Makes it possible to compactly provide a delibrately invalid signature
for use with CHECK(MULTI)SIG. For instance with BIP19 if m != n invalid
signatures need to be provided in the scriptSig; prior to this change
those invalid signatures would need to be large DER-encoded signatures.
Note that we may want to further expand on this change in the future by
saying that only OP_0 is a "valid" invalid signature; BIP19 even with
this change is inherently malleable as the invalid signatures can be any
validly encoded DER signature.
If uint256() constructor takes a string, uint256(0) will become
dangerous when uint256 does not take integers anymore (it will go
through std::string(const char*) making a NULL string, and the explicit
keyword is no help).
SignatureHash and its test function SignatureHashOld
return uint256(1) as a special error signaling value.
Return a local static constant with the same value instead.
Previously an empty script wouldn't be hashed, and CScriptID would be
assigned the incorrect value of 0 instead. This bug can be seen in the
RPC decodescript command:
$ btc decodescript ""
{
"asm" : "",
"type" : "nonstandard",
"p2sh" : "31h1vYVSYuKP6AhS86fbRdMw9XHieotbST"
}
Correct output:
$ btc decodescript ""
{
"asm" : "",
"type" : "nonstandard",
"p2sh" : "3J98t1WpEZ73CNmQviecrnyiWrnqRhWNLy"
}
Based on an earlier patch by Peter Todd, though the rules here are different
(P2SH scripts should not have a CLEANSTACK check before the P2SH evaluation).
This turns STRICTENC turn into a softforking-safe change (even though it
is not intended as a consensus rule), and as a result guarantee that using
it for mempool validation only results in consensus-valid transactions in
the mempool.
NOP1 to NOP10 are reserved for future soft-fork upgrades. In the event
of an upgrade such NOPs have *VERIFY behavior, meaning that if their
arguments are not correct the script fails. Discouraging these NOPs by
rejecting transactions containing them from the mempool ensures that
we'll never accept transactions, nor mine blocks, with scripts that are
now invalid according to the majority of hashing power even if we're not
yet upgraded. Previously this wasn't an issue as the IsStandard() rules
didn't allow upgradable NOPs anyway, but 7f3b4e95 relaxed the
IsStandard() rules for P2SH redemptions allowing any redeemScript to be
spent.
We *do* allow upgradable NOPs in scripts so long as they are not
executed. This is harmless as there is no opportunity for the script to
be invalid post-upgrade.
Attempt to codify the possible error statuses associated with script
validation. script/types.h has been created with the expectation that it will
be part of the public lib interface. The other flag enums will be moved here in
a future commit.
Logging has also been removed in order to drop the dependency on core.h. It can
be re-added to bitcoind as-needed. This makes script verification finally free
of application state and boost!
This allows for a reversal of the current behavior.
This:
CScript foo;
CScriptID bar(foo.GetID());
Becomes:
CScript foo;
CScriptID bar(foo);
This way, CScript is no longer dependent on CScriptID or Hash();
* Delete canonical_tests.cpp, and move the tests to script_tests.cpp.
* Split off SCRIPT_VERIFY_DERSIG from SCRIPT_VERIFY_STRICTENC (the BIP62 part of it).
* Change signature STRICTENC/DERSIG semantics to fail the script entirely rather than the CHECKSIG result (softfork safety, and BIP62 requirement).
* Add many autogenerated tests for several odd cases.
* Mention specific BIP62 rules in the script verification flags.
Wladimir J. van der Laan