class HMAC_DRBG : public NIST_DRBG, public NotCopyable
{
public:
CRYPTOPP_CONSTANT(SECURITY_STRENGTH=STRENGTH);
CRYPTOPP_CONSTANT(SEED_LENGTH=SEEDLENGTH);
CRYPTOPP_CONSTANT(MINIMUM_ENTROPY=STRENGTH);
CRYPTOPP_CONSTANT(MINIMUM_NONCE=0);
CRYPTOPP_CONSTANT(MINIMUM_ADDITIONAL=0);
CRYPTOPP_CONSTANT(MINIMUM_PERSONALIZATION=0);
CRYPTOPP_CONSTANT(MAXIMUM_ENTROPY=INT_MAX);
CRYPTOPP_CONSTANT(MAXIMUM_NONCE=INT_MAX);
CRYPTOPP_CONSTANT(MAXIMUM_ADDITIONAL=INT_MAX);
CRYPTOPP_CONSTANT(MAXIMUM_PERSONALIZATION=INT_MAX);
CRYPTOPP_CONSTANT(MAXIMUM_BYTES_PER_REQUEST=65536);
CRYPTOPP_CONSTANT(MAXIMUM_REQUESTS_BEFORE_RESEED=INT_MAX);
static std::string StaticAlgorithmName() { return std::string("HMAC_DRBG(") + HASH::StaticAlgorithmName() + std::string(")"); }
/// \brief Construct a HMAC DRBG
/// \param entropy the entropy to instantiate the generator
/// \param entropyLength the size of the entropy buffer
/// \param nonce additional input to instantiate the generator
/// \param nonceLength the size of the nonce buffer
/// \param personalization additional input to instantiate the generator
/// \param personalizationLength the size of the personalization buffer
/// \throws NIST_DRBG::Err if the generator is instantiated with insufficient entropy
/// \details All NIST DRBGs must be instaniated with at least MINIMUM_ENTROPY bytes of entropy.
/// The byte array for entropy must meet NIST
/// SP 800-90B or SP 800-90C requirements.
/// \details The nonce and personalization are optional byte arrays. If nonce is supplied,
/// then it should be at least MINIMUM_NONCE bytes of entropy.
/// \details An example of instantiating a SHA256 generator is shown below.
/// The example provides more entropy than required for SHA256. The NonblockingRng meets the
/// requirements of NIST SP 800-90B or SP 800-90C.
/// RDRAND() and RDSEED() generators would work as well.
///
/// SecByteBlock entropy(48), result(128);
/// NonblockingRng prng;
/// RandomNumberSource rns(prng, entropy.size(), new ArraySink(entropy, entropy.size()));
///
/// HMAC_DRBG drbg(entropy, 32, entropy+32, 16);
/// drbg.GenerateBlock(result, result.size());
///
HMAC_DRBG(const byte* entropy=NULLPTR, size_t entropyLength=STRENGTH, const byte* nonce=NULLPTR,
size_t nonceLength=0, const byte* personalization=NULLPTR, size_t personalizationLength=0)
: NIST_DRBG(), m_k(HASH::DIGESTSIZE), m_v(HASH::DIGESTSIZE), m_reseed(0)
{
if (m_k.data()) // GCC analyzer warning
std::memset(m_k, 0x00, m_k.size());
if (m_v.data()) // GCC analyzer warning
std::memset(m_v, 0x00, m_v.size());
if (entropy != NULLPTR && entropyLength != 0)
DRBG_Instantiate(entropy, entropyLength, nonce, nonceLength, personalization, personalizationLength);
}
unsigned int SecurityStrength() const {return SECURITY_STRENGTH;}
unsigned int SeedLength() const {return SEED_LENGTH;}
unsigned int MinEntropyLength() const {return MINIMUM_ENTROPY;}
unsigned int MaxEntropyLength() const {return MAXIMUM_ENTROPY;}
unsigned int MinNonceLength() const {return MINIMUM_NONCE;}
unsigned int MaxNonceLength() const {return MAXIMUM_NONCE;}
unsigned int MaxBytesPerRequest() const {return MAXIMUM_BYTES_PER_REQUEST;}
unsigned int MaxRequestBeforeReseed() const {return MAXIMUM_REQUESTS_BEFORE_RESEED;}
void IncorporateEntropy(const byte *input, size_t length)
{return DRBG_Reseed(input, length, NULLPTR, 0);}
void IncorporateEntropy(const byte *entropy, size_t entropyLength, const byte* additional, size_t additionaLength)
{return DRBG_Reseed(entropy, entropyLength, additional, additionaLength);}
void GenerateBlock(byte *output, size_t size)
{return HMAC_Generate(NULLPTR, 0, output, size);}
void GenerateBlock(const byte* additional, size_t additionaLength, byte *output, size_t size)
{return HMAC_Generate(additional, additionaLength, output, size);}
std::string AlgorithmProvider() const
{/*Hack*/HASH hash; return hash.AlgorithmProvider();}
protected:
// 10.1.2.3 Instantiation of HMAC_DRBG (p.45)
void DRBG_Instantiate(const byte* entropy, size_t entropyLength, const byte* nonce, size_t nonceLength,
const byte* personalization, size_t personalizationLength);
// 10.1.2.4 Reseeding a HMAC_DRBG Instantiation (p.46)
void DRBG_Reseed(const byte* entropy, size_t entropyLength, const byte* additional, size_t additionaLength);
// 10.1.2.5 Generating Pseudorandom Bits Using HMAC_DRBG (p.46)
void HMAC_Generate(const byte* additional, size_t additionaLength, byte *output, size_t size);
// 10.1.2.2 Derivation Function Using a HMAC Function (HMAC_Update) (p.44)
void HMAC_Update(const byte* input1, size_t inlen1, const byte* input2, size_t inlen2, const byte* input3, size_t inlen3);
private:
HMAC m_hmac;
SecByteBlock m_k, m_v;
word64 m_reseed;
};
// typedef HMAC_DRBG HMAC_SHA1_DRBG;
// typedef HMAC_DRBG HMAC_SHA256_DRBG;
// typedef HMAC_DRBG HMAC_SHA384_DRBG;
// typedef HMAC_DRBG HMAC_SHA512_DRBG;
// *************************************************************
// 10.1.1.2 Instantiation of Hash_DRBG (p.39)
template
void Hash_DRBG::DRBG_Instantiate(const byte* entropy, size_t entropyLength, const byte* nonce, size_t nonceLength,
const byte* personalization, size_t personalizationLength)
{
// SP 800-90A, 8.6.3: The entropy input shall have entropy that is equal to or greater than the security
// strength of the instantiation. Additional entropy may be provided in the nonce or the optional
// personalization string during instantiation, or in the additional input during reseeding and generation,
// but this is not required and does not increase the "official" security strength of the DRBG
// instantiation that is recorded in the internal state.
CRYPTOPP_ASSERT(entropyLength >= MINIMUM_ENTROPY);
if (entropyLength < MINIMUM_ENTROPY)
throw NIST_DRBG::Err("Hash_DRBG", "Insufficient entropy during instantiate");
// SP 800-90A, Section 9, says we should throw if we have too much entropy, too large a nonce,
// or too large a persoanlization string. We warn in Debug builds, but do nothing in Release builds.
CRYPTOPP_ASSERT(entropyLength <= MAXIMUM_ENTROPY);
CRYPTOPP_ASSERT(nonceLength <= MAXIMUM_NONCE);
CRYPTOPP_ASSERT(personalizationLength <= MAXIMUM_PERSONALIZATION);
const byte zero = 0;
SecByteBlock t1(SEEDLENGTH), t2(SEEDLENGTH);
Hash_Update(entropy, entropyLength, nonce, nonceLength, personalization, personalizationLength, NULLPTR, 0, t1, t1.size());
Hash_Update(&zero, 1, t1, t1.size(), NULLPTR, 0, NULLPTR, 0, t2, t2.size());
m_v.swap(t1); m_c.swap(t2);
m_reseed = 1;
}
// 10.1.1.3 Reseeding a Hash_DRBG Instantiation (p.40)
template
void Hash_DRBG::DRBG_Reseed(const byte* entropy, size_t entropyLength, const byte* additional, size_t additionaLength)
{
// SP 800-90A, 8.6.3: The entropy input shall have entropy that is equal to or greater than the security
// strength of the instantiation. Additional entropy may be provided in the nonce or the optional
// personalization string during instantiation, or in the additional input during reseeding and generation,
// but this is not required and does not increase the "official" security strength of the DRBG
// instantiation that is recorded in the internal state..
CRYPTOPP_ASSERT(entropyLength >= MINIMUM_ENTROPY);
if (entropyLength < MINIMUM_ENTROPY)
throw NIST_DRBG::Err("Hash_DRBG", "Insufficient entropy during reseed");
// SP 800-90A, Section 9, says we should throw if we have too much entropy, too large a nonce,
// or too large a persoanlization string. We warn in Debug builds, but do nothing in Release builds.
CRYPTOPP_ASSERT(entropyLength <= MAXIMUM_ENTROPY);
CRYPTOPP_ASSERT(additionaLength <= MAXIMUM_ADDITIONAL);
const byte zero = 0, one = 1;
SecByteBlock t1(SEEDLENGTH), t2(SEEDLENGTH);
Hash_Update(&one, 1, m_v, m_v.size(), entropy, entropyLength, additional, additionaLength, t1, t1.size());
Hash_Update(&zero, 1, t1, t1.size(), NULLPTR, 0, NULLPTR, 0, t2, t2.size());
m_v.swap(t1); m_c.swap(t2);
m_reseed = 1;
}
// 10.1.1.4 Generating Pseudorandom Bits Using Hash_DRBG (p.41)
template
void Hash_DRBG::Hash_Generate(const byte* additional, size_t additionaLength, byte *output, size_t size)
{
// Step 1
if (static_cast(m_reseed) >= static_cast(MaxRequestBeforeReseed()))
throw NIST_DRBG::Err("Hash_DRBG", "Reseed required");
if (size > MaxBytesPerRequest())
throw NIST_DRBG::Err("Hash_DRBG", "Request size exceeds limit");
// SP 800-90A, Section 9, says we should throw if we have too much entropy, too large a nonce,
// or too large a persoanlization string. We warn in Debug builds, but do nothing in Release builds.
CRYPTOPP_ASSERT(additionaLength <= MAXIMUM_ADDITIONAL);
// Step 2
if (additional && additionaLength)
{
const byte two = 2;
m_temp.New(HASH::DIGESTSIZE);
m_hash.Update(&two, 1);
m_hash.Update(m_v, m_v.size());
m_hash.Update(additional, additionaLength);
m_hash.Final(m_temp);
CRYPTOPP_ASSERT(SEEDLENGTH >= HASH::DIGESTSIZE);
int carry=0, j=HASH::DIGESTSIZE-1, i=SEEDLENGTH-1;
while (j>=0)
{
carry = m_v[i] + m_temp[j] + carry;
m_v[i] = static_cast(carry);
i--; j--; carry >>= 8;
}
while (i>=0)
{
carry = m_v[i] + carry;
m_v[i] = static_cast(carry);
i--; carry >>= 8;
}
}
// Step 3
{
m_temp.Assign(m_v);
while (size)
{
m_hash.Update(m_temp, m_temp.size());
size_t count = STDMIN(size, (size_t)HASH::DIGESTSIZE);
m_hash.TruncatedFinal(output, count);
IncrementCounterByOne(m_temp, static_cast(m_temp.size()));
size -= count; output += count;
}
}
// Steps 4-7
{
const byte three = 3;
m_temp.New(HASH::DIGESTSIZE);
m_hash.Update(&three, 1);
m_hash.Update(m_v, m_v.size());
m_hash.Final(m_temp);
CRYPTOPP_ASSERT(SEEDLENGTH >= HASH::DIGESTSIZE);
CRYPTOPP_ASSERT(HASH::DIGESTSIZE >= sizeof(m_reseed));
int carry=0, k=sizeof(m_reseed)-1, j=HASH::DIGESTSIZE-1, i=SEEDLENGTH-1;
while (k>=0)
{
carry = m_v[i] + m_c[i] + m_temp[j] + GetByte(BIG_ENDIAN_ORDER, m_reseed, k) + carry;
m_v[i] = static_cast(carry);
i--; j--; k--; carry >>= 8;
}
while (j>=0)
{
carry = m_v[i] + m_c[i] + m_temp[j] + carry;
m_v[i] = static_cast(carry);
i--; j--; carry >>= 8;
}
while (i>=0)
{
carry = m_v[i] + m_c[i] + carry;
m_v[i] = static_cast(carry);
i--; carry >>= 8;
}
}
m_reseed++;
}
// 10.3.1 Derivation Function Using a Hash Function (Hash_df) (p.49)
template
void Hash_DRBG::Hash_Update(const byte* input1, size_t inlen1, const byte* input2, size_t inlen2,
const byte* input3, size_t inlen3, const byte* input4, size_t inlen4, byte* output, size_t outlen)
{
byte counter = 1;
word32 bits = ConditionalByteReverse(BIG_ENDIAN_ORDER, static_cast(outlen*8));
while (outlen)
{
m_hash.Update(&counter, 1);
m_hash.Update(reinterpret_cast(&bits), 4);
if (input1 && inlen1)
m_hash.Update(input1, inlen1);
if (input2 && inlen2)
m_hash.Update(input2, inlen2);
if (input3 && inlen3)
m_hash.Update(input3, inlen3);
if (input4 && inlen4)
m_hash.Update(input4, inlen4);
size_t count = STDMIN(outlen, (size_t)HASH::DIGESTSIZE);
m_hash.TruncatedFinal(output, count);
output += count; outlen -= count;
counter++;
}
}
// *************************************************************
// 10.1.2.3 Instantiation of HMAC_DRBG (p.45)
template
void HMAC_DRBG::DRBG_Instantiate(const byte* entropy, size_t entropyLength, const byte* nonce, size_t nonceLength,
const byte* personalization, size_t personalizationLength)
{
// SP 800-90A, 8.6.3: The entropy input shall have entropy that is equal to or greater than the security
// strength of the instantiation. Additional entropy may be provided in the nonce or the optional
// personalization string during instantiation, or in the additional input during reseeding and generation,
// but this is not required and does not increase the "official" security strength of the DRBG
// instantiation that is recorded in the internal state.
CRYPTOPP_ASSERT(entropyLength >= MINIMUM_ENTROPY);
if (entropyLength < MINIMUM_ENTROPY)
throw NIST_DRBG::Err("HMAC_DRBG", "Insufficient entropy during instantiate");
// SP 800-90A, Section 9, says we should throw if we have too much entropy, too large a nonce,
// or too large a persoanlization string. We warn in Debug builds, but do nothing in Release builds.
CRYPTOPP_ASSERT(entropyLength <= MAXIMUM_ENTROPY);
CRYPTOPP_ASSERT(nonceLength <= MAXIMUM_NONCE);
CRYPTOPP_ASSERT(personalizationLength <= MAXIMUM_PERSONALIZATION);
std::fill(m_k.begin(), m_k.begin()+m_k.size(), byte(0));
std::fill(m_v.begin(), m_v.begin()+m_v.size(), byte(1));
HMAC_Update(entropy, entropyLength, nonce, nonceLength, personalization, personalizationLength);
m_reseed = 1;
}
// 10.1.2.4 Reseeding a HMAC_DRBG Instantiation (p.46)
template
void HMAC_DRBG::DRBG_Reseed(const byte* entropy, size_t entropyLength, const byte* additional, size_t additionaLength)
{
// SP 800-90A, 8.6.3: The entropy input shall have entropy that is equal to or greater than the security
// strength of the instantiation. Additional entropy may be provided in the nonce or the optional
// personalization string during instantiation, or in the additional input during reseeding and generation,
// but this is not required and does not increase the "official" security strength of the DRBG
// instantiation that is recorded in the internal state..
CRYPTOPP_ASSERT(entropyLength >= MINIMUM_ENTROPY);
if (entropyLength < MINIMUM_ENTROPY)
throw NIST_DRBG::Err("HMAC_DRBG", "Insufficient entropy during reseed");
// SP 800-90A, Section 9, says we should throw if we have too much entropy, too large a nonce,
// or too large a persoanlization string. We warn in Debug builds, but do nothing in Release builds.
CRYPTOPP_ASSERT(entropyLength <= MAXIMUM_ENTROPY);
CRYPTOPP_ASSERT(additionaLength <= MAXIMUM_ADDITIONAL);
HMAC_Update(entropy, entropyLength, additional, additionaLength, NULLPTR, 0);
m_reseed = 1;
}
// 10.1.2.5 Generating Pseudorandom Bits Using HMAC_DRBG (p.46)
template
void HMAC_DRBG::HMAC_Generate(const byte* additional, size_t additionaLength, byte *output, size_t size)
{
// Step 1
if (static_cast(m_reseed) >= static_cast(MaxRequestBeforeReseed()))
throw NIST_DRBG::Err("HMAC_DRBG", "Reseed required");
if (size > MaxBytesPerRequest())
throw NIST_DRBG::Err("HMAC_DRBG", "Request size exceeds limit");
// SP 800-90A, Section 9, says we should throw if we have too much entropy, too large a nonce,
// or too large a persoanlization string. We warn in Debug builds, but do nothing in Release builds.
CRYPTOPP_ASSERT(additionaLength <= MAXIMUM_ADDITIONAL);
// Step 2
if (additional && additionaLength)
HMAC_Update(additional, additionaLength, NULLPTR, 0, NULLPTR, 0);
// Step 3
m_hmac.SetKey(m_k, m_k.size());
while (size)
{
m_hmac.Update(m_v, m_v.size());
m_hmac.TruncatedFinal(m_v, m_v.size());
size_t count = STDMIN(size, (size_t)HASH::DIGESTSIZE);
memcpy(output, m_v, count);
size -= count; output += count;
}
HMAC_Update(additional, additionaLength, NULLPTR, 0, NULLPTR, 0);
m_reseed++;
}
// 10.1.2.2 Derivation Function Using a HMAC Function (HMAC_Update) (p.44)
template
void HMAC_DRBG::HMAC_Update(const byte* input1, size_t inlen1, const byte* input2, size_t inlen2, const byte* input3, size_t inlen3)
{
const byte zero = 0, one = 1;
// Step 1
m_hmac.SetKey(m_k, m_k.size());
m_hmac.Update(m_v, m_v.size());
m_hmac.Update(&zero, 1);
if (input1 && inlen1)
m_hmac.Update(input1, inlen1);
if (input2 && inlen2)
m_hmac.Update(input2, inlen2);
if (input3 && inlen3)
m_hmac.Update(input3, inlen3);
m_hmac.TruncatedFinal(m_k, m_k.size());
// Step 2
m_hmac.SetKey(m_k, m_k.size());
m_hmac.Update(m_v, m_v.size());
m_hmac.TruncatedFinal(m_v, m_v.size());
// Step 3
if ((inlen1 | inlen2 | inlen3) == 0)
return;
// Step 4
m_hmac.SetKey(m_k, m_k.size());
m_hmac.Update(m_v, m_v.size());
m_hmac.Update(&one, 1);
if (input1 && inlen1)
m_hmac.Update(input1, inlen1);
if (input2 && inlen2)
m_hmac.Update(input2, inlen2);
if (input3 && inlen3)
m_hmac.Update(input3, inlen3);
m_hmac.TruncatedFinal(m_k, m_k.size());
// Step 5
m_hmac.SetKey(m_k, m_k.size());
m_hmac.Update(m_v, m_v.size());
m_hmac.TruncatedFinal(m_v, m_v.size());
}
NAMESPACE_END
#endif // CRYPTOPP_NIST_DRBG_H