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@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ signing requests. |
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For OSX, the private key was generated by Keychain.app on Gavin's main work machine. |
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For OSX, the private key was generated by Keychain.app on Gavin's main work machine. |
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The key and certificate is in a separate, passphrase-protected keychain file that is |
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The key and certificate is in a separate, passphrase-protected keychain file that is |
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unlocked to sign the Bitcoin-Core.app bundle. |
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unlocked to sign the Bitcoin-Qt.app bundle. |
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For Windows, the private key was generated by Firefox running on Gavin's main work machine. |
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For Windows, the private key was generated by Firefox running on Gavin's main work machine. |
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The key and certificate were exported into a separate, passphrase-protected PKCS#12 file, and |
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The key and certificate were exported into a separate, passphrase-protected PKCS#12 file, and |
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@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ Threat analysis |
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-- |
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-- |
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Gavin is a single point of failure. He could be coerced to divulge the secret signing keys, |
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Gavin is a single point of failure. He could be coerced to divulge the secret signing keys, |
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allowing somebody to distribute a Bitcoin-Core.app or bitcoin-qt-setup.exe with a valid |
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allowing somebody to distribute a Bitcoin-Qt.app or bitcoin-qt-setup.exe with a valid |
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signature but containing a malicious binary. |
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signature but containing a malicious binary. |
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Or the machine Gavin uses to sign the binaries could be compromised, either remotely or |
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Or the machine Gavin uses to sign the binaries could be compromised, either remotely or |
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