You can not select more than 25 topics
Topics must start with a letter or number, can include dashes ('-') and can be up to 35 characters long.
836 lines
26 KiB
836 lines
26 KiB
/* v3_purp.c */ |
|
/* |
|
* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project |
|
* 2001. |
|
*/ |
|
/* ==================================================================== |
|
* Copyright (c) 1999-2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
|
* |
|
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
|
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
|
* are met: |
|
* |
|
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
|
* |
|
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
|
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
|
* distribution. |
|
* |
|
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
|
* software must display the following acknowledgment: |
|
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
|
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" |
|
* |
|
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
|
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
|
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
|
* licensing@OpenSSL.org. |
|
* |
|
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
|
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
|
* permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
|
* |
|
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
|
* acknowledgment: |
|
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
|
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" |
|
* |
|
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
|
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
|
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
|
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
|
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
|
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
|
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
|
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
|
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
|
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
|
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
|
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
|
* ==================================================================== |
|
* |
|
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
|
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
|
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
|
* |
|
*/ |
|
|
|
#include <stdio.h> |
|
#include "cryptlib.h" |
|
#include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
|
#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h> |
|
|
|
static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x); |
|
|
|
static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x); |
|
static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
|
int ca); |
|
static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
|
int ca); |
|
static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
|
int ca); |
|
static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca); |
|
static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
|
int ca); |
|
static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
|
int ca); |
|
static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
|
int ca); |
|
static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
|
int ca); |
|
static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); |
|
static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); |
|
|
|
static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE *const *a, const X509_PURPOSE *const *b); |
|
static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p); |
|
|
|
static X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = { |
|
{X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0, |
|
check_purpose_ssl_client, "SSL client", "sslclient", NULL}, |
|
{X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, |
|
check_purpose_ssl_server, "SSL server", "sslserver", NULL}, |
|
{X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, |
|
check_purpose_ns_ssl_server, "Netscape SSL server", "nssslserver", NULL}, |
|
{X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_sign, |
|
"S/MIME signing", "smimesign", NULL}, |
|
{X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, |
|
check_purpose_smime_encrypt, "S/MIME encryption", "smimeencrypt", NULL}, |
|
{X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, check_purpose_crl_sign, |
|
"CRL signing", "crlsign", NULL}, |
|
{X509_PURPOSE_ANY, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT, 0, no_check, "Any Purpose", "any", |
|
NULL}, |
|
{X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, ocsp_helper, |
|
"OCSP helper", "ocsphelper", NULL}, |
|
{X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN, X509_TRUST_TSA, 0, |
|
check_purpose_timestamp_sign, "Time Stamp signing", "timestampsign", |
|
NULL}, |
|
}; |
|
|
|
#define X509_PURPOSE_COUNT (sizeof(xstandard)/sizeof(X509_PURPOSE)) |
|
|
|
IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) |
|
|
|
static STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) *xptable = NULL; |
|
|
|
static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE *const *a, const X509_PURPOSE *const *b) |
|
{ |
|
return (*a)->purpose - (*b)->purpose; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509* I |
|
* really can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const |
|
* things. |
|
*/ |
|
int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca) |
|
{ |
|
int idx; |
|
const X509_PURPOSE *pt; |
|
if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) { |
|
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); |
|
x509v3_cache_extensions(x); |
|
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); |
|
} |
|
if (id == -1) |
|
return 1; |
|
idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id); |
|
if (idx == -1) |
|
return -1; |
|
pt = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); |
|
return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, ca); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose) |
|
{ |
|
if (X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose) == -1) { |
|
X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_SET, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE); |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
*p = purpose; |
|
return 1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
int X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void) |
|
{ |
|
if (!xptable) |
|
return X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; |
|
return sk_X509_PURPOSE_num(xptable) + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; |
|
} |
|
|
|
X509_PURPOSE *X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx) |
|
{ |
|
if (idx < 0) |
|
return NULL; |
|
if (idx < (int)X509_PURPOSE_COUNT) |
|
return xstandard + idx; |
|
return sk_X509_PURPOSE_value(xptable, idx - X509_PURPOSE_COUNT); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(char *sname) |
|
{ |
|
int i; |
|
X509_PURPOSE *xptmp; |
|
for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) { |
|
xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i); |
|
if (!strcmp(xptmp->sname, sname)) |
|
return i; |
|
} |
|
return -1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose) |
|
{ |
|
X509_PURPOSE tmp; |
|
int idx; |
|
if ((purpose >= X509_PURPOSE_MIN) && (purpose <= X509_PURPOSE_MAX)) |
|
return purpose - X509_PURPOSE_MIN; |
|
tmp.purpose = purpose; |
|
if (!xptable) |
|
return -1; |
|
idx = sk_X509_PURPOSE_find(xptable, &tmp); |
|
if (idx == -1) |
|
return -1; |
|
return idx + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; |
|
} |
|
|
|
int X509_PURPOSE_add(int id, int trust, int flags, |
|
int (*ck) (const X509_PURPOSE *, const X509 *, int), |
|
char *name, char *sname, void *arg) |
|
{ |
|
int idx; |
|
X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; |
|
/* |
|
* This is set according to what we change: application can't set it |
|
*/ |
|
flags &= ~X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC; |
|
/* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */ |
|
flags |= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME; |
|
/* Get existing entry if any */ |
|
idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id); |
|
/* Need a new entry */ |
|
if (idx == -1) { |
|
if (!(ptmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_PURPOSE)))) { |
|
X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
ptmp->flags = X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC; |
|
} else |
|
ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); |
|
|
|
/* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */ |
|
if (ptmp->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) { |
|
OPENSSL_free(ptmp->name); |
|
OPENSSL_free(ptmp->sname); |
|
} |
|
/* dup supplied name */ |
|
ptmp->name = BUF_strdup(name); |
|
ptmp->sname = BUF_strdup(sname); |
|
if (!ptmp->name || !ptmp->sname) { |
|
X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
/* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */ |
|
ptmp->flags &= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC; |
|
/* Set all other flags */ |
|
ptmp->flags |= flags; |
|
|
|
ptmp->purpose = id; |
|
ptmp->trust = trust; |
|
ptmp->check_purpose = ck; |
|
ptmp->usr_data = arg; |
|
|
|
/* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */ |
|
if (idx == -1) { |
|
if (!xptable && !(xptable = sk_X509_PURPOSE_new(xp_cmp))) { |
|
X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_push(xptable, ptmp)) { |
|
X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
return 1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p) |
|
{ |
|
if (!p) |
|
return; |
|
if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC) { |
|
if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) { |
|
OPENSSL_free(p->name); |
|
OPENSSL_free(p->sname); |
|
} |
|
OPENSSL_free(p); |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
void X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void) |
|
{ |
|
unsigned int i; |
|
sk_X509_PURPOSE_pop_free(xptable, xptable_free); |
|
for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; i++) |
|
xptable_free(xstandard + i); |
|
xptable = NULL; |
|
} |
|
|
|
int X509_PURPOSE_get_id(X509_PURPOSE *xp) |
|
{ |
|
return xp->purpose; |
|
} |
|
|
|
char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(X509_PURPOSE *xp) |
|
{ |
|
return xp->name; |
|
} |
|
|
|
char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(X509_PURPOSE *xp) |
|
{ |
|
return xp->sname; |
|
} |
|
|
|
int X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(X509_PURPOSE *xp) |
|
{ |
|
return xp->trust; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int nid_cmp(const int *a, const int *b) |
|
{ |
|
return *a - *b; |
|
} |
|
|
|
DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(int, int, nid); |
|
IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(int, int, nid); |
|
|
|
int X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION *ex) |
|
{ |
|
/* |
|
* This table is a list of the NIDs of supported extensions: that is |
|
* those which are used by the verify process. If an extension is |
|
* critical and doesn't appear in this list then the verify process will |
|
* normally reject the certificate. The list must be kept in numerical |
|
* order because it will be searched using bsearch. |
|
*/ |
|
|
|
static const int supported_nids[] = { |
|
NID_netscape_cert_type, /* 71 */ |
|
NID_key_usage, /* 83 */ |
|
NID_subject_alt_name, /* 85 */ |
|
NID_basic_constraints, /* 87 */ |
|
NID_certificate_policies, /* 89 */ |
|
NID_ext_key_usage, /* 126 */ |
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 |
|
NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, /* 290 */ |
|
NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum, /* 291 */ |
|
#endif |
|
NID_policy_constraints, /* 401 */ |
|
NID_proxyCertInfo, /* 663 */ |
|
NID_name_constraints, /* 666 */ |
|
NID_policy_mappings, /* 747 */ |
|
NID_inhibit_any_policy /* 748 */ |
|
}; |
|
|
|
int ex_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex)); |
|
|
|
if (ex_nid == NID_undef) |
|
return 0; |
|
|
|
if (OBJ_bsearch_nid(&ex_nid, supported_nids, |
|
sizeof(supported_nids) / sizeof(int))) |
|
return 1; |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void setup_dp(X509 *x, DIST_POINT *dp) |
|
{ |
|
X509_NAME *iname = NULL; |
|
int i; |
|
if (dp->reasons) { |
|
if (dp->reasons->length > 0) |
|
dp->dp_reasons = dp->reasons->data[0]; |
|
if (dp->reasons->length > 1) |
|
dp->dp_reasons |= (dp->reasons->data[1] << 8); |
|
dp->dp_reasons &= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS; |
|
} else |
|
dp->dp_reasons = CRLDP_ALL_REASONS; |
|
if (!dp->distpoint || (dp->distpoint->type != 1)) |
|
return; |
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) { |
|
GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); |
|
if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) { |
|
iname = gen->d.directoryName; |
|
break; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
if (!iname) |
|
iname = X509_get_issuer_name(x); |
|
|
|
DIST_POINT_set_dpname(dp->distpoint, iname); |
|
|
|
} |
|
|
|
static void setup_crldp(X509 *x) |
|
{ |
|
int i; |
|
x->crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, NULL, NULL); |
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) |
|
setup_dp(x, sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x) |
|
{ |
|
BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs; |
|
PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci; |
|
ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage; |
|
ASN1_BIT_STRING *ns; |
|
EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage; |
|
X509_EXTENSION *ex; |
|
|
|
int i; |
|
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) |
|
return; |
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA |
|
X509_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), x->sha1_hash, NULL); |
|
#endif |
|
/* Does subject name match issuer ? */ |
|
if (!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x))) |
|
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI; |
|
/* V1 should mean no extensions ... */ |
|
if (!X509_get_version(x)) |
|
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1; |
|
/* Handle basic constraints */ |
|
if ((bs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, NULL, NULL))) { |
|
if (bs->ca) |
|
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA; |
|
if (bs->pathlen) { |
|
if ((bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) |
|
|| !bs->ca) { |
|
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; |
|
x->ex_pathlen = 0; |
|
} else |
|
x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen); |
|
} else |
|
x->ex_pathlen = -1; |
|
BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs); |
|
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS; |
|
} |
|
/* Handle proxy certificates */ |
|
if ((pci = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_proxyCertInfo, NULL, NULL))) { |
|
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA |
|
|| X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_alt_name, -1) >= 0 |
|
|| X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_issuer_alt_name, -1) >= 0) { |
|
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; |
|
} |
|
if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint) { |
|
x->ex_pcpathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pci->pcPathLengthConstraint); |
|
} else |
|
x->ex_pcpathlen = -1; |
|
PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci); |
|
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY; |
|
} |
|
/* Handle key usage */ |
|
if ((usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) { |
|
if (usage->length > 0) { |
|
x->ex_kusage = usage->data[0]; |
|
if (usage->length > 1) |
|
x->ex_kusage |= usage->data[1] << 8; |
|
} else |
|
x->ex_kusage = 0; |
|
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_KUSAGE; |
|
ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage); |
|
} |
|
x->ex_xkusage = 0; |
|
if ((extusage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) { |
|
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_XKUSAGE; |
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) { |
|
switch (OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage, i))) { |
|
case NID_server_auth: |
|
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_SERVER; |
|
break; |
|
|
|
case NID_client_auth: |
|
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_CLIENT; |
|
break; |
|
|
|
case NID_email_protect: |
|
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SMIME; |
|
break; |
|
|
|
case NID_code_sign: |
|
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_CODE_SIGN; |
|
break; |
|
|
|
case NID_ms_sgc: |
|
case NID_ns_sgc: |
|
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SGC; |
|
break; |
|
|
|
case NID_OCSP_sign: |
|
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_OCSP_SIGN; |
|
break; |
|
|
|
case NID_time_stamp: |
|
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_TIMESTAMP; |
|
break; |
|
|
|
case NID_dvcs: |
|
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_DVCS; |
|
break; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage, ASN1_OBJECT_free); |
|
} |
|
|
|
if ((ns = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_netscape_cert_type, NULL, NULL))) { |
|
if (ns->length > 0) |
|
x->ex_nscert = ns->data[0]; |
|
else |
|
x->ex_nscert = 0; |
|
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NSCERT; |
|
ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ns); |
|
} |
|
x->skid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, NULL, NULL); |
|
x->akid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL); |
|
x->altname = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL); |
|
x->nc = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_name_constraints, &i, NULL); |
|
if (!x->nc && (i != -1)) |
|
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; |
|
setup_crldp(x); |
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 |
|
x->rfc3779_addr = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, NULL, NULL); |
|
x->rfc3779_asid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum, |
|
NULL, NULL); |
|
#endif |
|
for (i = 0; i < X509_get_ext_count(x); i++) { |
|
ex = X509_get_ext(x, i); |
|
if (OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex)) |
|
== NID_freshest_crl) |
|
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_FRESHEST; |
|
if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex)) |
|
continue; |
|
if (!X509_supported_extension(ex)) { |
|
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL; |
|
break; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/*- |
|
* CA checks common to all purposes |
|
* return codes: |
|
* 0 not a CA |
|
* 1 is a CA |
|
* 2 basicConstraints absent so "maybe" a CA |
|
* 3 basicConstraints absent but self signed V1. |
|
* 4 basicConstraints absent but keyUsage present and keyCertSign asserted. |
|
*/ |
|
|
|
#define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS) |
|
#define ku_reject(x, usage) \ |
|
(((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage))) |
|
#define xku_reject(x, usage) \ |
|
(((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage))) |
|
#define ns_reject(x, usage) \ |
|
(((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage))) |
|
|
|
static int check_ca(const X509 *x) |
|
{ |
|
/* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */ |
|
if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) |
|
return 0; |
|
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) { |
|
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) |
|
return 1; |
|
/* If basicConstraints says not a CA then say so */ |
|
else |
|
return 0; |
|
} else { |
|
/* we support V1 roots for... uh, I don't really know why. */ |
|
if ((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT) |
|
return 3; |
|
/* |
|
* If key usage present it must have certSign so tolerate it |
|
*/ |
|
else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) |
|
return 4; |
|
/* Older certificates could have Netscape-specific CA types */ |
|
else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT && x->ex_nscert & NS_ANY_CA) |
|
return 5; |
|
/* can this still be regarded a CA certificate? I doubt it */ |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
int X509_check_ca(X509 *x) |
|
{ |
|
if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) { |
|
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); |
|
x509v3_cache_extensions(x); |
|
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); |
|
} |
|
|
|
return check_ca(x); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* Check SSL CA: common checks for SSL client and server */ |
|
static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x) |
|
{ |
|
int ca_ret; |
|
ca_ret = check_ca(x); |
|
if (!ca_ret) |
|
return 0; |
|
/* check nsCertType if present */ |
|
if (ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CA) |
|
return ca_ret; |
|
else |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
|
int ca) |
|
{ |
|
if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_CLIENT)) |
|
return 0; |
|
if (ca) |
|
return check_ssl_ca(x); |
|
/* We need to do digital signatures with it */ |
|
if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) |
|
return 0; |
|
/* nsCertType if present should allow SSL client use */ |
|
if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_CLIENT)) |
|
return 0; |
|
return 1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
|
int ca) |
|
{ |
|
if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_SERVER | XKU_SGC)) |
|
return 0; |
|
if (ca) |
|
return check_ssl_ca(x); |
|
|
|
if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_SERVER)) |
|
return 0; |
|
/* Now as for keyUsage: we'll at least need to sign OR encipher */ |
|
if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) |
|
return 0; |
|
|
|
return 1; |
|
|
|
} |
|
|
|
static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
|
int ca) |
|
{ |
|
int ret; |
|
ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, ca); |
|
if (!ret || ca) |
|
return ret; |
|
/* We need to encipher or Netscape complains */ |
|
if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) |
|
return 0; |
|
return ret; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* common S/MIME checks */ |
|
static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca) |
|
{ |
|
if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SMIME)) |
|
return 0; |
|
if (ca) { |
|
int ca_ret; |
|
ca_ret = check_ca(x); |
|
if (!ca_ret) |
|
return 0; |
|
/* check nsCertType if present */ |
|
if (ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA) |
|
return ca_ret; |
|
else |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) { |
|
if (x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME) |
|
return 1; |
|
/* Workaround for some buggy certificates */ |
|
if (x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CLIENT) |
|
return 2; |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
return 1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
|
int ca) |
|
{ |
|
int ret; |
|
ret = purpose_smime(x, ca); |
|
if (!ret || ca) |
|
return ret; |
|
if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_NON_REPUDIATION)) |
|
return 0; |
|
return ret; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
|
int ca) |
|
{ |
|
int ret; |
|
ret = purpose_smime(x, ca); |
|
if (!ret || ca) |
|
return ret; |
|
if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) |
|
return 0; |
|
return ret; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
|
int ca) |
|
{ |
|
if (ca) { |
|
int ca_ret; |
|
if ((ca_ret = check_ca(x)) != 2) |
|
return ca_ret; |
|
else |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
if (ku_reject(x, KU_CRL_SIGN)) |
|
return 0; |
|
return 1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* OCSP helper: this is *not* a full OCSP check. It just checks that each CA |
|
* is valid. Additional checks must be made on the chain. |
|
*/ |
|
|
|
static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) |
|
{ |
|
/* |
|
* Must be a valid CA. Should we really support the "I don't know" value |
|
* (2)? |
|
*/ |
|
if (ca) |
|
return check_ca(x); |
|
/* leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */ |
|
return 1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
|
int ca) |
|
{ |
|
int i_ext; |
|
|
|
/* If ca is true we must return if this is a valid CA certificate. */ |
|
if (ca) |
|
return check_ca(x); |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Check the optional key usage field: |
|
* if Key Usage is present, it must be one of digitalSignature |
|
* and/or nonRepudiation (other values are not consistent and shall |
|
* be rejected). |
|
*/ |
|
if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) |
|
&& ((x->ex_kusage & ~(KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) || |
|
!(x->ex_kusage & (KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)))) |
|
return 0; |
|
|
|
/* Only time stamp key usage is permitted and it's required. */ |
|
if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) || x->ex_xkusage != XKU_TIMESTAMP) |
|
return 0; |
|
|
|
/* Extended Key Usage MUST be critical */ |
|
i_ext = X509_get_ext_by_NID((X509 *)x, NID_ext_key_usage, -1); |
|
if (i_ext >= 0) { |
|
X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_get_ext((X509 *)x, i_ext); |
|
if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)) |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
return 1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) |
|
{ |
|
return 1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/*- |
|
* Various checks to see if one certificate issued the second. |
|
* This can be used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates |
|
* which have been looked up using some simple method such as by |
|
* subject name. |
|
* These are: |
|
* 1. Check issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer) |
|
* 2. If akid(subject) exists check it matches issuer |
|
* 3. If key_usage(issuer) exists check it supports certificate signing |
|
* returns 0 for OK, positive for reason for mismatch, reasons match |
|
* codes for X509_verify_cert() |
|
*/ |
|
|
|
int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject) |
|
{ |
|
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer), |
|
X509_get_issuer_name(subject))) |
|
return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH; |
|
x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer); |
|
x509v3_cache_extensions(subject); |
|
|
|
if (subject->akid) { |
|
int ret = X509_check_akid(issuer, subject->akid); |
|
if (ret != X509_V_OK) |
|
return ret; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (subject->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { |
|
if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) |
|
return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE; |
|
} else if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) |
|
return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN; |
|
return X509_V_OK; |
|
} |
|
|
|
int X509_check_akid(X509 *issuer, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid) |
|
{ |
|
|
|
if (!akid) |
|
return X509_V_OK; |
|
|
|
/* Check key ids (if present) */ |
|
if (akid->keyid && issuer->skid && |
|
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(akid->keyid, issuer->skid)) |
|
return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH; |
|
/* Check serial number */ |
|
if (akid->serial && |
|
ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer), akid->serial)) |
|
return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH; |
|
/* Check issuer name */ |
|
if (akid->issuer) { |
|
/* |
|
* Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes SEQUENCE OF |
|
* GeneralName. So look for a DirName. There may be more than one but |
|
* we only take any notice of the first. |
|
*/ |
|
GENERAL_NAMES *gens; |
|
GENERAL_NAME *gen; |
|
X509_NAME *nm = NULL; |
|
int i; |
|
gens = akid->issuer; |
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { |
|
gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); |
|
if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) { |
|
nm = gen->d.dirn; |
|
break; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
if (nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer))) |
|
return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH; |
|
} |
|
return X509_V_OK; |
|
}
|
|
|