To bridge the time until a dynamic method for determining this fee is
merged.
This is especially aimed at the stable releases (0.10, 0.11) because
full mempool limiting, as will be in 0.12, is too invasive and risky to
backport.
Adds an `obfuscate` parameter to `CLevelDBWrapper` and makes use of it
for all new chainstate stores built via `CCoinsViewDB`. Also adds an
`Xor` method to `CDataStream`.
Thanks to @sipa@laanwj@pstratem@dexX7@KyrosKrane@gmaxwell.
This adds SCRIPT_VERIFY_LOW_S to STANDARD_SCRIPT_VERIFY_FLAGS which
will make the node require the canonical 'low-s' encoding for
ECDSA signatures when relaying or mining.
Consensus behavior is unchanged.
The rational is explained in a81cd96805ce6b65cca3a40ebbd3b2eb428abb7b:
Absent this kind of test ECDSA is not a strong signature as given
a valid signature {r, s} both that value and {r, -s mod n} are valid.
These two encodings have different hashes allowing third parties a
vector to change users txids. These attacks are avoided by picking
a particular form as canonical and rejecting the other form(s); in
the of the LOW_S rule, the smaller of the two possible S values is
used.
If widely deployed this change would eliminate the last remaining
known vector for nuisance malleability on boring SIGHASH_ALL
p2pkh transactions. On the down-side it will block most
transactions made by sufficiently out of date software.
Unlike the other avenues to change txids on boring transactions this
one was randomly violated by all deployed bitcoin software prior to
its discovery. So, while other malleability vectors where made
non-standard as soon as they were discovered, this one has remained
permitted. Even BIP62 did not propose applying this rule to
old version transactions, but conforming implementations have become
much more common since BIP62 was initially written.
Bitcoin Core has produced compatible signatures since a28fb70e in
September 2013, but this didn't make it into a release until 0.9
in March 2014; Bitcoinj has done so for a similar span of time.
Bitcoinjs and electrum have been more recently updated.
This does not replace the need for BIP62 or similar, as miners can
still cooperate to break transactions. Nor does it replace the
need for wallet software to handle malleability sanely[1]. This
only eliminates the cheap and irritating DOS attack.
[1] On the Malleability of Bitcoin Transactions
Marcin Andrychowicz, Stefan Dziembowski, Daniel Malinowski, Łukasz Mazurek
http://fc15.ifca.ai/preproceedings/bitcoin/paper_9.pdf
- to match the peers.dat handling also supply a debug.log entry for how
many entries were loaded from banlist.dat and how long it took
- add a GUI init message for loading the banlist (same as with peers.dat)
- move the same message for peers.dat upwards in the code, to be able to
reuse the timing variable nStart and also just log, if our read from
peers.dat didn't fail
- only start working on/with banlist data, if reading in the banlist from
disk didn't fail
- as CNode::setBannedIsDirty is false (default) when reading fails, we
don't need to explicitly set it to false to prevent writing
banlist.dat in that case either
Previously only one PUSHDATA was allowed, needlessly limiting
applications such as matching OP_RETURN contents with bloom filters that
operate on a per-PUSHDATA level. Now any combination that passes
IsPushOnly() is allowed, so long as the total size of the scriptPubKey
is less than 42 bytes. (unchanged modulo non-minimal PUSHDATA encodings)
Also, this fixes the odd bug where previously the PUSHDATA could be
replaced by any single opcode, even sigops consuming opcodes such as
CHECKMULTISIG. (20 sigops!)
Previously unlike other transaction types the TX_SCRIPTHASH would not
clear vSolutionsRet, which means that unlike other transaction types if
it was called twice in a row you would get the result of the previous
invocation as well.
Avoid calling gettimeofday every time through the benchmarking loop, by keeping
track of how long each loop takes and doubling the number of iterations done
between time checks when they take less than 1/16'th of the total elapsed time.
Benchmarking framework, loosely based on google's micro-benchmarking
library (https://github.com/google/benchmark)
Wny not use the Google Benchmark framework? Because adding Even More Dependencies
isn't worth it. If we get a dozen or three benchmarks and need nanosecond-accurate
timings of threaded code then switching to the full-blown Google Benchmark library
should be considered.
The benchmark framework is hard-coded to run each benchmark for one wall-clock second,
and then spits out .csv-format timing information to stdout. It is left as an
exercise for later (or maybe never) to add command-line arguments to specify which
benchmark(s) to run, how long to run them for, how to format results, etc etc etc.
Again, see the Google Benchmark framework for where that might end up.
See src/bench/MilliSleep.cpp for a sanity-test benchmark that just benchmarks
'sleep 100 milliseconds.'
To compile and run benchmarks:
cd src; make bench
Sample output:
Benchmark,count,min,max,average
Sleep100ms,10,0.101854,0.105059,0.103881
This makes sure that the event loop eventually terminates, even if an
event (like an open timeout, or a hanging connection) happens to be
holding it up.
Add a WaitExit() call to http's WorkQueue to make it delete the work
queue only when all worker threads stopped.
This fixes a problem that was reproducable by pressing Ctrl-C during
AppInit2:
```
/usr/include/boost/thread/pthread/condition_variable_fwd.hpp:81: boost::condition_variable::~condition_variable(): Assertion `!ret' failed.
/usr/include/boost/thread/pthread/mutex.hpp:108: boost::mutex::~mutex(): Assertion `!posix::pthread_mutex_destroy(&m)' failed.
```
I was assuming that `threadGroup->join_all();` would always have been
called when entering the Shutdown(). However this is not the case in
bitcoind's AppInit2-non-zero-exit case "was left out intentionally
here".
Shutting down the HTTP server currently breaks off all current requests.
This can create a race condition with RPC `stop` command, where the calling
process never receives confirmation.
This change removes the listening sockets on shutdown so that no new
requests can come in, but no longer breaks off requests in progress.
Meant to fix#6717.
The "please check your computer's data and time" message when the clock
deviates from the network currently generates an overkill of messages:
orion@lethe:~/bitcoin$ src/bitcoind
Warning: Warning: Please check that your computer's date and time are correct! If your clock is wrong Bitcoin Core will not work properly.
In the log:
2015-09-27 16:24:13 *** Warning: Please check that your computer's date and time are correct! If your clock is wrong Bitcoin Core will not work properly.
2015-09-27 16:24:13 Warning: Warning: Please check that your computer's date and time are correct! If your clock is wrong Bitcoin Core will not work properly.
Remove one level of 'Warning:' and reduce to one log message.
CalculateMemPoolAncestors was always looping over a transaction's inputs
to find in-mempool parents. When adding a new transaction, this is the
correct behavior, but when removing a transaction, we want to use the
ancestor set that would be calculated by walking mapLinks (which should
in general be the same set, except during a reorg when the mempool is
in an inconsistent state, and the mapLinks-based calculation would be the
correct one).
* Raise the debug window when hidden behind other windows
* Switch to the debug window when on another virtual desktop
* Show the debug window when minimized
This change is a conceptual copy of 5ffaaba and 382e9e2
Assume that when a wallet transaction has a valid block hash and transaction position
in it, the transaction is actually there. We're already trusting wallet data in a
much more fundamental way anyway.
To prevent backward compatibility issues, a new record is used for storing the
block locator in the wallet. Old wallets will see a wallet file synchronized up
to the genesis block, and rescan automatically.
The two timeouts for the server and client, are essentially different:
- In the case of the server it should be a lower value to avoid clients
clogging up connection slots
- In the case of the client it should be a high value to accomedate slow
responses from the server, for example for slow queries or when the
lock is contended
Split the options into `-rpcservertimeout` and `-rpcclienttimeout` with
respective defaults of 30 and 900.
Associate with each CTxMemPoolEntry all the size/fees of descendant
mempool transactions. Sort mempool by max(feerate of entry, feerate
of descendants). Update statistics on-the-fly as transactions enter
or leave the mempool.
Also add ancestor and descendant limiting, so that transactions can
be rejected if the number or size of unconfirmed ancestors exceeds
a target, or if adding a transaction would cause some other mempool
entry to have too many (or too large) a set of unconfirmed in-
mempool descendants.
Ignore SIGPIPE on all non-win32 OSes, otherwise an unexpectedly disconnecting
RPC client will terminate the application. This problem was introduced
with the libhttp-based RPC server.
Fixes#6660.
James O'Beirne