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904 lines
28 KiB
904 lines
28 KiB
/* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */ |
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
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* All rights reserved. |
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* |
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* This package is an SSL implementation written |
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
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* |
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
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* |
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
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* the code are not to be removed. |
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
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* as the author of the parts of the library used. |
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
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* |
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
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* are met: |
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
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* must display the following acknowledgement: |
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
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* |
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
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* SUCH DAMAGE. |
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* |
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
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* copied and put under another distribution licence |
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
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*/ |
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/* ==================================================================== |
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
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* |
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
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* are met: |
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* |
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
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* |
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
|
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
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* distribution. |
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* |
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
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* software must display the following acknowledgment: |
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
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* |
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
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* openssl-core@openssl.org. |
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* |
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
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* |
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
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* acknowledgment: |
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
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* |
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
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* ==================================================================== |
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* |
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
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* |
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*/ |
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|
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#include <stdio.h> |
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#include "cryptlib.h" |
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#include <openssl/bn.h> |
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#include <openssl/rsa.h> |
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#include <openssl/rand.h> |
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|
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#ifndef RSA_NULL |
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|
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static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, |
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unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); |
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static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, |
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unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); |
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static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, |
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unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); |
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static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, |
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unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); |
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static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa, |
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BN_CTX *ctx); |
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static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa); |
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static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa); |
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static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth = { |
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"Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA", |
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RSA_eay_public_encrypt, |
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RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */ |
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RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */ |
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RSA_eay_private_decrypt, |
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RSA_eay_mod_exp, |
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BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery |
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* if e == 3 */ |
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RSA_eay_init, |
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RSA_eay_finish, |
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0, /* flags */ |
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NULL, |
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0, /* rsa_sign */ |
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0, /* rsa_verify */ |
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NULL /* rsa_keygen */ |
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}; |
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|
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const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void) |
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{ |
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return (&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth); |
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} |
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|
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static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, |
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unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) |
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{ |
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BIGNUM *f, *ret; |
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int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1; |
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unsigned char *buf = NULL; |
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BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
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|
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if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { |
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); |
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return -1; |
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} |
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|
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if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) { |
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); |
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return -1; |
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} |
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|
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/* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */ |
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if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) { |
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if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) { |
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); |
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return -1; |
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} |
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} |
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|
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if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) |
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goto err; |
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BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
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f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
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ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
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num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); |
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buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); |
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if (!f || !ret || !buf) { |
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
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goto err; |
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} |
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|
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switch (padding) { |
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case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: |
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i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen); |
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break; |
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# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA |
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case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: |
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i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0); |
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break; |
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# endif |
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case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: |
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i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen); |
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break; |
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case RSA_NO_PADDING: |
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i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); |
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break; |
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default: |
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); |
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goto err; |
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} |
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if (i <= 0) |
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goto err; |
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|
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if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL) |
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goto err; |
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|
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if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { |
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/* usually the padding functions would catch this */ |
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, |
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RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); |
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goto err; |
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} |
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|
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if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) |
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if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked |
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(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) |
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goto err; |
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|
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if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, |
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rsa->_method_mod_n)) |
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goto err; |
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|
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/* |
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* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the |
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* modulus |
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*/ |
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j = BN_num_bytes(ret); |
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i = BN_bn2bin(ret, &(to[num - j])); |
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for (k = 0; k < (num - i); k++) |
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to[k] = 0; |
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|
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r = num; |
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err: |
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if (ctx != NULL) { |
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BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
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BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
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} |
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if (buf != NULL) { |
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OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); |
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OPENSSL_free(buf); |
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} |
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return (r); |
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} |
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|
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static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx) |
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{ |
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BN_BLINDING *ret; |
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int got_write_lock = 0; |
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CRYPTO_THREADID cur; |
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|
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CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); |
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|
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if (rsa->blinding == NULL) { |
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CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); |
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CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); |
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got_write_lock = 1; |
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|
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if (rsa->blinding == NULL) |
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rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx); |
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} |
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|
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ret = rsa->blinding; |
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if (ret == NULL) |
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goto err; |
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|
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CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur); |
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if (!CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&cur, BN_BLINDING_thread_id(ret))) { |
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/* rsa->blinding is ours! */ |
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|
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*local = 1; |
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} else { |
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/* resort to rsa->mt_blinding instead */ |
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|
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/* |
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* instructs rsa_blinding_convert(), rsa_blinding_invert() that the |
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* BN_BLINDING is shared, meaning that accesses require locks, and |
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* that the blinding factor must be stored outside the BN_BLINDING |
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*/ |
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*local = 0; |
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|
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if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL) { |
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if (!got_write_lock) { |
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CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); |
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CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); |
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got_write_lock = 1; |
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} |
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|
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if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL) |
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rsa->mt_blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx); |
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} |
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ret = rsa->mt_blinding; |
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} |
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|
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err: |
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if (got_write_lock) |
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CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); |
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else |
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CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); |
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return ret; |
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} |
|
|
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static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind, |
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BN_CTX *ctx) |
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{ |
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if (unblind == NULL) |
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/* |
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* Local blinding: store the unblinding factor in BN_BLINDING. |
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*/ |
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return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx); |
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else { |
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/* |
|
* Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor outside BN_BLINDING. |
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*/ |
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int ret; |
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CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING); |
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ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx); |
|
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING); |
|
return ret; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind, |
|
BN_CTX *ctx) |
|
{ |
|
/* |
|
* For local blinding, unblind is set to NULL, and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex |
|
* will use the unblinding factor stored in BN_BLINDING. If BN_BLINDING |
|
* is shared between threads, unblind must be non-null: |
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* BN_BLINDING_invert_ex will then use the local unblinding factor, and |
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* will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING. In both cases it's safe |
|
* to access the blinding without a lock. |
|
*/ |
|
return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* signing */ |
|
static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, |
|
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) |
|
{ |
|
BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res; |
|
int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1; |
|
unsigned char *buf = NULL; |
|
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
|
int local_blinding = 0; |
|
/* |
|
* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind |
|
* instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store |
|
* the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. |
|
*/ |
|
BIGNUM *unblind = NULL; |
|
BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL; |
|
|
|
if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) |
|
goto err; |
|
BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
|
f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
|
ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
|
num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); |
|
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); |
|
if (!f || !ret || !buf) { |
|
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
|
goto err; |
|
} |
|
|
|
switch (padding) { |
|
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: |
|
i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen); |
|
break; |
|
case RSA_X931_PADDING: |
|
i = RSA_padding_add_X931(buf, num, from, flen); |
|
break; |
|
case RSA_NO_PADDING: |
|
i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); |
|
break; |
|
case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: |
|
default: |
|
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); |
|
goto err; |
|
} |
|
if (i <= 0) |
|
goto err; |
|
|
|
if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL) |
|
goto err; |
|
|
|
if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { |
|
/* usually the padding functions would catch this */ |
|
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, |
|
RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); |
|
goto err; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) { |
|
blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx); |
|
if (blinding == NULL) { |
|
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
|
goto err; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (blinding != NULL) { |
|
if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) { |
|
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
|
goto err; |
|
} |
|
if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx)) |
|
goto err; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || |
|
((rsa->p != NULL) && |
|
(rsa->q != NULL) && |
|
(rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) { |
|
if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) |
|
goto err; |
|
} else { |
|
BIGNUM local_d; |
|
BIGNUM *d = NULL; |
|
|
|
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { |
|
BN_init(&local_d); |
|
d = &local_d; |
|
BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
|
} else |
|
d = rsa->d; |
|
|
|
if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) |
|
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked |
|
(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) |
|
goto err; |
|
|
|
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx, |
|
rsa->_method_mod_n)) |
|
goto err; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (blinding) |
|
if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx)) |
|
goto err; |
|
|
|
if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) { |
|
BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret); |
|
if (BN_cmp(ret, f) > 0) |
|
res = f; |
|
else |
|
res = ret; |
|
} else |
|
res = ret; |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the |
|
* modulus |
|
*/ |
|
j = BN_num_bytes(res); |
|
i = BN_bn2bin(res, &(to[num - j])); |
|
for (k = 0; k < (num - i); k++) |
|
to[k] = 0; |
|
|
|
r = num; |
|
err: |
|
if (ctx != NULL) { |
|
BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
|
BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
|
} |
|
if (buf != NULL) { |
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); |
|
OPENSSL_free(buf); |
|
} |
|
return (r); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, |
|
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) |
|
{ |
|
BIGNUM *f, *ret; |
|
int j, num = 0, r = -1; |
|
unsigned char *p; |
|
unsigned char *buf = NULL; |
|
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
|
int local_blinding = 0; |
|
/* |
|
* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind |
|
* instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store |
|
* the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. |
|
*/ |
|
BIGNUM *unblind = NULL; |
|
BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL; |
|
|
|
if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) |
|
goto err; |
|
BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
|
f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
|
ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
|
num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); |
|
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); |
|
if (!f || !ret || !buf) { |
|
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
|
goto err; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the |
|
* top '0' bytes |
|
*/ |
|
if (flen > num) { |
|
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, |
|
RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); |
|
goto err; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* make data into a big number */ |
|
if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, f) == NULL) |
|
goto err; |
|
|
|
if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { |
|
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, |
|
RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); |
|
goto err; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) { |
|
blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx); |
|
if (blinding == NULL) { |
|
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
|
goto err; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (blinding != NULL) { |
|
if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) { |
|
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
|
goto err; |
|
} |
|
if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx)) |
|
goto err; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* do the decrypt */ |
|
if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || |
|
((rsa->p != NULL) && |
|
(rsa->q != NULL) && |
|
(rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) { |
|
if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) |
|
goto err; |
|
} else { |
|
BIGNUM local_d; |
|
BIGNUM *d = NULL; |
|
|
|
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { |
|
d = &local_d; |
|
BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
|
} else |
|
d = rsa->d; |
|
|
|
if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) |
|
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked |
|
(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) |
|
goto err; |
|
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx, |
|
rsa->_method_mod_n)) |
|
goto err; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (blinding) |
|
if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx)) |
|
goto err; |
|
|
|
p = buf; |
|
j = BN_bn2bin(ret, p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */ |
|
|
|
switch (padding) { |
|
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: |
|
r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, buf, j, num); |
|
break; |
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA |
|
case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: |
|
r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, buf, j, num, NULL, 0); |
|
break; |
|
# endif |
|
case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: |
|
r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, buf, j, num); |
|
break; |
|
case RSA_NO_PADDING: |
|
r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, j, num); |
|
break; |
|
default: |
|
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); |
|
goto err; |
|
} |
|
if (r < 0) |
|
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); |
|
|
|
err: |
|
if (ctx != NULL) { |
|
BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
|
BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
|
} |
|
if (buf != NULL) { |
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); |
|
OPENSSL_free(buf); |
|
} |
|
return (r); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* signature verification */ |
|
static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, |
|
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) |
|
{ |
|
BIGNUM *f, *ret; |
|
int i, num = 0, r = -1; |
|
unsigned char *p; |
|
unsigned char *buf = NULL; |
|
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
|
|
|
if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { |
|
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); |
|
return -1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) { |
|
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); |
|
return -1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */ |
|
if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) { |
|
if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) { |
|
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); |
|
return -1; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) |
|
goto err; |
|
BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
|
f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
|
ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
|
num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); |
|
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); |
|
if (!f || !ret || !buf) { |
|
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
|
goto err; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the |
|
* top '0' bytes |
|
*/ |
|
if (flen > num) { |
|
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); |
|
goto err; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, f) == NULL) |
|
goto err; |
|
|
|
if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { |
|
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, |
|
RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); |
|
goto err; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) |
|
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked |
|
(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) |
|
goto err; |
|
|
|
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, |
|
rsa->_method_mod_n)) |
|
goto err; |
|
|
|
if ((padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) && ((ret->d[0] & 0xf) != 12)) |
|
if (!BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret)) |
|
goto err; |
|
|
|
p = buf; |
|
i = BN_bn2bin(ret, p); |
|
|
|
switch (padding) { |
|
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: |
|
r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, buf, i, num); |
|
break; |
|
case RSA_X931_PADDING: |
|
r = RSA_padding_check_X931(to, num, buf, i, num); |
|
break; |
|
case RSA_NO_PADDING: |
|
r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, i, num); |
|
break; |
|
default: |
|
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); |
|
goto err; |
|
} |
|
if (r < 0) |
|
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); |
|
|
|
err: |
|
if (ctx != NULL) { |
|
BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
|
BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
|
} |
|
if (buf != NULL) { |
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); |
|
OPENSSL_free(buf); |
|
} |
|
return (r); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) |
|
{ |
|
BIGNUM *r1, *m1, *vrfy; |
|
BIGNUM local_dmp1, local_dmq1, local_c, local_r1; |
|
BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1, *c, *pr1; |
|
int ret = 0; |
|
|
|
BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
|
r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
|
m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
|
vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
|
|
|
{ |
|
BIGNUM local_p, local_q; |
|
BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL; |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the |
|
* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set) |
|
*/ |
|
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { |
|
BN_init(&local_p); |
|
p = &local_p; |
|
BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
|
|
|
BN_init(&local_q); |
|
q = &local_q; |
|
BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
|
} else { |
|
p = rsa->p; |
|
q = rsa->q; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) { |
|
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked |
|
(&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx)) |
|
goto err; |
|
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked |
|
(&rsa->_method_mod_q, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx)) |
|
goto err; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) |
|
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked |
|
(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) |
|
goto err; |
|
|
|
/* compute I mod q */ |
|
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { |
|
c = &local_c; |
|
BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
|
if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->q, ctx)) |
|
goto err; |
|
} else { |
|
if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->q, ctx)) |
|
goto err; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */ |
|
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { |
|
dmq1 = &local_dmq1; |
|
BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
|
} else |
|
dmq1 = rsa->dmq1; |
|
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1, r1, dmq1, rsa->q, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_q)) |
|
goto err; |
|
|
|
/* compute I mod p */ |
|
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { |
|
c = &local_c; |
|
BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
|
if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->p, ctx)) |
|
goto err; |
|
} else { |
|
if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->p, ctx)) |
|
goto err; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */ |
|
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { |
|
dmp1 = &local_dmp1; |
|
BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
|
} else |
|
dmp1 = rsa->dmp1; |
|
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, r1, dmp1, rsa->p, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_p)) |
|
goto err; |
|
|
|
if (!BN_sub(r0, r0, m1)) |
|
goto err; |
|
/* |
|
* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does affect the |
|
* multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size |
|
*/ |
|
if (BN_is_negative(r0)) |
|
if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p)) |
|
goto err; |
|
|
|
if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->iqmp, ctx)) |
|
goto err; |
|
|
|
/* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */ |
|
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { |
|
pr1 = &local_r1; |
|
BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
|
} else |
|
pr1 = r1; |
|
if (!BN_mod(r0, pr1, rsa->p, ctx)) |
|
goto err; |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of adding 'p' |
|
* if r0 is negative above to leave the result still negative. This can |
|
* break the private key operations: the following second correction |
|
* should *always* correct this rare occurrence. This will *never* happen |
|
* with OpenSSL generated keys because they ensure p > q [steve] |
|
*/ |
|
if (BN_is_negative(r0)) |
|
if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p)) |
|
goto err; |
|
if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->q, ctx)) |
|
goto err; |
|
if (!BN_add(r0, r1, m1)) |
|
goto err; |
|
|
|
if (rsa->e && rsa->n) { |
|
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, |
|
rsa->_method_mod_n)) |
|
goto err; |
|
/* |
|
* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation will |
|
* be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of the |
|
* verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check for |
|
* absolute equality, just congruency. |
|
*/ |
|
if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I)) |
|
goto err; |
|
if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) |
|
goto err; |
|
if (BN_is_negative(vrfy)) |
|
if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n)) |
|
goto err; |
|
if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy)) { |
|
/* |
|
* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak |
|
* miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower) mod_exp and |
|
* return that instead. |
|
*/ |
|
|
|
BIGNUM local_d; |
|
BIGNUM *d = NULL; |
|
|
|
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { |
|
d = &local_d; |
|
BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
|
} else |
|
d = rsa->d; |
|
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, I, d, rsa->n, ctx, |
|
rsa->_method_mod_n)) |
|
goto err; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
ret = 1; |
|
err: |
|
BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
|
return (ret); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa) |
|
{ |
|
rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC | RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE; |
|
return (1); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa) |
|
{ |
|
if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL) |
|
BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n); |
|
if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL) |
|
BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p); |
|
if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL) |
|
BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q); |
|
return (1); |
|
} |
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|