Browse Source

Non-grammatical language improvements

0.13
Luke Dashjr 10 years ago
parent
commit
b05a89b2de
  1. 2
      doc/gitian-building.md
  2. 2
      doc/release-process.md
  3. 2
      src/addrman.h
  4. 6
      src/base58.h
  5. 2
      src/chain.h
  6. 9
      src/chainparams.cpp
  7. 2
      src/chainparams.h
  8. 7
      src/checkpoints.cpp
  9. 25
      src/main.cpp
  10. 2
      src/qt/sendcoinsdialog.cpp
  11. 4
      src/rpcserver.cpp

2
doc/gitian-building.md

@ -393,4 +393,4 @@ Uploading signatures @@ -393,4 +393,4 @@ Uploading signatures
After building and signing you can push your signatures (both the `.assert` and `.assert.sig` files) to the
[bitcoin/gitian.sigs](https://github.com/bitcoin/gitian.sigs/) repository, or if that's not possible create a pull
request. You can also mail the files to me (laanwj@gmail.com) and I'll commit them.
request. You can also mail the files to Wladimir (laanwj@gmail.com) and he will commit them.

2
doc/release-process.md

@ -164,4 +164,4 @@ Note: check that SHA256SUMS itself doesn't end up in SHA256SUMS, which is a spur @@ -164,4 +164,4 @@ Note: check that SHA256SUMS itself doesn't end up in SHA256SUMS, which is a spur
- Add release notes for the new version to the directory `doc/release-notes` in git master
- Celebrate
- Celebrate

2
src/addrman.h

@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ public: @@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ public:
/** Stochastic address manager
*
* Design goals:
* * Keep the address tables in-memory, and asynchronously dump the entire to able in peers.dat.
* * Keep the address tables in-memory, and asynchronously dump the entire table to peers.dat.
* * Make sure no (localized) attacker can fill the entire table with his nodes/addresses.
*
* To that end:

6
src/base58.h

@ -6,10 +6,10 @@ @@ -6,10 +6,10 @@
/**
* Why base-58 instead of standard base-64 encoding?
* - Don't want 0OIl characters that look the same in some fonts and
* could be used to create visually identical looking account numbers.
* - A string with non-alphanumeric characters is not as easily accepted as an account number.
* could be used to create visually identical looking data.
* - A string with non-alphanumeric characters is not as easily accepted as input.
* - E-mail usually won't line-break if there's no punctuation to break at.
* - Double-clicking selects the whole number as one word if it's all alphanumeric.
* - Double-clicking selects the whole string as one word if it's all alphanumeric.
*/
#ifndef BITCOIN_BASE58_H
#define BITCOIN_BASE58_H

2
src/chain.h

@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ enum BlockStatus { @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ enum BlockStatus {
*/
BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS = 3,
//! Outputs do not overspend inputs, no double spends, coinbase output ok, immature coinbase spends, BIP30.
//! Outputs do not overspend inputs, no double spends, coinbase output ok, no immature coinbase spends, BIP30.
//! Implies all parents are also at least CHAIN.
BLOCK_VALID_CHAIN = 4,

9
src/chainparams.cpp

@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ public: @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ public:
/**
* The message start string is designed to be unlikely to occur in normal data.
* The characters are rarely used upper ASCII, not valid as UTF-8, and produce
* a large 4-byte int at any alignment.
* a large 32-bit integer with any alignment.
*/
pchMessageStart[0] = 0xf9;
pchMessageStart[1] = 0xbe;
@ -124,9 +124,10 @@ public: @@ -124,9 +124,10 @@ public:
nPruneAfterHeight = 100000;
/**
* Build the genesis block. Note that the output of the genesis coinbase cannot
* be spent as it did not originally exist in the database.
*
* Build the genesis block. Note that the output of its generation
* transaction cannot be spent since it did not originally exist in the
* database.
*
* CBlock(hash=000000000019d6, ver=1, hashPrevBlock=00000000000000, hashMerkleRoot=4a5e1e, nTime=1231006505, nBits=1d00ffff, nNonce=2083236893, vtx=1)
* CTransaction(hash=4a5e1e, ver=1, vin.size=1, vout.size=1, nLockTime=0)
* CTxIn(COutPoint(000000, -1), coinbase 04ffff001d0104455468652054696d65732030332f4a616e2f32303039204368616e63656c6c6f72206f6e206272696e6b206f66207365636f6e64206261696c6f757420666f722062616e6b73)

2
src/chainparams.h

@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ public: @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ public:
bool MiningRequiresPeers() const { return fMiningRequiresPeers; }
/** Default value for -checkmempool and -checkblockindex argument */
bool DefaultConsistencyChecks() const { return fDefaultConsistencyChecks; }
/** Make standard checks */
/** Policy: Filter transactions that do not match well-defined patterns */
bool RequireStandard() const { return fRequireStandard; }
int64_t PruneAfterHeight() const { return nPruneAfterHeight; }
/** Make miner stop after a block is found. In RPC, don't return until nGenProcLimit blocks are generated */

7
src/checkpoints.cpp

@ -15,9 +15,10 @@ @@ -15,9 +15,10 @@
namespace Checkpoints {
/**
* How many times we expect transactions after the last checkpoint to
* be slower. This number is a compromise, as it can't be accurate for
* every system. When reindexing from a fast disk with a slow CPU, it
* How many times slower we expect checking transactions after the last
* checkpoint to be (from checking signatures, which is skipped up to the
* last checkpoint). This number is a compromise, as it can't be accurate
* for every system. When reindexing from a fast disk with a slow CPU, it
* can be up to 20, while when downloading from a slow network with a
* fast multicore CPU, it won't be much higher than 1.
*/

25
src/main.cpp

@ -142,8 +142,9 @@ namespace { @@ -142,8 +142,9 @@ namespace {
uint32_t nBlockSequenceId = 1;
/**
* Sources of received blocks, to be able to send them reject messages or ban
* them, if processing happens afterwards. Protected by cs_main.
* Sources of received blocks, saved to be able to send them reject
* messages or ban them when processing happens afterwards. Protected by
* cs_main.
*/
map<uint256, NodeId> mapBlockSource;
@ -389,7 +390,7 @@ void FindNextBlocksToDownload(NodeId nodeid, unsigned int count, std::vector<CBl @@ -389,7 +390,7 @@ void FindNextBlocksToDownload(NodeId nodeid, unsigned int count, std::vector<CBl
}
// If the peer reorganized, our previous pindexLastCommonBlock may not be an ancestor
// of their current tip anymore. Go back enough to fix that.
// of its current tip anymore. Go back enough to fix that.
state->pindexLastCommonBlock = LastCommonAncestor(state->pindexLastCommonBlock, state->pindexBestKnownBlock);
if (state->pindexLastCommonBlock == state->pindexBestKnownBlock)
return;
@ -1721,7 +1722,7 @@ bool ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBlockIndex* pin @@ -1721,7 +1722,7 @@ bool ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBlockIndex* pin
// already refuses previously-known transaction ids entirely.
// This rule was originally applied to all blocks with a timestamp after March 15, 2012, 0:00 UTC.
// Now that the whole chain is irreversibly beyond that time it is applied to all blocks except the
// two in the chain that violate it. This prevents exploiting the issue against nodes in their
// two in the chain that violate it. This prevents exploiting the issue against nodes during their
// initial block download.
bool fEnforceBIP30 = (!pindex->phashBlock) || // Enforce on CreateNewBlock invocations which don't have a hash.
!((pindex->nHeight==91842 && pindex->GetBlockHash() == uint256S("0x00000000000a4d0a398161ffc163c503763b1f4360639393e0e4c8e300e0caec")) ||
@ -2315,7 +2316,7 @@ bool InvalidateBlock(CValidationState& state, CBlockIndex *pindex) { @@ -2315,7 +2316,7 @@ bool InvalidateBlock(CValidationState& state, CBlockIndex *pindex) {
}
// The resulting new best tip may not be in setBlockIndexCandidates anymore, so
// add them again.
// add it again.
BlockMap::iterator it = mapBlockIndex.begin();
while (it != mapBlockIndex.end()) {
if (it->second->IsValid(BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS) && it->second->nChainTx && !setBlockIndexCandidates.value_comp()(it->second, chainActive.Tip())) {
@ -3745,7 +3746,7 @@ void static ProcessGetData(CNode* pfrom) @@ -3745,7 +3746,7 @@ void static ProcessGetData(CNode* pfrom)
// no response
}
// Trigger them to send a getblocks request for the next batch of inventory
// Trigger the peer node to send a getblocks request for the next batch of inventory
if (inv.hash == pfrom->hashContinue)
{
// Bypass PushInventory, this must send even if redundant,
@ -4141,8 +4142,8 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, @@ -4141,8 +4142,8 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv,
pfrom->PushInventory(CInv(MSG_BLOCK, pindex->GetBlockHash()));
if (--nLimit <= 0)
{
// When this block is requested, we'll send an inv that'll make them
// getblocks the next batch of inventory.
// When this block is requested, we'll send an inv that'll
// trigger the peer to getblocks the next batch of inventory.
LogPrint("net", " getblocks stopping at limit %d %s\n", pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString());
pfrom->hashContinue = pindex->GetBlockHash();
break;
@ -4379,9 +4380,9 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, @@ -4379,9 +4380,9 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv,
// This asymmetric behavior for inbound and outbound connections was introduced
// to prevent a fingerprinting attack: an attacker can send specific fake addresses
// to users' AddrMan and later request them by sending getaddr messages.
// Making users (which are behind NAT and can only make outgoing connections) ignore
// getaddr message mitigates the attack.
// to users' AddrMan and later request them by sending getaddr messages.
// Making nodes which are behind NAT and can only make outgoing connections ignore
// the getaddr message mitigates the attack.
else if ((strCommand == "getaddr") && (pfrom->fInbound))
{
pfrom->vAddrToSend.clear();
@ -4734,7 +4735,7 @@ bool SendMessages(CNode* pto, bool fSendTrickle) @@ -4734,7 +4735,7 @@ bool SendMessages(CNode* pto, bool fSendTrickle)
{
const Consensus::Params& consensusParams = Params().GetConsensus();
{
// Don't send anything until we get their version message
// Don't send anything until we get its version message
if (pto->nVersion == 0)
return true;

2
src/qt/sendcoinsdialog.cpp

@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ void SendCoinsDialog::processSendCoinsReturn(const WalletModel::SendCoinsReturn @@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ void SendCoinsDialog::processSendCoinsReturn(const WalletModel::SendCoinsReturn
msgParams.first = tr("The total exceeds your balance when the %1 transaction fee is included.").arg(msgArg);
break;
case WalletModel::DuplicateAddress:
msgParams.first = tr("Duplicate address found: can only send to each address once per send operation.");
msgParams.first = tr("Duplicate address found: addresses should only be used once each.");
break;
case WalletModel::TransactionCreationFailed:
msgParams.first = tr("Transaction creation failed!");

4
src/rpcserver.cpp

@ -912,8 +912,8 @@ static bool HTTPReq_JSONRPC(AcceptedConnection *conn, @@ -912,8 +912,8 @@ static bool HTTPReq_JSONRPC(AcceptedConnection *conn,
{
LogPrintf("ThreadRPCServer incorrect password attempt from %s\n", conn->peer_address_to_string());
/* Deter brute-forcing
If this results in a DoS the user really
shouldn't have their RPC port exposed. */
We don't support exposing the RPC port, so this shouldn't result
in a DoS. */
MilliSleep(250);
conn->stream() << HTTPError(HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED, false) << std::flush;

Loading…
Cancel
Save