QT_NO_KEYWORDS prevents Qt from defining the `foreach`, `signals`,
`slots` and `emit` macros.
Avoid overlap between Qt macros and boost - for example #undef hackiness
in #6421.
When no `-rpcpassword` is specified, use a special 'cookie' file for
authentication. This file is generated with random content when the
daemon starts, and deleted when it exits. Read access to this file
controls who can access through RPC. By default this file is stored in
the data directory but it be overriden with `-rpccookiefile`.
This is similar to Tor CookieAuthentication: see
https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html.en
Alternative to #6258. Like that pull, this allows running bitcoind
without any manual configuration. However, daemons should ideally never write to
their configuration files, so I prefer this solution.
Add a function `ParseFixedPoint` that parses numbers according
to the JSON number specification and returns a 64-bit integer.
Then this in `AmountFromValue`, rather than `ParseMoney`.
Also add lots of tests (thanks to @jonasschnelli for some of them).
Fixes issue #6297.
I've never liked the chain-specific exception to having to set a
password. It gives issues with #6388 which makes it valid to
set no password in every case (as it enables random cookie authentication).
This pull removes the flag, so that all chains are regarded the same.
It also removes the username==password test, which doesn't provide any
substantial extra security.
Prevents stomping on debug logs in datadirs that are locked by other
instances and lost parameter interaction messages that can get wiped by
ShrinkDebugFile().
The log is now opened explicitly and all emitted messages are buffered
until this open occurs. The version message and log cut have also been
moved to the earliest possible sensible location.
Four cases included:
* The CLTV operand type mismatches the tx locktime. In the script it is
1 (interpreted as block height), but in the tx is 500000000
(interpreted as date)
* The stack is empty when executing OP_CLTV
* The tx is final by having only one input with MAX_INT sequence number
* The operand for CLTV is negative (after OP_0 OP_1 OP_SUB)
No longer relevant after #5957. This hack existed because of another
hack where the numthreads parameter, on regtest, doubled as how many
blocks to generate.
CTransAction::IsEquivalentTo was introduced in #5881.
This functionality is only useful to the wallet, and should never have
been added to the primitive transaction type.
request object before returning an error so that id value can
be used in the response.
Prior to this commit, RPC commands sent during Bitcoin's
warmup/startup phase were responded to with a JSON-RPC error
with an id of null, which violated the JSON-RPC 2.0 spec:
id: This member is REQUIRED. It MUST be the same as the value
of the id member in the Request Object. If there was an error
in detecting the id in the Request object (e.g. Parse
error/Invalid Request), it MUST be Null.
To determine the default for `-par`, the number of script verification
threads, use [boost:馃У:physical_concurrency()](http://www.boost.org/doc/libs/1_58_0/doc/html/thread/thread_management.html#thread.thread_management.thread.physical_concurrency)
which counts only physical cores, not virtual cores.
Virtual cores are roughly a set of cached registers to avoid context
switches while threading, they cannot actually perform work, so spawning
a verification thread for them could even reduce efficiency and will put
undue load on the system.
Should fix issue #6358, as well as some other reported system overload
issues, especially on Intel processors.
The function was only introduced in boost 1.56, so provide a utility
function `GetNumCores` to fall back for older Boost versions.
New, undocumented-on-purpose -mocktime=timestamp command-line
argument to startup with mocktime set. Needed because
time-related blockchain sanity checks are done on startup, before a
test has a chance to make a setmocktime RPC call.
And changed the setmocktime RPC call so calling it will not result in
currently connected peers being disconnected due to inactivity timeouts.
Transactions that fail CLTV verification will be rejected from the
mempool, making it easy to test the feature. However blocks containing
"invalid" CLTV-using transactions will still be accepted; this is *not*
the soft-fork required to actually enable CLTV for production use.
<nLockTime> CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY -> <nLockTime>
Fails if tx.nLockTime < nLockTime, allowing the funds in a txout to be
locked until some block height or block time in the future is reached.
Only the logic and unittests are implemented; this commit does not have
any actual soft-fork logic in it.
Thanks to Pieter Wuille for rebase.
Credit goes to Gregory Maxwell for the suggestion of comparing the
argument against the transaction nLockTime rather than the current
time/blockheight directly.
Now that the off-by-one error w/nLockTime txs issue has been fixed by
87550eef (75a4d512 in the 0.11 branch) we can make the anti-fee-sniping
protection create transactions with nLockTime set such that they're only
valid in the next block, rather than an earlier block.
There was also a concern about poor propagation, however testing with
transactions with nLockTime = GetAdjustedTime()+1 as a proxy for
nLockTime propagation, as well as a few transactions sent the moment
blocks were received, has turned up no detectable issues with
propagation. If you have a block at a given height you certainly have at
least one peer with that block who will accept the transaction. That
peer will certainly have other peers who will accept it, and soon
essentially the whole network has the transaction. In particular, if a
node recives a transaction that it rejects due to the tx being
non-final, it will be accepted again later as it winds its way around
the network.
Wladimir J. van der Laan