Currently Bitcoin-Qts support for OSX User Notification Center is broken. This pull will fix a known issue of non-official-apple-built apps having problems sending user notifications.
NOP1 to NOP10 are reserved for future soft-fork upgrades. In the event
of an upgrade such NOPs have *VERIFY behavior, meaning that if their
arguments are not correct the script fails. Discouraging these NOPs by
rejecting transactions containing them from the mempool ensures that
we'll never accept transactions, nor mine blocks, with scripts that are
now invalid according to the majority of hashing power even if we're not
yet upgraded. Previously this wasn't an issue as the IsStandard() rules
didn't allow upgradable NOPs anyway, but 7f3b4e95 relaxed the
IsStandard() rules for P2SH redemptions allowing any redeemScript to be
spent.
We *do* allow upgradable NOPs in scripts so long as they are not
executed. This is harmless as there is no opportunity for the script to
be invalid post-upgrade.
Attempt to codify the possible error statuses associated with script
validation. script/types.h has been created with the expectation that it will
be part of the public lib interface. The other flag enums will be moved here in
a future commit.
Logging has also been removed in order to drop the dependency on core.h. It can
be re-added to bitcoind as-needed. This makes script verification finally free
of application state and boost!
Speed up generating blocks in regression test mode, by moving
block-creating and nonce-finding directly into the setgenerate
RPC call (instead of starting up a mining thread and waiting for
it to find a block).
This makes the forknotify RPC test three times quicker, for
example (10 seconds runtime instead of 30 seconds, assuming
the initial blockchain cache is already built).
- use __func__ instead of hard-coded function name for logging
- update -discover help message to reflect newly added parameter
interaction
- use DEFAULT_LISTEN in a parameter interaction check instead a hard coded
value
Previously transactions were only tested again the
STANDARD_SCRIPT_VERIFY_FLAGS prior to mempool acceptance, so any bugs in
those flags that allowed actually-invalid transactions to pass would
result in allowing invalid transactions into the mempool. Fortunately
there is a second check in CreateNewBlock() that would prevent those
transactions from being mined, resulting in an invalid block, however
this could still be exploited as a DoS attack.
Cory Fields