kevacoin/include/secp256k1.h
Pieter Wuille 1d84107924 Squashed 'src/secp256k1/' changes from 22f60a6..2bfb82b
2bfb82b Merge pull request #351
06aeea5 Turn secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize outlen to in/out
970164d Merge pull request #348
6466625 Improvements for coordinate decompression
e2100ad Merge pull request #347
8e48787 Change secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine's count argument to size_t.
c69dea0 Clear output in more cases for pubkey_combine, adds tests.
269d422 Comment copyediting.
b4d17da Merge pull request #344
4709265 Merge pull request #345
26abce7 Adds 32 static test vectors for scalar mul, sqr, inv.
5b71a3f Better error case handling for pubkey_create & pubkey_serialize, more tests.
3b7bc69 Merge pull request #343
eed87af Change contrib/laxder from headers-only to files compilable as standalone C
d7eb1ae Merge pull request #342
7914a6e Make lax_der_privatekey_parsing.h not depend on internal code
73f64ff Merge pull request #339
9234391 Overhaul flags handling
1a36898 Make flags more explicit, add runtime checks.
1a3e03a Merge pull request #340
96be204 Add additional tests for eckey and arg-checks.
bb5aa4d Make the tweak function zeroize-output-on-fail behavior consistent.
4a243da Move secp256k1_ec_privkey_import/export to contrib.
1b3efc1 Move secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_recover into the recovery module.
e3cd679 Eliminate all side-effects from VERIFY_CHECK() usage.
b30fc85 Avoid nonce_function_rfc6979 algo16 argument emulation.
70d4640 Make secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create skip processing invalid secret keys.
6c476a8 Minor comment improvements.
131afe5 Merge pull request #334
0c6ab2f Introduce explicit lower-S normalization
fea19e7 Add contrib/lax_der_parsing.h
3bb9c44 Rewrite ECDSA signature parsing code
fa57f1b Use secp256k1_rand_int and secp256k1_rand_bits more
49b3749 Add new tests for the extra testrand functions
f684d7d Faster secp256k1_rand_int implementation
251b1a6 Improve testrand: add extra random functions
31994c8 Merge pull request #338
f79aa88 Bugfix: swap arguments to noncefp
c98df26 Merge pull request #319
67f7da4 Extensive interface and operations tests for secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse.
ee2cb40 Add ARG_CHECKs to secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse/secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize
7450ef1 Merge pull request #328
68a3c76 Merge pull request #329
98135ee Merge pull request #332
37100d7 improve ECDH header-doc
b13d749 Fix couple of typos in API comments
7c823e3 travis: fixup module configs
cc3141a Merge pull request #325
ee58fae Merge pull request #326
213aa67 Do not force benchmarks to be statically linked.
338fc8b Add API exports to secp256k1_nonce_function_default and secp256k1_nonce_function_rfc6979.
52fd03f Merge pull request #320
9f6993f Remove some dead code.
357f8cd Merge pull request #314
118cd82 Use explicit symbol visibility.
4e64608 Include public module headers when compiling modules.
1f41437 Merge pull request #316
fe0d463 Merge pull request #317
cfe0ed9 Fix miscellaneous style nits that irritate overactive static analysis.
2b199de Use the explicit NULL macro for pointer comparisons.
9e90516 Merge pull request #294
dd891e0 Get rid of _t as it is POSIX reserved
201819b Merge pull request #313
912f203 Eliminate a few unbraced statements that crept into the code.
eeab823 Merge pull request #299
486b9bb Use a flags bitfield for compressed option to secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize and secp256k1_ec_privkey_export
05732c5 Callback data: Accept pointers to either const or non-const data
1973c73 Bugfix: Reinitialise buffer lengths that have been used as outputs
788038d Use size_t for lengths (at least in external API)
c9d7c2a secp256k1_context_set_{error,illegal}_callback: Restore default handler by passing NULL as function argument
9aac008 secp256k1_context_destroy: Allow NULL argument as a no-op
64b730b secp256k1_context_create: Use unsigned type for flags bitfield
cb04ab5 Merge pull request #309
a551669 Merge pull request #295
81e45ff Update group_impl.h
85e3a2c Merge pull request #112
b2eb63b Merge pull request #293
dc0ce9f [API BREAK] Change argument order to out/outin/in
6d947ca Merge pull request #298
c822693 Merge pull request #301
6d04350 Merge pull request #303
7ab311c Merge pull request #304
5fb3229 Fixes a bug where bench_sign would fail due to passing in too small a buffer.
263dcbc remove unused assignment
b183b41 bugfix: "ARG_CHECK(ctx != NULL)" makes no sense
6da1446 build: fix parallel build
5eb4356 Merge pull request #291
c996d53 Print success
9f443be Move pubkey recovery code to separate module
d49abbd Separate ECDSA recovery tests
439d34a Separate recoverable and normal signatures
a7b046e Merge pull request #289
f66907f Improve/reformat API documentation secp256k1.h
2f77487 Add context building benchmarks
cc623d5 Merge pull request #287
de7e398 small typo fix
9d96e36 Merge pull request #280
432e1ce Merge pull request #283
14727fd Use correct name in gitignore
356b0e9 Actually test static precomputation in Travis
ff3a5df Merge pull request #284
2587208 Merge pull request #212
a5a66c7 Add support for custom EC-Schnorr-SHA256 signatures
d84a378 Merge pull request #252
72ae443 Improve perf. of cmov-based table lookup
92e53fc Implement endomorphism optimization for secp256k1_ecmult_const
ed35d43 Make `secp256k1_scalar_add_bit` conditional; make `secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda_var` constant time
91c0ce9 Add benchmarks for ECDH and const-time multiplication
0739bbb Add ECDH module which works by hashing the output of ecmult_const
4401500 Add constant-time multiply `secp256k1_ecmult_const` for ECDH
e4ce393 build: fix hard-coded usage of "gen_context"
b8e39ac build: don't use BUILT_SOURCES for the static context header
baa75da tests: add a couple tests
ae4f0c6 Merge pull request #278
995c548 Introduce callback functions for dealing with errors.
c333074 Merge pull request #282
18c329c Remove the internal secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_t type
74a2acd Add a secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_t type
23cfa91 Introduce secp256k1_pubkey_t type
4c63780 Merge pull request #269
3e6f1e2 Change rfc6979 implementation to be a generic PRNG
ed5334a Update configure.ac to make it build on OpenBSD
1b68366 Merge pull request #274
a83bb48 Make ecmult static precomputation default
166b32f Merge pull request #276
c37812f Add gen_context src/ecmult_static_context.h to CLEANFILES to fix distclean.
125c15d Merge pull request #275
76f6769 Fix build with static ecmult altroot and make dist.
5133f78 Merge pull request #254
b0a60e6 Merge pull request #258
733c1e6 Add travis build to test the static context.
fbecc38 Add ability to use a statically generated ecmult context.
4fb174d Merge pull request #263
4ab8990 Merge pull request #270
bdf0e0c Merge pull request #271
31d0c1f Merge pull request #273
eb2c8ff Add missing casts to SECP256K1_FE_CONST_INNER
55399c2 Further performance improvements to _ecmult_wnaf
99fd963 Add secp256k1_ec_pubkey_compress(), with test similar to the related decompress() function.
145cc6e Improve performance of _ecmult_wnaf
36b305a Verify the result of GMP modular inverse using non-GMP code
0cbc860 Merge pull request #266
06ff7fe Merge pull request #267
5a43124 Save 1 _fe_negate since s1 == -s2
a5d796e Update code comments
3f3964e Add specific VERIFY tests for _fe_cmov
7d054cd Refactor to save a _fe_negate
b28d02a Refactor to remove a local var
55e7fc3 Perf. improvement in _gej_add_ge
a0601cd Fix VERIFY calculations in _fe_cmov methods
17f7148 Merge pull request #261
7657420 Add tests for adding P+Q with P.x!=Q.x and P.y=-Q.y
8c5d5f7 tests: Add failing unit test for #257 (bad addition formula)
5de4c5d gej_add_ge: fix degenerate case when computing P + (-lambda)P
bcf2fcf gej_add_ge: rearrange algebra
e2a07c7 Fix compilation with C++
873a453 Merge pull request #250
91eb0da Merge pull request #247
210ffed Use separate in and out pointers in `secp256k1_ec_pubkey_decompress`
a1d5ae1 Tiny optimization
729badf Merge pull request #210
2d5a186 Apply effective-affine trick to precomp
4f9791a Effective affine addition in EC multiplication
2b4cf41 Use pkg-config always when possible, with failover to manual checks for libcrypto

git-subtree-dir: src/secp256k1
git-subtree-split: 2bfb82b10edf0f0b0e366a12f94c8b21a914159d
2015-11-13 00:12:43 +01:00

584 lines
25 KiB
C

#ifndef _SECP256K1_
# define _SECP256K1_
# ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
# endif
#include <stddef.h>
/* These rules specify the order of arguments in API calls:
*
* 1. Context pointers go first, followed by output arguments, combined
* output/input arguments, and finally input-only arguments.
* 2. Array lengths always immediately the follow the argument whose length
* they describe, even if this violates rule 1.
* 3. Within the OUT/OUTIN/IN groups, pointers to data that is typically generated
* later go first. This means: signatures, public nonces, private nonces,
* messages, public keys, secret keys, tweaks.
* 4. Arguments that are not data pointers go last, from more complex to less
* complex: function pointers, algorithm names, messages, void pointers,
* counts, flags, booleans.
* 5. Opaque data pointers follow the function pointer they are to be passed to.
*/
/** Opaque data structure that holds context information (precomputed tables etc.).
*
* The purpose of context structures is to cache large precomputed data tables
* that are expensive to construct, and also to maintain the randomization data
* for blinding.
*
* Do not create a new context object for each operation, as construction is
* far slower than all other API calls (~100 times slower than an ECDSA
* verification).
*
* A constructed context can safely be used from multiple threads
* simultaneously, but API call that take a non-const pointer to a context
* need exclusive access to it. In particular this is the case for
* secp256k1_context_destroy and secp256k1_context_randomize.
*
* Regarding randomization, either do it once at creation time (in which case
* you do not need any locking for the other calls), or use a read-write lock.
*/
typedef struct secp256k1_context_struct secp256k1_context;
/** Opaque data structure that holds a parsed and valid public key.
*
* The exact representation of data inside is implementation defined and not
* guaranteed to be portable between different platforms or versions. It is
* however guaranteed to be 64 bytes in size, and can be safely copied/moved.
* If you need to convert to a format suitable for storage or transmission, use
* secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize and secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse.
*
* Furthermore, it is guaranteed that identical public keys (ignoring
* compression) will have identical representation, so they can be memcmp'ed.
*/
typedef struct {
unsigned char data[64];
} secp256k1_pubkey;
/** Opaque data structured that holds a parsed ECDSA signature.
*
* The exact representation of data inside is implementation defined and not
* guaranteed to be portable between different platforms or versions. It is
* however guaranteed to be 64 bytes in size, and can be safely copied/moved.
* If you need to convert to a format suitable for storage or transmission, use
* the secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_* and
* secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_* functions.
*
* Furthermore, it is guaranteed to identical signatures will have identical
* representation, so they can be memcmp'ed.
*/
typedef struct {
unsigned char data[64];
} secp256k1_ecdsa_signature;
/** A pointer to a function to deterministically generate a nonce.
*
* Returns: 1 if a nonce was successfully generated. 0 will cause signing to fail.
* Out: nonce32: pointer to a 32-byte array to be filled by the function.
* In: msg32: the 32-byte message hash being verified (will not be NULL)
* key32: pointer to a 32-byte secret key (will not be NULL)
* algo16: pointer to a 16-byte array describing the signature
* algorithm (will be NULL for ECDSA for compatibility).
* data: Arbitrary data pointer that is passed through.
* attempt: how many iterations we have tried to find a nonce.
* This will almost always be 0, but different attempt values
* are required to result in a different nonce.
*
* Except for test cases, this function should compute some cryptographic hash of
* the message, the algorithm, the key and the attempt.
*/
typedef int (*secp256k1_nonce_function)(
unsigned char *nonce32,
const unsigned char *msg32,
const unsigned char *key32,
const unsigned char *algo16,
void *data,
unsigned int attempt
);
# if !defined(SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ)
# if defined(__GNUC__)&&defined(__GNUC_MINOR__)
# define SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ(_maj,_min) \
((__GNUC__<<16)+__GNUC_MINOR__>=((_maj)<<16)+(_min))
# else
# define SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ(_maj,_min) 0
# endif
# endif
# if (!defined(__STDC_VERSION__) || (__STDC_VERSION__ < 199901L) )
# if SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ(2,7)
# define SECP256K1_INLINE __inline__
# elif (defined(_MSC_VER))
# define SECP256K1_INLINE __inline
# else
# define SECP256K1_INLINE
# endif
# else
# define SECP256K1_INLINE inline
# endif
#ifndef SECP256K1_API
# if defined(_WIN32)
# ifdef SECP256K1_BUILD
# define SECP256K1_API __declspec(dllexport)
# else
# define SECP256K1_API
# endif
# elif defined(__GNUC__) && defined(SECP256K1_BUILD)
# define SECP256K1_API __attribute__ ((visibility ("default")))
# else
# define SECP256K1_API
# endif
#endif
/**Warning attributes
* NONNULL is not used if SECP256K1_BUILD is set to avoid the compiler optimizing out
* some paranoid null checks. */
# if defined(__GNUC__) && SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ(3, 4)
# define SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT __attribute__ ((__warn_unused_result__))
# else
# define SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT
# endif
# if !defined(SECP256K1_BUILD) && defined(__GNUC__) && SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ(3, 4)
# define SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(_x) __attribute__ ((__nonnull__(_x)))
# else
# define SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(_x)
# endif
/** All flags' lower 8 bits indicate what they're for. Do not use directly. */
#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_MASK ((1 << 8) - 1)
#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT (1 << 0)
#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_COMPRESSION (1 << 1)
/** The higher bits contain the actual data. Do not use directly. */
#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_VERIFY (1 << 8)
#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_SIGN (1 << 9)
#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_COMPRESSION (1 << 8)
/** Flags to pass to secp256k1_context_create. */
#define SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT | SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_VERIFY)
#define SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT | SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_SIGN)
#define SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT)
/** Flag to pass to secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize and secp256k1_ec_privkey_export. */
#define SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_COMPRESSION | SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_COMPRESSION)
#define SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_COMPRESSION)
/** Create a secp256k1 context object.
*
* Returns: a newly created context object.
* In: flags: which parts of the context to initialize.
*/
SECP256K1_API secp256k1_context* secp256k1_context_create(
unsigned int flags
) SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT;
/** Copies a secp256k1 context object.
*
* Returns: a newly created context object.
* Args: ctx: an existing context to copy (cannot be NULL)
*/
SECP256K1_API secp256k1_context* secp256k1_context_clone(
const secp256k1_context* ctx
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT;
/** Destroy a secp256k1 context object.
*
* The context pointer may not be used afterwards.
* Args: ctx: an existing context to destroy (cannot be NULL)
*/
SECP256K1_API void secp256k1_context_destroy(
secp256k1_context* ctx
);
/** Set a callback function to be called when an illegal argument is passed to
* an API call. It will only trigger for violations that are mentioned
* explicitly in the header.
*
* The philosophy is that these shouldn't be dealt with through a
* specific return value, as calling code should not have branches to deal with
* the case that this code itself is broken.
*
* On the other hand, during debug stage, one would want to be informed about
* such mistakes, and the default (crashing) may be inadvisable.
* When this callback is triggered, the API function called is guaranteed not
* to cause a crash, though its return value and output arguments are
* undefined.
*
* Args: ctx: an existing context object (cannot be NULL)
* In: fun: a pointer to a function to call when an illegal argument is
* passed to the API, taking a message and an opaque pointer
* (NULL restores a default handler that calls abort).
* data: the opaque pointer to pass to fun above.
*/
SECP256K1_API void secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(
secp256k1_context* ctx,
void (*fun)(const char* message, void* data),
const void* data
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1);
/** Set a callback function to be called when an internal consistency check
* fails. The default is crashing.
*
* This can only trigger in case of a hardware failure, miscompilation,
* memory corruption, serious bug in the library, or other error would can
* otherwise result in undefined behaviour. It will not trigger due to mere
* incorrect usage of the API (see secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback
* for that). After this callback returns, anything may happen, including
* crashing.
*
* Args: ctx: an existing context object (cannot be NULL)
* In: fun: a pointer to a function to call when an internal error occurs,
* taking a message and an opaque pointer (NULL restores a default
* handler that calls abort).
* data: the opaque pointer to pass to fun above.
*/
SECP256K1_API void secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(
secp256k1_context* ctx,
void (*fun)(const char* message, void* data),
const void* data
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1);
/** Parse a variable-length public key into the pubkey object.
*
* Returns: 1 if the public key was fully valid.
* 0 if the public key could not be parsed or is invalid.
* Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object.
* Out: pubkey: pointer to a pubkey object. If 1 is returned, it is set to a
* parsed version of input. If not, its value is undefined.
* In: input: pointer to a serialized public key
* inputlen: length of the array pointed to by input
*
* This function supports parsing compressed (33 bytes, header byte 0x02 or
* 0x03), uncompressed (65 bytes, header byte 0x04), or hybrid (65 bytes, header
* byte 0x06 or 0x07) format public keys.
*/
SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(
const secp256k1_context* ctx,
secp256k1_pubkey* pubkey,
const unsigned char *input,
size_t inputlen
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
/** Serialize a pubkey object into a serialized byte sequence.
*
* Returns: 1 always.
* Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object.
* Out: output: a pointer to a 65-byte (if compressed==0) or 33-byte (if
* compressed==1) byte array to place the serialized key
* in.
* In/Out: outputlen: a pointer to an integer which is initially set to the
* size of output, and is overwritten with the written
* size.
* In: pubkey: a pointer to a secp256k1_pubkey containing an
* initialized public key.
* flags: SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED if serialization should be in
* compressed format, otherwise SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED.
*/
SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(
const secp256k1_context* ctx,
unsigned char *output,
size_t *outputlen,
const secp256k1_pubkey* pubkey,
unsigned int flags
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);
/** Parse an ECDSA signature in compact (64 bytes) format.
*
* Returns: 1 when the signature could be parsed, 0 otherwise.
* Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object
* Out: sig: a pointer to a signature object
* In: input64: a pointer to the 64-byte array to parse
*
* The signature must consist of a 32-byte big endian R value, followed by a
* 32-byte big endian S value. If R or S fall outside of [0..order-1], the
* encoding is invalid. R and S with value 0 are allowed in the encoding.
*
* After the call, sig will always be initialized. If parsing failed or R or
* S are zero, the resulting sig value is guaranteed to fail validation for any
* message and public key.
*/
SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_compact(
const secp256k1_context* ctx,
secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig,
const unsigned char *input64
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
/** Parse a DER ECDSA signature.
*
* Returns: 1 when the signature could be parsed, 0 otherwise.
* Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object
* Out: sig: a pointer to a signature object
* In: input: a pointer to the signature to be parsed
* inputlen: the length of the array pointed to be input
*
* This function will accept any valid DER encoded signature, even if the
* encoded numbers are out of range.
*
* After the call, sig will always be initialized. If parsing failed or the
* encoded numbers are out of range, signature validation with it is
* guaranteed to fail for every message and public key.
*/
SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(
const secp256k1_context* ctx,
secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig,
const unsigned char *input,
size_t inputlen
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
/** Serialize an ECDSA signature in DER format.
*
* Returns: 1 if enough space was available to serialize, 0 otherwise
* Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object
* Out: output: a pointer to an array to store the DER serialization
* In/Out: outputlen: a pointer to a length integer. Initially, this integer
* should be set to the length of output. After the call
* it will be set to the length of the serialization (even
* if 0 was returned).
* In: sig: a pointer to an initialized signature object
*/
SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(
const secp256k1_context* ctx,
unsigned char *output,
size_t *outputlen,
const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);
/** Serialize an ECDSA signature in compact (64 byte) format.
*
* Returns: 1
* Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object
* Out: output64: a pointer to a 64-byte array to store the compact serialization
* In: sig: a pointer to an initialized signature object
*
* See secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_compact for details about the encoding.
*/
SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_compact(
const secp256k1_context* ctx,
unsigned char *output64,
const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
/** Verify an ECDSA signature.
*
* Returns: 1: correct signature
* 0: incorrect or unparseable signature
* Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object, initialized for verification.
* In: sig: the signature being verified (cannot be NULL)
* msg32: the 32-byte message hash being verified (cannot be NULL)
* pubkey: pointer to an initialized public key to verify with (cannot be NULL)
*
* To avoid accepting malleable signatures, only ECDSA signatures in lower-S
* form are accepted.
*
* If you need to accept ECDSA signatures from sources that do not obey this
* rule, apply secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize to the signature prior to
* validation, but be aware that doing so results in malleable signatures.
*
* For details, see the comments for that function.
*/
SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(
const secp256k1_context* ctx,
const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sig,
const unsigned char *msg32,
const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);
/** Convert a signature to a normalized lower-S form.
*
* Returns: 1 if sigin was not normalized, 0 if it already was.
* Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object
* Out: sigout: a pointer to a signature to fill with the normalized form,
* or copy if the input was already normalized. (can be NULL if
* you're only interested in whether the input was already
* normalized).
* In: sigin: a pointer to a signature to check/normalize (cannot be NULL,
* can be identical to sigout)
*
* With ECDSA a third-party can forge a second distinct signature of the same
* message, given a single initial signature, but without knowing the key. This
* is done by negating the S value modulo the order of the curve, 'flipping'
* the sign of the random point R which is not included in the signature.
*
* Forgery of the same message isn't universally problematic, but in systems
* where message malleability or uniqueness of signatures is important this can
* cause issues. This forgery can be blocked by all verifiers forcing signers
* to use a normalized form.
*
* The lower-S form reduces the size of signatures slightly on average when
* variable length encodings (such as DER) are used and is cheap to verify,
* making it a good choice. Security of always using lower-S is assured because
* anyone can trivially modify a signature after the fact to enforce this
* property anyway.
*
* The lower S value is always between 0x1 and
* 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF5D576E7357A4501DDFE92F46681B20A0,
* inclusive.
*
* No other forms of ECDSA malleability are known and none seem likely, but
* there is no formal proof that ECDSA, even with this additional restriction,
* is free of other malleability. Commonly used serialization schemes will also
* accept various non-unique encodings, so care should be taken when this
* property is required for an application.
*
* The secp256k1_ecdsa_sign function will by default create signatures in the
* lower-S form, and secp256k1_ecdsa_verify will not accept others. In case
* signatures come from a system that cannot enforce this property,
* secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize must be called before verification.
*/
SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize(
const secp256k1_context* ctx,
secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sigout,
const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sigin
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
/** An implementation of RFC6979 (using HMAC-SHA256) as nonce generation function.
* If a data pointer is passed, it is assumed to be a pointer to 32 bytes of
* extra entropy.
*/
SECP256K1_API extern const secp256k1_nonce_function secp256k1_nonce_function_rfc6979;
/** A default safe nonce generation function (currently equal to secp256k1_nonce_function_rfc6979). */
SECP256K1_API extern const secp256k1_nonce_function secp256k1_nonce_function_default;
/** Create an ECDSA signature.
*
* Returns: 1: signature created
* 0: the nonce generation function failed, or the private key was invalid.
* Args: ctx: pointer to a context object, initialized for signing (cannot be NULL)
* Out: sig: pointer to an array where the signature will be placed (cannot be NULL)
* In: msg32: the 32-byte message hash being signed (cannot be NULL)
* seckey: pointer to a 32-byte secret key (cannot be NULL)
* noncefp:pointer to a nonce generation function. If NULL, secp256k1_nonce_function_default is used
* ndata: pointer to arbitrary data used by the nonce generation function (can be NULL)
*
* The created signature is always in lower-S form. See
* secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize for more details.
*/
SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(
const secp256k1_context* ctx,
secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sig,
const unsigned char *msg32,
const unsigned char *seckey,
secp256k1_nonce_function noncefp,
const void *ndata
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);
/** Verify an ECDSA secret key.
*
* Returns: 1: secret key is valid
* 0: secret key is invalid
* Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL)
* In: seckey: pointer to a 32-byte secret key (cannot be NULL)
*/
SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(
const secp256k1_context* ctx,
const unsigned char *seckey
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2);
/** Compute the public key for a secret key.
*
* Returns: 1: secret was valid, public key stores
* 0: secret was invalid, try again
* Args: ctx: pointer to a context object, initialized for signing (cannot be NULL)
* Out: pubkey: pointer to the created public key (cannot be NULL)
* In: seckey: pointer to a 32-byte private key (cannot be NULL)
*/
SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(
const secp256k1_context* ctx,
secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey,
const unsigned char *seckey
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
/** Tweak a private key by adding tweak to it.
* Returns: 0 if the tweak was out of range (chance of around 1 in 2^128 for
* uniformly random 32-byte arrays, or if the resulting private key
* would be invalid (only when the tweak is the complement of the
* private key). 1 otherwise.
* Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL).
* In/Out: seckey: pointer to a 32-byte private key.
* In: tweak: pointer to a 32-byte tweak.
*/
SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(
const secp256k1_context* ctx,
unsigned char *seckey,
const unsigned char *tweak
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
/** Tweak a public key by adding tweak times the generator to it.
* Returns: 0 if the tweak was out of range (chance of around 1 in 2^128 for
* uniformly random 32-byte arrays, or if the resulting public key
* would be invalid (only when the tweak is the complement of the
* corresponding private key). 1 otherwise.
* Args: ctx: pointer to a context object initialized for validation
* (cannot be NULL).
* In/Out: pubkey: pointer to a public key object.
* In: tweak: pointer to a 32-byte tweak.
*/
SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(
const secp256k1_context* ctx,
secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey,
const unsigned char *tweak
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
/** Tweak a private key by multiplying it by a tweak.
* Returns: 0 if the tweak was out of range (chance of around 1 in 2^128 for
* uniformly random 32-byte arrays, or equal to zero. 1 otherwise.
* Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL).
* In/Out: seckey: pointer to a 32-byte private key.
* In: tweak: pointer to a 32-byte tweak.
*/
SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_mul(
const secp256k1_context* ctx,
unsigned char *seckey,
const unsigned char *tweak
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
/** Tweak a public key by multiplying it by a tweak value.
* Returns: 0 if the tweak was out of range (chance of around 1 in 2^128 for
* uniformly random 32-byte arrays, or equal to zero. 1 otherwise.
* Args: ctx: pointer to a context object initialized for validation
* (cannot be NULL).
* In/Out: pubkey: pointer to a public key obkect.
* In: tweak: pointer to a 32-byte tweak.
*/
SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(
const secp256k1_context* ctx,
secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey,
const unsigned char *tweak
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
/** Updates the context randomization.
* Returns: 1: randomization successfully updated
* 0: error
* Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL)
* In: seed32: pointer to a 32-byte random seed (NULL resets to initial state)
*/
SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_context_randomize(
secp256k1_context* ctx,
const unsigned char *seed32
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1);
/** Add a number of public keys together.
* Returns: 1: the sum of the public keys is valid.
* 0: the sum of the public keys is not valid.
* Args: ctx: pointer to a context object
* Out: out: pointer to a public key object for placing the resulting public key
* (cannot be NULL)
* In: ins: pointer to array of pointers to public keys (cannot be NULL)
* n: the number of public keys to add together (must be at least 1)
*/
SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(
const secp256k1_context* ctx,
secp256k1_pubkey *out,
const secp256k1_pubkey * const * ins,
size_t n
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
# ifdef __cplusplus
}
# endif
#endif