With an encrypted wallet the GUI was prompting for a passphrase every time
the user requested a new address. This is unnecessary, increases the
exposure to keyboard sniffers, and discourages using fresh addresses for
every transaction.
Instead only prompt for a passphrase when the keypool runs out, also call
the new address function with the flag that prevents reuse.
Thanks to AlexNagy on IRC for pointing this out and who wouldn't take any
lip from a curmudgeonly developer and insisted on what he knew to be true.
WalletView:
- add new signal showNormalIfMinimized()
- emit the new signal in handleURI() to fix a bug, preventing the main
window to show up when using bitcoin: URIs
WalletStack:
- connect the showNormalIfMinimized() signal from WalletView with the
showNormalIfMinimized() slot in BitcoinGUI
- rework setCurrentWallet() to return a bool
- add check for valid walletModel in addWallet()
- add missing gui attribute initialisation in constructor
WalletFrame:
- remove unused or unneded class attributes gui and clientModel
- add a check for valid clientModel in setClientModel()
General:
- small code formatting changes
Add support for a Payment Protocol to Bitcoin-Qt.
Payment messages are protocol-buffer encoded and communicated over
http(s), so this adds a dependency on the Google protocol buffer
library, and requires Qt with OpenSSL support.
- move SelectParamsFromCommandLine() from init.cpp to bitcoin.cpp to allow
to use TestNet() for Bitcoin-Qt instead of GetBoolArg("-testnet", false)
- change order in bitcoind.cpp to match bitcoin.cpp functionality
- hamonize error message strings for missing datadir and failing
SelectParamsFromCommandLine() in bitcoin.cpp and bitcoind.cpp
- use TestNet() call in splashscreen.cpp
Straight refactor, so mapAddressBook stores a CAddressBookData
(which just contains a std::string) instead of a std::string.
Preparation for payment protocol work, which will add the notion
of refund addresses to the address book.
Replaces the validation check for "amount == 0" with an isDust check,
so very small output amounts are caught before the wallet
is unlocked, a transaction is created, etc.
- update translation master files
- include current translations from Transifex
- add several new languages
- fix a bug in bitcoin.qrc, which prevents some languages from beeing used
(wrong file extension .ts instead of .qm was used)
This reduces a peer's ability to attack network resources by
using a full bloom filter, but without reducing the usability
of bloom filters. It sets a default match everything filter
for peers and it generalizes a prior optimization to
cover more cases.
To fix a minor malleability found by Sergio Lerner (reported here:
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=8392.msg1245898#msg1245898)
The problem is that if (R,S) is a valid ECDSA signature for a given
message and public key, (R,-S) is also valid. Modulo N (the order
of the secp256k1 curve), this means that both (R,S) and (R,N-S) are
valid. Given that N is odd, S and N-S have a different lowest bit.
We solve the problem by forcing signatures to have an even S value,
excluding one of the alternatives.
This commit just changes the signing code to always produce even S
values, and adds a verification mode to check it. This code is not
enabled anywhere yet. Existing tests in key_tests.cpp verify that
the produced signatures are still valid.
The length of vectors, maps, sets, etc are serialized using
Write/ReadCompactSize -- which, unfortunately, do not use a
unique encoding.
So deserializing and then re-serializing a transaction (for example)
can give you different bits than you started with. That doesn't
cause any problems that we are aware of, but it is exactly the type
of subtle mismatch that can lead to exploits.
With this pull, reading a non-canonical CompactSize throws an
exception, which means nodes will ignore 'tx' or 'block' or
other messages that are not properly encoded.
Please check my logic... but this change is safe with respect to
causing a network split. Old clients that receive
non-canonically-encoded transactions or blocks deserialize
them into CTransaction/CBlock structures in memory, and then
re-serialize them before relaying them to peers.
And please check my logic with respect to causing a blockchain
split: there are no CompactSize fields in the block header, so
the block hash is always canonical. The merkle root in the block
header is computed on a vector<CTransaction>, so
any non-canonical encoding of the transactions in 'tx' or 'block'
messages is erased as they are read into memory by old clients,
and does not affect the block hash. And, as noted above, old
clients re-serialize (with canonical encoding) 'tx' and 'block'
messages before relaying to peers.
Fixes issue#2838; this is a tweaked version of pull#2845 that
should not leak the length of the password and is more generic,
in case we run into other situations where we need
timing-attack-resistant comparisons.
Orphan transactions were stored as a CDataStream pointer;
this changes the mapOrphanTransactions data structures to
store orphans as a CTransaction.
This also fixes CVE-2013-4627 by always re-serializing
transactions before relaying them.
- move the code for saving and restoring window positions from BitcoinGUI
to GUIUtil, make it more generic and also use it for saving/restoring
debug window positions
- it was possible to trigger an infinite loop in FreespaceChecker::check() by
simply removing the drive letter on Windows (which leads to an infinite
loop in the FreespaceChecker thread)
- this was caused by not checking if we make progress with
parentDir.parent_path()
- remove an unneded include for mswsock.h as we use winsock2.h anyway
- move typedef u_int SOCKET; into the #ifndef WIN32 part
- remove typedef int socklen_t; as this is defined in ws2tcpip.h
Jeff Garzik