// Copyright (c) 2009-2010 Satoshi Nakamoto
// Copyright (c) 2011 The Bitcoin developers
// Distributed under the MIT/X11 software license, see the accompanying
// file license.txt or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
# include "headers.h"
# include "db.h"
Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
# include "crypter.h"
using namespace std ;
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// mapWallet
//
bool CWallet : : AddKey ( const CKey & key )
{
Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
if ( ! CCryptoKeyStore : : AddKey ( key ) )
return false ;
if ( ! fFileBacked )
return true ;
Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
if ( ! IsCrypted ( ) )
return CWalletDB ( strWalletFile ) . WriteKey ( key . GetPubKey ( ) , key . GetPrivKey ( ) ) ;
return true ;
Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
}
bool CWallet : : AddCryptedKey ( const vector < unsigned char > & vchPubKey , const vector < unsigned char > & vchCryptedSecret )
{
if ( ! CCryptoKeyStore : : AddCryptedKey ( vchPubKey , vchCryptedSecret ) )
return false ;
if ( ! fFileBacked )
return true ;
CRITICAL_BLOCK ( cs_wallet )
{
if ( pwalletdbEncryption )
return pwalletdbEncryption - > WriteCryptedKey ( vchPubKey , vchCryptedSecret ) ;
else
return CWalletDB ( strWalletFile ) . WriteCryptedKey ( vchPubKey , vchCryptedSecret ) ;
}
return false ;
Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
}
bool CWallet : : Unlock ( const SecureString & strWalletPassphrase )
Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
{
if ( ! IsLocked ( ) )
return false ;
Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
CCrypter crypter ;
CKeyingMaterial vMasterKey ;
Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
CRITICAL_BLOCK ( cs_wallet )
Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
BOOST_FOREACH ( const MasterKeyMap : : value_type & pMasterKey , mapMasterKeys )
{
if ( ! crypter . SetKeyFromPassphrase ( strWalletPassphrase , pMasterKey . second . vchSalt , pMasterKey . second . nDeriveIterations , pMasterKey . second . nDerivationMethod ) )
return false ;
if ( ! crypter . Decrypt ( pMasterKey . second . vchCryptedKey , vMasterKey ) )
return false ;
if ( CCryptoKeyStore : : Unlock ( vMasterKey ) )
return true ;
}
return false ;
}
bool CWallet : : ChangeWalletPassphrase ( const SecureString & strOldWalletPassphrase , const SecureString & strNewWalletPassphrase )
Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
{
bool fWasLocked = IsLocked ( ) ;
Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
CRITICAL_BLOCK ( cs_wallet )
{
Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
Lock ( ) ;
CCrypter crypter ;
CKeyingMaterial vMasterKey ;
BOOST_FOREACH ( MasterKeyMap : : value_type & pMasterKey , mapMasterKeys )
{
if ( ! crypter . SetKeyFromPassphrase ( strOldWalletPassphrase , pMasterKey . second . vchSalt , pMasterKey . second . nDeriveIterations , pMasterKey . second . nDerivationMethod ) )
return false ;
if ( ! crypter . Decrypt ( pMasterKey . second . vchCryptedKey , vMasterKey ) )
Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
return false ;
if ( CCryptoKeyStore : : Unlock ( vMasterKey ) )
{
int64 nStartTime = GetTimeMillis ( ) ;
crypter . SetKeyFromPassphrase ( strNewWalletPassphrase , pMasterKey . second . vchSalt , pMasterKey . second . nDeriveIterations , pMasterKey . second . nDerivationMethod ) ;
pMasterKey . second . nDeriveIterations = pMasterKey . second . nDeriveIterations * ( 100 / ( ( double ) ( GetTimeMillis ( ) - nStartTime ) ) ) ;
nStartTime = GetTimeMillis ( ) ;
crypter . SetKeyFromPassphrase ( strNewWalletPassphrase , pMasterKey . second . vchSalt , pMasterKey . second . nDeriveIterations , pMasterKey . second . nDerivationMethod ) ;
pMasterKey . second . nDeriveIterations = ( pMasterKey . second . nDeriveIterations + pMasterKey . second . nDeriveIterations * 100 / ( ( double ) ( GetTimeMillis ( ) - nStartTime ) ) ) / 2 ;
if ( pMasterKey . second . nDeriveIterations < 25000 )
pMasterKey . second . nDeriveIterations = 25000 ;
printf ( " Wallet passphrase changed to an nDeriveIterations of %i \n " , pMasterKey . second . nDeriveIterations ) ;
Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
if ( ! crypter . SetKeyFromPassphrase ( strNewWalletPassphrase , pMasterKey . second . vchSalt , pMasterKey . second . nDeriveIterations , pMasterKey . second . nDerivationMethod ) )
return false ;
if ( ! crypter . Encrypt ( vMasterKey , pMasterKey . second . vchCryptedKey ) )
return false ;
CWalletDB ( strWalletFile ) . WriteMasterKey ( pMasterKey . first , pMasterKey . second ) ;
if ( fWasLocked )
Lock ( ) ;
return true ;
}
}
}
Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
return false ;
}
// This class implements an addrIncoming entry that causes pre-0.4
// clients to crash on startup if reading a private-key-encrypted wallet.
class CCorruptAddress
{
public :
IMPLEMENT_SERIALIZE
(
if ( nType & SER_DISK )
READWRITE ( nVersion ) ;
)
} ;
bool CWallet : : EncryptWallet ( const SecureString & strWalletPassphrase )
Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
{
if ( IsCrypted ( ) )
return false ;
Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
CKeyingMaterial vMasterKey ;
RandAddSeedPerfmon ( ) ;
Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
vMasterKey . resize ( WALLET_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE ) ;
RAND_bytes ( & vMasterKey [ 0 ] , WALLET_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE ) ;
Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
CMasterKey kMasterKey ;
Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
RandAddSeedPerfmon ( ) ;
kMasterKey . vchSalt . resize ( WALLET_CRYPTO_SALT_SIZE ) ;
RAND_bytes ( & kMasterKey . vchSalt [ 0 ] , WALLET_CRYPTO_SALT_SIZE ) ;
Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
CCrypter crypter ;
int64 nStartTime = GetTimeMillis ( ) ;
crypter . SetKeyFromPassphrase ( strWalletPassphrase , kMasterKey . vchSalt , 25000 , kMasterKey . nDerivationMethod ) ;
kMasterKey . nDeriveIterations = 2500000 / ( ( double ) ( GetTimeMillis ( ) - nStartTime ) ) ;
nStartTime = GetTimeMillis ( ) ;
crypter . SetKeyFromPassphrase ( strWalletPassphrase , kMasterKey . vchSalt , kMasterKey . nDeriveIterations , kMasterKey . nDerivationMethod ) ;
kMasterKey . nDeriveIterations = ( kMasterKey . nDeriveIterations + kMasterKey . nDeriveIterations * 100 / ( ( double ) ( GetTimeMillis ( ) - nStartTime ) ) ) / 2 ;
if ( kMasterKey . nDeriveIterations < 25000 )
kMasterKey . nDeriveIterations = 25000 ;
printf ( " Encrypting Wallet with an nDeriveIterations of %i \n " , kMasterKey . nDeriveIterations ) ;
if ( ! crypter . SetKeyFromPassphrase ( strWalletPassphrase , kMasterKey . vchSalt , kMasterKey . nDeriveIterations , kMasterKey . nDerivationMethod ) )
return false ;
if ( ! crypter . Encrypt ( vMasterKey , kMasterKey . vchCryptedKey ) )
return false ;
Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
CRITICAL_BLOCK ( cs_wallet )
{
Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
mapMasterKeys [ + + nMasterKeyMaxID ] = kMasterKey ;
if ( fFileBacked )
{
pwalletdbEncryption = new CWalletDB ( strWalletFile ) ;
pwalletdbEncryption - > TxnBegin ( ) ;
pwalletdbEncryption - > WriteMasterKey ( nMasterKeyMaxID , kMasterKey ) ;
Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
}
if ( ! EncryptKeys ( vMasterKey ) )
{
if ( fFileBacked )
pwalletdbEncryption - > TxnAbort ( ) ;
exit ( 1 ) ; //We now probably have half of our keys encrypted in memory, and half not...die and let the user reload their unencrypted wallet.
}
if ( fFileBacked )
{
CCorruptAddress corruptAddress ;
pwalletdbEncryption - > WriteSetting ( " addrIncoming " , corruptAddress ) ;
if ( ! pwalletdbEncryption - > TxnCommit ( ) )
exit ( 1 ) ; //We now have keys encrypted in memory, but no on disk...die to avoid confusion and let the user reload their unencrypted wallet.
pwalletdbEncryption - > Close ( ) ;
pwalletdbEncryption = NULL ;
}
Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
Lock ( ) ;
Unlock ( strWalletPassphrase ) ;
NewKeyPool ( ) ;
Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
Lock ( ) ;
// Need to completely rewrite the wallet file; if we don't, bdb might keep
// bits of the unencrypted private key in slack space in the database file.
CDB : : Rewrite ( strWalletFile ) ;
}
Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
return true ;
}
void CWallet : : WalletUpdateSpent ( const CTransaction & tx )
{
// Anytime a signature is successfully verified, it's proof the outpoint is spent.
// Update the wallet spent flag if it doesn't know due to wallet.dat being
// restored from backup or the user making copies of wallet.dat.
CRITICAL_BLOCK ( cs_wallet )
{
BOOST_FOREACH ( const CTxIn & txin , tx . vin )
{
map < uint256 , CWalletTx > : : iterator mi = mapWallet . find ( txin . prevout . hash ) ;
if ( mi ! = mapWallet . end ( ) )
{
CWalletTx & wtx = ( * mi ) . second ;
if ( ! wtx . IsSpent ( txin . prevout . n ) & & IsMine ( wtx . vout [ txin . prevout . n ] ) )
{
printf ( " WalletUpdateSpent found spent coin %sbc %s \n " , FormatMoney ( wtx . GetCredit ( ) ) . c_str ( ) , wtx . GetHash ( ) . ToString ( ) . c_str ( ) ) ;
wtx . MarkSpent ( txin . prevout . n ) ;
wtx . WriteToDisk ( ) ;
vWalletUpdated . push_back ( txin . prevout . hash ) ;
}
}
}
}
}
void CWallet : : MarkDirty ( )
{
CRITICAL_BLOCK ( cs_wallet )
{
BOOST_FOREACH ( PAIRTYPE ( const uint256 , CWalletTx ) & item , mapWallet )
item . second . MarkDirty ( ) ;
}
}
bool CWallet : : AddToWallet ( const CWalletTx & wtxIn )
{
uint256 hash = wtxIn . GetHash ( ) ;
CRITICAL_BLOCK ( cs_wallet )
{
// Inserts only if not already there, returns tx inserted or tx found
pair < map < uint256 , CWalletTx > : : iterator , bool > ret = mapWallet . insert ( make_pair ( hash , wtxIn ) ) ;
CWalletTx & wtx = ( * ret . first ) . second ;
wtx . BindWallet ( this ) ;
bool fInsertedNew = ret . second ;
if ( fInsertedNew )
wtx . nTimeReceived = GetAdjustedTime ( ) ;
bool fUpdated = false ;
if ( ! fInsertedNew )
{
// Merge
if ( wtxIn . hashBlock ! = 0 & & wtxIn . hashBlock ! = wtx . hashBlock )
{
wtx . hashBlock = wtxIn . hashBlock ;
fUpdated = true ;
}
if ( wtxIn . nIndex ! = - 1 & & ( wtxIn . vMerkleBranch ! = wtx . vMerkleBranch | | wtxIn . nIndex ! = wtx . nIndex ) )
{
wtx . vMerkleBranch = wtxIn . vMerkleBranch ;
wtx . nIndex = wtxIn . nIndex ;
fUpdated = true ;
}
if ( wtxIn . fFromMe & & wtxIn . fFromMe ! = wtx . fFromMe )
{
wtx . fFromMe = wtxIn . fFromMe ;
fUpdated = true ;
}
fUpdated | = wtx . UpdateSpent ( wtxIn . vfSpent ) ;
}
//// debug print
printf ( " AddToWallet %s %s%s \n " , wtxIn . GetHash ( ) . ToString ( ) . substr ( 0 , 10 ) . c_str ( ) , ( fInsertedNew ? " new " : " " ) , ( fUpdated ? " update " : " " ) ) ;
// Write to disk
if ( fInsertedNew | | fUpdated )
if ( ! wtx . WriteToDisk ( ) )
return false ;
# ifndef QT_GUI
// If default receiving address gets used, replace it with a new one
CScript scriptDefaultKey ;
scriptDefaultKey . SetBitcoinAddress ( vchDefaultKey ) ;
BOOST_FOREACH ( const CTxOut & txout , wtx . vout )
{
if ( txout . scriptPubKey = = scriptDefaultKey )
{
std : : vector < unsigned char > newDefaultKey ;
if ( GetKeyFromPool ( newDefaultKey , false ) )
{
SetDefaultKey ( newDefaultKey ) ;
SetAddressBookName ( CBitcoinAddress ( vchDefaultKey ) , " " ) ;
}
}
}
# endif
// Notify UI
vWalletUpdated . push_back ( hash ) ;
// since AddToWallet is called directly for self-originating transactions, check for consumption of own coins
WalletUpdateSpent ( wtx ) ;
}
// Refresh UI
MainFrameRepaint ( ) ;
return true ;
}
// Add a transaction to the wallet, or update it.
// pblock is optional, but should be provided if the transaction is known to be in a block.
// If fUpdate is true, existing transactions will be updated.
bool CWallet : : AddToWalletIfInvolvingMe ( const CTransaction & tx , const CBlock * pblock , bool fUpdate , bool fFindBlock )
{
uint256 hash = tx . GetHash ( ) ;
CRITICAL_BLOCK ( cs_wallet )
{
bool fExisted = mapWallet . count ( hash ) ;
if ( fExisted & & ! fUpdate ) return false ;
if ( fExisted | | IsMine ( tx ) | | IsFromMe ( tx ) )
{
CWalletTx wtx ( this , tx ) ;
// Get merkle branch if transaction was found in a block
if ( pblock )
wtx . SetMerkleBranch ( pblock ) ;
return AddToWallet ( wtx ) ;
}
else
WalletUpdateSpent ( tx ) ;
}
return false ;
}
bool CWallet : : EraseFromWallet ( uint256 hash )
{
if ( ! fFileBacked )
return false ;
CRITICAL_BLOCK ( cs_wallet )
{
if ( mapWallet . erase ( hash ) )
CWalletDB ( strWalletFile ) . EraseTx ( hash ) ;
}
return true ;
}
bool CWallet : : IsMine ( const CTxIn & txin ) const
{
CRITICAL_BLOCK ( cs_wallet )
{
map < uint256 , CWalletTx > : : const_iterator mi = mapWallet . find ( txin . prevout . hash ) ;
if ( mi ! = mapWallet . end ( ) )
{
const CWalletTx & prev = ( * mi ) . second ;
if ( txin . prevout . n < prev . vout . size ( ) )
if ( IsMine ( prev . vout [ txin . prevout . n ] ) )
return true ;
}
}
return false ;
}
int64 CWallet : : GetDebit ( const CTxIn & txin ) const
{
CRITICAL_BLOCK ( cs_wallet )
{
map < uint256 , CWalletTx > : : const_iterator mi = mapWallet . find ( txin . prevout . hash ) ;
if ( mi ! = mapWallet . end ( ) )
{
const CWalletTx & prev = ( * mi ) . second ;
if ( txin . prevout . n < prev . vout . size ( ) )
if ( IsMine ( prev . vout [ txin . prevout . n ] ) )
return prev . vout [ txin . prevout . n ] . nValue ;
}
}
return 0 ;
}
int64 CWalletTx : : GetTxTime ( ) const
{
return nTimeReceived ;
}
int CWalletTx : : GetRequestCount ( ) const
{
// Returns -1 if it wasn't being tracked
int nRequests = - 1 ;
CRITICAL_BLOCK ( pwallet - > cs_wallet )
{
if ( IsCoinBase ( ) )
{
// Generated block
if ( hashBlock ! = 0 )
{
map < uint256 , int > : : const_iterator mi = pwallet - > mapRequestCount . find ( hashBlock ) ;
if ( mi ! = pwallet - > mapRequestCount . end ( ) )
nRequests = ( * mi ) . second ;
}
}
else
{
// Did anyone request this transaction?
map < uint256 , int > : : const_iterator mi = pwallet - > mapRequestCount . find ( GetHash ( ) ) ;
if ( mi ! = pwallet - > mapRequestCount . end ( ) )
{
nRequests = ( * mi ) . second ;
// How about the block it's in?
if ( nRequests = = 0 & & hashBlock ! = 0 )
{
map < uint256 , int > : : const_iterator mi = pwallet - > mapRequestCount . find ( hashBlock ) ;
if ( mi ! = pwallet - > mapRequestCount . end ( ) )
nRequests = ( * mi ) . second ;
else
nRequests = 1 ; // If it's in someone else's block it must have got out
}
}
}
}
return nRequests ;
}
void CWalletTx : : GetAmounts ( int64 & nGeneratedImmature , int64 & nGeneratedMature , list < pair < CBitcoinAddress , int64 > > & listReceived ,
list < pair < CBitcoinAddress , int64 > > & listSent , int64 & nFee , string & strSentAccount ) const
{
nGeneratedImmature = nGeneratedMature = nFee = 0 ;
listReceived . clear ( ) ;
listSent . clear ( ) ;
strSentAccount = strFromAccount ;
if ( IsCoinBase ( ) )
{
if ( GetBlocksToMaturity ( ) > 0 )
nGeneratedImmature = pwallet - > GetCredit ( * this ) ;
else
nGeneratedMature = GetCredit ( ) ;
return ;
}
// Compute fee:
int64 nDebit = GetDebit ( ) ;
if ( nDebit > 0 ) // debit>0 means we signed/sent this transaction
{
int64 nValueOut = GetValueOut ( ) ;
nFee = nDebit - nValueOut ;
}
// Sent/received. Standard client will never generate a send-to-multiple-recipients,
// but non-standard clients might (so return a list of address/amount pairs)
BOOST_FOREACH ( const CTxOut & txout , vout )
{
CBitcoinAddress address ;
vector < unsigned char > vchPubKey ;
if ( ! ExtractAddress ( txout . scriptPubKey , NULL , address ) )
{
printf ( " CWalletTx::GetAmounts: Unknown transaction type found, txid %s \n " ,
this - > GetHash ( ) . ToString ( ) . c_str ( ) ) ;
address = " unknown " ;
}
// Don't report 'change' txouts
if ( nDebit > 0 & & pwallet - > IsChange ( txout ) )
continue ;
if ( nDebit > 0 )
listSent . push_back ( make_pair ( address , txout . nValue ) ) ;
if ( pwallet - > IsMine ( txout ) )
listReceived . push_back ( make_pair ( address , txout . nValue ) ) ;
}
}
void CWalletTx : : GetAccountAmounts ( const string & strAccount , int64 & nGenerated , int64 & nReceived ,
int64 & nSent , int64 & nFee ) const
{
nGenerated = nReceived = nSent = nFee = 0 ;
int64 allGeneratedImmature , allGeneratedMature , allFee ;
allGeneratedImmature = allGeneratedMature = allFee = 0 ;
string strSentAccount ;
list < pair < CBitcoinAddress , int64 > > listReceived ;
list < pair < CBitcoinAddress , int64 > > listSent ;
GetAmounts ( allGeneratedImmature , allGeneratedMature , listReceived , listSent , allFee , strSentAccount ) ;
if ( strAccount = = " " )
nGenerated = allGeneratedMature ;
if ( strAccount = = strSentAccount )
{
BOOST_FOREACH ( const PAIRTYPE ( CBitcoinAddress , int64 ) & s , listSent )
nSent + = s . second ;
nFee = allFee ;
}
CRITICAL_BLOCK ( pwallet - > cs_wallet )
{
BOOST_FOREACH ( const PAIRTYPE ( CBitcoinAddress , int64 ) & r , listReceived )
{
if ( pwallet - > mapAddressBook . count ( r . first ) )
{
map < CBitcoinAddress , string > : : const_iterator mi = pwallet - > mapAddressBook . find ( r . first ) ;
if ( mi ! = pwallet - > mapAddressBook . end ( ) & & ( * mi ) . second = = strAccount )
nReceived + = r . second ;
}
else if ( strAccount . empty ( ) )
{
nReceived + = r . second ;
}
}
}
}
void CWalletTx : : AddSupportingTransactions ( CTxDB & txdb )
{
vtxPrev . clear ( ) ;
const int COPY_DEPTH = 3 ;
if ( SetMerkleBranch ( ) < COPY_DEPTH )
{
vector < uint256 > vWorkQueue ;
BOOST_FOREACH ( const CTxIn & txin , vin )
vWorkQueue . push_back ( txin . prevout . hash ) ;
// This critsect is OK because txdb is already open
CRITICAL_BLOCK ( pwallet - > cs_wallet )
{
map < uint256 , const CMerkleTx * > mapWalletPrev ;
set < uint256 > setAlreadyDone ;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < vWorkQueue . size ( ) ; i + + )
{
uint256 hash = vWorkQueue [ i ] ;
if ( setAlreadyDone . count ( hash ) )
continue ;
setAlreadyDone . insert ( hash ) ;
CMerkleTx tx ;
map < uint256 , CWalletTx > : : const_iterator mi = pwallet - > mapWallet . find ( hash ) ;
if ( mi ! = pwallet - > mapWallet . end ( ) )
{
tx = ( * mi ) . second ;
BOOST_FOREACH ( const CMerkleTx & txWalletPrev , ( * mi ) . second . vtxPrev )
mapWalletPrev [ txWalletPrev . GetHash ( ) ] = & txWalletPrev ;
}
else if ( mapWalletPrev . count ( hash ) )
{
tx = * mapWalletPrev [ hash ] ;
}
else if ( ! fClient & & txdb . ReadDiskTx ( hash , tx ) )
{
;
}
else
{
printf ( " ERROR: AddSupportingTransactions() : unsupported transaction \n " ) ;
continue ;
}
int nDepth = tx . SetMerkleBranch ( ) ;
vtxPrev . push_back ( tx ) ;
if ( nDepth < COPY_DEPTH )
BOOST_FOREACH ( const CTxIn & txin , tx . vin )
vWorkQueue . push_back ( txin . prevout . hash ) ;
}
}
}
reverse ( vtxPrev . begin ( ) , vtxPrev . end ( ) ) ;
}
bool CWalletTx : : WriteToDisk ( )
{
return CWalletDB ( pwallet - > strWalletFile ) . WriteTx ( GetHash ( ) , * this ) ;
}
// Scan the block chain (starting in pindexStart) for transactions
// from or to us. If fUpdate is true, found transactions that already
// exist in the wallet will be updated.
int CWallet : : ScanForWalletTransactions ( CBlockIndex * pindexStart , bool fUpdate )
{
int ret = 0 ;
CBlockIndex * pindex = pindexStart ;
CRITICAL_BLOCK ( cs_wallet )
{
while ( pindex )
{
CBlock block ;
block . ReadFromDisk ( pindex , true ) ;
BOOST_FOREACH ( CTransaction & tx , block . vtx )
{
if ( AddToWalletIfInvolvingMe ( tx , & block , fUpdate ) )
ret + + ;
}
pindex = pindex - > pnext ;
}
}
return ret ;
}
int CWallet : : ScanForWalletTransaction ( const uint256 & hashTx )
{
CTransaction tx ;
tx . ReadFromDisk ( COutPoint ( hashTx , 0 ) ) ;
if ( AddToWalletIfInvolvingMe ( tx , NULL , true , true ) )
return 1 ;
return 0 ;
}
void CWallet : : ReacceptWalletTransactions ( )
{
CTxDB txdb ( " r " ) ;
bool fRepeat = true ;
while ( fRepeat ) CRITICAL_BLOCK ( cs_wallet )
{
fRepeat = false ;
vector < CDiskTxPos > vMissingTx ;
BOOST_FOREACH ( PAIRTYPE ( const uint256 , CWalletTx ) & item , mapWallet )
{
CWalletTx & wtx = item . second ;
if ( wtx . IsCoinBase ( ) & & wtx . IsSpent ( 0 ) )
continue ;
CTxIndex txindex ;
bool fUpdated = false ;
if ( txdb . ReadTxIndex ( wtx . GetHash ( ) , txindex ) )
{
// Update fSpent if a tx got spent somewhere else by a copy of wallet.dat
if ( txindex . vSpent . size ( ) ! = wtx . vout . size ( ) )
{
printf ( " ERROR: ReacceptWalletTransactions() : txindex.vSpent.size() %d != wtx.vout.size() %d \n " , txindex . vSpent . size ( ) , wtx . vout . size ( ) ) ;
continue ;
}
for ( int i = 0 ; i < txindex . vSpent . size ( ) ; i + + )
{
if ( wtx . IsSpent ( i ) )
continue ;
if ( ! txindex . vSpent [ i ] . IsNull ( ) & & IsMine ( wtx . vout [ i ] ) )
{
wtx . MarkSpent ( i ) ;
fUpdated = true ;
vMissingTx . push_back ( txindex . vSpent [ i ] ) ;
}
}
if ( fUpdated )
{
printf ( " ReacceptWalletTransactions found spent coin %sbc %s \n " , FormatMoney ( wtx . GetCredit ( ) ) . c_str ( ) , wtx . GetHash ( ) . ToString ( ) . c_str ( ) ) ;
wtx . MarkDirty ( ) ;
wtx . WriteToDisk ( ) ;
}
}
else
{
// Reaccept any txes of ours that aren't already in a block
if ( ! wtx . IsCoinBase ( ) )
wtx . AcceptWalletTransaction ( txdb , false ) ;
}
}
if ( ! vMissingTx . empty ( ) )
{
// TODO: optimize this to scan just part of the block chain?
if ( ScanForWalletTransactions ( pindexGenesisBlock ) )
fRepeat = true ; // Found missing transactions: re-do Reaccept.
}
}
}
void CWalletTx : : RelayWalletTransaction ( CTxDB & txdb )
{
BOOST_FOREACH ( const CMerkleTx & tx , vtxPrev )
{
if ( ! tx . IsCoinBase ( ) )
{
uint256 hash = tx . GetHash ( ) ;
if ( ! txdb . ContainsTx ( hash ) )
RelayMessage ( CInv ( MSG_TX , hash ) , ( CTransaction ) tx ) ;
}
}
if ( ! IsCoinBase ( ) )
{
uint256 hash = GetHash ( ) ;
if ( ! txdb . ContainsTx ( hash ) )
{
printf ( " Relaying wtx %s \n " , hash . ToString ( ) . substr ( 0 , 10 ) . c_str ( ) ) ;
RelayMessage ( CInv ( MSG_TX , hash ) , ( CTransaction ) * this ) ;
}
}
}
void CWalletTx : : RelayWalletTransaction ( )
{
CTxDB txdb ( " r " ) ;
RelayWalletTransaction ( txdb ) ;
}
void CWallet : : ResendWalletTransactions ( )
{
// Do this infrequently and randomly to avoid giving away
// that these are our transactions.
static int64 nNextTime ;
if ( GetTime ( ) < nNextTime )
return ;
bool fFirst = ( nNextTime = = 0 ) ;
nNextTime = GetTime ( ) + GetRand ( 30 * 60 ) ;
if ( fFirst )
return ;
// Only do it if there's been a new block since last time
static int64 nLastTime ;
if ( nTimeBestReceived < nLastTime )
return ;
nLastTime = GetTime ( ) ;
// Rebroadcast any of our txes that aren't in a block yet
printf ( " ResendWalletTransactions() \n " ) ;
CTxDB txdb ( " r " ) ;
CRITICAL_BLOCK ( cs_wallet )
{
// Sort them in chronological order
multimap < unsigned int , CWalletTx * > mapSorted ;
BOOST_FOREACH ( PAIRTYPE ( const uint256 , CWalletTx ) & item , mapWallet )
{
CWalletTx & wtx = item . second ;
// Don't rebroadcast until it's had plenty of time that
// it should have gotten in already by now.
if ( nTimeBestReceived - ( int64 ) wtx . nTimeReceived > 5 * 60 )
mapSorted . insert ( make_pair ( wtx . nTimeReceived , & wtx ) ) ;
}
BOOST_FOREACH ( PAIRTYPE ( const unsigned int , CWalletTx * ) & item , mapSorted )
{
CWalletTx & wtx = * item . second ;
wtx . RelayWalletTransaction ( txdb ) ;
}
}
}
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// Actions
//
int64 CWallet : : GetBalance ( ) const
{
int64 nTotal = 0 ;
CRITICAL_BLOCK ( cs_wallet )
{
for ( map < uint256 , CWalletTx > : : const_iterator it = mapWallet . begin ( ) ; it ! = mapWallet . end ( ) ; + + it )
{
const CWalletTx * pcoin = & ( * it ) . second ;
if ( ! pcoin - > IsFinal ( ) | | ! pcoin - > IsConfirmed ( ) )
continue ;
nTotal + = pcoin - > GetAvailableCredit ( ) ;
}
}
return nTotal ;
}
int64 CWallet : : GetUnconfirmedBalance ( ) const
{
int64 nTotal = 0 ;
CRITICAL_BLOCK ( cs_wallet )
{
for ( map < uint256 , CWalletTx > : : const_iterator it = mapWallet . begin ( ) ; it ! = mapWallet . end ( ) ; + + it )
{
const CWalletTx * pcoin = & ( * it ) . second ;
if ( pcoin - > IsFinal ( ) & & pcoin - > IsConfirmed ( ) )
continue ;
nTotal + = pcoin - > GetAvailableCredit ( ) ;
}
}
return nTotal ;
}
bool CWallet : : SelectCoinsMinConf ( int64 nTargetValue , int nConfMine , int nConfTheirs , set < pair < const CWalletTx * , unsigned int > > & setCoinsRet , int64 & nValueRet ) const
{
setCoinsRet . clear ( ) ;
nValueRet = 0 ;
// List of values less than target
pair < int64 , pair < const CWalletTx * , unsigned int > > coinLowestLarger ;
coinLowestLarger . first = INT64_MAX ;
coinLowestLarger . second . first = NULL ;
vector < pair < int64 , pair < const CWalletTx * , unsigned int > > > vValue ;
int64 nTotalLower = 0 ;
CRITICAL_BLOCK ( cs_wallet )
{
vector < const CWalletTx * > vCoins ;
vCoins . reserve ( mapWallet . size ( ) ) ;
for ( map < uint256 , CWalletTx > : : const_iterator it = mapWallet . begin ( ) ; it ! = mapWallet . end ( ) ; + + it )
vCoins . push_back ( & ( * it ) . second ) ;
random_shuffle ( vCoins . begin ( ) , vCoins . end ( ) , GetRandInt ) ;
BOOST_FOREACH ( const CWalletTx * pcoin , vCoins )
{
if ( ! pcoin - > IsFinal ( ) | | ! pcoin - > IsConfirmed ( ) )
continue ;
if ( pcoin - > IsCoinBase ( ) & & pcoin - > GetBlocksToMaturity ( ) > 0 )
continue ;
int nDepth = pcoin - > GetDepthInMainChain ( ) ;
if ( nDepth < ( pcoin - > IsFromMe ( ) ? nConfMine : nConfTheirs ) )
continue ;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < pcoin - > vout . size ( ) ; i + + )
{
if ( pcoin - > IsSpent ( i ) | | ! IsMine ( pcoin - > vout [ i ] ) )
continue ;
int64 n = pcoin - > vout [ i ] . nValue ;
if ( n < = 0 )
continue ;
pair < int64 , pair < const CWalletTx * , unsigned int > > coin = make_pair ( n , make_pair ( pcoin , i ) ) ;
if ( n = = nTargetValue )
{
setCoinsRet . insert ( coin . second ) ;
nValueRet + = coin . first ;
return true ;
}
else if ( n < nTargetValue + CENT )
{
vValue . push_back ( coin ) ;
nTotalLower + = n ;
}
else if ( n < coinLowestLarger . first )
{
coinLowestLarger = coin ;
}
}
}
}
if ( nTotalLower = = nTargetValue | | nTotalLower = = nTargetValue + CENT )
{
for ( int i = 0 ; i < vValue . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
setCoinsRet . insert ( vValue [ i ] . second ) ;
nValueRet + = vValue [ i ] . first ;
}
return true ;
}
if ( nTotalLower < nTargetValue + ( coinLowestLarger . second . first ? CENT : 0 ) )
{
if ( coinLowestLarger . second . first = = NULL )
return false ;
setCoinsRet . insert ( coinLowestLarger . second ) ;
nValueRet + = coinLowestLarger . first ;
return true ;
}
if ( nTotalLower > = nTargetValue + CENT )
nTargetValue + = CENT ;
// Solve subset sum by stochastic approximation
sort ( vValue . rbegin ( ) , vValue . rend ( ) ) ;
vector < char > vfIncluded ;
vector < char > vfBest ( vValue . size ( ) , true ) ;
int64 nBest = nTotalLower ;
for ( int nRep = 0 ; nRep < 1000 & & nBest ! = nTargetValue ; nRep + + )
{
vfIncluded . assign ( vValue . size ( ) , false ) ;
int64 nTotal = 0 ;
bool fReachedTarget = false ;
for ( int nPass = 0 ; nPass < 2 & & ! fReachedTarget ; nPass + + )
{
for ( int i = 0 ; i < vValue . size ( ) ; i + + )
{
if ( nPass = = 0 ? rand ( ) % 2 : ! vfIncluded [ i ] )
{
nTotal + = vValue [ i ] . first ;
vfIncluded [ i ] = true ;
if ( nTotal > = nTargetValue )
{
fReachedTarget = true ;
if ( nTotal < nBest )
{
nBest = nTotal ;
vfBest = vfIncluded ;
}
nTotal - = vValue [ i ] . first ;
vfIncluded [ i ] = false ;
}
}
}
}
}
// If the next larger is still closer, return it
if ( coinLowestLarger . second . first & & coinLowestLarger . first - nTargetValue < = nBest - nTargetValue )
{
setCoinsRet . insert ( coinLowestLarger . second ) ;
nValueRet + = coinLowestLarger . first ;
}
else {
for ( int i = 0 ; i < vValue . size ( ) ; i + + )
if ( vfBest [ i ] )
{
setCoinsRet . insert ( vValue [ i ] . second ) ;
nValueRet + = vValue [ i ] . first ;
}
//// debug print
printf ( " SelectCoins() best subset: " ) ;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < vValue . size ( ) ; i + + )
if ( vfBest [ i ] )
printf ( " %s " , FormatMoney ( vValue [ i ] . first ) . c_str ( ) ) ;
printf ( " total %s \n " , FormatMoney ( nBest ) . c_str ( ) ) ;
}
return true ;
}
bool CWallet : : SelectCoins ( int64 nTargetValue , set < pair < const CWalletTx * , unsigned int > > & setCoinsRet , int64 & nValueRet ) const
{
return ( SelectCoinsMinConf ( nTargetValue , 1 , 6 , setCoinsRet , nValueRet ) | |
SelectCoinsMinConf ( nTargetValue , 1 , 1 , setCoinsRet , nValueRet ) | |
SelectCoinsMinConf ( nTargetValue , 0 , 1 , setCoinsRet , nValueRet ) ) ;
}
bool CWallet : : CreateTransaction ( const vector < pair < CScript , int64 > > & vecSend , CWalletTx & wtxNew , CReserveKey & reservekey , int64 & nFeeRet )
{
int64 nValue = 0 ;
BOOST_FOREACH ( const PAIRTYPE ( CScript , int64 ) & s , vecSend )
{
if ( nValue < 0 )
return false ;
nValue + = s . second ;
}
if ( vecSend . empty ( ) | | nValue < 0 )
return false ;
wtxNew . BindWallet ( this ) ;
CRITICAL_BLOCK ( cs_main )
CRITICAL_BLOCK ( cs_wallet )
{
// txdb must be opened before the mapWallet lock
CTxDB txdb ( " r " ) ;
{
nFeeRet = nTransactionFee ;
loop
{
wtxNew . vin . clear ( ) ;
wtxNew . vout . clear ( ) ;
wtxNew . fFromMe = true ;
int64 nTotalValue = nValue + nFeeRet ;
double dPriority = 0 ;
// vouts to the payees
BOOST_FOREACH ( const PAIRTYPE ( CScript , int64 ) & s , vecSend )
wtxNew . vout . push_back ( CTxOut ( s . second , s . first ) ) ;
// Choose coins to use
set < pair < const CWalletTx * , unsigned int > > setCoins ;
int64 nValueIn = 0 ;
if ( ! SelectCoins ( nTotalValue , setCoins , nValueIn ) )
return false ;
BOOST_FOREACH ( PAIRTYPE ( const CWalletTx * , unsigned int ) pcoin , setCoins )
{
int64 nCredit = pcoin . first - > vout [ pcoin . second ] . nValue ;
dPriority + = ( double ) nCredit * pcoin . first - > GetDepthInMainChain ( ) ;
}
int64 nChange = nValueIn - nValue - nFeeRet ;
// if sub-cent change is required, the fee must be raised to at least MIN_TX_FEE
// or until nChange becomes zero
if ( nFeeRet < MIN_TX_FEE & & nChange > 0 & & nChange < CENT )
{
int64 nMoveToFee = min ( nChange , MIN_TX_FEE - nFeeRet ) ;
nChange - = nMoveToFee ;
nFeeRet + = nMoveToFee ;
}
if ( nChange > 0 )
{
// Note: We use a new key here to keep it from being obvious which side is the change.
// The drawback is that by not reusing a previous key, the change may be lost if a
// backup is restored, if the backup doesn't have the new private key for the change.
// If we reused the old key, it would be possible to add code to look for and
// rediscover unknown transactions that were written with keys of ours to recover
// post-backup change.
// Reserve a new key pair from key pool
vector < unsigned char > vchPubKey = reservekey . GetReservedKey ( ) ;
// assert(mapKeys.count(vchPubKey));
// Fill a vout to ourself, using same address type as the payment
CScript scriptChange ;
if ( vecSend [ 0 ] . first . GetBitcoinAddress ( ) . IsValid ( ) )
scriptChange . SetBitcoinAddress ( vchPubKey ) ;
else
scriptChange < < vchPubKey < < OP_CHECKSIG ;
// Insert change txn at random position:
vector < CTxOut > : : iterator position = wtxNew . vout . begin ( ) + GetRandInt ( wtxNew . vout . size ( ) ) ;
wtxNew . vout . insert ( position , CTxOut ( nChange , scriptChange ) ) ;
}
else
reservekey . ReturnKey ( ) ;
// Fill vin
BOOST_FOREACH ( const PAIRTYPE ( const CWalletTx * , unsigned int ) & coin , setCoins )
wtxNew . vin . push_back ( CTxIn ( coin . first - > GetHash ( ) , coin . second ) ) ;
// Sign
int nIn = 0 ;
BOOST_FOREACH ( const PAIRTYPE ( const CWalletTx * , unsigned int ) & coin , setCoins )
if ( ! SignSignature ( * this , * coin . first , wtxNew , nIn + + ) )
return false ;
// Limit size
unsigned int nBytes = : : GetSerializeSize ( * ( CTransaction * ) & wtxNew , SER_NETWORK ) ;
if ( nBytes > = MAX_BLOCK_SIZE_GEN / 5 )
return false ;
dPriority / = nBytes ;
// Check that enough fee is included
int64 nPayFee = nTransactionFee * ( 1 + ( int64 ) nBytes / 1000 ) ;
bool fAllowFree = CTransaction : : AllowFree ( dPriority ) ;
int64 nMinFee = wtxNew . GetMinFee ( 1 , fAllowFree ) ;
if ( nFeeRet < max ( nPayFee , nMinFee ) )
{
nFeeRet = max ( nPayFee , nMinFee ) ;
continue ;
}
// Fill vtxPrev by copying from previous transactions vtxPrev
wtxNew . AddSupportingTransactions ( txdb ) ;
wtxNew . fTimeReceivedIsTxTime = true ;
break ;
}
}
}
return true ;
}
bool CWallet : : CreateTransaction ( CScript scriptPubKey , int64 nValue , CWalletTx & wtxNew , CReserveKey & reservekey , int64 & nFeeRet )
{
vector < pair < CScript , int64 > > vecSend ;
vecSend . push_back ( make_pair ( scriptPubKey , nValue ) ) ;
return CreateTransaction ( vecSend , wtxNew , reservekey , nFeeRet ) ;
}
// Call after CreateTransaction unless you want to abort
bool CWallet : : CommitTransaction ( CWalletTx & wtxNew , CReserveKey & reservekey )
{
CRITICAL_BLOCK ( cs_main )
CRITICAL_BLOCK ( cs_wallet )
{
printf ( " CommitTransaction: \n %s " , wtxNew . ToString ( ) . c_str ( ) ) ;
{
// This is only to keep the database open to defeat the auto-flush for the
// duration of this scope. This is the only place where this optimization
// maybe makes sense; please don't do it anywhere else.
CWalletDB * pwalletdb = fFileBacked ? new CWalletDB ( strWalletFile , " r " ) : NULL ;
// Take key pair from key pool so it won't be used again
reservekey . KeepKey ( ) ;
// Add tx to wallet, because if it has change it's also ours,
// otherwise just for transaction history.
AddToWallet ( wtxNew ) ;
// Mark old coins as spent
set < CWalletTx * > setCoins ;
BOOST_FOREACH ( const CTxIn & txin , wtxNew . vin )
{
CWalletTx & coin = mapWallet [ txin . prevout . hash ] ;
coin . BindWallet ( this ) ;
coin . MarkSpent ( txin . prevout . n ) ;
coin . WriteToDisk ( ) ;
vWalletUpdated . push_back ( coin . GetHash ( ) ) ;
}
if ( fFileBacked )
delete pwalletdb ;
}
// Track how many getdata requests our transaction gets
mapRequestCount [ wtxNew . GetHash ( ) ] = 0 ;
// Broadcast
if ( ! wtxNew . AcceptToMemoryPool ( ) )
{
// This must not fail. The transaction has already been signed and recorded.
printf ( " CommitTransaction() : Error: Transaction not valid " ) ;
return false ;
}
wtxNew . RelayWalletTransaction ( ) ;
}
MainFrameRepaint ( ) ;
return true ;
}
string CWallet : : SendMoney ( CScript scriptPubKey , int64 nValue , CWalletTx & wtxNew , bool fAskFee )
{
CReserveKey reservekey ( this ) ;
int64 nFeeRequired ;
if ( IsLocked ( ) )
{
string strError = _ ( " Error: Wallet locked, unable to create transaction " ) ;
printf ( " SendMoney() : %s " , strError . c_str ( ) ) ;
return strError ;
}
if ( ! CreateTransaction ( scriptPubKey , nValue , wtxNew , reservekey , nFeeRequired ) )
{
string strError ;
if ( nValue + nFeeRequired > GetBalance ( ) )
strError = strprintf ( _ ( " Error: This transaction requires a transaction fee of at least %s because of its amount, complexity, or use of recently received funds " ) , FormatMoney ( nFeeRequired ) . c_str ( ) ) ;
else
strError = _ ( " Error: Transaction creation failed " ) ;
printf ( " SendMoney() : %s " , strError . c_str ( ) ) ;
return strError ;
}
if ( fAskFee & & ! ThreadSafeAskFee ( nFeeRequired , _ ( " Sending... " ) , NULL ) )
return " ABORTED " ;
if ( ! CommitTransaction ( wtxNew , reservekey ) )
return _ ( " Error: The transaction was rejected. This might happen if some of the coins in your wallet were already spent, such as if you used a copy of wallet.dat and coins were spent in the copy but not marked as spent here. " ) ;
MainFrameRepaint ( ) ;
return " " ;
}
string CWallet : : SendMoneyToBitcoinAddress ( const CBitcoinAddress & address , int64 nValue , CWalletTx & wtxNew , bool fAskFee )
{
// Check amount
if ( nValue < = 0 )
return _ ( " Invalid amount " ) ;
if ( nValue + nTransactionFee > GetBalance ( ) )
return _ ( " Insufficient funds " ) ;
// Parse bitcoin address
CScript scriptPubKey ;
scriptPubKey . SetBitcoinAddress ( address ) ;
return SendMoney ( scriptPubKey , nValue , wtxNew , fAskFee ) ;
}
int CWallet : : LoadWallet ( bool & fFirstRunRet )
{
if ( ! fFileBacked )
return false ;
fFirstRunRet = false ;
int nLoadWalletRet = CWalletDB ( strWalletFile , " cr+ " ) . LoadWallet ( this ) ;
if ( nLoadWalletRet = = DB_NEED_REWRITE )
{
if ( CDB : : Rewrite ( strWalletFile , " \x04 pool " ) )
{
setKeyPool . clear ( ) ;
// Note: can't top-up keypool here, because wallet is locked.
// User will be prompted to unlock wallet the next operation
// the requires a new key.
}
nLoadWalletRet = DB_NEED_REWRITE ;
}
if ( nLoadWalletRet ! = DB_LOAD_OK )
return nLoadWalletRet ;
fFirstRunRet = vchDefaultKey . empty ( ) ;
if ( ! HaveKey ( Hash160 ( vchDefaultKey ) ) )
{
// Create new keyUser and set as default key
RandAddSeedPerfmon ( ) ;
std : : vector < unsigned char > newDefaultKey ;
if ( ! GetKeyFromPool ( newDefaultKey , false ) )
return DB_LOAD_FAIL ;
SetDefaultKey ( newDefaultKey ) ;
if ( ! SetAddressBookName ( CBitcoinAddress ( vchDefaultKey ) , " " ) )
return DB_LOAD_FAIL ;
}
CreateThread ( ThreadFlushWalletDB , & strWalletFile ) ;
return DB_LOAD_OK ;
}
bool CWallet : : SetAddressBookName ( const CBitcoinAddress & address , const string & strName )
{
mapAddressBook [ address ] = strName ;
if ( ! fFileBacked )
return false ;
return CWalletDB ( strWalletFile ) . WriteName ( address . ToString ( ) , strName ) ;
}
bool CWallet : : DelAddressBookName ( const CBitcoinAddress & address )
{
mapAddressBook . erase ( address ) ;
if ( ! fFileBacked )
return false ;
return CWalletDB ( strWalletFile ) . EraseName ( address . ToString ( ) ) ;
}
void CWallet : : PrintWallet ( const CBlock & block )
{
CRITICAL_BLOCK ( cs_wallet )
{
if ( mapWallet . count ( block . vtx [ 0 ] . GetHash ( ) ) )
{
CWalletTx & wtx = mapWallet [ block . vtx [ 0 ] . GetHash ( ) ] ;
printf ( " mine: %d %d %d " , wtx . GetDepthInMainChain ( ) , wtx . GetBlocksToMaturity ( ) , wtx . GetCredit ( ) ) ;
}
}
printf ( " \n " ) ;
}
bool CWallet : : GetTransaction ( const uint256 & hashTx , CWalletTx & wtx )
{
CRITICAL_BLOCK ( cs_wallet )
{
map < uint256 , CWalletTx > : : iterator mi = mapWallet . find ( hashTx ) ;
if ( mi ! = mapWallet . end ( ) )
{
wtx = ( * mi ) . second ;
return true ;
}
}
return false ;
}
bool CWallet : : SetDefaultKey ( const std : : vector < unsigned char > & vchPubKey )
{
if ( fFileBacked )
{
if ( ! CWalletDB ( strWalletFile ) . WriteDefaultKey ( vchPubKey ) )
return false ;
}
vchDefaultKey = vchPubKey ;
return true ;
}
bool GetWalletFile ( CWallet * pwallet , string & strWalletFileOut )
{
if ( ! pwallet - > fFileBacked )
return false ;
strWalletFileOut = pwallet - > strWalletFile ;
return true ;
}
//
// Mark old keypool keys as used,
// and generate all new keys
//
bool CWallet : : NewKeyPool ( )
{
CRITICAL_BLOCK ( cs_wallet )
{
CWalletDB walletdb ( strWalletFile ) ;
BOOST_FOREACH ( int64 nIndex , setKeyPool )
walletdb . ErasePool ( nIndex ) ;
setKeyPool . clear ( ) ;
if ( IsLocked ( ) )
return false ;
int64 nKeys = max ( GetArg ( " -keypool " , 100 ) , ( int64 ) 0 ) ;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < nKeys ; i + + )
{
int64 nIndex = i + 1 ;
walletdb . WritePool ( nIndex , CKeyPool ( GenerateNewKey ( ) ) ) ;
setKeyPool . insert ( nIndex ) ;
}
printf ( " CWallet::NewKeyPool wrote % " PRI64d " new keys \n " , nKeys ) ;
}
return true ;
}
Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
bool CWallet : : TopUpKeyPool ( )
{
CRITICAL_BLOCK ( cs_wallet )
{
Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
if ( IsLocked ( ) )
return false ;
CWalletDB walletdb ( strWalletFile ) ;
// Top up key pool
int64 nTargetSize = max ( GetArg ( " -keypool " , 100 ) , ( int64 ) 0 ) ;
while ( setKeyPool . size ( ) < nTargetSize + 1 )
{
int64 nEnd = 1 ;
if ( ! setKeyPool . empty ( ) )
nEnd = * ( - - setKeyPool . end ( ) ) + 1 ;
if ( ! walletdb . WritePool ( nEnd , CKeyPool ( GenerateNewKey ( ) ) ) )
Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
throw runtime_error ( " TopUpKeyPool() : writing generated key failed " ) ;
setKeyPool . insert ( nEnd ) ;
printf ( " keypool added key % " PRI64d " , size=%d \n " , nEnd , setKeyPool . size ( ) ) ;
}
Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
}
return true ;
}
void CWallet : : ReserveKeyFromKeyPool ( int64 & nIndex , CKeyPool & keypool )
{
nIndex = - 1 ;
keypool . vchPubKey . clear ( ) ;
CRITICAL_BLOCK ( cs_wallet )
Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
{
if ( ! IsLocked ( ) )
TopUpKeyPool ( ) ;
// Get the oldest key
Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
if ( setKeyPool . empty ( ) )
return ;
CWalletDB walletdb ( strWalletFile ) ;
nIndex = * ( setKeyPool . begin ( ) ) ;
setKeyPool . erase ( setKeyPool . begin ( ) ) ;
if ( ! walletdb . ReadPool ( nIndex , keypool ) )
throw runtime_error ( " ReserveKeyFromKeyPool() : read failed " ) ;
if ( ! HaveKey ( Hash160 ( keypool . vchPubKey ) ) )
throw runtime_error ( " ReserveKeyFromKeyPool() : unknown key in key pool " ) ;
assert ( ! keypool . vchPubKey . empty ( ) ) ;
printf ( " keypool reserve % " PRI64d " \n " , nIndex ) ;
}
}
int64 CWallet : : AddReserveKey ( const CKeyPool & keypool )
{
CRITICAL_BLOCK ( cs_main )
CRITICAL_BLOCK ( cs_wallet )
{
CWalletDB walletdb ( strWalletFile ) ;
int64 nIndex = 1 + * ( - - setKeyPool . end ( ) ) ;
if ( ! walletdb . WritePool ( nIndex , keypool ) )
throw runtime_error ( " AddReserveKey() : writing added key failed " ) ;
setKeyPool . insert ( nIndex ) ;
return nIndex ;
}
return - 1 ;
}
void CWallet : : KeepKey ( int64 nIndex )
{
// Remove from key pool
if ( fFileBacked )
{
CWalletDB walletdb ( strWalletFile ) ;
walletdb . ErasePool ( nIndex ) ;
}
printf ( " keypool keep % " PRI64d " \n " , nIndex ) ;
}
void CWallet : : ReturnKey ( int64 nIndex )
{
// Return to key pool
CRITICAL_BLOCK ( cs_wallet )
setKeyPool . insert ( nIndex ) ;
printf ( " keypool return % " PRI64d " \n " , nIndex ) ;
}
bool CWallet : : GetKeyFromPool ( vector < unsigned char > & result , bool fAllowReuse )
{
int64 nIndex = 0 ;
CKeyPool keypool ;
CRITICAL_BLOCK ( cs_wallet )
{
ReserveKeyFromKeyPool ( nIndex , keypool ) ;
if ( nIndex = = - 1 )
{
if ( fAllowReuse & & ! vchDefaultKey . empty ( ) )
{
result = vchDefaultKey ;
return true ;
}
if ( IsLocked ( ) ) return false ;
result = GenerateNewKey ( ) ;
return true ;
}
KeepKey ( nIndex ) ;
result = keypool . vchPubKey ;
}
return true ;
}
int64 CWallet : : GetOldestKeyPoolTime ( )
{
int64 nIndex = 0 ;
CKeyPool keypool ;
ReserveKeyFromKeyPool ( nIndex , keypool ) ;
Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
if ( nIndex = = - 1 )
return GetTime ( ) ;
ReturnKey ( nIndex ) ;
return keypool . nTime ;
}
vector < unsigned char > CReserveKey : : GetReservedKey ( )
{
if ( nIndex = = - 1 )
{
CKeyPool keypool ;
pwallet - > ReserveKeyFromKeyPool ( nIndex , keypool ) ;
if ( nIndex ! = - 1 )
vchPubKey = keypool . vchPubKey ;
else
{
printf ( " CReserveKey::GetReservedKey(): Warning: using default key instead of a new key, top up your keypool. " ) ;
vchPubKey = pwallet - > vchDefaultKey ;
}
}
assert ( ! vchPubKey . empty ( ) ) ;
return vchPubKey ;
}
void CReserveKey : : KeepKey ( )
{
if ( nIndex ! = - 1 )
pwallet - > KeepKey ( nIndex ) ;
nIndex = - 1 ;
vchPubKey . clear ( ) ;
}
void CReserveKey : : ReturnKey ( )
{
if ( nIndex ! = - 1 )
pwallet - > ReturnKey ( nIndex ) ;
nIndex = - 1 ;
vchPubKey . clear ( ) ;
}
void CWallet : : GetAllReserveAddresses ( set < CBitcoinAddress > & setAddress )
{
setAddress . clear ( ) ;
CWalletDB walletdb ( strWalletFile ) ;
CRITICAL_BLOCK ( cs_main )
CRITICAL_BLOCK ( cs_wallet )
BOOST_FOREACH ( const int64 & id , setKeyPool )
{
CKeyPool keypool ;
if ( ! walletdb . ReadPool ( id , keypool ) )
throw runtime_error ( " GetAllReserveKeyHashes() : read failed " ) ;
CBitcoinAddress address ( keypool . vchPubKey ) ;
assert ( ! keypool . vchPubKey . empty ( ) ) ;
if ( ! HaveKey ( address ) )
throw runtime_error ( " GetAllReserveKeyHashes() : unknown key in key pool " ) ;
setAddress . insert ( address ) ;
}
}