Non-grammatical language improvements

doc/gitian-building.md

@@ -393,4 +393,4 @@ Uploading signatures
 
 After building and signing you can push your signatures (both the `.assert` and `.assert.sig` files) to the
 [bitcoin/gitian.sigs](https://github.com/bitcoin/gitian.sigs/) repository, or if that's not possible create a pull
-request. You can also mail the files to me (laanwj@gmail.com) and I'll commit them.
+request. You can also mail the files to Wladimir (laanwj@gmail.com) and he will commit them.

src/addrman.h

@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ public:
 /** Stochastic address manager
  *
  * Design goals:
- *  * Keep the address tables in-memory, and asynchronously dump the entire to able in peers.dat.
+ *  * Keep the address tables in-memory, and asynchronously dump the entire table to peers.dat.
  *  * Make sure no (localized) attacker can fill the entire table with his nodes/addresses.
  *
  * To that end:

src/base58.h

@@ -6,10 +6,10 @@
 /**
  * Why base-58 instead of standard base-64 encoding?
  * - Don't want 0OIl characters that look the same in some fonts and
- *      could be used to create visually identical looking account numbers.
- * - A string with non-alphanumeric characters is not as easily accepted as an account number.
+ *      could be used to create visually identical looking data.
+ * - A string with non-alphanumeric characters is not as easily accepted as input.
  * - E-mail usually won't line-break if there's no punctuation to break at.
- * - Double-clicking selects the whole number as one word if it's all alphanumeric.
+ * - Double-clicking selects the whole string as one word if it's all alphanumeric.
  */
 #ifndef BITCOIN_BASE58_H
 #define BITCOIN_BASE58_H

src/chain.h

@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ enum BlockStatus {
      */
     BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS =    3,
 
-    //! Outputs do not overspend inputs, no double spends, coinbase output ok, immature coinbase spends, BIP30.
+    //! Outputs do not overspend inputs, no double spends, coinbase output ok, no immature coinbase spends, BIP30.
     //! Implies all parents are also at least CHAIN.
     BLOCK_VALID_CHAIN        =    4,
 

src/chainparams.cpp

@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ public:
         /** 
          * The message start string is designed to be unlikely to occur in normal data.
          * The characters are rarely used upper ASCII, not valid as UTF-8, and produce
-         * a large 4-byte int at any alignment.
+         * a large 32-bit integer with any alignment.
          */
         pchMessageStart[0] = 0xf9;
         pchMessageStart[1] = 0xbe;
@@ -124,8 +124,9 @@ public:
         nPruneAfterHeight = 100000;
 
         /**
-         * Build the genesis block. Note that the output of the genesis coinbase cannot
-         * be spent as it did not originally exist in the database.
+         * Build the genesis block. Note that the output of its generation
+         * transaction cannot be spent since it did not originally exist in the
+         * database.
          *
          * CBlock(hash=000000000019d6, ver=1, hashPrevBlock=00000000000000, hashMerkleRoot=4a5e1e, nTime=1231006505, nBits=1d00ffff, nNonce=2083236893, vtx=1)
          *   CTransaction(hash=4a5e1e, ver=1, vin.size=1, vout.size=1, nLockTime=0)

src/chainparams.h

@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ public:
     bool MiningRequiresPeers() const { return fMiningRequiresPeers; }
     /** Default value for -checkmempool and -checkblockindex argument */
     bool DefaultConsistencyChecks() const { return fDefaultConsistencyChecks; }
-    /** Make standard checks */
+    /** Policy: Filter transactions that do not match well-defined patterns */
     bool RequireStandard() const { return fRequireStandard; }
     int64_t PruneAfterHeight() const { return nPruneAfterHeight; }
     /** Make miner stop after a block is found. In RPC, don't return until nGenProcLimit blocks are generated */

src/checkpoints.cpp

@@ -15,9 +15,10 @@
 namespace Checkpoints {
 
     /**
-     * How many times we expect transactions after the last checkpoint to
-     * be slower. This number is a compromise, as it can't be accurate for
-     * every system. When reindexing from a fast disk with a slow CPU, it
+     * How many times slower we expect checking transactions after the last
+     * checkpoint to be (from checking signatures, which is skipped up to the
+     * last checkpoint). This number is a compromise, as it can't be accurate
+     * for every system. When reindexing from a fast disk with a slow CPU, it
      * can be up to 20, while when downloading from a slow network with a
      * fast multicore CPU, it won't be much higher than 1.
      */

src/main.cpp

@@ -142,8 +142,9 @@ namespace {
     uint32_t nBlockSequenceId = 1;
 
     /**
-     * Sources of received blocks, to be able to send them reject messages or ban
-     * them, if processing happens afterwards. Protected by cs_main.
+     * Sources of received blocks, saved to be able to send them reject
+     * messages or ban them when processing happens afterwards. Protected by
+     * cs_main.
      */
     map<uint256, NodeId> mapBlockSource;
 
@@ -389,7 +390,7 @@ void FindNextBlocksToDownload(NodeId nodeid, unsigned int count, std::vector<CBl
     }
 
     // If the peer reorganized, our previous pindexLastCommonBlock may not be an ancestor
-    // of their current tip anymore. Go back enough to fix that.
+    // of its current tip anymore. Go back enough to fix that.
     state->pindexLastCommonBlock = LastCommonAncestor(state->pindexLastCommonBlock, state->pindexBestKnownBlock);
     if (state->pindexLastCommonBlock == state->pindexBestKnownBlock)
         return;
@@ -1721,7 +1722,7 @@ bool ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBlockIndex* pin
     // already refuses previously-known transaction ids entirely.
     // This rule was originally applied to all blocks with a timestamp after March 15, 2012, 0:00 UTC.
     // Now that the whole chain is irreversibly beyond that time it is applied to all blocks except the
-    // two in the chain that violate it. This prevents exploiting the issue against nodes in their
+    // two in the chain that violate it. This prevents exploiting the issue against nodes during their
     // initial block download.
     bool fEnforceBIP30 = (!pindex->phashBlock) || // Enforce on CreateNewBlock invocations which don't have a hash.
                           !((pindex->nHeight==91842 && pindex->GetBlockHash() == uint256S("0x00000000000a4d0a398161ffc163c503763b1f4360639393e0e4c8e300e0caec")) ||
@@ -2315,7 +2316,7 @@ bool InvalidateBlock(CValidationState& state, CBlockIndex *pindex) {
     }
 
     // The resulting new best tip may not be in setBlockIndexCandidates anymore, so
-    // add them again.
+    // add it again.
     BlockMap::iterator it = mapBlockIndex.begin();
     while (it != mapBlockIndex.end()) {
         if (it->second->IsValid(BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS) && it->second->nChainTx && !setBlockIndexCandidates.value_comp()(it->second, chainActive.Tip())) {
@@ -3745,7 +3746,7 @@ void static ProcessGetData(CNode* pfrom)
                             // no response
                     }
 
-                    // Trigger them to send a getblocks request for the next batch of inventory
+                    // Trigger the peer node to send a getblocks request for the next batch of inventory
                     if (inv.hash == pfrom->hashContinue)
                     {
                         // Bypass PushInventory, this must send even if redundant,
@@ -4141,8 +4142,8 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv,
             pfrom->PushInventory(CInv(MSG_BLOCK, pindex->GetBlockHash()));
             if (--nLimit <= 0)
             {
-                // When this block is requested, we'll send an inv that'll make them
-                // getblocks the next batch of inventory.
+                // When this block is requested, we'll send an inv that'll
+                // trigger the peer to getblocks the next batch of inventory.
                 LogPrint("net", "  getblocks stopping at limit %d %s\n", pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString());
                 pfrom->hashContinue = pindex->GetBlockHash();
                 break;
@@ -4380,8 +4381,8 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv,
     // This asymmetric behavior for inbound and outbound connections was introduced
     // to prevent a fingerprinting attack: an attacker can send specific fake addresses
     // to users' AddrMan and later request them by sending getaddr messages.
-    // Making users (which are behind NAT and can only make outgoing connections) ignore 
-    // getaddr message mitigates the attack.
+    // Making nodes which are behind NAT and can only make outgoing connections ignore
+    // the getaddr message mitigates the attack.
     else if ((strCommand == "getaddr") && (pfrom->fInbound))
     {
         pfrom->vAddrToSend.clear();
@@ -4734,7 +4735,7 @@ bool SendMessages(CNode* pto, bool fSendTrickle)
 {
     const Consensus::Params& consensusParams = Params().GetConsensus();
     {
-        // Don't send anything until we get their version message
+        // Don't send anything until we get its version message
         if (pto->nVersion == 0)
             return true;
 

src/qt/sendcoinsdialog.cpp

@@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ void SendCoinsDialog::processSendCoinsReturn(const WalletModel::SendCoinsReturn
         msgParams.first = tr("The total exceeds your balance when the %1 transaction fee is included.").arg(msgArg);
         break;
     case WalletModel::DuplicateAddress:
-        msgParams.first = tr("Duplicate address found: can only send to each address once per send operation.");
+        msgParams.first = tr("Duplicate address found: addresses should only be used once each.");
         break;
     case WalletModel::TransactionCreationFailed:
         msgParams.first = tr("Transaction creation failed!");

src/rpcserver.cpp

@@ -912,8 +912,8 @@ static bool HTTPReq_JSONRPC(AcceptedConnection *conn,
     {
         LogPrintf("ThreadRPCServer incorrect password attempt from %s\n", conn->peer_address_to_string());
         /* Deter brute-forcing
-           If this results in a DoS the user really
-           shouldn't have their RPC port exposed. */
+           We don't support exposing the RPC port, so this shouldn't result
+           in a DoS. */
         MilliSleep(250);
 
         conn->stream() << HTTPError(HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED, false) << std::flush;