, true },
{ "getbalance", &getbalance, false },
{ "move", &movecmd, false },
{ "sendfrom", &sendfrom, false },
{ "sendmany", &sendmany, false },
{ "addmultisigaddress", &addmultisigaddress, false },
{ "getrawmempool", &getrawmempool, true },
{ "getblock", &getblock, false },
{ "getblockhash", &getblockhash, false },
{ "gettransaction", &gettransaction, false },
{ "listtransactions", &listtransactions, false },
{ "signmessage", &signmessage, false },
{ "verifymessage", &verifymessage, false },
{ "getwork", &getwork, true },
{ "listaccounts", &listaccounts, false },
{ "settxfee", &settxfee, false },
{ "getmemorypool", &getmemorypool, true },
{ "listsinceblock", &listsinceblock, false },
{ "dumpprivkey", &dumpprivkey, false },
{ "importprivkey", &importprivkey, false },
{ "listunspent", &listunspent, false },
{ "getrawtransaction", &getrawtransaction, false },
{ "createrawtransaction", &createrawtransaction, false },
{ "decoderawtransaction", &decoderawtransaction, false },
{ "signrawtransaction", &signrawtransaction, false },
{ "sendrawtransaction", &sendrawtransaction, false },
};
CRPCTable::CRPCTable()
{
unsigned int vcidx;
for (vcidx = 0; vcidx < (sizeof(vRPCCommands) / sizeof(vRPCCommands[0])); vcidx++)
{
const CRPCCommand *pcmd;
pcmd = &vRPCCommands[vcidx];
mapCommands[pcmd->name] = pcmd;
}
}
const CRPCCommand *CRPCTable::operator[](string name) const
{
map<string, const CRPCCommand*>::const_iterator it = mapCommands.find(name);
if (it == mapCommands.end())
return NULL;
return (*it).second;
}
//
// HTTP protocol
//
// This ain't Apache. We're just using HTTP header for the length field
// and to be compatible with other JSON-RPC implementations.
//
string HTTPPost(const string& strMsg, const map<string,string>& mapRequestHeaders)
{
ostringstream s;
s << "POST / HTTP/1.1\r\n"
<< "User-Agent: bitcoin-json-rpc/" << FormatFullVersion() << "\r\n"
<< "Host: 127.0.0.1\r\n"
<< "Content-Type: application/json\r\n"
<< "Content-Length: " << strMsg.size() << "\r\n"
<< "Connection: close\r\n"
<< "Accept: application/json\r\n";
BOOST_FOREACH(const PAIRTYPE(string, string)& item, mapRequestHeaders)
s << item.first << ": " << item.second << "\r\n";
s << "\r\n" << strMsg;
return s.str();
}
string rfc1123Time()
{
char buffer[64];
time_t now;
time(&now);
struct tm* now_gmt = gmtime(&now);
string locale(setlocale(LC_TIME, NULL));
setlocale(LC_TIME, "C"); // we want POSIX (aka "C") weekday/month strings
strftime(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%a, %d %b %Y %H:%M:%S +0000", now_gmt);
setlocale(LC_TIME, locale.c_str());
return string(buffer);
}
static string HTTPReply(int nStatus, const string& strMsg, bool keepalive)
{
if (nStatus == 401)
return strprintf("HTTP/1.0 401 Authorization Required\r\n"
"Date: %s\r\n"
"Server: bitcoin-json-rpc/%s\r\n"
"WWW-Authenticate: Basic realm=\"jsonrpc\"\r\n"
"Content-Type: text/html\r\n"
"Content-Length: 296\r\n"
"\r\n"
"<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC \"-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN\"\r\n"
"\"http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-html401-19991224/loose.dtd\">\r\n"
"<HTML>\r\n"
"<HEAD>\r\n"
"<TITLE>Error</TITLE>\r\n"
"<META HTTP-EQUIV='Content-Type' CONTENT='text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1'>\r\n"
"</HEAD>\r\n"
"<BODY><H1>401 Unauthorized.</H1></BODY>\r\n"
"</HTML>\r\n", rfc1123Time().c_str(), FormatFullVersion().c_str());
const char *cStatus;
if (nStatus == 200) cStatus = "OK";
else if (nStatus == 400) cStatus = "Bad Request";
else if (nStatus == 403) cStatus = "Forbidden";
else if (nStatus == 404) cStatus = "Not Found";
else if (nStatus == 500) cStatus = "Internal Server Error";
else cStatus = "";
return strprintf(
"HTTP/1.1 %d %s\r\n"
"Date: %s\r\n"
"Connection: %s\r\n"
"Content-Length: %d\r\n"
"Content-Type: application/json\r\n"
"Server: bitcoin-json-rpc/%s\r\n"
"\r\n"
"%s",
nStatus,
cStatus,
rfc1123Time().c_str(),
keepalive ? "keep-alive" : "close",
strMsg.size(),
FormatFullVersion().c_str(),
strMsg.c_str());
}
int ReadHTTPStatus(std::basic_istream<char>& stream, int &proto)
{
string str;
getline(stream, str);
vector<string> vWords;
boost::split(vWords, str, boost::is_any_of(" "));
if (vWords.size() < 2)
return 500;
proto = 0;
const char *ver = strstr(str.c_str(), "HTTP/1.");
if (ver != NULL)
proto = atoi(ver+7);
return atoi(vWords[1].c_str());
}
int ReadHTTPHeader(std::basic_istream<char>& stream, map<string, string>& mapHeadersRet)
{
int nLen = 0;
loop
{
string str;
std::getline(stream, str);
if (str.empty() || str == "\r")
break;
string::size_type nColon = str.find(":");
if (nColon != string::npos)
{
string strHeader = str.substr(0, nColon);
boost::trim(strHeader);
boost::to_lower(strHeader);
string strValue = str.substr(nColon+1);
boost::trim(strValue);
mapHeadersRet[strHeader] = strValue;
if (strHeader == "content-length")
nLen = atoi(strValue.c_str());
}
}
return nLen;
}
int ReadHTTP(std::basic_istream<char>& stream, map<string, string>& mapHeadersRet, string& strMessageRet)
{
mapHeadersRet.clear();
strMessageRet = "";
// Read status
int nProto = 0;
int nStatus = ReadHTTPStatus(stream, nProto);
// Read header
int nLen = ReadHTTPHeader(stream, mapHeadersRet);
if (nLen < 0 || nLen > (int)MAX_SIZE)
return 500;
// Read message
if (nLen > 0)
{
vector<char> vch(nLen);
stream.read(&vch[0], nLen);
strMessageRet = string(vch.begin(), vch.end());
}
string sConHdr = mapHeadersRet["connection"];
if ((sConHdr != "close") && (sConHdr != "keep-alive"))
{
if (nProto >= 1)
mapHeadersRet["connection"] = "keep-alive";
else
mapHeadersRet["connection"] = "close";
}
return nStatus;
}
bool HTTPAuthorized(map<string, string>& mapHeaders)
{
string strAuth = mapHeaders["authorization"];
if (strAuth.substr(0,6) != "Basic ")
return false;
string strUserPass64 = strAuth.substr(6); boost::trim(strUserPass64);
string strUserPass = DecodeBase64(strUserPass64);
return strUserPass == strRPCUserColonPass;
}
//
// JSON-RPC protocol. Bitcoin speaks version 1.0 for maximum compatibility,
// but uses JSON-RPC 1.1/2.0 standards for parts of the 1.0 standard that were
// unspecified (HTTP errors and contents of 'error').
//
// 1.0 spec: http://json-rpc.org/wiki/specification
// 1.2 spec: http://groups.google.com/group/json-rpc/web/json-rpc-over-http
// http://www.codeproject.com/KB/recipes/JSON_Spirit.aspx
//
string JSONRPCRequest(const string& strMethod, const Array& params, const Value& id)
{
Object request;
request.push_back(Pair("method", strMethod));
request.push_back(Pair("params", params));
request.push_back(Pair("id", id));
return write_string(Value(request), false) + "\n";
}
Object JSONRPCReplyObj(const Value& result, const Value& error, const Value& id)
{
Object reply;
if (error.type() != null_type)
reply.push_back(Pair("result", Value::null));
else
reply.push_back(Pair("result", result));
reply.push_back(Pair("error", error));
reply.push_back(Pair("id", id));
return reply;
}
string JSONRPCReply(const Value& result, const Value& error, const Value& id)
{
Object reply = JSONRPCReplyObj(result, error, id);
return write_string(Value(reply), false) + "\n";
}
void ErrorReply(std::ostream& stream, const Object& objError, const Value& id)
{
// Send error reply from json-rpc error object
int nStatus = 500;
int code = find_value(objError, "code").get_int();
if (code == -32600) nStatus = 400;
else if (code == -32601) nStatus = 404;
string strReply = JSONRPCReply(Value::null, objError, id);
stream << HTTPReply(nStatus, strReply, false) << std::flush;
}
bool ClientAllowed(const boost::asio::ip::address& address)
{
// Make sure that IPv4-compatible and IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses are treated as IPv4 addresses
if (address.is_v6()
&& (address.to_v6().is_v4_compatible()
|| address.to_v6().is_v4_mapped()))
return ClientAllowed(address.to_v6().to_v4());
if (address == asio::ip::address_v4::loopback()
|| address == asio::ip::address_v6::loopback()
|| (address.is_v4()
// Check whether IPv4 addresses match 127.0.0.0/8 (loopback subnet)
&& (address.to_v4().to_ulong() & 0xff000000) == 0x7f000000))
return true;
const string strAddress = address.to_string();
const vector<string>& vAllow = mapMultiArgs["-rpcallowip"];
BOOST_FOREACH(string strAllow, vAllow)
if (WildcardMatch(strAddress, strAllow))
return true;
return false;
}
//
// IOStream device that speaks SSL but can also speak non-SSL
//
template <typename Protocol>
class SSLIOStreamDevice : public iostreams::device<iostreams::bidirectional> {
public:
SSLIOStreamDevice(asio::ssl::stream<typename Protocol::socket> &streamIn, bool fUseSSLIn) : stream(streamIn)
{
fUseSSL = fUseSSLIn;
fNeedHandshake = fUseSSLIn;
}
void handshake(ssl::stream_base::handshake_type role)
{
if (!fNeedHandshake) return;
fNeedHandshake = false;
stream.handshake(role);
}
std::streamsize read(char* s, std::streamsize n)
{
handshake(ssl::stream_base::server); // HTTPS servers read first
if (fUseSSL) return stream.read_some(asio::buffer(s, n));
return stream.next_layer().read_some(asio::buffer(s, n));
}
std::streamsize write(const char* s, std::streamsize n)
{
handshake(ssl::stream_base::client); // HTTPS clients write first
if (fUseSSL) return asio::write(stream, asio::buffer(s, n));
return asio::write(stream.next_layer(), asio::buffer(s, n));
}
bool connect(const std::string& server, const std::string& port)
{
ip::tcp::resolver resolver(stream.get_io_service());
ip::tcp::resolver::query query(server.c_str(), port.c_str());
ip::tcp::resolver::iterator endpoint_iterator = resolver.resolve(query);
ip::tcp::resolver::iterator end;
boost::system::error_code error = asio::error::host_not_found;
while (error && endpoint_iterator != end)
{
stream.lowest_layer().close();
stream.lowest_layer().connect(*endpoint_iterator++, error);
}
if (error)
return false;
return true;
}
private:
bool fNeedHandshake;
bool fUseSSL;
asio::ssl::stream<typename Protocol::socket>& stream;
};
class AcceptedConnection
{
public:
virtual ~AcceptedConnection() {}
virtual std::iostream& stream() = 0;
virtual std::string peer_address_to_string() const = 0;
virtual void close() = 0;
};
template <typename Protocol>
class AcceptedConnectionImpl : public AcceptedConnection
{
public:
AcceptedConnectionImpl(
asio::io_service& io_service,
ssl::context &context,
bool fUseSSL) :
sslStream(io_service, context),
_d(sslStream, fUseSSL),
_stream(_d)
{
}
virtual std::iostream& stream()
{
return _stream;
}
virtual std::string peer_address_to_string() const
{
return peer.address().to_string();
}
virtual void close()
{
_stream.close();
}
typename Protocol::endpoint peer;
asio::ssl::stream<typename Protocol::socket> sslStream;
private:
SSLIOStreamDevice<Protocol> _d;
iostreams::stream< SSLIOStreamDevice<Protocol> > _stream;
};
void ThreadRPCServer(void* parg)
{
IMPLEMENT_RANDOMIZE_STACK(ThreadRPCServer(parg));
// Make this thread recognisable as the RPC listener
RenameThread("bitcoin-rpclist");
try
{
vnThreadsRunning[THREAD_RPCLISTENER]++;
ThreadRPCServer2(parg);
vnThreadsRunning[THREAD_RPCLISTENER]--;
}
catch (std::exception& e) {
vnThreadsRunning[THREAD_RPCLISTENER]--;
PrintException(&e, "ThreadRPCServer()");
} catch (...) {
vnThreadsRunning[THREAD_RPCLISTENER]--;
PrintException(NULL, "ThreadRPCServer()");
}
printf("ThreadRPCServer exited\n");
}
// Forward declaration required for RPCListen
template <typename Protocol, typename SocketAcceptorService>
static void RPCAcceptHandler(boost::shared_ptr< basic_socket_acceptor<Protocol, SocketAcceptorService> > acceptor,
ssl::context& context,
bool fUseSSL,
AcceptedConnection* conn,
const boost::system::error_code& error);
/**
* Sets up I/O resources to accept and handle a new connection.
*/
template <typename Protocol, typename SocketAcceptorService>
static void RPCListen(boost::shared_ptr< basic_socket_acceptor<Protocol, SocketAcceptorService> > acceptor,
ssl::context& context,
const bool fUseSSL)
{
// Accept connection
AcceptedConnectionImpl<Protocol>* conn = new AcceptedConnectionImpl<Protocol>(acceptor->get_io_service(), context, fUseSSL);
acceptor->async_accept(
conn->sslStream.lowest_layer(),
conn->peer,
boost::bind(&RPCAcceptHandler<Protocol, SocketAcceptorService>,
acceptor,
boost::ref(context),
fUseSSL,
conn,
boost::asio::placeholders::error));
}
/**
* Accept and handle incoming connection.
*/
template <typename Protocol, typename SocketAcceptorService>
static void RPCAcceptHandler(boost::shared_ptr< basic_socket_acceptor<Protocol, SocketAcceptorService> > acceptor,
ssl::context& context,
const bool fUseSSL,
AcceptedConnection* conn,
const boost::system::error_code& error)
{
vnThreadsRunning[THREAD_RPCLISTENER]++;
// Immediately start accepting new connections, except when we're cancelled or our socket is closed.
13 years ago
if (error != asio::error::operation_aborted
&& acceptor->is_open())
RPCListen(acceptor, context, fUseSSL);
AcceptedConnectionImpl<ip::tcp>* tcp_conn = dynamic_cast< AcceptedConnectionImpl<ip::tcp>* >(conn);
// TODO: Actually handle errors
if (error)
{
delete conn;
}
// Restrict callers by IP. It is important to
// do this before starting client thread, to filter out
// certain DoS and misbehaving clients.
else if (tcp_conn
&& !ClientAllowed(tcp_conn->peer.address()))
{
// Only send a 403 if we're not using SSL to prevent a DoS during the SSL handshake.
if (!fUseSSL)
conn->stream() << HTTPReply(403, "", false) << std::flush;
delete conn;
}
// start HTTP client thread
else if (!CreateThread(ThreadRPCServer3, conn)) {
printf("Failed to create RPC server client thread\n");
delete conn;
}
vnThreadsRunning[THREAD_RPCLISTENER]--;
}
void ThreadRPCServer2(void* parg)
{
printf("ThreadRPCServer started\n");
strRPCUserColonPass = mapArgs["-rpcuser"] + ":" + mapArgs["-rpcpassword"];
if (mapArgs["-rpcpassword"] == "")
{
unsigned char rand_pwd[32];
RAND_bytes(rand_pwd, 32);
string strWhatAmI = "To use bitcoind";
if (mapArgs.count("-server"))
strWhatAmI = strprintf(_("To use the %s option"), "\"-server\"");
else if (mapArgs.count("-daemon"))
strWhatAmI = strprintf(_("To use the %s option"), "\"-daemon\"");
uiInterface.ThreadSafeMessageBox(strprintf(
_("%s, you must set a rpcpassword in the configuration file:\n %s\n"
"It is recommended you use the following random password:\n"
"rpcuser=bitcoinrpc\n"
"rpcpassword=%s\n"
"(you do not need to remember this password)\n"
"If the file does not exist, create it with owner-readable-only file permissions.\n"),
strWhatAmI.c_str(),
GetConfigFile().string().c_str(),
EncodeBase58(&rand_pwd[0],&rand_pwd[0]+32).c_str()),
_("Error"), CClientUIInterface::OK | CClientUIInterface::MODAL);
StartShutdown();
return;
}
const bool fUseSSL = GetBoolArg("-rpcssl");
asio::io_service io_service;
ssl::context context(io_service, ssl::context::sslv23);
if (fUseSSL)
{
context.set_options(ssl::context::no_sslv2);
filesystem::path pathCertFile(GetArg("-rpcsslcertificatechainfile", "server.cert"));
if (!pathCertFile.is_complete()) pathCertFile = filesystem::path(GetDataDir()) / pathCertFile;
if (filesystem::exists(pathCertFile)) context.use_certificate_chain_file(pathCertFile.string());
else printf("ThreadRPCServer ERROR: missing server certificate file %s\n", pathCertFile.string().c_str());
filesystem::path pathPKFile(GetArg("-rpcsslprivatekeyfile", "server.pem"));
if (!pathPKFile.is_complete()) pathPKFile = filesystem::path(GetDataDir()) / pathPKFile;
if (filesystem::exists(pathPKFile)) context.use_private_key_file(pathPKFile.string(), ssl::context::pem);
else printf("ThreadRPCServer ERROR: missing server private key file %s\n", pathPKFile.string().c_str());
string strCiphers = GetArg("-rpcsslciphers", "TLSv1+HIGH:!SSLv2:!aNULL:!eNULL:!AH:!3DES:@STRENGTH");
SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(context.impl(), strCiphers.c_str());
}
// Try a dual IPv6/IPv4 socket, falling back to separate IPv4 and IPv6 sockets
const bool loopback = !mapArgs.count("-rpcallowip");
asio::ip::address bindAddress = loopback ? asio::ip::address_v6::loopback() : asio::ip::address_v6::any();
ip::tcp::endpoint endpoint(bindAddress, GetArg("-rpcport", 8332));
boost::signals2::signal<void ()> StopRequests;
try
{
boost::shared_ptr<ip::tcp::acceptor> acceptor(new ip::tcp::acceptor(io_service));
acceptor->open(endpoint.protocol());
acceptor->set_option(boost::asio::ip::tcp::acceptor::reuse_address(true));
// Try making the socket dual IPv6/IPv4 (if listening on the "any" address)
boost::system::error_code v6_only_error;
acceptor->set_option(boost::asio::ip::v6_only(loopback), v6_only_error);
acceptor->bind(endpoint);
acceptor->listen(socket_base::max_connections);
RPCListen(acceptor, context, fUseSSL);
// Cancel outstanding listen-requests for this acceptor when shutting down
StopRequests.connect(signals2::slot<void ()>(
static_cast<void (ip::tcp::acceptor::*)()>(&ip::tcp::acceptor::close), acceptor.get())
.track(acceptor));
// If dual IPv6/IPv4 failed (or we're opening loopback interfaces only), open IPv4 separately
if (loopback || v6_only_error)
{
bindAddress = loopback ? asio::ip::address_v4::loopback() : asio::ip::address_v4::any();
endpoint.address(bindAddress);
acceptor.reset(new ip::tcp::acceptor(io_service));
acceptor->open(endpoint.protocol());
acceptor->set_option(boost::asio::ip::tcp::acceptor::reuse_address(true));
acceptor->bind(endpoint);
acceptor->listen(socket_base::max_connections);
RPCListen(acceptor, context, fUseSSL);
// Cancel outstanding listen-requests for this acceptor when shutting down
StopRequests.connect(signals2::slot<void ()>(
static_cast<void (ip::tcp::acceptor::*)()>(&ip::tcp::acceptor::close), acceptor.get())
.track(acceptor));
}
}
catch(boost::system::system_error &e)
{
uiInterface.ThreadSafeMessageBox(strprintf(_("An error occurred while setting up the RPC port %i for listening: %s"), endpoint.port(), e.what()),
_("Error"), CClientUIInterface::OK | CClientUIInterface::MODAL);
StartShutdown();
return;
}
vnThreadsRunning[THREAD_RPCLISTENER]--;
while (!fShutdown)
io_service.run_one();
vnThreadsRunning[THREAD_RPCLISTENER]++;
StopRequests();
}
class JSONRequest
{
public:
Value id;
string strMethod;
Array params;
JSONRequest() { id = Value::null; }
void parse(const Value& valRequest);
};
void JSONRequest::parse(const Value& valRequest)
{
// Parse request
if (valRequest.type() != obj_type)
throw JSONRPCError(-32600, "Invalid Request object");
const Object& request = valRequest.get_obj();
// Parse id now so errors from here on will have the id
id = find_value(request, "id");
// Parse method
Value valMethod = find_value(request, "method");
if (valMethod.type() == null_type)
throw JSONRPCError(-32600, "Missing method");
if (valMethod.type() != str_type)
throw JSONRPCError(-32600, "Method must be a string");
strMethod = valMethod.get_str();
if (strMethod != "getwork" && strMethod != "getmemorypool")
printf("ThreadRPCServer method=%s\n", strMethod.c_str());
// Parse params
Value valParams = find_value(request, "params");
if (valParams.type() == array_type)
params = valParams.get_array();
else if (valParams.type() == null_type)
params = Array();
else
throw JSONRPCError(-32600, "Params must be an array");
}
static Object JSONRPCExecOne(const Value& req)
{
Object rpc_result;
JSONRequest jreq;
try {
jreq.parse(req);
Value result = tableRPC.execute(jreq.strMethod, jreq.params);
rpc_result = JSONRPCReplyObj(result, Value::null, jreq.id);
}
catch (Object& objError)
{
rpc_result = JSONRPCReplyObj(Value::null, objError, jreq.id);
}
catch (std::exception& e)
{
rpc_result = JSONRPCReplyObj(Value::null,
JSONRPCError(-32700, e.what()), jreq.id);
}
return rpc_result;
}
static string JSONRPCExecBatch(const Array& vReq)
{
Array ret;
for (unsigned int reqIdx = 0; reqIdx < vReq.size(); reqIdx++)
ret.push_back(JSONRPCExecOne(vReq[reqIdx]));
return write_string(Value(ret), false) + "\n";
}
static CCriticalSection cs_THREAD_RPCHANDLER;
void ThreadRPCServer3(void* parg)
{
IMPLEMENT_RANDOMIZE_STACK(ThreadRPCServer3(parg));
// Make this thread recognisable as the RPC handler
RenameThread("bitcoin-rpchand");
{
LOCK(cs_THREAD_RPCHANDLER);
vnThreadsRunning[THREAD_RPCHANDLER]++;
}
AcceptedConnection *conn = (AcceptedConnection *) parg;
bool fRun = true;
loop {
if (fShutdown || !fRun)
{
conn->close();
delete conn;
{
LOCK(cs_THREAD_RPCHANDLER);
--vnThreadsRunning[THREAD_RPCHANDLER];
}
return;
}
map<string, string> mapHeaders;
string strRequest;
ReadHTTP(conn->stream(), mapHeaders, strRequest);
// Check authorization
if (mapHeaders.count("authorization") == 0)
{
conn->stream() << HTTPReply(401, "", false) << std::flush;
break;
}
if (!HTTPAuthorized(mapHeaders))
{
printf("ThreadRPCServer incorrect password attempt from %s\n", conn->peer_address_to_string().c_str());
/* Deter brute-forcing short passwords.
If this results in a DOS the user really
shouldn't have their RPC port exposed.*/
if (mapArgs["-rpcpassword"].size() < 20)
Sleep(250);
conn->stream() << HTTPReply(401, "", false) << std::flush;
break;
}
if (mapHeaders["connection"] == "close")
fRun = false;
JSONRequest jreq;
try
{
// Parse request
Value valRequest;
if (!read_string(strRequest, valRequest))
throw JSONRPCError(-32700, "Parse error");
string strReply;
// singleton request
if (valRequest.type() == obj_type) {
jreq.parse(valRequest);
Value result = tableRPC.execute(jreq.strMethod, jreq.params);
// Send reply
strReply = JSONRPCReply(result, Value::null, jreq.id);
// array of requests
} else if (valRequest.type() == array_type)
strReply = JSONRPCExecBatch(valRequest.get_array());
else
throw JSONRPCError(-32700, "Top-level object parse error");
conn->stream() << HTTPReply(200, strReply, fRun) << std::flush;
}
catch (Object& objError)
{
ErrorReply(conn->stream(), objError, jreq.id);
break;
}
catch (std::exception& e)
{
ErrorReply(conn->stream(), JSONRPCError(-32700, e.what()), jreq.id);
break;
}
}
delete conn;
{
LOCK(cs_THREAD_RPCHANDLER);
vnThreadsRunning[THREAD_RPCHANDLER]--;
}
}
json_spirit::Value CRPCTable::execute(const std::string &strMethod, const json_spirit::Array &params) const
{
// Find method
const CRPCCommand *pcmd = tableRPC[strMethod];
if (!pcmd)
throw JSONRPCError(-32601, "Method not found");
// Observe safe mode
string strWarning = GetWarnings("rpc");
if (strWarning != "" && !GetBoolArg("-disablesafemode") &&
!pcmd->okSafeMode)
throw JSONRPCError(-2, string("Safe mode: ") + strWarning);
try
{
// Execute
Value result;
{
LOCK2(cs_main, pwalletMain->cs_wallet);
result = pcmd->actor(params, false);
}
return result;
}
catch (std::exception& e)
{
throw JSONRPCError(-1, e.what());
}
}
Object CallRPC(const string& strMethod, const Array& params)
{
if (mapArgs["-rpcuser"] == "" && mapArgs["-rpcpassword"] == "")
throw runtime_error(strprintf(
_("You must set rpcpassword=<password> in the configuration file:\n%s\n"
"If the file does not exist, create it with owner-readable-only file permissions."),
GetConfigFile().string().c_str()));
// Connect to localhost
bool fUseSSL = GetBoolArg("-rpcssl");
asio::io_service io_service;
ssl::context context(io_service, ssl::context::sslv23);
context.set_options(ssl::context::no_sslv2);
asio::ssl::stream<asio::ip::tcp::socket> sslStream(io_service, context);
SSLIOStreamDevice<asio::ip::tcp> d(sslStream, fUseSSL);
iostreams::stream< SSLIOStreamDevice<asio::ip::tcp> > stream(d);
if (!d.connect(GetArg("-rpcconnect", "127.0.0.1"), GetArg("-rpcport", "8332")))
throw runtime_error("couldn't connect to server");
// HTTP basic authentication
string strUserPass64 = EncodeBase64(mapArgs["-rpcuser"] + ":" + mapArgs["-rpcpassword"]);
map<string, string> mapRequestHeaders;
mapRequestHeaders["Authorization"] = string("Basic ") + strUserPass64;
// Send request
string strRequest = JSONRPCRequest(strMethod, params, 1);
string strPost = HTTPPost(strRequest, mapRequestHeaders);
stream << strPost << std::flush;
// Receive reply
map<string, string> mapHeaders;
string strReply;
int nStatus = ReadHTTP(stream, mapHeaders, strReply);
if (nStatus == 401)
throw runtime_error("incorrect rpcuser or rpcpassword (authorization failed)");
else if (nStatus >= 400 && nStatus != 400 && nStatus != 404 && nStatus != 500)
throw runtime_error(strprintf("server returned HTTP error %d", nStatus));
else if (strReply.empty())
throw runtime_error("no response from server");
// Parse reply
Value valReply;
if (!read_string(strReply, valReply))
throw runtime_error("couldn't parse reply from server");
const Object& reply = valReply.get_obj();
if (reply.empty())
throw runtime_error("expected reply to have result, error and id properties");
return reply;
}
template<typename T>
void ConvertTo(Value& value)
{
if (value.type() == str_type)
{
// reinterpret string as unquoted json value
Value value2;
string strJSON = value.get_str();
if (!read_string(strJSON, value2))
throw runtime_error(string("Error parsing JSON:")+strJSON);
value = value2.get_value<T>();
}
else
{
value = value.get_value<T>();
}
}
// Convert strings to command-specific RPC representation
Array RPCConvertValues(const std::string &strMethod, const std::vector<std::string> &strParams)
{
Array params;
BOOST_FOREACH(const std::string &param, strParams)
params.push_back(param);
int n = params.size();
//
// Special case non-string parameter types
//
if (strMethod == "setgenerate" && n > 0) ConvertTo<bool>(params[0]);
if (strMethod == "setgenerate" && n > 1) ConvertTo<boost::int64_t>(params[1]);
if (strMethod == "sendtoaddress" && n > 1) ConvertTo<double>(params[1]);
if (strMethod == "settxfee" && n > 0) ConvertTo<double>(params[0]);
if (strMethod == "getreceivedbyaddress" && n > 1) ConvertTo<boost::int64_t>(params[1]);
if (strMethod == "getreceivedbyaccount" && n > 1) ConvertTo<boost::int64_t>(params[1]);
if (strMethod == "listreceivedbyaddress" && n > 0) ConvertTo<boost::int64_t>(params[0]);
if (strMethod == "listreceivedbyaddress" && n > 1) ConvertTo<bool>(params[1]);
if (strMethod == "listreceivedbyaccount" && n > 0) ConvertTo<boost::int64_t>(params[0]);
if (strMethod == "listreceivedbyaccount" && n > 1) ConvertTo<bool>(params[1]);
if (strMethod == "getbalance" && n > 1) ConvertTo<boost::int64_t>(params[1]);
if (strMethod == "getblockhash" && n > 0) ConvertTo<boost::int64_t>(params[0]);
if (strMethod == "move" && n > 2) ConvertTo<double>(params[2]);
if (strMethod == "move" && n > 3) ConvertTo<boost::int64_t>(params[3]);
if (strMethod == "sendfrom" && n > 2) ConvertTo<double>(params[2]);
if (strMethod == "sendfrom" && n > 3) ConvertTo<boost::int64_t>(params[3]);
if (strMethod == "listtransactions" && n > 1) ConvertTo<boost::int64_t>(params[1]);
if (strMethod == "listtransactions" && n > 2) ConvertTo<boost::int64_t>(params[2]);
if (strMethod == "listaccounts" && n > 0) ConvertTo<boost::int64_t>(params[0]);
if (strMethod == "walletpassphrase" && n > 1) ConvertTo<boost::int64_t>(params[1]);
if (strMethod == "listsinceblock" && n > 1) ConvertTo<boost::int64_t>(params[1]);
if (strMethod == "sendmany" && n > 1) ConvertTo<Object>(params[1]);
if (strMethod == "sendmany" && n > 2) ConvertTo<boost::int64_t>(params[2]);
if (strMethod == "addmultisigaddress" && n > 0) ConvertTo<boost::int64_t>(params[0]);
if (strMethod == "addmultisigaddress" && n > 1) ConvertTo<Array>(params[1]);
if (strMethod == "listunspent" && n > 0) ConvertTo<boost::int64_t>(params[0]);
if (strMethod == "listunspent" && n > 1) ConvertTo<boost::int64_t>(params[1]);
if (strMethod == "getrawtransaction" && n > 1) ConvertTo<boost::int64_t>(params[1]);
if (strMethod == "createrawtransaction" && n > 0) ConvertTo<Array>(params[0]);
if (strMethod == "createrawtransaction" && n > 1) ConvertTo<Object>(params[1]);
if (strMethod == "signrawtransaction" && n > 1) ConvertTo<Array>(params[1]);
if (strMethod == "signrawtransaction" && n > 2) ConvertTo<Array>(params[2]);
return params;
}
int CommandLineRPC(int argc, char *argv[])
{
string strPrint;
int nRet = 0;
try
{
// Skip switches
while (argc > 1 && IsSwitchChar(argv[1][0]))
{
argc--;
argv++;
}
// Method
if (argc < 2)
throw runtime_error("too few parameters");
string strMethod = argv[1];
// Parameters default to strings
std::vector<std::string> strParams(&argv[2], &argv[argc]);
Array params = RPCConvertValues(strMethod, strParams);
// Execute
Object reply = CallRPC(strMethod, params);
// Parse reply
const Value& result = find_value(reply, "result");
const Value& error = find_value(reply, "error");
if (error.type() != null_type)
{
// Error
strPrint = "error: " + write_string(error, false);
int code = find_value(error.get_obj(), "code").get_int();
nRet = abs(code);
}
else
{
// Result
if (result.type() == null_type)
strPrint = "";
else if (result.type() == str_type)
strPrint = result.get_str();
else
strPrint = write_string(result, true);
}
}
catch (std::exception& e)
{
strPrint = string("error: ") + e.what();
nRet = 87;
}
catch (...)
{
PrintException(NULL, "CommandLineRPC()");
}
if (strPrint != "")
{
fprintf((nRet == 0 ? stdout : stderr), "%s\n", strPrint.c_str());
}
return nRet;
}
#ifdef TEST
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
#ifdef _MSC_VER
// Turn off Microsoft heap dump noise
_CrtSetReportMode(_CRT_WARN, _CRTDBG_MODE_FILE);
_CrtSetReportFile(_CRT_WARN, CreateFile("NUL", GENERIC_WRITE, 0, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, 0, 0));
#endif
setbuf(stdin, NULL);
setbuf(stdout, NULL);
setbuf(stderr, NULL);
try
{
if (argc >= 2 && string(argv[1]) == "-server")
{
printf("server ready\n");
ThreadRPCServer(NULL);
}
else
{
return CommandLineRPC(argc, argv);
}
}
catch (std::exception& e) {
PrintException(&e, "main()");
} catch (...) {
PrintException(NULL, "main()");
}
return 0;
}
#endif
const CRPCTable tableRPC;