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3325 lines
97 KiB
3325 lines
97 KiB
/* |
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* ! \file ssl/ssl_lib.c \brief Version independent SSL functions. |
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*/ |
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
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* All rights reserved. |
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* |
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* This package is an SSL implementation written |
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
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* |
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
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* |
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
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* the code are not to be removed. |
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
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* as the author of the parts of the library used. |
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
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* |
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
|
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
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* are met: |
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
|
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
|
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
|
* must display the following acknowledgement: |
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
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* |
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
|
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
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* SUCH DAMAGE. |
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* |
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
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* copied and put under another distribution licence |
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
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*/ |
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/* ==================================================================== |
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
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* |
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
|
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
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* are met: |
|
* |
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
|
* |
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
|
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
|
* distribution. |
|
* |
|
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
|
* software must display the following acknowledgment: |
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
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* |
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
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* openssl-core@openssl.org. |
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* |
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
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* |
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
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* acknowledgment: |
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
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* |
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
|
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
|
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
|
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
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* ==================================================================== |
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* |
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
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* |
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*/ |
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/* ==================================================================== |
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* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. |
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* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by |
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* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. |
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*/ |
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/* ==================================================================== |
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* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. |
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* |
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* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by |
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* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source |
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* license. |
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* |
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* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of |
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* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites |
|
* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. |
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* |
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* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in |
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* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received |
|
* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. |
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* |
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* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not |
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* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third |
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* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights |
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* to make use of the Contribution. |
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* |
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN |
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* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA |
|
* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY |
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* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR |
|
* OTHERWISE. |
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*/ |
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|
|
#ifdef REF_CHECK |
|
# include <assert.h> |
|
#endif |
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#include <stdio.h> |
|
#include "ssl_locl.h" |
|
#include "kssl_lcl.h" |
|
#include <openssl/objects.h> |
|
#include <openssl/lhash.h> |
|
#include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
|
#include <openssl/rand.h> |
|
#include <openssl/ocsp.h> |
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
|
# include <openssl/dh.h> |
|
#endif |
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE |
|
# include <openssl/engine.h> |
|
#endif |
|
|
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const char *SSL_version_str = OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT; |
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|
|
SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method = { |
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/* |
|
* evil casts, but these functions are only called if there's a library |
|
* bug |
|
*/ |
|
(int (*)(SSL *, int))ssl_undefined_function, |
|
(int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function, |
|
ssl_undefined_function, |
|
(int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int)) |
|
ssl_undefined_function, |
|
(int (*)(SSL *, int))ssl_undefined_function, |
|
(int (*)(SSL *, const char *, int, unsigned char *)) |
|
ssl_undefined_function, |
|
0, /* finish_mac_length */ |
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(int (*)(SSL *, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function, |
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NULL, /* client_finished_label */ |
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0, /* client_finished_label_len */ |
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NULL, /* server_finished_label */ |
|
0, /* server_finished_label_len */ |
|
(int (*)(int))ssl_undefined_function, |
|
(int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t, const char *, |
|
size_t, const unsigned char *, size_t, |
|
int use_context))ssl_undefined_function, |
|
}; |
|
|
|
int SSL_clear(SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
|
|
if (s->method == NULL) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR, SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED); |
|
return (0); |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (ssl_clear_bad_session(s)) { |
|
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); |
|
s->session = NULL; |
|
} |
|
|
|
s->error = 0; |
|
s->hit = 0; |
|
s->shutdown = 0; |
|
|
|
#if 0 |
|
/* |
|
* Disabled since version 1.10 of this file (early return not |
|
* needed because SSL_clear is not called when doing renegotiation) |
|
*/ |
|
/* |
|
* This is set if we are doing dynamic renegotiation so keep |
|
* the old cipher. It is sort of a SSL_clear_lite :-) |
|
*/ |
|
if (s->renegotiate) |
|
return (1); |
|
#else |
|
if (s->renegotiate) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
s->type = 0; |
|
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_BEFORE | ((s->server) ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT); |
|
|
|
s->version = s->method->version; |
|
s->client_version = s->version; |
|
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; |
|
s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; |
|
#if 0 |
|
s->read_ahead = s->ctx->read_ahead; |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
if (s->init_buf != NULL) { |
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BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); |
|
s->init_buf = NULL; |
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} |
|
|
|
ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); |
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ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash); |
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ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash); |
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|
|
s->first_packet = 0; |
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|
|
#if 1 |
|
/* |
|
* Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if so, revert |
|
* back if we are not doing session-id reuse. |
|
*/ |
|
if (!s->in_handshake && (s->session == NULL) |
|
&& (s->method != s->ctx->method)) { |
|
s->method->ssl_free(s); |
|
s->method = s->ctx->method; |
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if (!s->method->ssl_new(s)) |
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return (0); |
|
} else |
|
#endif |
|
s->method->ssl_clear(s); |
|
return (1); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** Used to change an SSL_CTXs default SSL method type */ |
|
int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *meth) |
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{ |
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; |
|
|
|
ctx->method = meth; |
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|
|
sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method, &(ctx->cipher_list), |
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&(ctx->cipher_list_by_id), |
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meth->version == |
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SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : |
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SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST); |
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if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0)) { |
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION, |
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SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); |
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return (0); |
|
} |
|
return (1); |
|
} |
|
|
|
SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) |
|
{ |
|
SSL *s; |
|
|
|
if (ctx == NULL) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX); |
|
return (NULL); |
|
} |
|
if (ctx->method == NULL) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION); |
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return (NULL); |
|
} |
|
|
|
s = (SSL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL)); |
|
if (s == NULL) |
|
goto err; |
|
memset(s, 0, sizeof(SSL)); |
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 |
|
s->kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); |
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ |
|
|
|
s->options = ctx->options; |
|
s->mode = ctx->mode; |
|
s->max_cert_list = ctx->max_cert_list; |
|
s->references = 1; |
|
|
|
if (ctx->cert != NULL) { |
|
/* |
|
* Earlier library versions used to copy the pointer to the CERT, not |
|
* its contents; only when setting new parameters for the per-SSL |
|
* copy, ssl_cert_new would be called (and the direct reference to |
|
* the per-SSL_CTX settings would be lost, but those still were |
|
* indirectly accessed for various purposes, and for that reason they |
|
* used to be known as s->ctx->default_cert). Now we don't look at the |
|
* SSL_CTX's CERT after having duplicated it once. |
|
*/ |
|
|
|
s->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert); |
|
if (s->cert == NULL) |
|
goto err; |
|
} else |
|
s->cert = NULL; /* Cannot really happen (see SSL_CTX_new) */ |
|
|
|
s->read_ahead = ctx->read_ahead; |
|
s->msg_callback = ctx->msg_callback; |
|
s->msg_callback_arg = ctx->msg_callback_arg; |
|
s->verify_mode = ctx->verify_mode; |
|
#if 0 |
|
s->verify_depth = ctx->verify_depth; |
|
#endif |
|
s->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length; |
|
OPENSSL_assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof s->sid_ctx); |
|
memcpy(&s->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(s->sid_ctx)); |
|
s->verify_callback = ctx->default_verify_callback; |
|
s->generate_session_id = ctx->generate_session_id; |
|
|
|
s->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); |
|
if (!s->param) |
|
goto err; |
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(s->param, ctx->param); |
|
#if 0 |
|
s->purpose = ctx->purpose; |
|
s->trust = ctx->trust; |
|
#endif |
|
s->quiet_shutdown = ctx->quiet_shutdown; |
|
s->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment; |
|
|
|
CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); |
|
s->ctx = ctx; |
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
|
s->tlsext_debug_cb = 0; |
|
s->tlsext_debug_arg = NULL; |
|
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; |
|
s->tlsext_status_type = -1; |
|
s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; |
|
s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL; |
|
s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = NULL; |
|
s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; |
|
s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; |
|
CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); |
|
s->initial_ctx = ctx; |
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
|
s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL; |
|
# endif |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
s->verify_result = X509_V_OK; |
|
|
|
s->method = ctx->method; |
|
|
|
if (!s->method->ssl_new(s)) |
|
goto err; |
|
|
|
s->server = (ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function) ? 0 : 1; |
|
|
|
SSL_clear(s); |
|
|
|
CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data); |
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
|
s->psk_client_callback = ctx->psk_client_callback; |
|
s->psk_server_callback = ctx->psk_server_callback; |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
return (s); |
|
err: |
|
if (s != NULL) |
|
SSL_free(s); |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
|
return (NULL); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sid_ctx, |
|
unsigned int sid_ctx_len) |
|
{ |
|
if (sid_ctx_len > sizeof ctx->sid_ctx) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT, |
|
SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
ctx->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len; |
|
memcpy(ctx->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len); |
|
|
|
return 1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *sid_ctx, |
|
unsigned int sid_ctx_len) |
|
{ |
|
if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT, |
|
SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
ssl->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len; |
|
memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len); |
|
|
|
return 1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, GEN_SESSION_CB cb) |
|
{ |
|
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); |
|
ctx->generate_session_id = cb; |
|
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); |
|
return 1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB cb) |
|
{ |
|
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); |
|
ssl->generate_session_id = cb; |
|
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); |
|
return 1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id, |
|
unsigned int id_len) |
|
{ |
|
/* |
|
* A quick examination of SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp shows how |
|
* we can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - ie. to |
|
* find if there's a session in the hash table that would conflict with |
|
* any new session built out of this id/id_len and the ssl_version in use |
|
* by this SSL. |
|
*/ |
|
SSL_SESSION r, *p; |
|
|
|
if (id_len > sizeof r.session_id) |
|
return 0; |
|
|
|
r.ssl_version = ssl->version; |
|
r.session_id_length = id_len; |
|
memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len); |
|
/* |
|
* NB: SSLv2 always uses a fixed 16-byte session ID, so even if a |
|
* callback is calling us to check the uniqueness of a shorter ID, it |
|
* must be compared as a padded-out ID because that is what it will be |
|
* converted to when the callback has finished choosing it. |
|
*/ |
|
if ((r.ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) && |
|
(id_len < SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) { |
|
memset(r.session_id + id_len, 0, SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH - id_len); |
|
r.session_id_length = SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; |
|
} |
|
|
|
CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); |
|
p = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ssl->ctx->sessions, &r); |
|
CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); |
|
return (p != NULL); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose) |
|
{ |
|
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose) |
|
{ |
|
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust) |
|
{ |
|
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust) |
|
{ |
|
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm) |
|
{ |
|
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, vpm); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm) |
|
{ |
|
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ssl->param, vpm); |
|
} |
|
|
|
void SSL_free(SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
int i; |
|
|
|
if (s == NULL) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
i = CRYPTO_add(&s->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); |
|
#ifdef REF_PRINT |
|
REF_PRINT("SSL", s); |
|
#endif |
|
if (i > 0) |
|
return; |
|
#ifdef REF_CHECK |
|
if (i < 0) { |
|
fprintf(stderr, "SSL_free, bad reference count\n"); |
|
abort(); /* ok */ |
|
} |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
if (s->param) |
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(s->param); |
|
|
|
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data); |
|
|
|
if (s->bbio != NULL) { |
|
/* If the buffering BIO is in place, pop it off */ |
|
if (s->bbio == s->wbio) { |
|
s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio); |
|
} |
|
BIO_free(s->bbio); |
|
s->bbio = NULL; |
|
} |
|
if (s->rbio != NULL) |
|
BIO_free_all(s->rbio); |
|
if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != s->rbio)) |
|
BIO_free_all(s->wbio); |
|
|
|
if (s->init_buf != NULL) |
|
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); |
|
|
|
/* add extra stuff */ |
|
if (s->cipher_list != NULL) |
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); |
|
if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) |
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); |
|
|
|
/* Make the next call work :-) */ |
|
if (s->session != NULL) { |
|
ssl_clear_bad_session(s); |
|
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); |
|
} |
|
|
|
ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); |
|
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash); |
|
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash); |
|
|
|
if (s->cert != NULL) |
|
ssl_cert_free(s->cert); |
|
/* Free up if allocated */ |
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
|
if (s->tlsext_hostname) |
|
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname); |
|
if (s->initial_ctx) |
|
SSL_CTX_free(s->initial_ctx); |
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
|
if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) |
|
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); |
|
if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) |
|
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); |
|
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
|
if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input) |
|
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input); |
|
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) |
|
sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, X509_EXTENSION_free); |
|
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids) |
|
sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free); |
|
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) |
|
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
if (s->client_CA != NULL) |
|
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->client_CA, X509_NAME_free); |
|
|
|
if (s->method != NULL) |
|
s->method->ssl_free(s); |
|
|
|
if (s->ctx) |
|
SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx); |
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 |
|
if (s->kssl_ctx != NULL) |
|
kssl_ctx_free(s->kssl_ctx); |
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ |
|
|
|
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) |
|
if (s->next_proto_negotiated) |
|
OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated); |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP |
|
if (s->srtp_profiles) |
|
sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(s->srtp_profiles); |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s); |
|
} |
|
|
|
void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio) |
|
{ |
|
/* |
|
* If the output buffering BIO is still in place, remove it |
|
*/ |
|
if (s->bbio != NULL) { |
|
if (s->wbio == s->bbio) { |
|
s->wbio = s->wbio->next_bio; |
|
s->bbio->next_bio = NULL; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
if ((s->rbio != NULL) && (s->rbio != rbio)) |
|
BIO_free_all(s->rbio); |
|
if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != wbio) && (s->rbio != s->wbio)) |
|
BIO_free_all(s->wbio); |
|
s->rbio = rbio; |
|
s->wbio = wbio; |
|
} |
|
|
|
BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
return (s->rbio); |
|
} |
|
|
|
BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
return (s->wbio); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
return (SSL_get_rfd(s)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
int ret = -1; |
|
BIO *b, *r; |
|
|
|
b = SSL_get_rbio(s); |
|
r = BIO_find_type(b, BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR); |
|
if (r != NULL) |
|
BIO_get_fd(r, &ret); |
|
return (ret); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
int ret = -1; |
|
BIO *b, *r; |
|
|
|
b = SSL_get_wbio(s); |
|
r = BIO_find_type(b, BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR); |
|
if (r != NULL) |
|
BIO_get_fd(r, &ret); |
|
return (ret); |
|
} |
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK |
|
int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s, int fd) |
|
{ |
|
int ret = 0; |
|
BIO *bio = NULL; |
|
|
|
bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); |
|
|
|
if (bio == NULL) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); |
|
goto err; |
|
} |
|
BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE); |
|
SSL_set_bio(s, bio, bio); |
|
ret = 1; |
|
err: |
|
return (ret); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s, int fd) |
|
{ |
|
int ret = 0; |
|
BIO *bio = NULL; |
|
|
|
if ((s->rbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->rbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET) |
|
|| ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->rbio, NULL) != fd)) { |
|
bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); |
|
|
|
if (bio == NULL) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); |
|
goto err; |
|
} |
|
BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE); |
|
SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_rbio(s), bio); |
|
} else |
|
SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_rbio(s), SSL_get_rbio(s)); |
|
ret = 1; |
|
err: |
|
return (ret); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s, int fd) |
|
{ |
|
int ret = 0; |
|
BIO *bio = NULL; |
|
|
|
if ((s->wbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->wbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET) |
|
|| ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->wbio, NULL) != fd)) { |
|
bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); |
|
|
|
if (bio == NULL) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); |
|
goto err; |
|
} |
|
BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE); |
|
SSL_set_bio(s, bio, SSL_get_wbio(s)); |
|
} else |
|
SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_wbio(s), SSL_get_wbio(s)); |
|
ret = 1; |
|
err: |
|
return (ret); |
|
} |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
/* return length of latest Finished message we sent, copy to 'buf' */ |
|
size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count) |
|
{ |
|
size_t ret = 0; |
|
|
|
if (s->s3 != NULL) { |
|
ret = s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len; |
|
if (count > ret) |
|
count = ret; |
|
memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, count); |
|
} |
|
return ret; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* return length of latest Finished message we expected, copy to 'buf' */ |
|
size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count) |
|
{ |
|
size_t ret = 0; |
|
|
|
if (s->s3 != NULL) { |
|
ret = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; |
|
if (count > ret) |
|
count = ret; |
|
memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, count); |
|
} |
|
return ret; |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
return (s->verify_mode); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(s->param); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s)) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *) { |
|
return (s->verify_callback); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx) |
|
{ |
|
return (ctx->verify_mode); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx) |
|
{ |
|
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ctx->param); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx)) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *) { |
|
return (ctx->default_verify_callback); |
|
} |
|
|
|
void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s, int mode, |
|
int (*callback) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)) |
|
{ |
|
s->verify_mode = mode; |
|
if (callback != NULL) |
|
s->verify_callback = callback; |
|
} |
|
|
|
void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s, int depth) |
|
{ |
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(s->param, depth); |
|
} |
|
|
|
void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s, int yes) |
|
{ |
|
s->read_ahead = yes; |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
return (s->read_ahead); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_pending(const SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
/* |
|
* SSL_pending cannot work properly if read-ahead is enabled |
|
* (SSL_[CTX_]ctrl(..., SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD, 1, NULL)), and it is |
|
* impossible to fix since SSL_pending cannot report errors that may be |
|
* observed while scanning the new data. (Note that SSL_pending() is |
|
* often used as a boolean value, so we'd better not return -1.) |
|
*/ |
|
return (s->method->ssl_pending(s)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
X509 *r; |
|
|
|
if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL)) |
|
r = NULL; |
|
else |
|
r = s->session->peer; |
|
|
|
if (r == NULL) |
|
return (r); |
|
|
|
CRYPTO_add(&r->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); |
|
|
|
return (r); |
|
} |
|
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
STACK_OF(X509) *r; |
|
|
|
if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL) |
|
|| (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)) |
|
r = NULL; |
|
else |
|
r = s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain; |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* If we are a client, cert_chain includes the peer's own certificate; if |
|
* we are a server, it does not. |
|
*/ |
|
|
|
return (r); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Now in theory, since the calling process own 't' it should be safe to |
|
* modify. We need to be able to read f without being hassled |
|
*/ |
|
void SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *t, const SSL *f) |
|
{ |
|
CERT *tmp; |
|
|
|
/* Do we need to to SSL locking? */ |
|
SSL_set_session(t, SSL_get_session(f)); |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* what if we are setup as SSLv2 but want to talk SSLv3 or vice-versa |
|
*/ |
|
if (t->method != f->method) { |
|
t->method->ssl_free(t); /* cleanup current */ |
|
t->method = f->method; /* change method */ |
|
t->method->ssl_new(t); /* setup new */ |
|
} |
|
|
|
tmp = t->cert; |
|
if (f->cert != NULL) { |
|
CRYPTO_add(&f->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT); |
|
t->cert = f->cert; |
|
} else |
|
t->cert = NULL; |
|
if (tmp != NULL) |
|
ssl_cert_free(tmp); |
|
SSL_set_session_id_context(t, f->sid_ctx, f->sid_ctx_length); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options */ |
|
int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx) |
|
{ |
|
if ((ctx == NULL) || |
|
(ctx->cert == NULL) || (ctx->cert->key->x509 == NULL)) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, |
|
SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); |
|
return (0); |
|
} |
|
if (ctx->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, |
|
SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); |
|
return (0); |
|
} |
|
return (X509_check_private_key |
|
(ctx->cert->key->x509, ctx->cert->key->privatekey)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */ |
|
int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl) |
|
{ |
|
if (ssl == NULL) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); |
|
return (0); |
|
} |
|
if (ssl->cert == NULL) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
if (ssl->cert->key->x509 == NULL) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); |
|
return (0); |
|
} |
|
if (ssl->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); |
|
return (0); |
|
} |
|
return (X509_check_private_key(ssl->cert->key->x509, |
|
ssl->cert->key->privatekey)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_accept(SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
if (s->handshake_func == 0) |
|
/* Not properly initialized yet */ |
|
SSL_set_accept_state(s); |
|
|
|
return (s->method->ssl_accept(s)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_connect(SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
if (s->handshake_func == 0) |
|
/* Not properly initialized yet */ |
|
SSL_set_connect_state(s); |
|
|
|
return (s->method->ssl_connect(s)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
return (s->method->get_timeout()); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int num) |
|
{ |
|
if (s->handshake_func == 0) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); |
|
return -1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { |
|
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; |
|
return (0); |
|
} |
|
return (s->method->ssl_read(s, buf, num)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int num) |
|
{ |
|
if (s->handshake_func == 0) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); |
|
return -1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { |
|
return (0); |
|
} |
|
return (s->method->ssl_peek(s, buf, num)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int num) |
|
{ |
|
if (s->handshake_func == 0) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); |
|
return -1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { |
|
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN); |
|
return (-1); |
|
} |
|
return (s->method->ssl_write(s, buf, num)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
/* |
|
* Note that this function behaves differently from what one might |
|
* expect. Return values are 0 for no success (yet), 1 for success; but |
|
* calling it once is usually not enough, even if blocking I/O is used |
|
* (see ssl3_shutdown). |
|
*/ |
|
|
|
if (s->handshake_func == 0) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); |
|
return -1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if ((s != NULL) && !SSL_in_init(s)) |
|
return (s->method->ssl_shutdown(s)); |
|
else |
|
return (1); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
if (s->renegotiate == 0) |
|
s->renegotiate = 1; |
|
|
|
s->new_session = 1; |
|
|
|
return (s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
if (s->renegotiate == 0) |
|
s->renegotiate = 1; |
|
|
|
s->new_session = 0; |
|
|
|
return (s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
/* |
|
* becomes true when negotiation is requested; false again once a |
|
* handshake has finished |
|
*/ |
|
return (s->renegotiate != 0); |
|
} |
|
|
|
long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) |
|
{ |
|
long l; |
|
|
|
switch (cmd) { |
|
case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD: |
|
return (s->read_ahead); |
|
case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD: |
|
l = s->read_ahead; |
|
s->read_ahead = larg; |
|
return (l); |
|
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG: |
|
s->msg_callback_arg = parg; |
|
return 1; |
|
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS: |
|
return (s->options |= larg); |
|
case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS: |
|
return (s->options &= ~larg); |
|
case SSL_CTRL_MODE: |
|
return (s->mode |= larg); |
|
case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE: |
|
return (s->mode &= ~larg); |
|
case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST: |
|
return (s->max_cert_list); |
|
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST: |
|
l = s->max_cert_list; |
|
s->max_cert_list = larg; |
|
return (l); |
|
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT: |
|
if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) |
|
return 0; |
|
s->max_send_fragment = larg; |
|
return 1; |
|
case SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT: |
|
if (s->s3) |
|
return s->s3->send_connection_binding; |
|
else |
|
return 0; |
|
default: |
|
return (s->method->ssl_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg)); |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void)) |
|
{ |
|
switch (cmd) { |
|
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK: |
|
s->msg_callback = (void (*) |
|
(int write_p, int version, int content_type, |
|
const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, |
|
void *arg))(fp); |
|
return 1; |
|
|
|
default: |
|
return (s->method->ssl_callback_ctrl(s, cmd, fp)); |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx) |
|
{ |
|
return ctx->sessions; |
|
} |
|
|
|
long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) |
|
{ |
|
long l; |
|
|
|
switch (cmd) { |
|
case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD: |
|
return (ctx->read_ahead); |
|
case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD: |
|
l = ctx->read_ahead; |
|
ctx->read_ahead = larg; |
|
return (l); |
|
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG: |
|
ctx->msg_callback_arg = parg; |
|
return 1; |
|
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST: |
|
return (ctx->max_cert_list); |
|
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST: |
|
l = ctx->max_cert_list; |
|
ctx->max_cert_list = larg; |
|
return (l); |
|
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE: |
|
l = ctx->session_cache_size; |
|
ctx->session_cache_size = larg; |
|
return (l); |
|
case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE: |
|
return (ctx->session_cache_size); |
|
case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE: |
|
l = ctx->session_cache_mode; |
|
ctx->session_cache_mode = larg; |
|
return (l); |
|
case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE: |
|
return (ctx->session_cache_mode); |
|
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER: |
|
return (lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions)); |
|
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT: |
|
return (ctx->stats.sess_connect); |
|
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD: |
|
return (ctx->stats.sess_connect_good); |
|
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE: |
|
return (ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate); |
|
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT: |
|
return (ctx->stats.sess_accept); |
|
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD: |
|
return (ctx->stats.sess_accept_good); |
|
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE: |
|
return (ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate); |
|
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT: |
|
return (ctx->stats.sess_hit); |
|
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT: |
|
return (ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit); |
|
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES: |
|
return (ctx->stats.sess_miss); |
|
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS: |
|
return (ctx->stats.sess_timeout); |
|
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL: |
|
return (ctx->stats.sess_cache_full); |
|
case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS: |
|
return (ctx->options |= larg); |
|
case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS: |
|
return (ctx->options &= ~larg); |
|
case SSL_CTRL_MODE: |
|
return (ctx->mode |= larg); |
|
case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE: |
|
return (ctx->mode &= ~larg); |
|
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT: |
|
if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) |
|
return 0; |
|
ctx->max_send_fragment = larg; |
|
return 1; |
|
default: |
|
return (ctx->method->ssl_ctx_ctrl(ctx, cmd, larg, parg)); |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp) (void)) |
|
{ |
|
switch (cmd) { |
|
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK: |
|
ctx->msg_callback = (void (*) |
|
(int write_p, int version, int content_type, |
|
const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, |
|
void *arg))(fp); |
|
return 1; |
|
|
|
default: |
|
return (ctx->method->ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx, cmd, fp)); |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b) |
|
{ |
|
long l; |
|
|
|
l = a->id - b->id; |
|
if (l == 0L) |
|
return (0); |
|
else |
|
return ((l > 0) ? 1 : -1); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *const *ap, |
|
const SSL_CIPHER *const *bp) |
|
{ |
|
long l; |
|
|
|
l = (*ap)->id - (*bp)->id; |
|
if (l == 0L) |
|
return (0); |
|
else |
|
return ((l > 0) ? 1 : -1); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of |
|
* preference */ |
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
if (s != NULL) { |
|
if (s->cipher_list != NULL) { |
|
return (s->cipher_list); |
|
} else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->cipher_list != NULL)) { |
|
return (s->ctx->cipher_list); |
|
} |
|
} |
|
return (NULL); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of |
|
* algorithm id */ |
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
if (s != NULL) { |
|
if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) { |
|
return (s->cipher_list_by_id); |
|
} else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)) { |
|
return (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id); |
|
} |
|
} |
|
return (NULL); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** The old interface to get the same thing as SSL_get_ciphers() */ |
|
const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s, int n) |
|
{ |
|
SSL_CIPHER *c; |
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; |
|
|
|
if (s == NULL) |
|
return (NULL); |
|
sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s); |
|
if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= n)) |
|
return (NULL); |
|
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, n); |
|
if (c == NULL) |
|
return (NULL); |
|
return (c->name); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** specify the ciphers to be used by default by the SSL_CTX */ |
|
int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) |
|
{ |
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; |
|
|
|
sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method, &ctx->cipher_list, |
|
&ctx->cipher_list_by_id, str); |
|
/* |
|
* ssl_create_cipher_list may return an empty stack if it was unable to |
|
* find a cipher matching the given rule string (for example if the rule |
|
* string specifies a cipher which has been disabled). This is not an |
|
* error as far as ssl_create_cipher_list is concerned, and hence |
|
* ctx->cipher_list and ctx->cipher_list_by_id has been updated. |
|
*/ |
|
if (sk == NULL) |
|
return 0; |
|
else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
return 1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */ |
|
int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s, const char *str) |
|
{ |
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; |
|
|
|
sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(s->ctx->method, &s->cipher_list, |
|
&s->cipher_list_by_id, str); |
|
/* see comment in SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list */ |
|
if (sk == NULL) |
|
return 0; |
|
else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
return 1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* works well for SSLv2, not so good for SSLv3 */ |
|
char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int len) |
|
{ |
|
char *p; |
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; |
|
SSL_CIPHER *c; |
|
int i; |
|
|
|
if ((s->session == NULL) || (s->session->ciphers == NULL) || (len < 2)) |
|
return (NULL); |
|
|
|
p = buf; |
|
sk = s->session->ciphers; |
|
|
|
if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) |
|
return NULL; |
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) { |
|
int n; |
|
|
|
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); |
|
n = strlen(c->name); |
|
if (n + 1 > len) { |
|
if (p != buf) |
|
--p; |
|
*p = '\0'; |
|
return buf; |
|
} |
|
strcpy(p, c->name); |
|
p += n; |
|
*(p++) = ':'; |
|
len -= n + 1; |
|
} |
|
p[-1] = '\0'; |
|
return (buf); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, |
|
unsigned char *p, |
|
int (*put_cb) (const SSL_CIPHER *, |
|
unsigned char *)) |
|
{ |
|
int i, j = 0; |
|
SSL_CIPHER *c; |
|
unsigned char *q; |
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 |
|
int nokrb5 = !kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx); |
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ |
|
|
|
if (sk == NULL) |
|
return (0); |
|
q = p; |
|
if (put_cb == NULL) |
|
put_cb = s->method->put_cipher_by_char; |
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) { |
|
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); |
|
/* Skip TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites if lower than v1.2 */ |
|
if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) && |
|
(TLS1_get_client_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)) |
|
continue; |
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 |
|
if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) |
|
|| (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) && nokrb5) |
|
continue; |
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ |
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
|
/* with PSK there must be client callback set */ |
|
if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) |
|
&& s->psk_client_callback == NULL) |
|
continue; |
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ |
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
|
if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)) |
|
&& !(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) |
|
continue; |
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ |
|
j = put_cb(c, p); |
|
p += j; |
|
} |
|
/* |
|
* If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add |
|
* applicable SCSVs. |
|
*/ |
|
if (p != q) { |
|
if (!s->renegotiate) { |
|
static SSL_CIPHER scsv = { |
|
0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 |
|
}; |
|
j = put_cb(&scsv, p); |
|
p += j; |
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG |
|
fprintf(stderr, |
|
"TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n"); |
|
#endif |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) { |
|
static SSL_CIPHER scsv = { |
|
0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 |
|
}; |
|
j = put_cb(&scsv, p); |
|
p += j; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
return (p - q); |
|
} |
|
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, |
|
int num, |
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp) |
|
{ |
|
const SSL_CIPHER *c; |
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; |
|
int i, n; |
|
|
|
if (s->s3) |
|
s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0; |
|
|
|
n = ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL); |
|
if (n == 0 || (num % n) != 0) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, |
|
SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST); |
|
return (NULL); |
|
} |
|
if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) { |
|
sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */ |
|
if(sk == NULL) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
|
return NULL; |
|
} |
|
} else { |
|
sk = *skp; |
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk); |
|
} |
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < num; i += n) { |
|
/* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */ |
|
if (s->s3 && (n != 3 || !p[0]) && |
|
(p[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) && |
|
(p[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) { |
|
/* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */ |
|
if (s->renegotiate) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, |
|
SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING); |
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
|
goto err; |
|
} |
|
s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; |
|
p += n; |
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG |
|
fprintf(stderr, "SCSV received by server\n"); |
|
#endif |
|
continue; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */ |
|
if ((n != 3 || !p[0]) && |
|
(p[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) && |
|
(p[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) { |
|
/* |
|
* The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher |
|
* version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected |
|
* downgrade. |
|
*/ |
|
if (!SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL)) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, |
|
SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); |
|
if (s->s3) |
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, |
|
SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); |
|
goto err; |
|
} |
|
p += n; |
|
continue; |
|
} |
|
|
|
c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p); |
|
p += n; |
|
if (c != NULL) { |
|
if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
|
goto err; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (skp != NULL) |
|
*skp = sk; |
|
return (sk); |
|
err: |
|
if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) |
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk); |
|
return (NULL); |
|
} |
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
|
/** return a servername extension value if provided in Client Hello, or NULL. |
|
* So far, only host_name types are defined (RFC 3546). |
|
*/ |
|
|
|
const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type) |
|
{ |
|
if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) |
|
return NULL; |
|
|
|
return s->session && !s->tlsext_hostname ? |
|
s->session->tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname; |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
if (s->session |
|
&& (!s->tlsext_hostname ? s->session-> |
|
tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname)) |
|
return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; |
|
return -1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
|
/* |
|
* SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is |
|
* expected that this function is called from the callback set by |
|
* SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb. The protocol data is assumed to be a |
|
* vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte strings. The length byte itself is |
|
* not included in the length. A byte string of length 0 is invalid. No byte |
|
* string may be truncated. The current, but experimental algorithm for |
|
* selecting the protocol is: 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this |
|
* is indicated to the callback. In this case, the client application has to |
|
* abort the connection or have a default application level protocol. 2) If |
|
* the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the client |
|
* selects the first protcol in its list, but indicates via the API that this |
|
* fallback case was enacted. 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first |
|
* protocol in the server's list that it supports and selects this protocol. |
|
* This is because it's assumed that the server has better information about |
|
* which protocol a client should use. 4) If the client doesn't support any |
|
* of the server's advertised protocols, then this is treated the same as |
|
* case 2. It returns either OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was |
|
* found, or OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached. |
|
*/ |
|
int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, |
|
const unsigned char *server, |
|
unsigned int server_len, |
|
const unsigned char *client, |
|
unsigned int client_len) |
|
{ |
|
unsigned int i, j; |
|
const unsigned char *result; |
|
int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED; |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it. |
|
*/ |
|
for (i = 0; i < server_len;) { |
|
for (j = 0; j < client_len;) { |
|
if (server[i] == client[j] && |
|
memcmp(&server[i + 1], &client[j + 1], server[i]) == 0) { |
|
/* We found a match */ |
|
result = &server[i]; |
|
status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED; |
|
goto found; |
|
} |
|
j += client[j]; |
|
j++; |
|
} |
|
i += server[i]; |
|
i++; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */ |
|
result = client; |
|
status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP; |
|
|
|
found: |
|
*out = (unsigned char *)result + 1; |
|
*outlen = result[0]; |
|
return status; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the |
|
* client's requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the |
|
* client didn't request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL. Note that |
|
* the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned from |
|
* this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols |
|
* provided by the callback. |
|
*/ |
|
void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, |
|
unsigned *len) |
|
{ |
|
*data = s->next_proto_negotiated; |
|
if (!*data) { |
|
*len = 0; |
|
} else { |
|
*len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when |
|
* a TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol |
|
* Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format. The list is |
|
* returned by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This |
|
* memory will not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a |
|
* reference to it. The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it |
|
* wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no such extension will be included in the |
|
* ServerHello. |
|
*/ |
|
void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
|
int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, |
|
const unsigned char |
|
**out, |
|
unsigned int *outlen, |
|
void *arg), void *arg) |
|
{ |
|
ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb; |
|
ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a |
|
* client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list. |out| |
|
* must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within |in|). |
|
* The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The |
|
* server's advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The |
|
* callback can assume that |in| is syntactically valid. The client must |
|
* select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this callback returns |
|
* a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK. |
|
*/ |
|
void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
|
int (*cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out, |
|
unsigned char *outlen, |
|
const unsigned char *in, |
|
unsigned int inlen, |
|
void *arg), void *arg) |
|
{ |
|
ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb; |
|
ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg; |
|
} |
|
# endif |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, |
|
const char *label, size_t llen, |
|
const unsigned char *p, size_t plen, |
|
int use_context) |
|
{ |
|
if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) |
|
return -1; |
|
|
|
return s->method->ssl3_enc->export_keying_material(s, out, olen, label, |
|
llen, p, plen, |
|
use_context); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static unsigned long ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a) |
|
{ |
|
unsigned long l; |
|
|
|
l = (unsigned long) |
|
((unsigned int)a->session_id[0]) | |
|
((unsigned int)a->session_id[1] << 8L) | |
|
((unsigned long)a->session_id[2] << 16L) | |
|
((unsigned long)a->session_id[3] << 24L); |
|
return (l); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of |
|
* coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure |
|
* SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on |
|
* being able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing |
|
* session with a matching session ID. |
|
*/ |
|
static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a, const SSL_SESSION *b) |
|
{ |
|
if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version) |
|
return (1); |
|
if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length) |
|
return (1); |
|
return (memcmp(a->session_id, b->session_id, a->session_id_length)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* These wrapper functions should remain rather than redeclaring |
|
* SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp for void* types and casting each |
|
* variable. The reason is that the functions aren't static, they're exposed |
|
* via ssl.h. |
|
*/ |
|
static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION) |
|
static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION) |
|
|
|
SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth) |
|
{ |
|
SSL_CTX *ret = NULL; |
|
|
|
if (meth == NULL) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED); |
|
return (NULL); |
|
} |
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS |
|
if (FIPS_mode() && (meth->version < TLS1_VERSION)) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE); |
|
return NULL; |
|
} |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS); |
|
goto err; |
|
} |
|
ret = (SSL_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CTX)); |
|
if (ret == NULL) |
|
goto err; |
|
|
|
memset(ret, 0, sizeof(SSL_CTX)); |
|
|
|
ret->method = meth; |
|
|
|
ret->cert_store = NULL; |
|
ret->session_cache_mode = SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER; |
|
ret->session_cache_size = SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT; |
|
ret->session_cache_head = NULL; |
|
ret->session_cache_tail = NULL; |
|
|
|
/* We take the system default */ |
|
ret->session_timeout = meth->get_timeout(); |
|
|
|
ret->new_session_cb = 0; |
|
ret->remove_session_cb = 0; |
|
ret->get_session_cb = 0; |
|
ret->generate_session_id = 0; |
|
|
|
memset((char *)&ret->stats, 0, sizeof(ret->stats)); |
|
|
|
ret->references = 1; |
|
ret->quiet_shutdown = 0; |
|
|
|
/* ret->cipher=NULL;*/ |
|
/*- |
|
ret->s2->challenge=NULL; |
|
ret->master_key=NULL; |
|
ret->key_arg=NULL; |
|
ret->s2->conn_id=NULL; */ |
|
|
|
ret->info_callback = NULL; |
|
|
|
ret->app_verify_callback = 0; |
|
ret->app_verify_arg = NULL; |
|
|
|
ret->max_cert_list = SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT; |
|
ret->read_ahead = 0; |
|
ret->msg_callback = 0; |
|
ret->msg_callback_arg = NULL; |
|
ret->verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_NONE; |
|
#if 0 |
|
ret->verify_depth = -1; /* Don't impose a limit (but x509_lu.c does) */ |
|
#endif |
|
ret->sid_ctx_length = 0; |
|
ret->default_verify_callback = NULL; |
|
if ((ret->cert = ssl_cert_new()) == NULL) |
|
goto err; |
|
|
|
ret->default_passwd_callback = 0; |
|
ret->default_passwd_callback_userdata = NULL; |
|
ret->client_cert_cb = 0; |
|
ret->app_gen_cookie_cb = 0; |
|
ret->app_verify_cookie_cb = 0; |
|
|
|
ret->sessions = lh_SSL_SESSION_new(); |
|
if (ret->sessions == NULL) |
|
goto err; |
|
ret->cert_store = X509_STORE_new(); |
|
if (ret->cert_store == NULL) |
|
goto err; |
|
|
|
ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method, |
|
&ret->cipher_list, &ret->cipher_list_by_id, |
|
meth->version == |
|
SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST); |
|
if (ret->cipher_list == NULL || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); |
|
goto err2; |
|
} |
|
|
|
ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); |
|
if (!ret->param) |
|
goto err; |
|
|
|
if ((ret->rsa_md5 = EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl2-md5")) == NULL) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL2_MD5_ROUTINES); |
|
goto err2; |
|
} |
|
if ((ret->md5 = EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-md5")) == NULL) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES); |
|
goto err2; |
|
} |
|
if ((ret->sha1 = EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-sha1")) == NULL) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES); |
|
goto err2; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if ((ret->client_CA = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL) |
|
goto err; |
|
|
|
CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data); |
|
|
|
ret->extra_certs = NULL; |
|
/* No compression for DTLS */ |
|
if (meth->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
|
ret->comp_methods = SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(); |
|
|
|
ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; |
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
|
ret->tlsext_servername_callback = 0; |
|
ret->tlsext_servername_arg = NULL; |
|
/* Setup RFC4507 ticket keys */ |
|
if ((RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16) <= 0) |
|
|| (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16) <= 0) |
|
|| (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16) <= 0)) |
|
ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; |
|
|
|
ret->tlsext_status_cb = 0; |
|
ret->tlsext_status_arg = NULL; |
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
|
ret->next_protos_advertised_cb = 0; |
|
ret->next_proto_select_cb = 0; |
|
# endif |
|
#endif |
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
|
ret->psk_identity_hint = NULL; |
|
ret->psk_client_callback = NULL; |
|
ret->psk_server_callback = NULL; |
|
#endif |
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
|
SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(ret); |
|
#endif |
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS |
|
ret->freelist_max_len = SSL_MAX_BUF_FREELIST_LEN_DEFAULT; |
|
ret->rbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST)); |
|
if (!ret->rbuf_freelist) |
|
goto err; |
|
ret->rbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0; |
|
ret->rbuf_freelist->len = 0; |
|
ret->rbuf_freelist->head = NULL; |
|
ret->wbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST)); |
|
if (!ret->wbuf_freelist) { |
|
OPENSSL_free(ret->rbuf_freelist); |
|
goto err; |
|
} |
|
ret->wbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0; |
|
ret->wbuf_freelist->len = 0; |
|
ret->wbuf_freelist->head = NULL; |
|
#endif |
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE |
|
ret->client_cert_engine = NULL; |
|
# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO |
|
# define eng_strx(x) #x |
|
# define eng_str(x) eng_strx(x) |
|
/* Use specific client engine automatically... ignore errors */ |
|
{ |
|
ENGINE *eng; |
|
eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO)); |
|
if (!eng) { |
|
ERR_clear_error(); |
|
ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(); |
|
eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO)); |
|
} |
|
if (!eng || !SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(ret, eng)) |
|
ERR_clear_error(); |
|
} |
|
# endif |
|
#endif |
|
/* |
|
* Default is to connect to non-RI servers. When RI is more widely |
|
* deployed might change this. |
|
*/ |
|
ret->options |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT; |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Disable SSLv2 by default, callers that want to enable SSLv2 will have to |
|
* explicitly clear this option via either of SSL_CTX_clear_options() or |
|
* SSL_clear_options(). |
|
*/ |
|
ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2; |
|
|
|
return (ret); |
|
err: |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
|
err2: |
|
if (ret != NULL) |
|
SSL_CTX_free(ret); |
|
return (NULL); |
|
} |
|
|
|
#if 0 |
|
static void SSL_COMP_free(SSL_COMP *comp) |
|
{ |
|
OPENSSL_free(comp); |
|
} |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS |
|
static void ssl_buf_freelist_free(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST *list) |
|
{ |
|
SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY *ent, *next; |
|
for (ent = list->head; ent; ent = next) { |
|
next = ent->next; |
|
OPENSSL_free(ent); |
|
} |
|
OPENSSL_free(list); |
|
} |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a) |
|
{ |
|
int i; |
|
|
|
if (a == NULL) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
i = CRYPTO_add(&a->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); |
|
#ifdef REF_PRINT |
|
REF_PRINT("SSL_CTX", a); |
|
#endif |
|
if (i > 0) |
|
return; |
|
#ifdef REF_CHECK |
|
if (i < 0) { |
|
fprintf(stderr, "SSL_CTX_free, bad reference count\n"); |
|
abort(); /* ok */ |
|
} |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
if (a->param) |
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(a->param); |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference |
|
* the ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed |
|
* after the sessions were flushed. |
|
* As the ex_data handling routines might also touch the session cache, |
|
* the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the cache, then |
|
* free ex_data, then finally free the cache. |
|
* (See ticket [openssl.org #212].) |
|
*/ |
|
if (a->sessions != NULL) |
|
SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(a, 0); |
|
|
|
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, a, &a->ex_data); |
|
|
|
if (a->sessions != NULL) |
|
lh_SSL_SESSION_free(a->sessions); |
|
|
|
if (a->cert_store != NULL) |
|
X509_STORE_free(a->cert_store); |
|
if (a->cipher_list != NULL) |
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list); |
|
if (a->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) |
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list_by_id); |
|
if (a->cert != NULL) |
|
ssl_cert_free(a->cert); |
|
if (a->client_CA != NULL) |
|
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->client_CA, X509_NAME_free); |
|
if (a->extra_certs != NULL) |
|
sk_X509_pop_free(a->extra_certs, X509_free); |
|
#if 0 /* This should never be done, since it |
|
* removes a global database */ |
|
if (a->comp_methods != NULL) |
|
sk_SSL_COMP_pop_free(a->comp_methods, SSL_COMP_free); |
|
#else |
|
a->comp_methods = NULL; |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP |
|
if (a->srtp_profiles) |
|
sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(a->srtp_profiles); |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
|
if (a->psk_identity_hint) |
|
OPENSSL_free(a->psk_identity_hint); |
|
#endif |
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
|
SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(a); |
|
#endif |
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE |
|
if (a->client_cert_engine) |
|
ENGINE_finish(a->client_cert_engine); |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS |
|
if (a->wbuf_freelist) |
|
ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->wbuf_freelist); |
|
if (a->rbuf_freelist) |
|
ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->rbuf_freelist); |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(a); |
|
} |
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb) |
|
{ |
|
ctx->default_passwd_callback = cb; |
|
} |
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *u) |
|
{ |
|
ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata = u; |
|
} |
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
|
int (*cb) (X509_STORE_CTX *, void *), |
|
void *arg) |
|
{ |
|
ctx->app_verify_callback = cb; |
|
ctx->app_verify_arg = arg; |
|
} |
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode, |
|
int (*cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) |
|
{ |
|
ctx->verify_mode = mode; |
|
ctx->default_verify_callback = cb; |
|
} |
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth) |
|
{ |
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); |
|
} |
|
|
|
void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) |
|
{ |
|
CERT_PKEY *cpk; |
|
int rsa_enc, rsa_tmp, rsa_sign, dh_tmp, dh_rsa, dh_dsa, dsa_sign; |
|
int rsa_enc_export, dh_rsa_export, dh_dsa_export; |
|
int rsa_tmp_export, dh_tmp_export, kl; |
|
unsigned long mask_k, mask_a, emask_k, emask_a; |
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA |
|
int have_ecc_cert, ecdsa_ok, ecc_pkey_size; |
|
#endif |
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH |
|
int have_ecdh_tmp, ecdh_ok; |
|
#endif |
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
|
X509 *x = NULL; |
|
EVP_PKEY *ecc_pkey = NULL; |
|
int signature_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0, md_nid = 0; |
|
#endif |
|
if (c == NULL) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
kl = SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(cipher); |
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
|
rsa_tmp = (c->rsa_tmp != NULL || c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL); |
|
rsa_tmp_export = (c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL || |
|
(rsa_tmp && RSA_size(c->rsa_tmp) * 8 <= kl)); |
|
#else |
|
rsa_tmp = rsa_tmp_export = 0; |
|
#endif |
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
|
dh_tmp = (c->dh_tmp != NULL || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL); |
|
dh_tmp_export = (c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL || |
|
(dh_tmp && DH_size(c->dh_tmp) * 8 <= kl)); |
|
#else |
|
dh_tmp = dh_tmp_export = 0; |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH |
|
have_ecdh_tmp = (c->ecdh_tmp != NULL || c->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL); |
|
#endif |
|
cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]); |
|
rsa_enc = (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); |
|
rsa_enc_export = (rsa_enc && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey) * 8 <= kl); |
|
cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN]); |
|
rsa_sign = (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); |
|
cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN]); |
|
dsa_sign = (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); |
|
cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA]); |
|
dh_rsa = (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); |
|
dh_rsa_export = (dh_rsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey) * 8 <= kl); |
|
cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA]); |
|
/* FIX THIS EAY EAY EAY */ |
|
dh_dsa = (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); |
|
dh_dsa_export = (dh_dsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey) * 8 <= kl); |
|
cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]); |
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
|
have_ecc_cert = (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); |
|
#endif |
|
mask_k = 0; |
|
mask_a = 0; |
|
emask_k = 0; |
|
emask_a = 0; |
|
|
|
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG |
|
fprintf(stderr, |
|
"rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d ecdht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n", |
|
rsa_tmp, rsa_tmp_export, dh_tmp, have_ecdh_tmp, rsa_enc, |
|
rsa_enc_export, rsa_sign, dsa_sign, dh_rsa, dh_dsa); |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01]); |
|
if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL) { |
|
mask_k |= SSL_kGOST; |
|
mask_a |= SSL_aGOST01; |
|
} |
|
cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94]); |
|
if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL) { |
|
mask_k |= SSL_kGOST; |
|
mask_a |= SSL_aGOST94; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (rsa_enc || (rsa_tmp && rsa_sign)) |
|
mask_k |= SSL_kRSA; |
|
if (rsa_enc_export || (rsa_tmp_export && (rsa_sign || rsa_enc))) |
|
emask_k |= SSL_kRSA; |
|
|
|
#if 0 |
|
/* The match needs to be both kEDH and aRSA or aDSA, so don't worry */ |
|
if ((dh_tmp || dh_rsa || dh_dsa) && (rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign)) |
|
mask_k |= SSL_kEDH; |
|
if ((dh_tmp_export || dh_rsa_export || dh_dsa_export) && |
|
(rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign)) |
|
emask_k |= SSL_kEDH; |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
if (dh_tmp_export) |
|
emask_k |= SSL_kEDH; |
|
|
|
if (dh_tmp) |
|
mask_k |= SSL_kEDH; |
|
|
|
if (dh_rsa) |
|
mask_k |= SSL_kDHr; |
|
if (dh_rsa_export) |
|
emask_k |= SSL_kDHr; |
|
|
|
if (dh_dsa) |
|
mask_k |= SSL_kDHd; |
|
if (dh_dsa_export) |
|
emask_k |= SSL_kDHd; |
|
|
|
if (rsa_enc || rsa_sign) { |
|
mask_a |= SSL_aRSA; |
|
emask_a |= SSL_aRSA; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (dsa_sign) { |
|
mask_a |= SSL_aDSS; |
|
emask_a |= SSL_aDSS; |
|
} |
|
|
|
mask_a |= SSL_aNULL; |
|
emask_a |= SSL_aNULL; |
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 |
|
mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5; |
|
mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5; |
|
emask_k |= SSL_kKRB5; |
|
emask_a |= SSL_aKRB5; |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH and/or ECDSA cipher suites |
|
* depending on the key usage extension. |
|
*/ |
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
|
if (have_ecc_cert) { |
|
/* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags) */ |
|
x = (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]).x509; |
|
X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); |
|
ecdh_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ? |
|
(x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT) : 1; |
|
ecdsa_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ? |
|
(x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) : 1; |
|
ecc_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); |
|
ecc_pkey_size = (ecc_pkey != NULL) ? EVP_PKEY_bits(ecc_pkey) : 0; |
|
EVP_PKEY_free(ecc_pkey); |
|
if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm)) { |
|
signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm); |
|
OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid); |
|
} |
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH |
|
if (ecdh_ok) { |
|
|
|
if (pk_nid == NID_rsaEncryption || pk_nid == NID_rsa) { |
|
mask_k |= SSL_kECDHr; |
|
mask_a |= SSL_aECDH; |
|
if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163) { |
|
emask_k |= SSL_kECDHr; |
|
emask_a |= SSL_aECDH; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (pk_nid == NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey) { |
|
mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe; |
|
mask_a |= SSL_aECDH; |
|
if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163) { |
|
emask_k |= SSL_kECDHe; |
|
emask_a |= SSL_aECDH; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
} |
|
#endif |
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA |
|
if (ecdsa_ok) { |
|
mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA; |
|
emask_a |= SSL_aECDSA; |
|
} |
|
#endif |
|
} |
|
#endif |
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH |
|
if (have_ecdh_tmp) { |
|
mask_k |= SSL_kEECDH; |
|
emask_k |= SSL_kEECDH; |
|
} |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
|
mask_k |= SSL_kPSK; |
|
mask_a |= SSL_aPSK; |
|
emask_k |= SSL_kPSK; |
|
emask_a |= SSL_aPSK; |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
c->mask_k = mask_k; |
|
c->mask_a = mask_a; |
|
c->export_mask_k = emask_k; |
|
c->export_mask_a = emask_a; |
|
c->valid = 1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* This handy macro borrowed from crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c */ |
|
#define ku_reject(x, usage) \ |
|
(((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage))) |
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
|
|
|
int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; |
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
|
int keysize = 0; |
|
int signature_nid = 0, md_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0; |
|
const SSL_CIPHER *cs = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; |
|
|
|
alg_k = cs->algorithm_mkey; |
|
alg_a = cs->algorithm_auth; |
|
|
|
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cs)) { |
|
/* ECDH key length in export ciphers must be <= 163 bits */ |
|
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); |
|
if (pkey == NULL) |
|
return 0; |
|
keysize = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey); |
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
|
if (keysize > 163) |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */ |
|
X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); |
|
if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm)) { |
|
signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm); |
|
OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid); |
|
} |
|
if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHe || alg_k & SSL_kECDHr) { |
|
/* key usage, if present, must allow key agreement */ |
|
if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, |
|
SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_KEY_AGREEMENT); |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHe) && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) { |
|
/* signature alg must be ECDSA */ |
|
if (pk_nid != NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, |
|
SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_SHA1_SIGNATURE); |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHr) && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) { |
|
/* signature alg must be RSA */ |
|
|
|
if (pk_nid != NID_rsaEncryption && pk_nid != NID_rsa) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, |
|
SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_RSA_SIGNATURE); |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
} |
|
if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) { |
|
/* key usage, if present, must allow signing */ |
|
if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, |
|
SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING); |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
return 1; /* all checks are ok */ |
|
} |
|
|
|
#endif |
|
|
|
/* THIS NEEDS CLEANING UP */ |
|
CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(const SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; |
|
CERT *c; |
|
int i; |
|
|
|
c = s->cert; |
|
ssl_set_cert_masks(c, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); |
|
|
|
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
|
alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; |
|
|
|
if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) { |
|
/* |
|
* we don't need to look at SSL_kEECDH since no certificate is needed |
|
* for anon ECDH and for authenticated EECDH, the check for the auth |
|
* algorithm will set i correctly NOTE: For ECDH-RSA, we need an ECC |
|
* not an RSA cert but for EECDH-RSA we need an RSA cert. Placing the |
|
* checks for SSL_kECDH before RSA checks ensures the correct cert is |
|
* chosen. |
|
*/ |
|
i = SSL_PKEY_ECC; |
|
} else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) { |
|
i = SSL_PKEY_ECC; |
|
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr) |
|
i = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA; |
|
else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd) |
|
i = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA; |
|
else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS) |
|
i = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; |
|
else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) { |
|
if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509 == NULL) |
|
i = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; |
|
else |
|
i = SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; |
|
} else if (alg_a & SSL_aKRB5) { |
|
/* VRS something else here? */ |
|
return (NULL); |
|
} else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94) |
|
i = SSL_PKEY_GOST94; |
|
else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) |
|
i = SSL_PKEY_GOST01; |
|
else { /* if (alg_a & SSL_aNULL) */ |
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
|
return (NULL); |
|
} |
|
|
|
return c->pkeys + i; |
|
} |
|
|
|
X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(const SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
CERT_PKEY *cpk; |
|
cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); |
|
if (!cpk) |
|
return NULL; |
|
return cpk->x509; |
|
} |
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, |
|
const EVP_MD **pmd) |
|
{ |
|
unsigned long alg_a; |
|
CERT *c; |
|
int idx = -1; |
|
|
|
alg_a = cipher->algorithm_auth; |
|
c = s->cert; |
|
|
|
if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && |
|
(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL)) |
|
idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; |
|
else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) { |
|
if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL) |
|
idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; |
|
else if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey != NULL) |
|
idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; |
|
} else if ((alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) && |
|
(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey != NULL)) |
|
idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC; |
|
if (idx == -1) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
|
return (NULL); |
|
} |
|
if (pmd) |
|
*pmd = c->pkeys[idx].digest; |
|
return c->pkeys[idx].privatekey; |
|
} |
|
|
|
void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode) |
|
{ |
|
int i; |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it, and it |
|
* would be rather hard to do anyway :-) |
|
*/ |
|
if (s->session->session_id_length == 0) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode; |
|
if ((i & mode) && (!s->hit) |
|
&& ((i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) |
|
|| SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, s->session)) |
|
&& (s->session_ctx->new_session_cb != NULL)) { |
|
CRYPTO_add(&s->session->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); |
|
if (!s->session_ctx->new_session_cb(s, s->session)) |
|
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* auto flush every 255 connections */ |
|
if ((!(i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) && ((i & mode) == mode)) { |
|
if ((((mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) |
|
? s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good |
|
: s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept_good) & 0xff) == 0xff) { |
|
SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(s->session_ctx, (unsigned long)time(NULL)); |
|
} |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
return (s->method); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *meth) |
|
{ |
|
int conn = -1; |
|
int ret = 1; |
|
|
|
if (s->method != meth) { |
|
if (s->handshake_func != NULL) |
|
conn = (s->handshake_func == s->method->ssl_connect); |
|
|
|
if (s->method->version == meth->version) |
|
s->method = meth; |
|
else { |
|
s->method->ssl_free(s); |
|
s->method = meth; |
|
ret = s->method->ssl_new(s); |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (conn == 1) |
|
s->handshake_func = meth->ssl_connect; |
|
else if (conn == 0) |
|
s->handshake_func = meth->ssl_accept; |
|
} |
|
return (ret); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s, int i) |
|
{ |
|
int reason; |
|
unsigned long l; |
|
BIO *bio; |
|
|
|
if (i > 0) |
|
return (SSL_ERROR_NONE); |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake etc, |
|
* where we do encode the error |
|
*/ |
|
if ((l = ERR_peek_error()) != 0) { |
|
if (ERR_GET_LIB(l) == ERR_LIB_SYS) |
|
return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); |
|
else |
|
return (SSL_ERROR_SSL); |
|
} |
|
|
|
if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_read(s)) { |
|
bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); |
|
if (BIO_should_read(bio)) |
|
return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ); |
|
else if (BIO_should_write(bio)) |
|
/* |
|
* This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try to write |
|
* to the rbio, and an application program where rbio and wbio |
|
* are separate couldn't even know what it should wait for. |
|
* However if we ever set s->rwstate incorrectly (so that we have |
|
* SSL_want_read(s) instead of SSL_want_write(s)) and rbio and |
|
* wbio *are* the same, this test works around that bug; so it |
|
* might be safer to keep it. |
|
*/ |
|
return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE); |
|
else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) { |
|
reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); |
|
if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) |
|
return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT); |
|
else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) |
|
return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT); |
|
else |
|
return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); /* unknown */ |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_write(s)) { |
|
bio = SSL_get_wbio(s); |
|
if (BIO_should_write(bio)) |
|
return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE); |
|
else if (BIO_should_read(bio)) |
|
/* |
|
* See above (SSL_want_read(s) with BIO_should_write(bio)) |
|
*/ |
|
return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ); |
|
else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) { |
|
reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); |
|
if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) |
|
return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT); |
|
else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) |
|
return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT); |
|
else |
|
return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); |
|
} |
|
} |
|
if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_x509_lookup(s)) { |
|
return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP); |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (i == 0) { |
|
if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION) { |
|
/* assume it is the socket being closed */ |
|
return (SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN); |
|
} else { |
|
if ((s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) && |
|
(s->s3->warn_alert == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)) |
|
return (SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN); |
|
} |
|
} |
|
return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
int ret = 1; |
|
|
|
if (s->handshake_func == NULL) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET); |
|
return (-1); |
|
} |
|
|
|
s->method->ssl_renegotiate_check(s); |
|
|
|
if (SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) { |
|
ret = s->handshake_func(s); |
|
} |
|
return (ret); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* For the next 2 functions, SSL_clear() sets shutdown and so one of these |
|
* calls will reset it |
|
*/ |
|
void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
s->server = 1; |
|
s->shutdown = 0; |
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ACCEPT | SSL_ST_BEFORE; |
|
s->handshake_func = s->method->ssl_accept; |
|
/* clear the current cipher */ |
|
ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); |
|
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash); |
|
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash); |
|
} |
|
|
|
void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
s->server = 0; |
|
s->shutdown = 0; |
|
s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT | SSL_ST_BEFORE; |
|
s->handshake_func = s->method->ssl_connect; |
|
/* clear the current cipher */ |
|
ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); |
|
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash); |
|
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); |
|
return (0); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int ssl_undefined_void_function(void) |
|
{ |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION, |
|
ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); |
|
return (0); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION, |
|
ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); |
|
return (0); |
|
} |
|
|
|
SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver) |
|
{ |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); |
|
return (NULL); |
|
} |
|
|
|
const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION) |
|
return ("TLSv1.2"); |
|
else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION) |
|
return ("TLSv1.1"); |
|
else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) |
|
return ("TLSv1"); |
|
else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) |
|
return ("SSLv3"); |
|
else if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION) |
|
return ("SSLv2"); |
|
else |
|
return ("unknown"); |
|
} |
|
|
|
SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk; |
|
X509_NAME *xn; |
|
SSL *ret; |
|
int i; |
|
|
|
if ((ret = SSL_new(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s))) == NULL) |
|
return (NULL); |
|
|
|
ret->version = s->version; |
|
ret->type = s->type; |
|
ret->method = s->method; |
|
|
|
if (s->session != NULL) { |
|
/* This copies session-id, SSL_METHOD, sid_ctx, and 'cert' */ |
|
SSL_copy_session_id(ret, s); |
|
} else { |
|
/* |
|
* No session has been established yet, so we have to expect that |
|
* s->cert or ret->cert will be changed later -- they should not both |
|
* point to the same object, and thus we can't use |
|
* SSL_copy_session_id. |
|
*/ |
|
|
|
ret->method->ssl_free(ret); |
|
ret->method = s->method; |
|
ret->method->ssl_new(ret); |
|
|
|
if (s->cert != NULL) { |
|
if (ret->cert != NULL) { |
|
ssl_cert_free(ret->cert); |
|
} |
|
ret->cert = ssl_cert_dup(s->cert); |
|
if (ret->cert == NULL) |
|
goto err; |
|
} |
|
|
|
SSL_set_session_id_context(ret, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length); |
|
} |
|
|
|
ret->options = s->options; |
|
ret->mode = s->mode; |
|
SSL_set_max_cert_list(ret, SSL_get_max_cert_list(s)); |
|
SSL_set_read_ahead(ret, SSL_get_read_ahead(s)); |
|
ret->msg_callback = s->msg_callback; |
|
ret->msg_callback_arg = s->msg_callback_arg; |
|
SSL_set_verify(ret, SSL_get_verify_mode(s), SSL_get_verify_callback(s)); |
|
SSL_set_verify_depth(ret, SSL_get_verify_depth(s)); |
|
ret->generate_session_id = s->generate_session_id; |
|
|
|
SSL_set_info_callback(ret, SSL_get_info_callback(s)); |
|
|
|
ret->debug = s->debug; |
|
|
|
/* copy app data, a little dangerous perhaps */ |
|
if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, &ret->ex_data, &s->ex_data)) |
|
goto err; |
|
|
|
/* setup rbio, and wbio */ |
|
if (s->rbio != NULL) { |
|
if (!BIO_dup_state(s->rbio, (char *)&ret->rbio)) |
|
goto err; |
|
} |
|
if (s->wbio != NULL) { |
|
if (s->wbio != s->rbio) { |
|
if (!BIO_dup_state(s->wbio, (char *)&ret->wbio)) |
|
goto err; |
|
} else |
|
ret->wbio = ret->rbio; |
|
} |
|
ret->rwstate = s->rwstate; |
|
ret->in_handshake = s->in_handshake; |
|
ret->handshake_func = s->handshake_func; |
|
ret->server = s->server; |
|
ret->renegotiate = s->renegotiate; |
|
ret->new_session = s->new_session; |
|
ret->quiet_shutdown = s->quiet_shutdown; |
|
ret->shutdown = s->shutdown; |
|
ret->state = s->state; /* SSL_dup does not really work at any state, |
|
* though */ |
|
ret->rstate = s->rstate; |
|
ret->init_num = 0; /* would have to copy ret->init_buf, |
|
* ret->init_msg, ret->init_num, |
|
* ret->init_off */ |
|
ret->hit = s->hit; |
|
|
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ret->param, s->param); |
|
|
|
/* dup the cipher_list and cipher_list_by_id stacks */ |
|
if (s->cipher_list != NULL) { |
|
if ((ret->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list)) == NULL) |
|
goto err; |
|
} |
|
if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) |
|
if ((ret->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list_by_id)) |
|
== NULL) |
|
goto err; |
|
|
|
/* Dup the client_CA list */ |
|
if (s->client_CA != NULL) { |
|
if ((sk = sk_X509_NAME_dup(s->client_CA)) == NULL) |
|
goto err; |
|
ret->client_CA = sk; |
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { |
|
xn = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); |
|
if (sk_X509_NAME_set(sk, i, X509_NAME_dup(xn)) == NULL) { |
|
X509_NAME_free(xn); |
|
goto err; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (0) { |
|
err: |
|
if (ret != NULL) |
|
SSL_free(ret); |
|
ret = NULL; |
|
} |
|
return (ret); |
|
} |
|
|
|
void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) { |
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_read_ctx); |
|
OPENSSL_free(s->enc_read_ctx); |
|
s->enc_read_ctx = NULL; |
|
} |
|
if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) { |
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_write_ctx); |
|
OPENSSL_free(s->enc_write_ctx); |
|
s->enc_write_ctx = NULL; |
|
} |
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
|
if (s->expand != NULL) { |
|
COMP_CTX_free(s->expand); |
|
s->expand = NULL; |
|
} |
|
if (s->compress != NULL) { |
|
COMP_CTX_free(s->compress); |
|
s->compress = NULL; |
|
} |
|
#endif |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */ |
|
X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
if (s->cert != NULL) |
|
return (s->cert->key->x509); |
|
else |
|
return (NULL); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */ |
|
EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
if (s->cert != NULL) |
|
return (s->cert->key->privatekey); |
|
else |
|
return (NULL); |
|
} |
|
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
if ((s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) |
|
return (s->session->cipher); |
|
return (NULL); |
|
} |
|
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
|
const void *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
return NULL; |
|
} |
|
|
|
const void *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
return NULL; |
|
} |
|
#else |
|
|
|
const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
if (s->compress != NULL) |
|
return (s->compress->meth); |
|
return (NULL); |
|
} |
|
|
|
const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
if (s->expand != NULL) |
|
return (s->expand->meth); |
|
return (NULL); |
|
} |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s, int push) |
|
{ |
|
BIO *bbio; |
|
|
|
if (s->bbio == NULL) { |
|
bbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); |
|
if (bbio == NULL) |
|
return (0); |
|
s->bbio = bbio; |
|
} else { |
|
bbio = s->bbio; |
|
if (s->bbio == s->wbio) |
|
s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio); |
|
} |
|
(void)BIO_reset(bbio); |
|
/* if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(bbio,16*1024)) */ |
|
if (!BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio, 1)) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); |
|
return (0); |
|
} |
|
if (push) { |
|
if (s->wbio != bbio) |
|
s->wbio = BIO_push(bbio, s->wbio); |
|
} else { |
|
if (s->wbio == bbio) |
|
s->wbio = BIO_pop(bbio); |
|
} |
|
return (1); |
|
} |
|
|
|
void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
if (s->bbio == NULL) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
if (s->bbio == s->wbio) { |
|
/* remove buffering */ |
|
s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio); |
|
#ifdef REF_CHECK /* not the usual REF_CHECK, but this avoids |
|
* adding one more preprocessor symbol */ |
|
assert(s->wbio != NULL); |
|
#endif |
|
} |
|
BIO_free(s->bbio); |
|
s->bbio = NULL; |
|
} |
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode) |
|
{ |
|
ctx->quiet_shutdown = mode; |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx) |
|
{ |
|
return (ctx->quiet_shutdown); |
|
} |
|
|
|
void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *s, int mode) |
|
{ |
|
s->quiet_shutdown = mode; |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
return (s->quiet_shutdown); |
|
} |
|
|
|
void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *s, int mode) |
|
{ |
|
s->shutdown = mode; |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
return (s->shutdown); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_version(const SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
return (s->version); |
|
} |
|
|
|
SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl) |
|
{ |
|
return (ssl->ctx); |
|
} |
|
|
|
SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx) |
|
{ |
|
CERT *ocert = ssl->cert; |
|
if (ssl->ctx == ctx) |
|
return ssl->ctx; |
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
|
if (ctx == NULL) |
|
ctx = ssl->initial_ctx; |
|
#endif |
|
ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert); |
|
if (ocert != NULL) { |
|
int i; |
|
/* Copy negotiated digests from original */ |
|
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { |
|
CERT_PKEY *cpk = ocert->pkeys + i; |
|
CERT_PKEY *rpk = ssl->cert->pkeys + i; |
|
rpk->digest = cpk->digest; |
|
} |
|
ssl_cert_free(ocert); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Program invariant: |sid_ctx| has fixed size (SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH), |
|
* so setter APIs must prevent invalid lengths from entering the system. |
|
*/ |
|
OPENSSL_assert(ssl->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx)); |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* If the session ID context matches that of the parent SSL_CTX, |
|
* inherit it from the new SSL_CTX as well. If however the context does |
|
* not match (i.e., it was set per-ssl with SSL_set_session_id_context), |
|
* leave it unchanged. |
|
*/ |
|
if ((ssl->ctx != NULL) && |
|
(ssl->sid_ctx_length == ssl->ctx->sid_ctx_length) && |
|
(memcmp(ssl->sid_ctx, ssl->ctx->sid_ctx, ssl->sid_ctx_length) == 0)) { |
|
ssl->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length; |
|
memcpy(&ssl->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); |
|
if (ssl->ctx != NULL) |
|
SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */ |
|
ssl->ctx = ctx; |
|
|
|
return (ssl->ctx); |
|
} |
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO |
|
int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx) |
|
{ |
|
return (X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile, |
|
const char *CApath) |
|
{ |
|
return (X509_STORE_load_locations(ctx->cert_store, CAfile, CApath)); |
|
} |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl, |
|
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)) |
|
{ |
|
ssl->info_callback = cb; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* One compiler (Diab DCC) doesn't like argument names in returned function |
|
* pointer. |
|
*/ |
|
void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl)) (const SSL * /* ssl */ , |
|
int /* type */ , |
|
int /* val */ ) { |
|
return ssl->info_callback; |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl) |
|
{ |
|
return (ssl->state); |
|
} |
|
|
|
void SSL_set_state(SSL *ssl, int state) |
|
{ |
|
ssl->state = state; |
|
} |
|
|
|
void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl, long arg) |
|
{ |
|
ssl->verify_result = arg; |
|
} |
|
|
|
long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl) |
|
{ |
|
return (ssl->verify_result); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, |
|
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) |
|
{ |
|
return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, argl, argp, |
|
new_func, dup_func, free_func); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s, int idx, void *arg) |
|
{ |
|
return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *s, int idx) |
|
{ |
|
return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, |
|
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, |
|
CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) |
|
{ |
|
return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, argl, argp, |
|
new_func, dup_func, free_func); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s, int idx, void *arg) |
|
{ |
|
return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *s, int idx) |
|
{ |
|
return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int ssl_ok(SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
return (1); |
|
} |
|
|
|
X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx) |
|
{ |
|
return (ctx->cert_store); |
|
} |
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store) |
|
{ |
|
if (ctx->cert_store != NULL) |
|
X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store); |
|
ctx->cert_store = store; |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_want(const SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
return (s->rwstate); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* \brief Set the callback for generating temporary RSA keys. |
|
* \param ctx the SSL context. |
|
* \param cb the callback |
|
*/ |
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
|
void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *(*cb) (SSL *ssl, |
|
int is_export, |
|
int keylength)) |
|
{ |
|
SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB, (void (*)(void))cb); |
|
} |
|
|
|
void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl, RSA *(*cb) (SSL *ssl, |
|
int is_export, |
|
int keylength)) |
|
{ |
|
SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB, (void (*)(void))cb); |
|
} |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
#ifdef DOXYGEN |
|
/** |
|
* \brief The RSA temporary key callback function. |
|
* \param ssl the SSL session. |
|
* \param is_export \c TRUE if the temp RSA key is for an export ciphersuite. |
|
* \param keylength if \c is_export is \c TRUE, then \c keylength is the size |
|
* of the required key in bits. |
|
* \return the temporary RSA key. |
|
* \sa SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback, SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback |
|
*/ |
|
|
|
RSA *cb(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength) |
|
{ |
|
} |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* \brief Set the callback for generating temporary DH keys. |
|
* \param ctx the SSL context. |
|
* \param dh the callback |
|
*/ |
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
|
void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
|
DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, |
|
int keylength)) |
|
{ |
|
SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB, (void (*)(void))dh); |
|
} |
|
|
|
void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl, DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, |
|
int keylength)) |
|
{ |
|
SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB, (void (*)(void))dh); |
|
} |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH |
|
void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
|
EC_KEY *(*ecdh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, |
|
int keylength)) |
|
{ |
|
SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB, |
|
(void (*)(void))ecdh); |
|
} |
|
|
|
void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl, |
|
EC_KEY *(*ecdh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, |
|
int keylength)) |
|
{ |
|
SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB, (void (*)(void))ecdh); |
|
} |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
|
int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint) |
|
{ |
|
if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, |
|
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
if (ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL) |
|
OPENSSL_free(ctx->psk_identity_hint); |
|
if (identity_hint != NULL) { |
|
ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint); |
|
if (ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL) |
|
return 0; |
|
} else |
|
ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL; |
|
return 1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *s, const char *identity_hint) |
|
{ |
|
if (s == NULL) |
|
return 0; |
|
|
|
if (s->session == NULL) |
|
return 1; /* session not created yet, ignored */ |
|
|
|
if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { |
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL) |
|
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); |
|
if (identity_hint != NULL) { |
|
s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint); |
|
if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) |
|
return 0; |
|
} else |
|
s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL; |
|
return 1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL) |
|
return NULL; |
|
return (s->session->psk_identity_hint); |
|
} |
|
|
|
const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL) |
|
return NULL; |
|
return (s->session->psk_identity); |
|
} |
|
|
|
void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *s, |
|
unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, |
|
const char *hint, |
|
char *identity, |
|
unsigned int |
|
max_identity_len, |
|
unsigned char *psk, |
|
unsigned int |
|
max_psk_len)) |
|
{ |
|
s->psk_client_callback = cb; |
|
} |
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
|
unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, |
|
const char *hint, |
|
char *identity, |
|
unsigned int |
|
max_identity_len, |
|
unsigned char *psk, |
|
unsigned int |
|
max_psk_len)) |
|
{ |
|
ctx->psk_client_callback = cb; |
|
} |
|
|
|
void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *s, |
|
unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, |
|
const char *identity, |
|
unsigned char *psk, |
|
unsigned int |
|
max_psk_len)) |
|
{ |
|
s->psk_server_callback = cb; |
|
} |
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
|
unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, |
|
const char *identity, |
|
unsigned char *psk, |
|
unsigned int |
|
max_psk_len)) |
|
{ |
|
ctx->psk_server_callback = cb; |
|
} |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
|
void (*cb) (int write_p, int version, |
|
int content_type, const void *buf, |
|
size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)) |
|
{ |
|
SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb); |
|
} |
|
|
|
void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, |
|
void (*cb) (int write_p, int version, |
|
int content_type, const void *buf, |
|
size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)) |
|
{ |
|
SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Allocates new EVP_MD_CTX and sets pointer to it into given pointer |
|
* vairable, freeing EVP_MD_CTX previously stored in that variable, if any. |
|
* If EVP_MD pointer is passed, initializes ctx with this md Returns newly |
|
* allocated ctx; |
|
*/ |
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash, const EVP_MD *md) |
|
{ |
|
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(hash); |
|
*hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); |
|
if (*hash == NULL || (md && EVP_DigestInit_ex(*hash, md, NULL) <= 0)) { |
|
EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(*hash); |
|
*hash = NULL; |
|
return NULL; |
|
} |
|
return *hash; |
|
} |
|
|
|
void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash) |
|
{ |
|
|
|
if (*hash) |
|
EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(*hash); |
|
*hash = NULL; |
|
} |
|
|
|
void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug) |
|
{ |
|
s->debug = debug; |
|
} |
|
|
|
int SSL_cache_hit(SSL *s) |
|
{ |
|
return s->hit; |
|
} |
|
|
|
#if defined(_WINDLL) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16) |
|
# include "../crypto/bio/bss_file.c" |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) |
|
IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) |
|
IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER, ssl_cipher_id);
|
|
|